Health and Healing: Spiritual, Pharmaceutical, and Mechanical Medicine

Modern medical practice is identified as a relatively recent way of approaching human ill health in the wide scope of how people have addressed sickness throughout history and across a wide range of cultures. The ideological biases of medical or “allopathic” (disease as “other” or “outsider”) practice are identified and grafted onto other perspectives on how people not engaged in modern medicine have achieved healing and health. Alternative forms of healing and health open a consideration of ethnomedicine, many forms of which are unknown and, hence, untested by modern medical research. Ethnomedicine the world over and throughout human history has displayed unique spiritual (vitalism), pharmaceutical (herbs/drugs), and mechanical (manipulation/surgery) approaches to treating illness. The argument is that modern allopathic medicine would do well to consider such “world medicine” as having valuable alternative and complementary therapies, the use of which could enhance contemporary medical advice and practice.     

Re‐framing systemic paradigms for the art of learning

Thoughtful people are increasingly concerned that the current paradigms for social, corporate, and educational activities are in disgraceful disarray. The “problem‐solving” or analytical model, the competitive or game model, the commercial or consumer model, the bureaucratic or institutional model, and the disease or illness model which prevail in public discourse are proving to be especially unwholesome. We cannot, however, educate ourselves without paradigms. A credible educational paradigm must be generally accessible without being simplistic, informative without being monothematic, and accommodating as well as discriminating. Given our disquiet with the current cognitive situation, a renewing paradigm must be somehow novel; given the character of human nature, a sustaining paradigm must be somehow familiar.

For a very long time now, professional Sciences have committed themselves to paradigms about “reality out there,” while professional Arts have devoted themselves to expressing “imagination from within here.” The more these two worldviews polarize in opposition to one another, the more room there is—and the more human heed there becomes—for mediation by an applied philosophy which accommodates the “real” as well as the “imaginary” in a complementary way. Such a philosophy would address not only “what do you know?” and “how do you do?” but also “how do you know?” and “why do you do?” In earlier times, people would have been considered neither educated nor wise unless they appreciated the Sciences and the Arts whole. In our time, we may not survive unless we can re‐integrate our fractured perceptions. How might we proceed to do so? There may be a systemological way.     

A cross‐cultural study of environmental belief structures in USA,Japan, Mexico,and Peru

Throughout history, the way in which people conceive nature/human relationships has dramatically changed, and different cultures also have divergent notions regarding the role humans play in nature. In Western societies a “new environmental paradigm” (NEP) of ecological nature has apparently replaced the old “human exception paradigm” (HEP), which conceives of humans as being superior and apart from nature. Previous research has shown that, in those societies, a marked dichotomy exist between these two apparently contradictory paradigms, meaning that people who accept the NEP reject the HEP. Countries other than Western ones also exhibit a bias towards the ecological paradigm; however, their world‐views are not necessarily dualistic, since they may adhere to the NEP and, simultaneously, believe that human beings are “special.” This study compares world‐views in four different countries. Responses of 1358 undergraduates from USA, Japan, Mexico, and Peru to the HEP and the NEP scale were analysed to see if they confirmed three factors previously found: (1) a vision of separation from nature (HEP), (2) a necessary “balance” between human needs and nature preservation, and (3) the need to impose “limits” on the human impact on nature. This trifactorial structure was tested using confirmatory factor analysis. USA students exhibited two dimensions (HEP‐NEP) and the other samples showed the expected three factors, although they intercorrelated differentially, depending on the national sample. In all samples “balance” and “limits” were positively correlated. In the Peruvian and Japanese samples the HEP and “balance” were negatively correlated while the USA sample produced a negative covariance between HEP and NEP. In the Japanese sample HEP and “limits” were uncorrelated but in Peru these factors covaried negatively, while in the Mexican sample they were positively correlated. The HEP‐NEP two‐factor structure would seem to be limited to Western nations. More countries need to be measured.     

An “Opting In” Paradigm for Kidney Transplantation

Almost 60,000 people in the United States with end stage renal disease are waiting for a kidney transplant. Because of the scarcity of organs from deceased donors live kidney donors have become a critical source of organs; in 2001, for the first time in recent decades, the number of live kidney donors exceeded the number of deceased donors. The paradigm used to justify putting live kidney donors at risk includes the low risk to the donor, the favorable risk-benefit ratio, the psychological benefits to the donor, altruism, and autonomy coupled with informed consent; because each of these arguments is flawed we need to lessen our dependence on live kidney donors and increase the number of organs retrieved from deceased donors.

An “opting in” paradigm would reward people who agree to donate their kidneys after they die with allocation preference should they need a kidney while they are alive. An “opting in” program should increase the number of kidneys available for transplantation and eliminate the morally troubling problem of “organ takers” who would accept a kidney if they needed one but have made no provision to be an organ donor themselves. People who “opt in” would preferentially get an organ should they need one at the minimal cost of donating their kidneys when they have no use for them; it is a form of organ insurance a rational person should find extremely attractive.

An “opting in” paradigm would simulate the reciprocal altruism observed in nature that sociobiologists believe enhances group survival. Although the allocation of organs based on factors other than need might be morally troubling, an “opting in” paradigm compares favorably with other methods of obtaining more organs and accepting the status quo of extreme organ scarcity. Although an “opting in” policy would be based on enlightened self-interest, by demonstrating the utilitarian value of mutual assistance, it would promote the attitude that self-interest sometimes requires the perception that we are all part of a common humanity.     

The Zhuangzi on Coping with Society

Stories in the Zhuangzi detailing expert artisans and other extraordinary people are often read as celebrations of “skills” or “knacks.” In this paper, I will argue that they would be more accurately understood as “coping” stories. Taken as a celebration of one’s “skill” or “knack” they transform the Zhuangzi into an implicit advocate of conforming to, or even identifying with, one’s social roles. I will argue that the stories of artisans and extraordinarily skilled people are less about cultivating one’s talents so as to “find one’s calling,” better fulfill social expectations, or achieve oneness with Dao, than they are concerned with developing strategies for coping with natural and social contingencies. Read in this way, there is much to learn from the Zhuangzi when reflecting on contemporary social and political issues, especially those related to meritocratic hubris.     

Perception of mind and dehumanization: Human,animal, or machine?

Dehumanization is reached through several approaches, including the attribute‐based model of mind perception and the metaphor‐based model of dehumanization. We performed two studies to find different (de)humanized images for three targets: Professional people, Evil people, and Lowest of the low. In Study 1, we examined dimensions of mind, expecting the last two categories to be dehumanized through denial of agency (Lowest of the low) or experience (Evil people), compared with humanized targets (Professional people). Study 2 aimed to distinguish these targets using metaphors. We predicted that Evil and Lowest of the low targets would suffer mechanistic and animalistic dehumanization, respectively; our predictions were confirmed, but the metaphor‐based model nuanced these results: animalistic and mechanistic dehumanization were shown as overlapping rather than independent. Evil persons were perceived as “killing machines” and “predators.” Finally, Lowest of the low were not animalized but considered human beings. We discuss possible interpretations.     

Inherent directionality of “even if” counterfactual conditionals

In this research, we investigate whether semifactual conditionals such as “even if there had been an A, there would have been a B” are understood by thinking initially of the antecedent “A”, as was found with factual conditionals. The “inherent directionality” hypothesis assumes that for the comprehension of most relational statements, a presuppositional element (i.e. the “relatum”) is initially established. For “even if”, both terms could work as “relatum”. This is because on the one hand, people tend to infer “B” from “A” and “not-A” and, on the other hand, “B” could work as a pragmatic presupposition. In the present experiment, semifactual and factual conditionals were tested with a sentence-picture verification task. Results were consistent with the “inherent directionality” hypothesis: only “if then” factual conditionals, but not semifactuals, showed a preference for reasoning from the antecedent, with faster verifications.     

Psychologie en première et en troisième personne : de la « psychologie concrète » à la psychologie clinique

This article presents some basic concepts proposed by G. Politzer, articulated around the concept of “tragic life”, in the literary sense of the composition of a complex of events, actions and people, unity and meaning can only be realized in “first person”. In this context, defining the perimeter of legitimacy of clinical psychology, a “fact” specifically psychological necessarily corresponds to an act which takes existence and feel like segment of a human drama, as an effective act of the singular individual. Critics resulting analyzes relate to the abstract and formal perspective of scientific psychology, which considers classes of facts rather than facts, designing them as entities in themselves, the external I they are demonstrations. The explanatory model which necessarily carries out field of concrete psychology since its causalists schemes have lost sight of the act “first person”. And psychologists would not have noticed that “I remove the psychological facts is destroying them.” (G. Politzer). The person, in his psychic dimension, can only be understood from the person, which makes it possible to specify the field of clinical psychology, and more generally, of any clinical approach.     

The Manifestation Range of Innately Good Knowledge and Ability,and the Danger of Separation: On Zhuzi’s Question about Understanding Words

Zhuzi (Zhu Xi), Zhang Nanxuan and Lü Donglai continued a discussion begun by Hu Wufeng and his disciples on the subject of “knowing the form of benevolence,” and “seeking for a true mind in an absent one.” One result of their discussion was to make people realize that innately good knowledge and ability are not only manifested in loving one’s parents and respecting one’s elders, but also in the simple acts of drinking when thirsty and eating when hungry. This generated the idea of “manifestation range of innately good knowledge and ability.” However, another conclusion of this discussion claimed that if the desire to drink and eat or the king of Qi’s grudging an ox are included in this range, there would be a danger of viewing innately good knowledge and ability merely as inborn human nature or instinct. This discussion reveals an unsteady relationship between innately good knowledge and ability and the feeling of commiseration, which are sometimes united and sometimes separate.     

Instructional Effects on Word Association Commonality in High and Low “Schizophrenic” College Students

In an attempt to assess the ability of normal Ss to give uncommon word associations and of “schizophrenic” Ss to give common ones, the effects of three types of instruction on the word association performance of 144 college students were measured. All Ss, including those with valid MMPI profiles suggestive of schizophrenia were able to increase their response commonality under instructions to give the word “most people” would give, and to decrease their commonality under instructions to give a word “no one else” would give, relative to the free association condition. Though Ss with high MMPI Schizophrenia scores produced more original associations under all conditions, there was an apparent floor effect on the production of popular responses under the “no one else” instructions.     

Imprecise lexical superiority and the (slightly less) Repugnant Conclusion

Philosophical Studies - Recently, Derek Parfit has offered a novel solution to the “Repugnant Conclusion” that compared with the existence of many people whose quality of life would be...     

Rediscovering pneumatology in the “Age of the Spirit”: A North American Lutheran contribution

This essay explores Luther's pneumatology, especially in his sermons on the Gospel of John, might offer resources for “discerning the spirits” in the emerging “age of the Spirit,” as Harvey Cox and Phyllis Tickle have dubbed it, which sees the rise of the “spiritual but not religious” and movements calling for spiritual revolution. The author shows that Luther's insistence that the Spirit work through the given means of “Word and sacrament,” was not intended to limit the Spirit's activity in the world, but rather to protect God's people from those who would wish to use the Spirit for their own means and power.     

Zombie Alleluias: Learning to Live in the Space Between Worlds

This essay was delivered as the Baer Seminar on Pastoral Care at an alumni/ae reunion of Princeton Theological Seminary on October 22, 2013, and at a Princeton Seminary alumni/ae gathering at Preston Hollow Presbyterian Church in Dallas, Texas, on February 10, 2014. It considers an increasing fascination with zombies in recent American cultural life as a means by which individuals attempt to cope with anxieties related to the rise of political and religious extremism in the post-9/11 landscape. Building on Freud’s recognition of fundamentalist tendencies within the human psyche and his sense that modern persons are living psychologically “beyond their means,” it calls for an empathic embrace of the complexities of what Donald Capps deems the “ecumenical self” as a path toward engaging personal threats within and without.     

Culture and perceptions of self—other similarity

In testing possible cultural effects of the use of the self as an habitual reference point to which others are compared, we expected that: (a) individualistic participants (i.e., those who give priority to personal goals) would rate self—other similarity higher when asked “How similar is X to you?” than when asked “How similar are you to X?”, whereas nondirectional similarity judgements (“How similar are these two people?”) would resemble the former directional comparison; (b) collectivistic participants (i.e., those who give priority to in‐group goals) would show a weaker or, possibly, reversed pattern, especially using in‐group comparison others. Neither hypothesis was upheld. However, the individualists perceived the in‐group to be relatively more similar to themselves as compared to the collectivists. This difference cannot be explained by response bias, status asymmetry, or role differentiation. We propose an explanation in terms of the differential relationship between self and other representations for people from collectivist versus individualist cultures.     

From the Terrible Loneliness to the Wonderful Agreement of Human Beings

What would be the “terrible loneliness” and what would be the “wonderful agreement” in the present paper? The “terrible loneliness” is the only reality that a person perceives and/or thinks during the now going on. For the person, an enormous quantity of occurrences is in the present moment absent. A very small quantity of occurrences is present. The person is the only being in having this. And, this is only during a little moment. The person never thinks about his loneliness in this moment. On the contrary, he thinks he is plenty of people and full of occurrences. But, if he were thinking about reality, he would live in a terrible loneliness. How does he escape himself from this loneliness? He thinks that the probable occurrences are real occurrences. He may be right in a plenty of times. Going through what I call opening hypotheses—basic hypotheses and non-basic but important hypotheses—and going through what I call simply hypotheses he is able to sanction a wonderful agreement of human beings about the known parts of the Universe. However, they are hypotheses, not absolute realities.     

Pneumatology and the Cross: The Challenge of Neo‐Pentecostalism to Lutheran Theology

Abstract : Historically, Lutheran engagement with the charismatic and Pentecostal movements has been largely negative. After a brief review of this history, I explore the question: What would a Lutheran engagement of the Spirit look like in view of the kinds of questions people are asking today that draw them to Pentecostal churches? Is there a place in Lutheran theology for affirming that the Holy Spirit is the “giver of life” and even “abundant life”?     

On Primoratz's Definition of Terrorism

ABSTRACT In “What is terrorism?” Igor Primoratz defines ‘terrorism’ as “the deliberate use of violence, or threat of its use, against innocent people, with the aim of intimidating them, or other people, into a course of action they otherwise would not take.” I argue that this definition needs to be modified (1) by requiring that the harm or threat be to persons other than those intimidated, (2) by including aims which do not concern action, and (3) by distinguishing terrorists who know they are terrorists from those who do not.     

Characteristics of Confucian Rituals (Li)—A Critique of Fan Ruiping’s Interpretation

In this paper I argue that Fan Ruiping’s explication of the Confucian notion of li 禮 (ritual propriety) is problematic in several ways. First, his division of human activities into “social” and “natural” is less than illuminating, as human “natural” activities (such as hunting) are already inescapably social. Second, I question the appropriateness for him to characterize li in terms of “closed activities,” as some rituals are evidently open-ended. Third, he seems to have overemphasized the constitutive function of li and understated its regulative function. Fourth, contrary to Fan’s claim, Confucian li accomplishes “external goals” in human life as well as “internal goals.” Finally, Fan’s requirement for being a Confucian with respect to the observance of li is unrealistically high and makes it difficult for people to qualify as Confucian.     

That “Ought” Does Not Imply “Right”: Why It Matters for Virtue Ethics

Virtue ethicists sometimes say that a right action is what a virtuous person would do, characteristically, in the circumstances. But some have objected recently that right action cannot be defined as what a virtuous person would do in the circumstances because there are circumstances in which a right action is possible but in which no virtuous person would be found. This objection moves from the premise that a given person ought to do an action that no virtuous person would do, to the conclusion that the action is a right action. I demon‐strate that virtue ethicists distinguish “ought” from “right” and reject the assumption that “ought” implies “right.” I then show how their rejection of that assumption blocks this “right but not virtuous” objection. I conclude by showing how the thesis that “ought” does not imply “right” can clarify a further dispute in virtue ethics regarding whether “ought” implies “can.”