Reward versus punishment: Reinforcement sensitivity theory,young novice drivers’ perceived risk,and risky driving

One reason that young novice drivers remain statistically over-represented in road deaths is their rate of engagement in risky driving. Prominent contributing factors include driver’s age, sex, personality, risk perception, and their driving experience. This study applied reinforcement sensitivity theory (RST, specifically reward sensitivity and punishment sensitivity) to predict young novice drivers’ perceived risk and self-reported risky driving engagement, while accounting for potential influences of age, sex, and driving experience. Drivers (N = 643, 490 females, 17–25 years, M = 20.02, SD = 2.32) who held an Australian driver’s license (P1, P2, or Open) anonymously completed an online survey containing the Behaviour of Young Novice Drivers Scale, the Sensitivity to Punishment and Sensitivity to Reward Questionnaire, and a measure of perceived risk of driving-related behaviours. A path analytic model derived from RST showed that perceived risk had the strongest negative association with reported risky driving engagement, followed by reward sensitivity (positive association). Respondent’s age and reward sensitivity were associated with perceived risk. Age, reward sensitivity, and perceived risk were associated with reported engagement in risky driving behaviours. Driver sex only had direct paths with RST variables, and through reward sensitivity, indirect paths to perceived risk, and reported risky driving. Neither punishment sensitivity nor driving experience contributed significantly to the model. Implications and applications of the model, and the unique set of variables examined, are discussed in relation to road safety interventions and driver training.     

Distinctive Preferences Toward Risk in the Substantive Domain of Sociality*

As with standard models of rationality, theorists generally treat prospect theory's demonstration of risk aversion in gains but risk tolerance in losses as domain‐general. Yet evolutionary psychology suggests that natural selection has designed a domain specific cognitive architecture—with systems specialized for some substantive domains but not others. Here we address risky choices through that lens asking whether humans' risk responses dispose them to enter social relationships even when doing so is counter to normative rationality and regardless of whether the “enter” versus “not enter” choice is framed as between gains and losses. Laboratory findings in five sites across three countries provide a positive answer to both possibilities. Participants could enter or not enter inherently risky social relationships. They were more willing to enter such relationships than rational choice models would predict and were equally so willing regardless of whether equivalent alternatives were framed as gains and as losses. With the “social context” extracted in otherwise identical games, participants' risk responses were consistent with prospect theory. The present findings suggest the possibility of adaptations designed to facilitate sociality—despite its risks and how those risks are framed.     

Distinguishing between learning and motivation in behavioral tests of the reinforcement sensitivity theory of personality

According to Gray's (1973) Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (RST), a Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS) and a Behavioral Activation System (BAS) mediate effects of goal conflict and reward on behavior. BIS functioning has been linked with individual differences in trait anxiety and BAS functioning with individual differences in trait impulsivity. In this article, it is argued that behavioral outputs of the BIS and BAS can be distinguished in terms of learning and motivation processes and that these can be operationalized using the Signal Detection Theory measures of response-sensitivity and response-bias. In Experiment 1, two measures of BIS-reactivity predicted increased response-sensitivity under goal conflict, whereas one measure of BAS-reactivity predicted increased response-sensitivity under reward. In Experiment 2, two measures of BIS-reactivity predicted response-bias under goal conflict, whereas a measure of BAS-reactivity predicted motivation response-bias under reward. In both experiments, impulsivity measures did not predict criteria for BAS-reactivity as traditionally predicted by RST.     

Bringing together humanistic and intergroup perspectives to build a model of internalisation of normative social harmdoing

This article introduces a model of the internalisation of normative social harmdoing: the MINSOH. This model seeks to explain how group members internalise harmful social norms such that they personally endorse their groups' normative actions. To this aim, the MINSOH integrates two divergent yet complementary theoretical perspectives: self-determination theory and the social identity approach. These perspectives differ in their basic assumptions about the possibility for harm to become internalised, yet when integrated, they provide a powerful account of how harmdoing can become internalised. The MINSOH proposes specific conditions under which harmful normative actions become accepted by group members. This article outlines multiple self-determined motivations for harmdoing and discrete group processes that enable harmdoing to be internalised and autonomously enacted, and reviews factors that facilitate (i.e., strong/unique/comparative social identification; endorsement of ideological justifications) and block the internalisation process (presence of multiple identities/diverging norms; inclusive superordinate identity). Directions for future research are then discussed.     

Modeling behavior in a clinically diagnostic sequential risk-taking task

This article models the cognitive processes underlying learning and sequential choice in a risk-taking task for the purposes of understanding how they occur in this moderately complex environment and how behavior in it relates to self-reported real-world risk taking. The best stochastic model assumes that participants incorrectly treat outcome probabilities as stationary, update probabilities in a Bayesian fashion, evaluate choice policies prior to rather than during responding, and maintain constant response sensitivity. The model parameter associated with subjective value of gains correlates well with external risk taking. Both the overall approach, which can be expanded as the basic paradigm is varied, and the specific results provide direction for theories of risky choice and for understanding risk taking as a public health problem.     

Anticipatory emotions in decision tasks: Covert markers of value or attentional processes?

Anticipatory emotions precede behavioral outcomes and provide a means to infer interactions between emotional and cognitive processes. A number of theories hold that anticipatory emotions serve as inputs to the decision process and code the value or risk associated with a stimulus. We argue that current data do not unequivocally support this theory. We present an alternative theory whereby anticipatory emotions reflect the outcome of a decision process and serve to ready the subject for new information when making an uncertain response. We test these two accounts, which we refer to as emotions-as-input and emotions-as-outcome, in a task that allows risky stimuli to be dissociated from uncertain responses. We find that emotions are associated with responses as opposed to stimuli. This finding is contrary to the emotions-as-input perspective as it shows that emotions arise from decision processes.     

Cognitive models of risky choice: parameter stability and predictive accuracy of prospect theory

In the behavioral sciences, a popular approach to describe and predict behavior is cognitive modeling with adjustable parameters (i.e., which can be fitted to data). Modeling with adjustable parameters allows, among other things, measuring differences between people. At the same time, parameter estimation also bears the risk of overfitting. Are individual differences as measured by model parameters stable enough to improve the ability to predict behavior as compared to modeling without adjustable parameters? We examined this issue in cumulative prospect theory (CPT), arguably the most widely used framework to model decisions under risk. Specifically, we examined (a) the temporal stability of CPT’s parameters; and (b) how well different implementations of CPT, varying in the number of adjustable parameters, predict individual choice relative to models with no adjustable parameters (such as CPT with fixed parameters, expected value theory, and various heuristics). We presented participants with risky choice problems and fitted CPT to each individual’s choices in two separate sessions (which were 1 week apart). All parameters were correlated across time, in particular when using a simple implementation of CPT. CPT allowing for individual variability in parameter values predicted individual choice better than CPT with fixed parameters, expected value theory, and the heuristics. CPT’s parameters thus seem to pick up stable individual differences that need to be considered when predicting risky choice.     

A contextual approach to research on AIDS prevention

The acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) is a disease that is transmitted almost entirely through behavioral factors. In the absence of a cure or vaccine, the modification of AIDS-risk behavior presents a unique challenge to behavioral scientists and should be taken as a clear imperative by behavior analysts. This paper discusses the currently dominant social-cognitive theories (the health belief model, the theory of reasoned action, and self-efficacy theory) that have been widely used to predict and understand AIDS-risk behavior. Although these theories have generated a voluminous literature on the cognitive, attitudinal, and demographic correlates of AIDS-risk behavior, they have not resulted in specific intervention strategies to influence risky behavior, most likely because they fail to specify manipulable variables. As an alternative to social-cognitive theories, this paper evaluates the usefulness of a behavior-analytic approach to stem the spread of HIV infection. It examines some of the philosophical differences underlying cognitive and behavioral approaches that are embedded in mechanistic versus functional contextualistic principles. It explores the theoretical and practical implications of adopting either predicting and explaining behavior or predicting and influencing behavior as the goals of science. To illustrate the value of adopting the goal of prediction and influence, behavior-analytic research on the social context of risky sexual behavior in adolescents is described. The paper argues that in order to alter the future course of the AIDS epidemic, the behavioral sciences must move beyond describing cognitive and attitudinal correlates of risky behavior and focus on the social context of the behavior of individuals. In addition, population-wide changes in AIDS-risk behavior can be accomplished only if research focuses on how to influence larger social systems, including the media, school systems, and community organizations.     

青少年高冒险行为与大脑发展

青少年时期是一个转折期,也是冒险行为多发的时期。以往有关青少年冒险行为的研究大多集中在心理学视角与社会关系学视角,双系统竞争理论从生物学视角对青少年高冒险行为作出解释。该理论认为青少年高冒险行为的产生主要是由于大脑中的社会情绪系统与认知控制系统相互竞争作用的结果。社会情绪系统对奖赏寻求起作用,而认知控制系统对执行功能起作用。较早发展的社会情绪系统与较晚才成熟的认知控制系统间的竞争是青少年冒险行为产生的原因。     

Moral Uncertainty for Deontologists

Defenders of deontological constraints in normative ethics face a challenge: how should an agent decide what to do when she is uncertain whether some course of action would violate a constraint? One common response to this challenge proposes a threshold principle on which it is subjectively permissible to act iff the agent’s credence that her action would be constraint-violating is below some threshold t. But the threshold approach seems arbitrary and unmotivated: where does the threshold come from, and why should it take any one value rather than another? Threshold views also seem to violate “ought” agglomeration, since a pair of actions each of which is below the threshold for acceptable moral risk can, in combination, exceed that threshold. In this paper, I argue that stochastic dominance reasoning can vindicate and lend rigor to the threshold approach: given characteristically deontological assumptions about the moral value of acts, it turns out that morally safe options will stochastically dominate morally risky alternatives when and only when the likelihood that the risky option violates a moral constraint is greater than some precisely definable threshold (in the simplest case, .5). The stochastic dominance approach also allows a principled, albeit intuitively imperfect, response to the agglomeration problem. Thus, I argue, deontologists are better equipped than many critics have supposed to address the problems of decision-making under uncertainty.     

Altered emotional decision-making in prisoners with borderline personality disorder

Previous studies have identified neuropsychological deficits in individuals with antisocial personality disorder and/or psychopathy. Few studies have examined neuropsychological functioning in individuals with borderline personality disorder (BPD), and no studies have yet investigated cognitive and emotional function in male prisoners with BPD. In this study, we compared the risky decision-making of 17 participants with a history of serious violent or sexual offenses and a diagnosis of DSM-IV BPD with that of 17 participants with similar offending histories but personality disorders other than BPD. Those with BPD exhibited altered processing of information about potential losses (punishment) when the probability of gains (reward) was high; they also increased their choice of risky options even in circumstances where this was clearly avoidable. These data suggest that individuals with a diagnosis of BPD and a history of serious offenses have problems integrating different reinforcement signals when choosing between risky actions, perhaps reflecting corticolimbic dysfunction as an underlying mechanism in BPD.     

Beyond gains and losses: the effect of need on risky choice in framed decisions

Substantial evidence suggests people are risk-averse when making decisions described in terms of gains and risk-prone when making decisions described in terms of losses, a phenomenon known as the framing effect. Little research, however, has examined whether framing effects are a product of normative risk-sensitive cognitive processes. In 5 experiments, it is demonstrated that framing effects in the Asian disease problem can be explained by risk-sensitivity theory, which predicts that decision makers adjust risk acceptance on the basis of minimal acceptable thresholds, or need. Both explicit and self-determined need requirements eliminated framing effects and affected risk acceptance consistent with risk-sensitivity theory. Furthermore, negative language choice in loss frames conferred the perception of high need and led to the construction of higher minimal acceptable thresholds. The results of this study suggest that risk-sensitivity theory provides a normative rationale for framing effects based on sensitivity to minimal acceptable thresholds, or needs.     

Decision Neuroscience: New Directions in Studies of Judgment and Decision Making

ABSTRACT— Investigations of decision making have historically been undertaken by different disciplines, each using different techniques and assumptions, and few unifying efforts have been made. Economists have focused on precise mathematical models of normative decision making, psychologists have examined how decisions are actually made based on cognitive constraints, and neuroscientists have concentrated on the detailed operation of neural systems in simple choices. In recent years, however, researchers in these separate fields have joined forces in an attempt to better specify the foundations of decision making. This interdisciplinary effort has begun to use decision theory to guide the search for the neural bases of reward value and predictability. Concurrently, these formal models are beginning to incorporate processes such as social reward and emotion. The combination of these diverse theoretical approaches and methodologies is already yielding significant progress in the construction of more comprehensive decision-making models.     

Reward enhances backward inhibition in task switching

Recently, effects of reward incentives on interference-induced cognitive adjustments have drawn much attention. It has been demonstrated that reward can reduce or eliminate switch costs which occurred when alternating between different tasks. However, it still remains a question how reward affects inhibitory processes underlying task switching. The present study examined this issue by combining a task-switching paradigm with performance-contingent reward. Results showed that the inhibitory processes were modulated by reward, with n-2 repetition costs incremented after reward delivery. Data suggest that reward-triggered reduction or elimination of switch costs may reflect enhancing inhibitory processes which are motivated by reward signals and targeted at the irrelevant task set. These findings shed new light on the role of reward in cognitive control.     

Hybrid Speech Acts: A Theory of Normative Thought and Language That ‘Has It Both Ways’

In this essay, I propose a novel hybrid metanormative theory. According to this theory, speakers making normative claims express both cognitive and motivational attitudes in virtue of the constitutive norms of the particular speech acts they perform. This view has four principal virtues: (1) it is consistent with traditional semantic theories, (2) it supports a form of motivational judgment internalism that does justice to externalist intuitions, (3) it illuminates the connection between normative language and normative thought, and (4) it explains how speakers can express different conative states when speaking in different normative domains. In the first section, I discuss the theories of Stephen Finlay and David Copp. I show that they each come very close to having it both ways but ultimately fail. Understanding the shortcomings of these views is instrumental to a clear presentation of my own Hybrid Speech Act theory in section two. In the final section, I demonstrate how my view achieves its four advantages.     

How to Make Decisions in An Uncertain World: Heuristics,Biases, and Risk Perception

From the seventies onward a large quantity of theoretical and empirical studies have investigated the heuristic principles and cognitive strategies that individuals use to deal with risky and uncertain situations. This research has shown how the explicative and predictive shortcomings of normative risk analysis depend in many respects on undervaluing the continuous interaction between the individual and the environment. There are factors that, day by day, represent significant obstacles to decision making.     

Differential dependence of Pavlovian incentive motivation and instrumental incentive learning processes on dopamine signaling

Here we attempted to clarify the role of dopamine signaling in reward seeking. In Experiment 1, we assessed the effects of the dopamine D(1)/D(2) receptor antagonist flupenthixol (0.5 mg/kg i.p.) on Pavlovian incentive motivation and found that flupenthixol blocked the ability of a conditioned stimulus to enhance both goal approach and instrumental performance (Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer). In Experiment 2 we assessed the effects of flupenthixol on reward palatability during post-training noncontingent re-exposure to the sucrose reward in either a control 3-h or novel 23-h food-deprived state. Flupenthixol, although effective in blocking the Pavlovian goal approach, was without effect on palatability or the increase in reward palatability induced by the upshift in motivational state. This noncontingent re-exposure provided an opportunity for instrumental incentive learning, the process by which rats encode the value of a reward for use in updating reward-seeking actions. Flupenthixol administered prior to the instrumental incentive learning opportunity did not affect the increase in subsequent off-drug reward-seeking actions induced by that experience. These data suggest that although dopamine signaling is necessary for Pavlovian incentive motivation, it is not necessary for changes in reward experience, or for the instrumental incentive learning process that translates this experience into the incentive value used to drive reward-seeking actions, and provide further evidence that Pavlovian and instrumental incentive learning processes are dissociable.     

Examining the link between adolescent brain development and risk taking from a social–developmental perspective

The adolescent age period is often characterized as a health paradox because it is a time of extensive increases in physical and mental capabilities, yet overall mortality/morbidity rates increase significantly from childhood to adolescence, often due to preventable causes such as risk taking. Asynchrony in developmental time courses between the affective/approach and cognitive control brain systems, as well as the ongoing maturation of neural connectivity are thought to lead to increased vulnerability for risk taking in adolescence. A critical analysis of the frequency of risk taking behaviors, as well as mortality and morbidity rates across the lifespan, however, challenges the hypothesis that the peak of risk taking occurs in middle adolescence when the asynchrony between the different developmental time courses of the affective/approach and cognitive control systems is the largest. In fact, the highest levels of risk taking behaviors, such as alcohol and drug use, often occur among emerging adults (e.g., university/college students), and highlight the role of the social context in predicting risk taking behavior. Moreover, risk taking is not always unregulated or impulsive. Future research should broaden the scope of risk taking to include risks that are relevant to older adults, such as risky financial investing, gambling, and marital infidelity. In addition, a lifespan perspective, with a focus on how associations between neural systems and behavior are moderated by context and trait-level characteristics, and which includes diverse samples (e.g., divorced individuals), will help to address some important limitations in the adolescent brain development and risk taking literature.