Representation or context as a cognitive strategy in colour constancy?

If an identification task with colour constancy as its objective is carried out under drastically changing illumination, do people rely mainly on colour information or do they rely on other sources of information? This question suggested two hypotheses for testing: (i) context hypothesis: people rely mainly on colour information (spectral reflectance or illumination chromaticity) to achieve colour constancy; (ii) representation hypothesis: people rely mainly on all other clues associated with colour to achieve colour constancy, including form information (any shape elements) and space information (spatial coordinates or spatial correlation). Experiment 1 showed that form information was readily associated with colour information to produce implicit representation. This gave the best colour-constancy performance (95.72%) and the fastest processing speed, so it probably used a top-down process. However, it was also prone to error owing to assumptions. Space information was not readily associated with colour information so colour-constancy performance was halved (48.73%) and processing time doubled. When the subject was deprived of both information sources and only given colour information, this resulted in the longest reaction times and the worst colour-constancy performance (41.38%). These results clearly support the representation hypothesis rather than the context hypothesis. When all three clues were available at the same time, the order of preference was: symbol, location, then colour. Experiment 2 showed that when form information was the main clue, colour-constancy performance was conceptually driven and processed more quickly; this supports the representation hypothesis. However, when form information was not used, colour constancy was data-driven, processed more slowly, and achieved an inferior identification rate overall; this supports the context hypothesis.     

The influence of depth segmentation on colour constancy

In real scenes, surfaces in different depth planes often differ in the luminance and chromatic content of their illumination. Scene segmentation is therefore an important issue when considering the compensation of illumination changes in our visual perception (lightness and colour constancy). Chromatic adaptation is an important sensory component of colour constancy and has been shown to be linked to the two-dimensional spatial structure of a scene (Werner, 2003 Vision Research 43 1611 - 1623). Here, the question is posed whether this cooperation also extends to the organisation of a scene in depth. The influence of depth on colour constancy was tested by introducing stereo disparity, whereby the test patch and background were perceived in either the same or one of five different depth planes (1.9-57 min of arc). There were no additional cues to depth such as shadows or specular highlights. For consistent illumination changes, colour constancy was reduced when the test patch and background were separated in depth, indicating a reduction of contextual influences. An interaction was found between the influences of stereo depth and spatial frequency on colour constancy. In the case of an inconsistent illumination change, colour constancy was reduced if the test patch and background were in the same depth plane (2-D condition), but not if they were separated in depth (3-D condition). Furthermore, colour constancy was slightly better in the 3-D inconsistent condition than in the 2-D inconsistent condition. It is concluded that depth segmentation supports colour constancy in scenes with inconsistent illumination changes. Processes of depth segmentation are implemented at an early sensory stage of colour constancy, and they define visual regions within which the effects of illuminant changes are discounted for separately. The results support recent models that posit such implementation of scene segmentation in colour constancy.     

The AMBEGUJAS phenomenon and colour constancy

The AMBEGUJAS phenomenon is a reversible flat figure that is spontaneously shifting between two apparent 3-D shapes-'tile' and 'roof'. 2-D perceptions have very rarely been reported. Tied to the shifts between the tile and roof shapes are remarkable changes of perceived colour. In our example, the tile appears to have orange (top half) and blue-green (bottom half) surface colours in white light. The roof appears grey but in an orange illumination and with a blue-green shadow. This phenomenon appears whether a grey display is presented in two coloured illuminations, or a chromatic display with two surface colours (orange and blue-green) is presented in white light. In the coloured illuminations the tile is an example of non-constancy, since its colours are non-veridical colour perceptions. The centre stripe of the display appears to have the same orange and blue-green colours as the lateral stripes but in a shadow. This seems like a colour constancy in a non-constancy situation. An alternative to the classical definition of colour constancy is discussed.     

Perception of chromatic motion requires luminance interaction

There is an ongoing debate related to whether chromatic motion perception arises as a consequence of a chromatic signal only (eg Wandell et al 1999 Neuron 24 901-909) or a signal that is essentially based on luminance processes (luminance artifacts) (Mullen et al 2003 Vision Research 43 1235-1247). These two views conform to the idea that colour and luminance processes are physiologically independent (Livingstone and Hubel 1988 Science 240 740-749), but according to other reports many primary cortical 'V1' cells respond to both colour and luminance contrast (eg Vidyasagar et al 2002 European Journal of Neuroscience 16 945-956). A psychophysical task was designed to test whether possible interaction between luminance and chromatic contrast could account for perception of chromatic motion. It is shown that subjects respond in a manner that reflects involvement of both processes.     

Developmental changes in colour constancy in a naturalistic object selection task

When the illumination falling on a surface change, so does the reflected light. Despite this, adult observers are good at perceiving surfaces as relatively unchanging—an ability termed colour constancy. Very few studies have investigated colour constancy in infants, and even fewer in children. Here we asked whether there is a difference in colour constancy between children and adults; what the developmental trajectory is between six and 11 years; and whether the pattern of constancy across illuminations and reflectances differs between adults and children. To this end, we developed a novel, child-friendly computer-based object selection task. In this, observers saw a dragon's favourite sweet under a neutral illumination and picked the matching sweet from an array of eight seen under a different illumination (blue, yellow, red, or green). This set contained a reflectance match (colour constant; perfect performance) and a tristimulus match (colour inconstant). We ran two experiments, with two-dimensional scenes in one and three-dimensional renderings in the other. Twenty-six adults and 33 children took part in the first experiment; 26 adults and 40 children took part in the second. Children performed better than adults on this task, and their performance decreased with age in both experiments. We found differences across illuminations and sweets, but a similar pattern across both age groups. This unexpected finding might reflect a real decrease in colour constancy from childhood to adulthood, explained by developmental changes in the perceptual and cognitive mechanisms underpinning colour constancy, or differences in task strategies between children and adults.

Highlights

• Six- to 11-year-old children demonstrated better performance than adults on a colour constancy object selection task.
• Performance decreased with age over childhood.
• These findings may indicate development of cognitive strategies used to overcome automatic colour constancy mechanisms.

     

Reduced chromatic discrimination in children with autism spectrum disorders

Atypical perception in Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) is well documented ( Dakin & Frith, 2005 ). However, relatively little is known about colour perception in ASD. Less accurate performance on certain colour tasks has led some to argue that chromatic discrimination is reduced in ASD relative to typical development ( Franklin, Sowden, Burley, Notman & Alder, 2008 ). The current investigation assessed chromatic discrimination in children with high-functioning autism (HFA) and typically developing (TD) children matched on age and non-verbal cognitive ability, using the Farnsworth-Munsell 100 hue test (Experiment 1) and a threshold discrimination task (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, more errors on the chromatic discrimination task were made by the HFA than the TD group. Comparison with test norms revealed that performance for the HFA group was at a similar level to typically developing children around 3 years younger. In Experiment 2, chromatic thresholds were elevated for the HFA group relative to the TD group. For both experiments, reduced chromatic discrimination in ASD was due to a general reduction in chromatic sensitivity rather than a specific difficulty with either red–green or blue–yellow subsystems of colour vision. The absence of group differences on control tasks ruled out an explanation in terms of general task ability rather than chromatic sensitivity. Theories to account for the reduction in chromatic discrimination in HFA are discussed, and findings are related to cortical models of perceptual processing in ASD.     

What matters in the associative learning of visual cues in foraging parasitoid wasps: colour or brightness?

Visual cues are known to be used by numerous animal taxa to gather information on quality and localisation of resources. Because environmental lighting can interfere with the spectral features of visual cues, the specific characteristics of the colour signals that promote forager decision and learning are still not known in the majority of insects (excepted in bees). We analysed the effect of previous experience on the use of visual information by the wasp Venturia canescens, a parasitoid of pyralidae, in the context of host searching. These parasitoids search for hosts concealed in several fruit species, so visual cues from the host microhabitat could play a key role in host finding. We also investigated the type of visual cues on which wasps based their decision. We tested whether wasps are able to associate an achromatic cue (brightness) or a chromatic one (hue, i.e. dominant wavelength and/or chroma) with the presence of hosts. Our results show that in the context of host foraging, chromatic cues are more reliable than brightness in achieving the associative learning process. Therefore, understanding the behavioural ecology of foraging should make use of the knowledge about the visual information used.     

Seeing red primes tomato: evidence for comparable priming from colour and colour name primes to semantically related word targets

There is ample evidence that an independent processing stream exists that subserves the perception and appreciation of colour. Neurophysiological research has identified separate brain mechanisms for the processing of wavelength and colour, and neuropsychological studies have revealed selective colour disorders, such as achromatopsia, colour agnosia, and colour anomia. The aim of the present study is to investigate whether the perception of colour may, despite its independent processing, influence other cognitive functions. Specifically, we investigate the possibility that the perception of a colour influences higher order processes such as the activation of semantically related concepts. We designed an associative priming task involving a colour prime (e.g. a red patch or the word RED) and a lexical decision response to a semantically related (‘tomato’ vs. ‘timato’) or unrelated (‘grass’ vs. ‘griss’) word target. The results of this experiment indicate that there is comparable facilitation of accessing colour-related semantics through the perception of a colour or the reading of a colour name. This suggests that colour has a direct effect on higher order level, cognitive processing. These results are discussed in terms of current models of colour processing.     

Common and relative components of reflected light as information about the illumination, colour, and three-dimensional form of objects

Abstract.— A model for perceptual analysis of the proximal stimulus into common and residual components, earlier described in a series of papers by Johansson and his co-workers for motion and space perception, is applied to colour perception. Though still premature, this application seems to make colour constancy a natural result of the analysis in the same way as size and form constancy is solved by Johansson's vector analysis in the frame of reference of projective geometry. Applications of the model to Land's Mondrian experiments, to simultaneous contrast, and to the Cornsweet-OBrien effect are outlined. The information from variations and invariances in reflected light (besides the geometrical projection) is discussed with reference to Gibson's ecological optics.     

Latency differences to monochromatic stimuli measured by disjunctive reaction time.

Two studies were done in order to assess the effects of wavelength on visual perceptual latency as measured in a disjunctive RT paradigm. The results of the first study, though not statistically significant, suggested a trend toward shorter RT to longer wavelength stimuli. In the second study, using well-practiced subjects, significant differences were found between disjunctive RT to red and green stimuli. The results suggest that latency differences as a function of wavelength are demonstrable in an experimental situation in which the subject must react to chromatic information, as differentiated from brightness information.     

Colour inputs to random-dot stereopsis.

Recently it has been claimed by Livingstone and Hubel that, of three anatomically and functionally distinct visual channels (the magnocellular, parvocellular interblob, and blob channels), only the magnocellular channel is involved in the processing of stereoscopic depth. Since the magnocellular system shows little overt colour opponency, the reported loss of the ability to resolve random-dot stereograms defined only by colour contrast seems consistent with this view. However, Julesz observed that reversed-contrast stereograms could be fused if correlated colour information was added. In the present study, 'noise' (non-corresponding) pixels were injected into random-dot stereograms in order to increase fusion time. All six subjects tested were able to achieve stereopsis in less than three minutes when there was only correspondence in colour and not in luminance, and three when luminance contrast was completely reversed. This ability depends on information about the direction of colour contrast, not just the presence of chromatic borders. When luminance and chromatic contrast are defined in terms of signal-to-noise ratios at the photoreceptor mosaic, chromatic information plays at least as important a role in stereopsis as does luminance information, suggesting that the magnocellular channel is not uniquely involved.     

Cone contributions to colour constancy

Colour constancy refers to the stable perception of object colour under changing illumination conditions. This problem has been reformulated as relational colour constancy, or the ability of the observer to discriminate between material changes and changes in illumination. It has been suggested that local cone excitation ratios play a prominent role in achieving such constancy. Here we show that perceptual colour constancy measured by achromatic adjustments is to a large part complete after 25 ms. This speaks against a prominent role for receptor adaptation, which takes significantly longer. We also found no difference in colour constancy between colour changes that were compatible with a change of illuminant, and between colour changes where local cone ratios were uncorrelated between the two illuminants. Our results show that constant cone ratios are not necessary for colour constancy.     

Partial color constancy of isolated surface colors examined by a color-naming method

Color samples selected from the OSA Uniform Color Scales set were viewed without any surround. Separate light sources were used to illuminate the samples and to control the state of adaptation of the subject, thereby separating two factors that are normally confounded. A color-naming procedure was used to assess shifts in color appearance produced by altering the spectral distributions of one or both light sources. The results confirm that chromatic adaptation, when it is the only factor operating, can mediate partial color constancy.     

Color constancy: phenomenal or projective?

Naive observers viewed a sequence of colored Mondrian patterns, simulated on a color monitor. Each pattern was presented twice in succession, first under one daylight illuminant with a correlated color temperature of either 16,000 or 4000 K and then under the other, to test for color constancy. The observers compared the central square of the pattern across illuminants, either rating it for sameness of material appearance or sameness of hue and saturation or judging an objective property-that is, whether its change of color originated from a change in material or only from a change in illumination. Average color constancy indices were high for material appearance ratings and binary judgments of origin and low for hue-saturation ratings. Individuals' performance varied, but judgments of material and of hue and saturation remained demarcated. Observers seem able to separate phenomenal percepts from their ontological projections of mental appearance onto physical phenomena; thus, even when a chromatic change alters perceived hue and saturation, observers can reliably infer the cause, the constancy of the underlying surface spectral reflectance.     

Second-order statistics of colour codes modulate transformations that effectuate varying degrees of scene invariance and illumination invariance

We argue, from an ethology-inspired perspective, that the internal concepts 'surface colours' and 'illumination colours' are part of the data format of two different representational primitives. Thus, the internal concept of 'colour' is not a unitary one but rather refers to two different types of 'data structure', each with its own proprietary types of parameters and relations. The relation of these representational structures is modulated by a class of parameterised transformations whose effects are mirrored in the idealised computational achievements of illumination invariance of colour codes, on the one hand, and scene invariance, on the other hand. Because the same characteristics of a light array reaching the eye can be physically produced in many different ways, the visual system, then, has to make an 'inference' whether a chromatic deviation of the space-averaged colour codes from the neutral point is due to a 'non-normal', ie chromatic, illumination or due to an imbalanced spectral reflectance composition. We provide evidence that the visual system uses second-order statistics of chromatic codes of a single view of a scene in order to modulate corresponding transformations. In our experiments we used centre surround configurations with inhomogeneous surrounds given by a random structure of overlapping circles, referred to as Seurat configurations. Each family of surrounds has a fixed space-average of colour codes, but differs with respect to the covariance matrix of colour codes of pixels that defines the chromatic variance along some chromatic axis and the covariance between luminance and chromatic channels. We found that dominant wavelengths of red-green equilibrium settings of the infield exhibited a stable and strong dependence on the chromatic variance of the surround. High variances resulted in a tendency towards 'scene invariance', low variances in a tendency towards 'illumination invariance' of the infield.     

The influence of chromatic and achromatic variability on chromatic induction and perceived colour

Judgments of the colour of a surface are influenced by the colour of the surrounding. To determine whether only the average colour of the surrounding matters, or also the chromatic variability, judgments in colourful scenes are often compared with ones in which a target is surrounded by a plain background that provides the same average physical illumination of the retina as the colourful scene. The variability sometimes makes a difference (eg Shevell and Wei, 1998 Vision Research 38 1561-1566), and sometimes it does not (eg Brenner and Cornelissen, 1998 Vision Research 38 1789-1793). Is this because of the nonlinearity in cone responses? We designed scenes that stimulated the cones in an equivalent manner, both on average and in terms of variability, and yet differed markedly in chromatic variability. The more colourful surroundings had considerably less influence on subjects' colour judgments. We conclude that early cone-specific regulation of sensitivity cannot be responsible for the change in perceived colour, and deduce that chromatic induction takes place after contrast gain control.     

Colour vision brings clarity to shadows

We have revealed a new role for colour vision in visual scene analysis: colour vision facilitates shadow identification. Shadows are important features of the visual scene, providing information about the shape, depth, and movement of objects. To be useful for perception, however, shadows must be distinguished from other types of luminance variation, principally the variation in object reflectance. A potential cue for distinguishing shadows from reflectance variations is colour, since chromatic changes typically occur at object but not shadow boundaries. We tested whether colour cues were exploited by the visual system for shadow identification, by comparing the ability of human test subjects to identify simulated shadows on chromatically variegated versus achromatically variegated backgrounds with identical luminance compositions. Performance was superior with the chromatically variegated backgrounds. Furthermore, introducing random colour contrast across the shadow boundaries degraded their identification. These findings demonstrate that the visual system exploits inbuilt assumptions about the relationships between colour and luminance in the natural visual world.     

Size constancy in monkeys with inferotemporal lesions

In a study of size constancy, monkeys were trained with extended practice to choose the larger of two projected stimulus discs independently of distance. When surgical brain lesions were made following pre-operative training, it was found that posterior parietal lesions caused no deficit on this task while inferotemporal lesions caused a severe breakdown from which three out of four animals showed almost no recovery. Mathematical analysis showed that the pattern of performance after inferotemporal lesions could be described as due to a tendency to oscillate between a “correct” and two “incorrect strategies” and that this tendency was also apparent to at least some extent in the unoperated animals. It is argued that the two incorrect strategies might have resulted from a disturbance of size constancy, such that the animal became unable to use both retinal size and distance information in computing physical size and instead used either retinal size or distance information alone. Parallels are drawn between such an hypothetical perceptual disorder and certain clinical disturbances in man.     

Colour constancy and Fregean representationalism

All representationalists maintain that there is a necessary connection between an experience’s phenomenal character and intentional content; but there is a disagreement amongst representationalists regarding the nature of those intentional contents that are necessarily connected to phenomenal character. Russellian representationalists maintain that the relevant contents are composed of objects and/or properties, while Fregean representationalists maintain that the relevant contents are composed of modes of presentation of objects and properties. According to Fregean representationalists such as David Chalmers and Brad Thompson, the Fregean variety of the view is preferable to the Russellian variety because the former can accommodate purported counterexamples involving spectrum inversion without illusion and colour constancy while the latter cannot. I maintain that colour constancy poses a special problem for the Fregean theory in that the features of the theory that enable it handle spectrum inversion without illusion cannot be extended to handle colour constancy. I consider the two most plausible proposals regarding how the Fregean view might be developed in order to handle colour constancy—one of which has recently been defended by Thompson (Australas J Philos 87:99–117, 2009)—and argue that neither is adequate. I conclude that Fregean representationalism is no more able to accommodate colour constancy than is Russellian representationalism and, as such, ought to be rejected.     

Does colour constancy exist?

For a stable visual world, the colours of objects should appear the same under different lights. This property of colour constancy has been assumed to be fundamental to vision, and many experimental attempts have been made to quantify it. I contend here, however, that the usual methods of measurement are either too coarse or concentrate not on colour constancy itself, but on other, complementary aspects of scene perception. Whether colour constancy exists other than in nominal terms remains unclear.