Paradox explored: Climate shame,moral agency,the church,and the birds

This article explores shame and moral agency in relationship to the climate catastrophe, and the moral situation of the world's relatively high-consuming people who are implicated in greenhouse gas emissions that cause climate change. The author complexifies that situation in the conundrums of climate colonialism, climate racism, structural sin, and the moral ambiguities they raise, including such questions as: “What are the moral demands of climate sin grounded in historically rooted economic systems that one did not create but upon which the material conditions of one's life depend? To what extent, if any, is the individual morally accountable for the social structures of which one is a part and from which one benefits?” From there, the essay moves to its central question. It is whether shame theory might help to enable moral agency for what is desperately needed now by people of climate privilege and economic privilege in the North Atlantic world—wise and courageous action to address climate change and climate injustice. The article probes shame theory for clues to what disables moral agency and what catalyzes it. The author finds in shame theory pathways for transforming shame-based moral inertia into moral agency. Those pathways suggest vital roles for the church.     

Welfare and Self-Governance

Two ideas have dominated ethical thought since the time of Bentham and Kant. One is utilitarianism, the other is an idea of moral agency as self-governance. Utilitarianism says that morality must somehow subserve welfare, self-governance says that it must be graspable directly by individual moral insight. But these ideas seem to war with one another. Can we eliminate the apparent conflict by a careful review of what is plausible in the two ideas? In seeking an answer to this question I examine (1) the implications of welfarism, (2) the nature of moral obligation (3) the nature of our moral knowledge.     

The Balance Between Providing Support,Prolonging Suffering,and Promoting Death: Ethical Issues Surrounding Psychological Treatment of a Terminally Ill Client

The concept of moral identity based on virtue ethics has become an issue of considerable import in explaining moral behavior. This attempt to offer adequate explanations of the full range of morally relevant human behavior inevitably provokes boundary issues between ethics and moral psychology. In terms of the relationship between the two disciplines, some argue for “naturalized (or psychologized) morality,” whereas, on the other hand, others insist on “moralized psychology.” This article investigates the relationship between virtue ethics and moral identity based on previous research on the relationship between ethics and moral psychology. This article especially attempts to show that meaningful links between the two concepts possible by using theoretical frameworks constructed by the most influential philosophers of science such as Kuhn and Lakatos.     

Blaming the Kids: Children's Agency and Diminished Responsibility

Children are less blameworthy for their beliefs and actions because they are young. But the relationship between development and responsibility is complex. What exactly grounds the excuses we rightly give to young agents? This article presents three distinct arguments for children's diminished responsibility. Drawing on significant resources from developmental psychology, it rejects views which base the normative adult/child distinction on children's inability to participate in certain kinds of moral communication or to form principled self‐conceptions which guide their actions. The article then argues that children's responsibility ought to be diminished because (and to the degree that) they are less competent at using features of their moral agency to meet social demands. This ‘normative competence’ view is philosophically defensible, supported by research in developmental psychology, and provides us with a method to evaluate whether things like peer pressure are relevant to responsibility.     

Book Review

Abstract

In this article, I respond to questions about, and criticisms of, my article “Toward an African Moral Theory” that have been put forth by Allen Wood, Mogobe Ramose, Douglas Farland and Jason van Niekerk. The major topics I address include: what bearing the objectivity of moral value should have on cross-cultural moral differences between Africans and Westerners; whether a harmonious relationship is a good candidate for having final moral value; whether consequentialism exhausts the proper way to respond to the value of a hannonious relationship; what makes a moral theory count as “African”; how the existing literature on African ethics relates to the aim of analytically developing and defending a single foundational moral principle; whether the intuitions I appeal to ground an African moral theory are pro tanto right-makers or general moral truths; whether the moral theory I defend can capture pro tanto rightness; and whether the best interpretation of African ethics is self-regarding (deeming the only basic moral reason for action to be that it would develop one’s own valuable human nature) or other-regarding (holding that a certain kind of harmonious relationship between individuals could ground a basic moral reason for action).     

Faith-based development of World Vision Tanzania

ABSTRACT

This article examines how faith is intertwined in conceptions of development in the work of World Vision Tanzania, a faith-based organisation focusing on child welfare. Issues that are explored include the question how an apparently common faith setting constitutes and provides a source of social meanings and values for the assessment of human development as well as secular development concepts such as human agency and empowerment. The analysis shows how World Vision staff assign different values to Christian and non-Christian development when assessing the potential and achievements of the beneficiaries in terms of secular concepts. It is argued that a faith-based worldview in this context provides the foundation for the specific set of values and social meanings, which are examined in this article, and a source for these more generally when value judgements and assessments of agency, empowerment, freedom, and, ultimately, well-being are made. It is further suggested that, by employing ideas of freedom, agency, and empowerment and investing them with Christian meaning, World Vision is able to generate a portrait of itself and its beneficiaries that is positioned in a hierarchy of values where Christian ideals and secular development fuse and become paramount.     

Synchronous stimulation in the rubber hand illusion task boosts the subsequent sense of ownership on the vicarious agency task

The relationship between sense of agency and sense of ownership remains unclear. Here we investigated this relationship by manipulating ownership using the rubber hand illusion and assessing the resulting impact on self-experiences during the vicarious agency illusion. We tested whether modulating ownership towards another limb using the rubber hand illusion would subsequently influence the illusory experience of ownership and agency towards a similar-looking limb in the vicarious agency task. Crucially, the vicarious agency task measures both sense of agency and sense of ownership at the same time, while removing the confounding influence of motor signals. Our results replicated the well-established effects of both paradigms. We also found that manipulating the sense of ownership with the rubber hand illusion influenced the subsequent vicarious experience of ownership but not the vicarious experience of agency. This supports the idea that sense of agency and sense of ownership are, at least partially, independent experiences.     

Churches as organisations: towards a virtue ecclesiology for today

This article is an attempt to offer insights from organisation studies to ecclesiology. To do so it draws particularly on the work of the moral philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre to offer a virtue ecclesiology for today. The application of MacIntyre's conceptual framework of practices, institutions, goods and virtues to all kinds of organisations, which already exists in the field of organisation studies, is extended to the church as an organisation. It suggests that the church may be re-described as an organisation in which the practices of faith are housed within the institution of the church. On this understanding, the gift of the church to the world is not simply the practices of faith but the manner in which they are institutionalised.     

The Moral Foundations of Human Rights Attitudes

Human rights are claimed to be innate and based on moral principles. Human rights attitudes have been shown to be related to political ideology, but there have been few studies investigating their relationship with morality. Using moral foundations theory, we examine whether morals can predict human rights attitudes across two studies. The first study used questionnaires to show that human rights are based exclusively on individualizing moral foundations; however, increases in individualizing and decreases in binding foundations predict increases in human rights endorsement. Moral foundations also mediated the relationship between political identification and human rights. Both individualizing and binding foundations performed a role in explaining the lower endorsement of human rights by conservatives as compared to liberals. The second study used textual analysis of newspaper articles to show that human-rights-related articles contained more moral language than other articles, in particular for the individualizing foundations. Conservative newspapers had a greater use of binding foundations in human rights articles than liberal newspapers.     

Moral Agency and the Paradox of Self-Interested Concern for the Future in Vasubandhu’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Abhidharmakośabhāṣya</Emphasis>

It is a common view in modern scholarship on Buddhist ethics that attachment to the self constitutes a hindrance to ethics, whereas rejecting this type of attachment is a necessary condition for acting morally. The present article argues that in Vasubandhu’s theory of agency, as formulated in the Abhidharmako?abhā?ya (Treasury of Metaphysics with Self-Commentary), a cognitive and psychological identification with a conventional, persisting self is a requisite for exercising moral agency. As such, this identification is essential for embracing the ethics of Buddhism and its way of life. The article delineates the method that Vasubandhu employs to account for the notion of a selfless moral agent, with particular emphasis on his strategies for dealing with one central aspect of agency, self-interested concern for the future.     

Morality,Inescapable Rational Authority,and a God's Wishes

It is a supposed conceptual truth about moral norms that we have reason to comply with them even if we desire not to. This combination of rational authority and inescapability is thought to be incompatible with instrumentalism about practical reason. This essay argues that there are ways in which norms with inescapable rational authority can exist alongside instrumentalism about practical reason. One way involves positing an afterlife and a powerful supernatural agency—so, a kind of god—who has total control over our welfare in that afterlife. I go on to argue that the attitudes of this god would also provide something answering to our impressions of moral desert.     

Agency and pain: An exploration

The notion of agency has become particularly prominent in social‐science writing. This article identifies some of the weaknesses in the ways it has been employed in contemporary anthropology. It criticises the assumptions of self‐empowerment, responsibility, and constructivism that are held to be essential to moral agency in much of that usage. Present‐day conceptions of agency in this literature introduce—whether intentionally or not—a triumphalist vision of history. Drawing on recent neuro‐physiological research, religious history and ethnography, it focuses on pain in order to think about agency in other than triumphalist terms. Triumphalist versions of agency, the article argues, are not only inherently questionable, they also distract our attention away from the need to understand how different traditions articulate the idea of living sanely in a world that is inevitably painful.     

Moral (dis)engagement with anthropogenic climate change in online comments on newspaper articles

Anthropogenic climate change (ACC) is widely acknowledged to be morally significant, but little is known about everyday moralising around ACC. We addressed this gap via quantified thematic analysis of 300 online comments to British newspaper articles on ACC, drawing on Bandura's moral disengagement theory. Moral disengagement through denial of ACC was widespread. Other disengagement strategies, such as palliative comparison and diminishing agency, occurred less often. There was also some moral engagement, most often through assertions of the existence of ACC and/or its harmful effects. Moral disengagement was significantly more common in comments on right wing than left wing newspapers, whereas the opposite was true of moral engagement. Although Bandura's framework provided a useful starting point to make sense of ACC moralising, it did not capture moral concerns that extended beyond its “harm/care” remit. In particular, many “denial” comments included a “dishonesty” discourse, whereby ACC proponents were accused of deception for ulterior motives. To classify this discourse as moral disengagement obscures its engagement with a different set of moral issues around trust and honesty. We suggest that Bandura's theory represents one possible “moral landscape” around ACC and could be extended to encompass a broader range of moral concerns.     

Having a body versus moving your body: How agency structures body-ownership

We investigated how motor agency in the voluntary control of body movement influences body awareness. In the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI), synchronous tactile stimulation of a rubber hand and the participant's hand leads to a feeling of the rubber hand being incorporated in the participant's own body. One quantifiable behavioural correlate of the illusion is an induced shift in the perceived location of the participant's hand towards the rubber hand. Previous studies showed that the induced changes in body awareness are local and fragmented: the proprioceptive drift is largely restricted to the stimulated finger. In the present study, we investigated whether active and passive movements, rather than tactile stimulation, would lead to similarly fragmented body awareness. Participants watched a projected image of their hand under three conditions: active finger movement, passive finger movement, and tactile stimulation. Visual feedback was either synchronous or asynchronous with respect to stimulation of the hand. A significant overall RHI, defined as greater drifts following synchronous than asynchronous stimulation, was found in all cases. However, the distribution of the RHI across stimulated and non-stimulated fingers depended on the kind of stimulation. Localised proprioceptive drifts, specific to the stimulated finger, were found for tactile and passive stimulation. Conversely, during active movement of a single digit, the proprioceptive drifts were not localised to that digit, but were spread across the whole hand. Whereas a purely proprioceptive sense of body-ownership is local and fragmented, the motor sense of agency integrates distinct body-parts into a coherent, unified awareness of the body.     

How individual was conscience in the early-modern period? Observations on the development of Catholic moral theology

This article investigates how the notion of individual conscience has to be understood within the early-modern development of Catholic moral theology. It highlights that 16th-century Catholic theologians continued to understand conscience mainly in Thomist terms as a rational judgment. Yet they also came to investigate more deeply questions of intention and individual circumstances that might interfere with the perfect execution of moral reasoning. Particular emphasis is given to the question of probabilism and whether this new method of analyzing moral agency provided a stepping stone towards a more individualized conception of conscience, as some intellectual historians have contended. The article argues that whilst probabilism sharpened the awareness for problems of conscience, this development cannot be disconnected from the culture of counsel of conscience, inscribed into the fundamentally Thomist definition of it.     

Implicit Mental Processes in Ethical Management Behavior

This article examines the relationship between implicit mental processes and ethical decisions made by managers. Based on the dual-process view in social and cognitive psychology, it is argued that social cognition (e.g., moral judgments) can rely on two different modes of information processing. On one hand, moral judgments reflect explicit, conscious, and extensive cognitive processes, which are attributed to explicit attitude. On the other hand, moral judgments may also be based on implicit, automatic, and effortless processes referring to implicit attitude. To test this thesis, a study involving 182 participants was conducted. The results support the thesis.     

Hierarchical integration of agency and communion: a study of influential moral figures

The purpose of this research is to (a) identify which of recent history's influential figures did and which did not personify moral excellence, and (b) to examine the motives that drove these individuals along such divergent paths. In Study 1, 102 social scientists evaluated the moral qualities of influential figures from Time Magazine's lists. In Study 2, we selected the 15 top ranking of these figures to comprise a moral exemplar group and the bottom 15 to comprise a comparison group of similarly influential people. We measured the motivational aspects of their personality (agency and communion) by content-analyzing extant speeches and interviews. Moral exemplars exhibited the hierarchical integration of agency and communion by treating agentic motives as a means to an end of communal motives. Comparison subjects, by contrast, personified unmitigated agency by treating motives of agency as both a means to an end and an end unto itself. These results imply that both the strength and structure of a person's motives account for moral behavior.     

The Capitalist Cage: Structural Domination and Collective Agency in the Market

This article develops and defends a triadic account of structural domination, according to which structural domination (e.g. patriarchy, white supremacy, capitalism) is a triadic relation between dominator(s), dominated, and regulator(s)—the constitutive domination dyad plus those roles and norms expressively upholding it. The article elaborates on the relationship between structure and agency from the perspective of both oppressor and oppressed and discusses the deduction of the concept of the capitalist state from the concept of capitalism. On the basis of these definitions, it shows that structural domination under capitalism presupposes collective power but no joint agency or shared intentions on the part of the dominators.     

Ethics and Marginal Cases: the rights of the mentally handicapped

ABSTRACT  Some beings, including children, animals and the mentally handicapped, seem to deserve moral consideration, despite the fact that they are not rational or moral agents. These so-called marginal cases create a problem for theories that heavily stress the role of moral and/or rational agency in ethics: the latter seem unable to account for the former's moral status. This paper discusses the recent and original attempt of Loren Lomasky to solve this problem. It is argued that Lomasky's arguments are self-defeating because they can only succeed by relying on common-sense morality and, thus, by giving up the heavy stress on the role of rational agency in ethics.     

Blaming, praising, and protecting our humanity: the implications of everyday dehumanization for judgments of moral status

Being human implies a particular moral status: having moral value, agency, and responsibility. However, people are not seen as equally human. Across two studies, we examine the consequences that subtle variations in the perceived humanness of actors or groups have for their perceived moral status. Drawing on Haslam's two-dimensional model of humanness and focusing on three ways people may be considered to have moral status - moral patiency (value), agency, or responsibility - we demonstrate that subtly denying humanness to others has implications for whether they are blamed, praised, or considered worthy of moral concern and rehabilitation. Moreover, we show that distinct human characteristics are linked to specific judgments of moral status. This work demonstrates that everyday judgments of moral status are influenced by perceptions of humanness.