Rethinking mind-body dualism: a Buddhist take on the mind-body problem

This paper is an effort to present the mind-body problem from a Buddhist point of view. Firstly, I show that the Buddhist distinction between mind and body is not absolute, but instead merely employed as a communicative tool to aid the understanding of human beings in a holistic light. Since Buddhism acknowledges a mind-body distinction only on a conventional level, it would not be fair to claim that the tradition necessarily advocates mind-body dualism. Secondly, I briefly discuss a response to Cartesian dualism from a Buddhist perspective and suggest that in this particular regard, the Buddhist approach may be likened to the ‘category mistake’ argument formulated by Gilbert Ryle. The fact that the Buddhist view does not accord with Cartesian dualism, however, does not imply that a monistic approach to the mind-body problem such as behaviourism, physicalism or biological naturalism is necessarily assumed. The Buddhist position could perhaps be best described as a middle way approach of ‘neither-duality-nor-identity’. Thirdly, I remain sceptical about the reductionist approach of accounting for mind merely on the level of brain or behaviour. In overlooking crucial ethical and axiological implications of mind, I argue that such an approach necessarily fails to impart a complete picture of mind. The Buddhist soteriological approach furthermore reveals certain law-like connections between mental attitudes and suffering which are for the most part overlooked in mainstream metaphysical explorations into the relation between mind and body. I thus endeavour to show why exploration into the link between mental phenomena, spiritual cultivation and the accumulation of karma is imperative to any comprehensive inquiry into the human mind.     

Jefferson and Adams on the mind-body problem

Amidst the voluminous correspondence between Thomas Jefferson and John Adams are several letters pertaining to the material basis of mental life. These reveal in a most suggestive way the substantial differences between them. Well informed on prevailing scientific and philosophical perspectives, Jefferson and Adams used the issue to express their positions on the nature and limits of knowledge, the relative authority of scientific methods and speculations, and the larger question of human perfectibility. At the same time, their exchanges illuminate the prevailing and divergent perspectives on human psychology adopted by major leaders of thought in the New World.     

Pavlov and the mind-body problem

I. P. Pavlov claimed that the mind-body problem would ultimately be resolved by empirical methods, rather than by rational arguments. A committed monist, Pavlov was confronted by dualism in the case of an hysterical person. Under normal conditions, her body's left side was insensitive to pain, but when she was hypnotized, there was a reversal of her sensitivity to pain, with the right side becoming insensitive. Pavlov acknowledged that the divergence between stimulation and response suggested dualism, yet condemned his disciple G.P. Zelenyî as well as Charles S. Sherrington, for their dualistic tendencies. Pavlov's continuous adherence to monism is attributed to the influence of popular scientific books that he read during his adolescence. The books maintained that science was based upon monism. Pavlov proposed that by introducing the concept of emotions, an hysterical person's condition could be explained within the framework of his theory of higher nervous activity, thereby obviating the need to change his paradigm.     

Human nutrition: Evolutionary perspectives

In recent decades, much new evidence relating to the ape forerunners of modern humans has come to hand and diet appears to be an important factor. At some stage, there must have been a transition from a largely vegetarian ape diet to a modern human hunting economy providing significant amounts of meat. On an even longer evolutionary time scale the change was more complex. The mechanisms of evolutionary change are now better understood than they were in Darwin's time, thanks largely to great advances in genetics, both experimental and theoretical. It is virtually certain that diet, as a major component of the human environment, must have exerted evolutionary effects, but researchers still have little good evidence. Reprinted from Ucko, Peter J. and G. W. Dimbleby (eds.).The Domestication and Exploitation of Plants and Animals. Aldine.     

Consciousness and working memory: Current trends and research perspectives

Working memory has long been thought to be closely related to consciousness. However, recent empirical studies show that unconscious content may be maintained within working memory and that complex cognitive computations may be performed on-line. This promotes research on the exact relationships between consciousness and working memory. Current evidence for working memory being a conscious as well as an unconscious process is reviewed. Consciousness is shown to be considered a subset of working memory by major current theories of working memory. Evidence for unconscious elements in working memory is shown to come from visual masking and attentional blink paradigms, and from the studies of implicit working memory. It is concluded that more research is needed to explicate the relationship between consciousness and working memory. Future research directions regarding the relationship between consciousness and working memory are discussed.     

Chaos theory and the evolution of consciousness and mind: A thermodynamic-holographic resolution to the mind-body problem

This address describes Neurological Positivism's (NP) energetic evolution of consciousness, mind, and the brain-mind relationship within a model that integrates ideas and research from chaos theory, Pribram's holonomic brain theory, evolutionary theory, and the laws of thermodynamics (the energy laws The energetic evolution and encapsulation of space-time consciousness from chaotic-holographic environments is described. Consciousness is described as a natural evolutionary space-time template of continuously generated self-referential energy patterns (algorithms). The energetic evolution of mind is described as a natural self-referential exteriorization of the algorithmic organization of consciousness in the form of culturally shared mental models. It is proposed that the brain-mind energy relationship has historically undergone and continues to undergo change, and that this change is a natural thermodynamic arrow that constitutes the evolution of culture. That is, the evolution of culture proceeds in the direction of progressively more complete and efficient exteriorizations of the algorithmic organization of the brain-thus, for example, the recent evolution of brain-like computing systems and virtual reality systems. Accordingly, an uneven, but closing, central-energy-state identity (self-similarity) between brain and mind is described. It is concluded that NP's conception of mind helps us understand the evolutionary unfoldment of culture, and provides a sense of direction as to its future.     

Comments on snake symbolism and mind-body relations

In summary, the symbolic use of an object in part depends on which of its functional-structural qualities is emphasized in a given moment. For example, the snake may take on different symbolic meanings when emphasis is given to its eyes, tongue, fangs, anatomical form, or movement. Its various aspects constitute a complex system of references to unconscious (and conscious) mental and body self-configurations. These references frequently undergo transformations which make use of structurally related symbols. In the present paper, various aspects of the snake symbol were related to one another and to other symbolic transformations, including the elevator and flying. The structural principles underlying these analyses may be found to organize a wide range of phenomena and were here applied to Tausk's "influencing machine."     

Realization,explanation and the mind-body relation

The Morris water maze has been put forward in the philosophy of neuroscience as an example of an experimental arrangement that may be used to delineate the cognitive faculty of spatial memory (e.g., Craver and Darden, Theory and method in the neurosciences, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 2001; Craver, Explaining the brain: Mechanisms and the mosaic unity of neuroscience, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007). However, in the experimental and review literature on the water maze throughout the history of its use, we encounter numerous responses to the question of “what” phenomenon it circumscribes ranging from cognitive functions (e.g., “spatial learning”, “spatial navigation”), to representational changes (e.g., “cognitive map formation”) to terms that appear to refer exclusively to observable changes in behavior (e.g., “water maze performance”). To date philosophical analyses of the water maze have not been directed at sorting out what phenomenon the device delineates nor the sources of the different answers to the question of what. I undertake both of these tasks in this paper. I begin with an analysis of Morris’s first published research study using the water maze and demonstrate that he emerged from it with an experimental learning paradigm that at best circumscribed a discrete set of observable changes in behavior. However, it delineated neither a discrete set of representational changes nor a discrete cognitive function. I cite this in combination with a reductionist-oriented research agenda in cellular and molecular neurobiology dating back to the 1980s as two sources of the lack of consistency across the history of the experimental and review literature as to what is under study in the water maze.