心智游移：现象、机制及意义

心智游移是一种常见的非自主内源性意识体验, 是意识流的重要组成部分, 它的存在提示非感官意识在人类意识经验中的重要地位, 以及持续进行的无意识加工对个体生存可能具有的重要意义, 对心智游移的研究是心理学和认知神经科学领域内新兴的热点课题。本文重点回顾了关于心智游移的体验内容、与情绪的关系及其相关神经活动方面的研究成果, 在此基础上探讨了心智游移的发生机制及适应性功能。文章最后总结了目前心智游移研究中存在的定义不清、研究策略和方法过于局限以及研究内容上存在的问题, 并提出了该领域未来的研究方向以及应用价值。     

马克思的本体论思想及其当代意义

马克思的本体论思想日益引起学界的关注。本文认为,必须从马克思的哲学革命变革的宗旨和使命出发,把本体论问题放到“解释世界”和“改变世界”的框架内,才能给马克思的本体论思想以及正确的诠释和定位,马克思终点了传统的思辨形而上学本体论,但却继承和光大了人类的形而上情结和追求,并以人和人的实践活动底蕴,深刻地回答了世界本真存在的追问,关爱生命,提高人的素质,促进人的全面发展,这就是马克思本体论思想的当代价值所在。     

"事"的本体论意义--兼论泰州学的哲学涵蕴

在中国哲学发展史上,以"道"、"理"、"气"、"心"为本原或本体的,随处可见,亦多为人们所看重与论究,而以"情"、以"事"为本体的,却少有人关切并予检讨.本文认为,泰州学为"情"本论.需要说明的是,"情"的本体论与"事"的本体论是相通的,就像"事"与"情"之连通而成"事情"一样,"情"的本体论又可释为"事"的本体论.如果要作区别的话,那么大体上可以说,情与理的关系,主要涉及人的精神心理结构与取向问题,"情"本论所要确认的,是情感之于理性更具本真性与至上性;事与理的关系,则涉及到存在界的结构和主体与客体之间的多重结构关系,"事"本论所要申明的,是事之于理更具本然性与先在性.     

临终关怀与内隐自尊的修复:现象、机制及意义

内隐自尊是自发的、自动的、无意识地自我评价系统.临终关怀系统与临终个体的心理健康、生活幸福感密切相关,人文社会科学已渗透临终关怀研究领域.通过回顾临终关怀与内隐自尊系统的社会表征及研究的现状,并从中揭示出临终关怀与内隐自尊的修复可能的机制及意义.     

The Waiting Room: Ontological Homelessness, Sexual Synecdoche, and Queer Becoming

An autobiographical reflection on the experience of being diagnosed as intersex, this essay considers the waiting room an apt metaphor for lives shaped by medical understandings of queer corporealities. Drawing upon the work of Gayle Salamon, Malatino develops the concept of sexual synecdoche as a useful analytic tool for considering the operations of medical pathologization in the realm of non-normative gender. She concludes with a discussion of queer becoming as an alternative ontology of gendered being that offers a resistant, coalitional way beyond contemporary, problematic institutionalized understandings of intersex subjectivities.     

The Trinity, Election and God's Ontological Freedom: A Response to Kevin W. Hector

Abstract:  A recent article by Kevin Hector considered the disagreement between Bruce McCormack and me over the relationship between the doctrines of election and the Trinity raising a number of crucial issues such as the proper relation of the immanent and economic Trinity, the nature of God's freedom and the identity of the logos asarkos . In this article I explore how and why Barth's dialectical understanding of the triune God's freedom from and for creatures disallowed equating God's ontological freedom with election in the manner suggested by McCormack and Hector, because that would reduce God's omnipotence to his omnicausality, the immanent to the economic Trinity.     

Bernard J. Verkamp,Senses of Mystery: Religious and Non-Religous

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

The two Bernard Berenson cousins: The interplay among immigration,culture, and narcissism

The lives of two 19th century cousins, both of whom changed their names to Bernard Berenson, are considered from historical and psychodynamic perspectives, using a psychobiographical method. The Jewish cousins immigrated separately to Boston from Lithuania in 1875 and 1882. One cousin, later calling himself simply B.B., became a world‐renowned art historian. The other Bernard became a misanthrope after feeling deeply humiliated by his cousin's family in Boston. Many biographies were written about the famous B.B. The only histories of his cousin Bernard were family stories, as he was the author's great‐grandfather. The intersecting lives of these cousins are discussed. Both men faced the challenges of immigration as well as intense anti‐Semitism and prejudice in each country in which they lived. These cultural and historical conditions interacted with the cousins’ narcissistic vulnerabilities. Their lives demonstrate different manifestations of narcissistic suffering, with B.B's being more consistent with the construct of a “grandiose narcissist” and Bernard's being more consistent with that of a “closet narcissist.” The life stories of these two cousins with the same name offers an intriguing instance of a complicated relationship among immigration, prejudice, and narcissism and case examples of the manifestation of how narcissistic suffering can influence lives.     

Quine: Peter HyltonReference, Ontological Relativity, and Realism

Section I of this essay discusses Quine's views about reference,, contrasting them with those of Russell. For the latter, our language and thought succeed in being about the world because of our acquaintance with objects; the relation of reference—roughly, the relation between a name and its bearer—is thus fundamental. For Quine, by contrast, the fundamental relation by which our language comes to be about the world, and to have empirical content, is that between a sentence and stimulations of our sensory surfaces; reference, while important, is a derivative notion. Section II shows how this view of reference as derivative makes possible the notorious Quinean doctrine of ontological relativity. Section III raises the issue of realism. It argues that somewhat different notions of realism are in play for Quine and for Russell—for Russell, objects, and our knowledge of objects, play the fundamental role, while for quine objectivity and truth are fundamental, with ontology being derivative.     

Scepticism: Epistemic and Ontological

It is widely thought that sceptical arguments, if correct, would show that everyday empirical knowledge-claims are false. Against this, I argue that the very generality of traditional sceptical arguments means that there is no direct incompatibility between everyday empirical claims and sceptical scenarios. Scepticism calls into doubt, not ordinary empirical beliefs, but philosophical attempts to give a deep ontological explanation of such beliefs. G. E. Moore's attempt to refute scepticism (and idealism) was unsuccessful, because it failed to recognise that philosophical scepticism operates on a different level from that on which we make – or doubt – particular empirical claims. And, as I argue with specific reference to work by Nozick and Fogelin, Moore's basic confusion is still widely shared in contemporary discussions of scepticism.     

Protecting Persons from Animal Bites: the Case for the Ontological Significance of Persons

Eric Olson criticizes Lynne Baker’s constitution account of persons on the grounds that personhood couldn’t be ontologically significant as nothing new comes into existence with the acquisition of thought. He claims that for something coming to function as a thinker is no more ontologically significant than something coming to function as a locomotor when a motor is added to it. He levels two related charges that there’s no principled answer about when and where constitution takes place rather than an already existing object just acquiring new properties. I’ll argue that none of these objections are problems for understanding person to be a substantial kind.