Moral Philosophy and the Ontology of Relations

The essay undertakes to explore the possibilities of mutually fruitful dialogue between moral philosophy and ontology, in particular, the ontology of relations. The latter copes with the question of how relations relate, whereas moral philosophy often ignores the ontological implications of such crucial relations as love and interpersonality. The paper proceeds as follows. First, the ontology of relations is discussed. Second, various examples are analysed. From this, a conception of relation instantiation emerges, according to which to determine which relation actually obtains, one has to take into account (a) the context, (b) the specific content or meaning of the relation, and (c) some action or decision or mode of existence of the relata. This conception suggests that relation instantiation cannot be explained by a single formula. By the help of this conception, Hume's thesis of the identity of killing relations between human and nonhuman beings is questioned. Then, the relation of love is analysed. It is shown that love as a moral relation is perfectly explicable in terms of ontology. Moreover, its essence is best captured by the interrelation of the particulars, the relation of love as a universal, and by the relating action of the particulars. Finally, the alleged relation of universal fraternity (interpersonality as such), linking up each human being to all other human beings, is discussed.     

Remarks On Quantum Ontology

Despite the discrepancies between quantum objects and `classical' ones, mainly with regard to the fact that the latter may be thought of as `individuals', contrary to the former, we still regard the quanta as `things' in our ordinary discourse as well as in the logico-mathematical basis of quantum theories. This paper considers some possibilities for accomodating the logico-mathematical framework of the theories which deal with such a strange ontology where the inhabitants are things devoid of identity and both having and not having certain properties.``All right', said the Cat; and this time it vanished quite slowly, beginning with the end of the tail, and ending with the grin, which remained some time after the rest of it had gone.``Well! I've often seen a cat without a grin', thought Alice, ``but a grin without a cat! It's the most curious thing I ever saw in all my life!'Lewis Carroll     

论莱布尼茨本体论的二阶性

罗素于1900年发表了《对莱布尼茨哲学的批判性解释》,尝试把莱布尼茨哲学当作一个完整的系统来解释。这种解释是逻辑主义的,声称莱布尼茨的整个形而上学都建立在其逻辑学的基础上。尽管这种观点在近几十年受到了一些挑战,但至今仍是英美学界对莱布尼茨的主流解释之一。本文试图     

On the Substantive Nature of Disagreements in Ontology

This paper concerns a fundamental dispute in ontology between the " Foundational Ontologist ", who believes that there is only one correct way of characterizing what there is, and the ontological " Skeptic ", who believes that there are viable alternative characterizations of what there is. I examine in detail an intriguing recent proposal in Dorr (2005), which promises to yield (i) a way of interpreting the Skeptic by means of a counter/actual semantics; and (ii) a way of converting the Skeptic to a position within Foundational Ontology, viz., that of Nihilism (according to which nothing composes anything and the world consists of mereological simples); this alleged conversion crucially turns on a novel notion of " metaphysical analyticity ". I argue that both components of Dorr's proposal are problematic in central ways: as a result, the Foundational Ontologist gains an indirect argument against the coherence of the Skeptic's position; and the non-Nihilist Foundational Ontologist may feel confirmed in his doubts towards the Nihilist outlook.     

On Quine on Carnap on Ontology

Philosophical Studies -     

On Scientific Ontology: Reply to Tambassi

Axiomathes - Two opposing uses of the term ‘Scientific Ontology’ reflect attitudes towards the relation between (empirical) science and philosophical ontology. On the one side we can...     

熟人关系的道德审视

我国传统人际关系是以熟人为主的社会关系,这种人际关系是与生产力不发达的自然经济和宗法家族社会结构相适应的,具有明显的双重道德特征,在当今社会经济生活中日益显示出其局限性改革开放的深入和市场经济的发展正促使我国传统熟人关系向生人关系转变,必然要求人们养成平等待人、宽容博爱、理性自觉、公私分明的道德观念和相应的道德行为模式。     

On Future Ontology: A Reply to Longenecker

Axiomathes - The supporters of Indeterminate Futurism Theory [IFT] suggest three different reasons for preferring their view over Growing Block Theory [GBT]. If compared to GBT, IFT offers a better...     

论医患关系的法律属性

医事法（又称卫生法）究竟是属于民法的调整范畴还是属于行政法的范畴,国内学术界争议很大。从医学科学与医疗行为的本质特征看,医患关系并不具备民事法律关系所必须具备的主体平等、双方自愿及等价有偿互惠互利三大特征中的任何一个特征。同时也不存在行政主体与行政相对人的关系。为此,首次提出医事法既不调整横向的民事法律关系,也不调整纵向的行政法律关系,而是调整斜向的医事法律关系的一门独立的法律体系的理论。     

论诠释学对话:方法、本体与德行

在西方诠释学的发展进程中曾出现过两种形态的对话理论:以施莱尔马赫为代表的方法论诠释学对话和以伽达默尔为代表的本体论诠释学对话。两种对话的宗旨分别在于作者原意的重建和理解意义的创造。这两种诠释学本身的限制暴露了对话的局限性:前者缺少意义的发挥,后者缺少方法的约束。完善的对话理论应该扬弃这两种诠释学理论,兼善原意的释读与意义的阐扬两个向度,且以德行作为价值诉求。德行诠释学视域中的对话乃是诠释学对话理论在当代语境中的发展新方向。     

论《老子》道之本体论的和谐意蕴及现代指向

《老子》最早赋予“道”以完整和深刻的哲学本体论意义。道的哲学本体论具有三重基本内涵,即追寻作为世界统一性的终极存在、知识统一性的终极解释、意义统一性的终极价值。三重内涵的融通合一即是和谐的意义和旨趣所在,体现为天人和谐、人际和谐和群体和谐。《老子》认为道是万物的本原,德是万物分享形上之道而各自获得的本性,二者皆以和谐为内核,和谐是道的基本特征和存在状态。和谐的终极价值以人的意义统一性为逻辑基点,和谐的终极存在以道的世界统一性为生成维度,和谐的终极解释以道的知识统一性为治理向度。     

中国古代"恶"之存在论与价值论探讨

从存在论角度来说,人的本质属性——自然属性与社会属性构成中国古代性恶论的前提和根据。从价值论层面而言,古代性恶论者主张抑恶扬善或存善除恶。这就导致古代性恶论的悖论,一方面在存在论上肯定"恶"有存在的事实和根据,另方面在价值论上却否定"恶"的正当性和合理性。正是因为性恶论者最终的价值取向是使人成善、为善,性恶论和性善论在善恶问题上是殊途同归的:在存在论意义上是殊途——性恶论者道性恶而性善论者道性善,而在价值论意义上是同归——为善。但在去"恶"、除"恶"的正统思想之外,宋明时期的功利学派却不同程度地肯定了"恶"的正当性和合理性。     

Ontology and the construction of systems

After drawing attention to the basic importance of Goodman's workThe Structure of Appearance, this paper turns to a critical analysis of Goodman's claims concerning worldmaking. It stresses that Goodman's acceptance of a multiplicity of actual worlds doesnot involve the belief in an unknowable underlying reality; but that it is due to the non-mysterious fact that constructional systems allow for a multiplicity of disagreeing, right versions. However, from the point of view of truthmaker ontology, most worlds of constructional systems are not genuine worlds; and so far it hasnot been shown that there are genuine truthmaker worlds that disagree.It is suggested that the construction of systems usually involves three conflicting aims: the logical, the ontological, and the psychological. Considering the current interest in cognitive psychology and phenomenology, the implications of the psychological aim, too, deserve to be reexamined.This paper was presented at the Autorenkolloqium with Nelson Goodman and Catherine Z. Elgin, held at the Zentrum für interdisziplinäre Forschung (Zif) of the University of Bielefeld (Germany) between 18–20 March 1991.     

Rethinking the Ontology of Cartesian Essences

The old and recent debates on Cartesian essences have focused on the question of whether Descartes is a Platonist or a conceptualist about essences. I argue that this is a false dichotomy. An adequate account of Cartesian essences must accommodate and reconcile two central doctrines and texts in Descartes' philosophy. I will argue that recent conceptualist and Platonist interpretations neither accommodate these doctrines nor reconcile these texts. Such failures are not accidental since Descartes' doctrines of divine creation and simplicity render it impossible for Descartes to be either a conceptualist or a Platonist. Failure to notice this fact explains why there has been no progress on this exegetical issue.     

Ontology in the Game of Life

The game of life is an excellent framework for metaphysical modeling. It can be used to study ontological categories like space, time, causality, persistence, substance, emergence, and supervenience. It is often said that there are many levels of existence in the game of life. Objects like the glider are said to exist on higher levels. Our goal here is to work out a precise formalization of the thesis that there are various levels of existence in the game of life. To formalize this thesis, we develop a set-theoretic construction of the glider. The method of this construction generalizes to other patterns in the game of life. And it can be extended to more realistic physical systems. The result is a highly general method for the set-theoretical construction of substances.