Steven Galt Crowell,Husserl, Heidegger,and the Space of Meaning: Paths toward Transcendental Phenomenology

Continental Philosophy Review -     

On the narratives of science: The critique of modernity in Husserl and Heidegger

Paper presented at the annual Meeting of the Society for Phenomenology and the Human Sciences, in conjunction with the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy. Boston 1992.     

Reduction,externalism and immanence in Husserl and Heidegger

This paper argues that the Husserl–Heidegger relationship is systematically misunderstood when framed in terms of a distinction between internalism and externalism. Both philosophers, it is argued, employ the phenomenological reduction to immanence as a fundamental methodological instrument. After first outlining the assumptions regarding inner and outer and the individual and the social from which recent epistemological interpretations of phenomenology begin, I turn to the question of Husserl’s internalism. I argue that Husserl can only be understood as an internalist on the assumption that immanence equates with internal. This, however, is not the case as can be seen once the reduction is understood not as setting aside the existence of the world, but rather a reflection on its meaning. Turning to Heidegger, I argue that his commitment to a form of the phenomenological reduction precludes him from being either a semantic or a social externalist. The place of authenticity and the first person perspective in his work derive from his phenomenological commitments, which can be seen in his accounts of discourse and language and of falling (Verfallen). I then go on to briefly outline a more plausible basis for understanding the difference between Husserl’s and Heidegger’s phenomenologies in terms of their respective emphases on logic and on poetics.     

广松涉对胡塞尔现象学的批判及其克服

以马克思、卡西尔和马赫哲学为立足点,以对胡塞尔现象学的批判为突破口,广松涉提出了“现象的所与-意义的所识”-“能知的某人-能识的某人”的四肢结构论,由此实现了由物的世界观到事的世界观、由实体主义到关系主义的哲学变革,标志着具有独创性的广松哲学的正式形成,在格外注重生态平衡与可持续发展的今天,它显示出独特的理论价值与现实意义。     

Husserl,Protention, and the Phenomenology of the Unexpected

Although there has been a great deal said about Husserl’s account of time-consciousness, little attention has been specifically paid to future-consciousness. This article gives an Husserlian account of future-consciousness. It begins by arguing that protention should be understood as a future-directed version of retention and so that future-consciousness should be understood as perception. This account is developed in two ways: (1) the future need not be determinately given in protention and so future-consciousness can be vague; (2) cases when the future turns out to be other than we perceived it to be (cases when the unexpected happens) can be understood as temporal illusions. This account of future-consciousness both illuminates some of Husserl’s more obscure remarks on time-consciousness and (more importantly) provides a means of understanding an often neglected phenomenon of independent philosophical interest: our awareness of the future.     

Edmund Husserl in Talcott Parsons: Analytical Realism and Phenomenology

This article aims at clarifying the philosophical (=phenomenological) implication of Talcott Parsons’s analytical realism. Generally, his theory is understood as being confrontational to phenomenology; however, in his first book, The Structure of Social Action, Parsons positively referred to Husserl’s Logical Investigations. They shared a sense of crisis: Husserl thought that there was no certain basis in modern science, and Parsons had the feeling that there was no common theory to establish sociology as a science. Thus, both of them criticized the factual sciences of positivism (positivistic empiricism) and showed a strong orientation to the general theory. For this, they depended on conceptual realism (Platonic realism). According to Husserl, scientific knowledge will be arbitrary if the Ideal is not there as the norm of fact. He believed that in truth all people always see Ideas. Similarly, Parsons thought that in truth all people always act toward the Ideal, because the Ideal element is necessarily found through the logical framework of sociology, i.e., the action frame of reference. Hence, he maintained that the Ideal element that gives a normative orientation to actions is real, though analytical, insofar as the social order is established.     

论上帝观念从胡塞尔到海德格尔的演化

本文通过分析胡塞尔和海德格尔对上帝问题的处理，试图揭示上帝观念从现象学到生存哲学演化的逻辑进路。基于从生存哲学角度对上帝的追问，我们可以从哲学上找到回答今天宗教生活如何可能这样一个问题的答案。     

Shinran and Heidegger on Dwelling: Reading Shinran as a Phenomenology of Shinjin

This article explores Shinran's depiction of the life of nembutsu through a discussion of his use of the term ‘dwelling’. It seeks thereby to propose a way of reading his writings that might serve as a corrective to the more usual doctrinal views of his teaching. In order to elucidate Shinran's phenomenological endeavour, I consider his writings together with Heidegger's exposition of ‘dwelling’ in his later essays. There are four characteristics of dwelling in particular that both Shinran and Heidegger elaborate in ways that resonate with each other: settledness, freedom, joy, and nearness. The article takes up each of these aspects of the account of dwelling in the two thinkers with the aim of casting new light on Shinran's understanding of human existence in its fullest potential.