A comment on mill's argument for utilitarianism

This article contains criticisms of various interpretations of Mill's argument for Utilitarianism. An attempt is made to explain how Mill conceived the rationality of his proof, and how his justification of the Principle of Utility differs from a justification of fundamental moral principles on the basis of the logic of ethical discourse.     

An axiomatic basis for distributional equality in utilitarianism

An axiomatic basis for a social preference ordering with interval-scaled utility levels satisfying the principles of anonymity and pareto superiority is elaborated. The ordering is required to be sensitive to distributional equality: Redistribution of utility income from poor to rich persons without changing their social rank should lead to a superior evaluation. The axiom of separability is weakened in order to make it compatible with distributional equality. We prove that every continuous ordering satisfying the upper axioms can be represented by a utility function which is positively linear on the convex cone of rank-ordered utility vectors. A modified unnormalized Gini coefficient is one possible choice, but it contradicts, as well as related proposals, the principle of adequacy of means for some distribution problems.     

An argument for basic emotions

Abstract

Emotions are viewed as having evolved through their adaptive value in dealing with fundamental life-tasks. Each emotion has unique features: signal, physiology, and antecedent events. Each emotion also has characteristics in common with other emotions: rapid onset, short duration, unbidden occurrence, automatic appraisal, and coherence among responses. These shared and unique characteristics are the product of our evolution, and distinguish emotions from other affective phenomena.     

An argument game for stable semantics

In this paper, we present a discussion game for argumentationunder stable semantics. Our work is inspired by Vreeswijk andPrakken, who have defined a similar game for preferred semantics.In the current paper, we restate Vreeswijk and Prakken's workusing the approach of argument labellings and then show howit can be adjusted for stable semantics. The nature of the resultingargument game is somewhat unusual, since stable semantics doesnot satisfy the property of relevance.