Consequences of confirmation and disconfirmation in a simulated research environment

Advanced undergraduate science majors attempted for approximately 10h each to discover the laws governing a dynamic system. The system included 27 fixed objects, some of which influenced the direction of a moving particle. At a given time, any one screen of a nine-screen matrix could be observed on a plasma display screen. Confirmatory strategies were the rule, even though half the subjects had been carefully instructed in strong inference. Falsification was counterproductive for some subjects. It seems that a firm base of inductive generalizations, supported by confirmatory research, is a prerequisite to useful implementation of a falsification strategy.     

The impact of implicit prejudice about the elderly on the reaction to stereotype confirmation and disconfirmation

Previous research demonstrated that perceivers explicitly condemn ingroup members who use racial stereotypes but that they are implicitly more likely to favor those ingroup members rather than ingroup members who do not use racial stereotypes (Castelli et al., 2001). The present study has two main goals. First, we want to investigate whether the same effects can be detected in the domain of ageism. In particular, we predicted that young adults would implicitly but not explicitly favor a young male who describes an old man in a stereotype-consistent way rather than in a stereotypeinconsistent way. Most importantly, we hypothesized that this tendency is related to participants’ prejudice level as assessed through an implicit measure (IAT, Greenwald et al., 1998), so that high prejudice individuals will implicitly favor stereotypere and derogate ingroup members who use stereotype-inconsistent information. Results provide general support for the hypotheses, and their implications for stereotype maintenance and change are discussed. Preparation of this paper was supported by a research grant from the University of Padova to the first author (CPDG018859).     

The impact of implicit prejudice about the elderly on the reaction to stereotype confirmation and disconfirmation

Previous research demonstrated that perceivers explicitly condemn ingroup members who use racial stereotypes but that they are implicitly more likely to favor those ingroup members rather than ingroup members who do not use racial stereotypes (Castelli et al., 2001). The present study has two main goals. First, we want to investigate whether the same effects can be detected in the domain of ageism. In particular, we predicted that young adults would implicitly but not explicitly favor a young male who describes an old man in a stereotype-consistent way rather than in a stereotypeinconsistent way. Most importantly, we hypothesized that this tendency is related to participants’ prejudice level as assessed through an implicit measure (IAT, Greenwald et al., 1998), so that high prejudice individuals will implicitly favor stereotypere and derogate ingroup members who use stereotype-inconsistent information. Results provide general support for the hypotheses, and their implications for stereotype maintenance and change are discussed. Preparation of this paper was supported by a research grant from the University of Padova to the first author (CPDG018859).     

Popper on Definitions

Summary  In the present paper I shall first summarize Popper’s criticism of the traditional method of definition, and then go on to comment critically on his own views on the form and function of so-called nominalist definitions.     

Karl Popper,Psychology and Philosophy

This paper intends to re-emphasize the relationship among Psychology, Popper and his Philosophy. Popper, who is often considered as one of the most important philosophers of science, had associations with the discipline of psychology in his early years. Popper was associated with Würzburg school of psychology, especially the psychologies of Külpe, Selz and Bühler. However, there was a change in Popper’s interest from the psychology of discovery to an objectivist epistemology—that is, to the logic of discovery, which he himself acknowledged (1976, p. 55). Popper, not only turned away from psychology, as early as 1930 or thereabouts, he later became one of the most outspoken opponents of a psychological approach to science. This antipathy has worked both ways! Very few psychologists study and discuss Popper. His place in the history of psychology, certainly remains inadequate. But why should psychologists ignore Popper? Instead of turning away from Popper, Psychologists’ efforts should be directed towards bringing into focus Popper, his works and association with psychology. This paper argues and tries to discuss the relationships among Popper, his training in psychology and his philosophy.     

Popper and Synthetic judgements A Priori

Summary  Popper uses the “Humean challenge” as a justification for his falsificationism. It is claimed that in his basic argument he confuses two different doubts: (a) the Humean doubt (Popper’s problem of induction), and (b) the “Popperean” doubt whether – presupposing that there are laws of nature – the laws we accept are in fact valid. Popper’s alleged solution of the problem of induction does not solve the problem in a straightforward way (as Levison and Salmon have remarked before). But if Popper’s solution of the Humean challenge is re-interpreted as being close to Kant’s it makes sense. Even though Popper explicitly rejects Kant’s synthetic judgements a priori, it is claimed here that this is so because he misinterprets Kant’s argument. If he had understood Kant correctly he should have been a modern “Kantianer”!