Preschoolers' current desires warp their choices for the future

We introduce a new paradigm to assess how children's choices for the future are influenced by their current desires. Forty-eight 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds were assigned to one of four conditions. In two of these conditions (intervention), we manipulated children's current state of thirst by allowing them to eat pretzels. In the remaining two conditions (baseline), we did not give them pretzels. The children were then asked to choose between water and pretzels. In one intervention and one baseline condition, they chose what they would like "now," whereas in the other intervention and baseline conditions, they chose what they would like "tomorrow." Results revealed that, despite children's overwhelming desire for pretzels in the baseline conditions, children in both intervention conditions chose water. The data support the notion that children's current state influences not only their choices for the present, but also their choices for the future. We discuss this finding in terms of both cognitive-developmental and adult social-cognitive theory.     

Irrational desires

Conclusion I believe that the attempts discussed above fail to show that logically satisfiable basic desires can be rationally impotent. Obviously, this does not entail that they cannot be. Nevertheless, I think it is reasonable to accept a Neo-Humean view. Such acceptence need not be based on burden of proof arguments, about which there is well-grounded skepticism. I prefer instead to base it on a burden of introduction argument; because of the initial plausibility of the Neo-Humean view, critics carry the burden of introducing theories that entail that basic desires can be non-instrumentally irrational (in the relevant sense). Once such theories are introduced, the philosophical court can rule without imposing a burden of proof. I have tried to establish that three recently introduced theories in fact give us no grounds for rejecting Neo-Humeanism.     

The distinction between desires and intentions

Within attitude theory the concepts of desires and intentions are not differentiated but are often treated as synonyms. However, we argue that there are theoretical reasons for distinguishing between desires and intentions, and we articulate three main criteria, perceived performability, action‐connectedness, and temporal framing, that differentiate between the two constructs. Two studies are reported to test the distinction. Study 1 (n = 188) revealed that desires, compared to intentions, are less performable, are less connected to actions, and are enacted over longer time frames. Study 2 (n = 249) showed, among other things, that the perceived feasibility for actions that are desired and intended is higher than for those that are only desired, but only when the action refers to relatively short time frames (i.e. 1 week or 4 weeks vs. 4 months). The findings are discussed in the light of the distinction between intentions and desires and the role that they play in individual decision making. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Revision of SKED: Needs and desires

Modifications are suggested for Snapper’s SKED system.     

De dicto desires and morality as fetish

It would be puzzling if the morally best agents were not so good after all. Yet one prominent account of the morally best agents ascribes to them the exact motivational defect that has famously been called a “fetish.” The supposed defect is a desire to do the right thing, where this is read de dicto. If the morally best agents really are driven by this de dicto desire, and if this de dicto desire is really a fetish, then the morally best agents are moral fetishists. This is puzzling. I resolve the puzzle by showing that on a proper understanding of the interaction between de dicto and de re moral motivation, it is not only not fetishistic, but quite possibly desirable, to be motivated by a de dicto desire to do the right thing. My argument relies partly on an appeal to a non-buck-passing account of moral rightness, according to which rightness is itself an additional reason-giving property over and above the right-making properties of an action. If this account of moral rightness is correct, then we would expect the morally best agents to exhibit de dicto moral motivation. However, since their de dicto desire acts in concert with de re desires, there is no reason to consider it a fetish.     

Ambivalent desires and the problem with reduction

Ambivalence is most naturally characterized as a case of conflicting desires. In most cases, an agent’s intrinsic desires conflict contingently: there is some possible world in which both desires would be satisfied. This paper argues, though, that there are cases in which intrinsic desires necessarily conflict—i.e., the desires are not jointly satisfiable in any possible world. Desiring a challenge for its own sake is a paradigm case of such a desire. Ambivalence of this sort in an agent’s desires creates special problems for the project of reducing all facts about an agent’s desires to facts about his or her preferences over options. If this reductive project fails, there is reason to suspect that the Decision Theory cannot give us a complete theory of Humean rationality.     

The problem of defective desires

This paper defends the actualist desire-satisfaction theory of welfare against a popular line of objection—namely, that it cannot accommodate the fact that, sometimes, it is bad for a person to get what he wants. Ill-informed desires, irrational desires, base desires, poorly cultivated desires, pointless desires, artificially aroused desires, and the desire to be badly off, are alleged by objectors to be defective in this way. I attempt to show that each of these kinds of desire either is not genuinely defective or else is defective in a way fully compatible with the theory.     

Preference as fulfilment of desires

We consider preferences as fulfillment of conditional desires, which can be either positive or negative, or both. We go beyond the standard multi-attributive additive utility theory in the sense that we separate the data given by the preference relation over an unstructured space from the property structure representing (conditional) attributes or desires. The model accounts for the psychologically motivated and empirically confirmed asymmetry between desire fulfillment and disappointment (loss aversion). The only restriction on the set of desires is, loosely speaking, a kind of mutual logical independence. We formulate a representation theorem characterising when a weak order (i.e. complete and transitive) preference is compatible with the logical structure of desires and has an additive representation over it. It is unique in the sense that each utility function representing the preferences has at most one such additive decomposition.     

Taboo desires,creativity, and career choice

Two studies suggest that Protestants are more likely than Catholics or Jews to sublimate taboo desires into motives to pursue creative careers. The results are consistent with a synthesis of psychological and classic sociological theories. In Study 1, Protestants induced to have taboo sexual desires were likely to express a preference for creative careers (as opposed to prosocial ones). In Study 2, a national probability sample revealed that “conflicted” Protestants—who had taboo desires but tried to rule their sexual behavior according to their religious beliefs—worked in the most creative jobs. The effects in both studies did not hold for Catholics and Jews. Results suggest that intrapsychic conflict can partially motivate important real-world decisions, such as the choice to pursue a creative career.     

Sex and shame: the inhibition of female desires

A developmental narrative is presented that centers on bodily based narcissistic injury and sense of shame in response to unrequited oedipal longings. Through an experience of oedipal defeat in relation to both mother and father, a female sense of inadequacy and shame may be internalized and accepted as one's identity, in contrast to the male phallic-omnipotent trajectory. The demise of genital narcissism in females can underlie various expressions of pervasive inhibition and failure to actualize desire. The thesis offered goes beyond separation-individuation theory in suggesting that girls may inhibit sexuality and aggression, and themselves more generally, due to a representation of self as "not having what it takes" genitally, and then bodily and psychically. Mental representations of the self, based on positive imagery of the female body, are needed to give voice to a woman's bodily experience and sexual desire and agency in various realms. Two clinical vignettes illustrate female inhibitions in sexuality and in professional ambition as understood within the framework presented.