Rigidity and corrigibility

Conclusions Zemach's arguments have gone to show that terms might be rigid designators in ordinary language even though they are not natural kind terms. It has been argued that his argument is inconclusive. However it has been claimed that Putnam's argument is much too strong for it would preclude interesting scientific hypotheses about identity between what appear to be different substances, solely on the grounds of modal necessity. It has been shown that rigid designators can be disjunctive but that this possibility is not a foregone conclusion, as Zemach would have us believe. We have to allow for differences between how wesingled out the extension of a natural kind termin the past and how we intend to single out such extensionin the future. Language is not inherently conservative. There is much room for reformist manoevres. *** DIRECT SUPPORT *** A0985038 00002     

Incontinence and Perception

The traditional problem of incontinence raises the question of whether there is any way to account for action contrary to judgment. When one acts, rather than only being acted upon by circumstances, the action is explained in terms of the reasons for action one judges oneself to have. It therefore seems impossible to explain action that iscontrary to such judgment. This paper examines the question of how such explanation would be possible. After excluding accounts that either eliminate incontinence or render it inexplicable, I argue that genuine incontinence would require three components: first, a distinction between the types of judgments simultaneously present in the agent; second, the Aristotelian idea that not all of those types of judgments can be directly action-guiding; and third, that the judgments that are action-guiding can be pre-conceptual perceptions. I then use elements of Collingwood's aesthetics to make the case that although such pre-conceptual perceptions would not be propositional judgments and the relationship between them and the behaviors of the agent could not be causal, those behaviors could still qualify as incontinent actions.     

Perception and Representation

I oppose the popular view that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience consists in the subject's representing the (putative) perceived object as being so-and-so. The account of perceptual experience I favor instead is a version of the "Theory of Appearing" that takes it to be a matter of the perceived object's appearing to one as so-and-so, where this does not mean that the subject takes or believes it to be so-and-so. This plays no part in my criticisms of Representationalism. I mention it only to be up front as to where I stand. My criticism of the Representationalist position is in sections. (1) There is no sufficient reason for positing a representative function for perceptual experience. It doesn't seem on the face of it to be that, and nothing serves in place of such seeming. (2) Even if it did have such a function, it doesn't have the conceptual resources to represent a state of affairs. (3) Even if it did, it is not suited to represent, e.g., a physical property of color. (4) Finally, even if I am wrong about the first three points, it is still impossible for the phenomenal character of the perceptual experience to consist in it's representing what it does. My central argument for this central claim of the paper is that it is metaphysically, de re possible that one have a certain perceptual experience without it's presenting any state of affairs. And since all identities hold necessarily, this identity claim fails.     

Perception and knowledge

Knowledge concerning the object, scene, or event in a conscious propositional form generally does not affect perception. By and large, perception is autonomous with respect to thought. That is because perception is stimulus bound and is based on mental contents, lawful principles and rules that are unconscious and in a form very different from such consciously represented propositional knowledge. Exceptions to this generalization can occur if the stimulus is ambiguous and can support a cued or suggested interpretation or one in line with what is known to be present as well as it can support the perception that occurs spontaneously. How the representation of the given, consciously apprehended knowledge can enter into the unconscious events that govern perception is not known, but it is suggested that such knowledge accesses memories and it is these memories that can affect perception.Since knowledge of this kind can affect perception, it is important to ensure that subjects in experiments are naive. Otherwise we will confuse spontaneous perceptions with those that only occur when suggested and the distinction is theoretically important. In certain cases, knowledge leads to an intentional intervention in the process of achieving a percept, the mechanism of which is not known. However, this kind of effect may be based on a process of imagining or visualizing of objects or events that dovetails with the proximal stimulus and it is the imagining that leads to the perception.Knowledge in the form of stored representations of past visual experience (or of phylogenetic ‘experience’) can affect perception in various ways: it enables recognition and interpretation to occur; it enables perceptual discrimination among similar members of a category to occur; it can lead to perceptual enrichment effects; it provides internal solutions which can then be accessed in cases where perceptual problem solving occurs; it provides rules or laws concerning geometrical optics on the basis of which phenomena such as perceptual constancy and the like can be achieved; it can lead to the recalibration of tactual or visual sensation. However, before such top-down effects of past experience can occur bottom-up processes must first achieve a preliminary perception. That perception provides the bridge to the relevant stored representations which are accessed on the basis of similarity.     

Perception and tonus

Abstract.— A review is given of the achievements of more than one hundred years of research concerning the influence of muscular tonus on the perceptual phenomena related to human spatial orientation. The tonal conditions of both the extrinsic eye muscles and the complex system of skeletal muscles have been shown to have decisive influence on "egocentric localization". The factual median is perceived as being displaced in the direction of the side of the body with greater tonus. This is the case whether the tonic asymmetry is experimentally induced or natural. Corresponding to this fact, a spot of light in the dark situated at the factual eye level will be perceived as being situated above the experienced eye level. The influence on egocentric localization exercised by prolonged fixation of greater or smaller parts of the muscular system (especially of the eye muscles) is pointed out. This "fixation effect" seems to be in accordance with conceiving the postural system of the body by analogy with a servo-mechanical system, the feed-back part of which is restrained.     

Perception and Belief

An attempt is made to pinpoint the way in which perception is related to belief. Although, for familiar reasons, it is not true to say that we necessarily believe in the existence of the objects we perceive, nor that they actually have their ostensible characteristics, it is argued that the relation between perception and belief is more than merely contingent
There are two main issues to address. the first is that 'collateral' beliefs may impede perceptual belief. It is argued that this still assigns an essential role to belief in perception, though the belief may be of an attenuated form. the second is Fred Dretske's claim that even attenuated belief may be entirely absent from perception. It is argued that (a) 'non-epistemic'perception can be understood only by employing the concept of 'epistemic'perception; (b) that the former can occur only partially—i.e., within perceptions that are otherwise epistemic; and (c) that by switching attention from the perception of objects to the Phenomenological tradition's concern with the perception of world, we can see that perception must be entirely permeated with 'doxastic'force.     

Perception

Book Information Perception. Perception Barry Maund, Chesham : Acumen Publishing, 2003, 240, £12.95 (paper) By Barry Maund. Acumen Publishing. Chesham. Pp. 240. £12.95 (paper:),     

Risk Perception and Affect

ABSTRACT— Humans perceive and act on risk in two fundamental ways. Risk as feelings refers to individuals' instinctive and intuitive reactions to danger. Risk as analysis brings logic, reason, and scientific deliberation to bear on risk management. Reliance on risk as feelings is described as "the affect heuristic." This article traces the development of this heuristic and discusses some of the important ways that it impacts how people perceive and evaluate risk.     

Perception and its objects

Early modern empiricists thought that the nature of perceptual experience is given by citing the object presented to the mind in that experience. Hallucination and illusion suggest that this requires untenable mind-dependent objects. Current orthodoxy replaces the appeal to direct objects with the claim that perceptual experience is characterized instead by its representational content. This paper argues that the move to content is problematic, and reclaims the early modern empiricist insight as perfectly consistent, even in cases of illusion, with the realist contention that these direct objects of perception are the persisting mind-independent physical objects we all know and love.