共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
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Vittorio De Palma 《Husserl Studies》2017,33(1):1-18
I deal with the relation between phenomenology and realism while examining Ingarden’s critique towards Husserl. I exhibit the empiricist nucleus of Husserl’s phenomenology, according to which the real is what can be sensuously experienced. On this basis, I argue that Husserl’s phenomenology is not idealistic, in opposition to the realistic phenomenology, according to which reality consists in entities which cannot be sensuously experienced and are thus ideal. Finally I attempt to show that the idealistic elements of Husserl’s thinking do not originate from the transcendental turn, but from a remainder of psychologism that contradicts his empiricism. 相似文献
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The following is an English translation of the 1960 paper by the South African philosopher D. C. S. Oosthuizen entitled “Die Transendentaal-Frenomenologiese Idealisme: ‘n Aspek van die konstitusie-probleem in die filosofie van Edmund Husserl,” preceded by a few contextualizing remarks by the translator. The paper attempts to show that the phenomenological, eidetic and transcendental reductions, the problem of constitution and transcendental genesis are indispensable parts of the transcendental phenomenological method. It then demonstrates that this method and the results that are obtained by means of it cannot, strictly speaking, be said to decisively favour a metaphysical or epistemological idealism, specifically because the transcendental reductions cannot be undone. 相似文献
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Mirja Hartimo 《Axiomathes》2012,22(1):121-133
In his 1896 lecture course on logic–reportedly a blueprint for the Prolegomena to Pure Logic–Husserl develops an explicit account of logic as an independent and purely theoretical discipline. According to Husserl,
such a theory is needed for the foundations of logic (in a more general sense) to avoid psychologism in logic. The present
paper shows that Husserl’s conception of logic (in a strict sense) belongs to the algebra of logic tradition. Husserl’s conception
is modeled after arithmetic, and respectively logical inferences are viewed as analogical to arithmetical calculation. The
paper ends with an examination of Husserl’s involvement with the key characters of the algebra of logic tradition. It is concluded
that Ernst Schr?der, but presumably also Hermann and Robert Grassmann influenced Husserl most in his turn away from psychologism. 相似文献
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Nikolai Onufriyevich Lossky 《Husserl Studies》2016,32(2):167-182
This is a translation from Russian to English of Nikolai Onufriyevich Lossky’s “Tpaнcцeндeнтaльнo-фeнoмeнoлoгичecкiй идeaлизмъ Гyccepля” (Husserl’s Transcendental-Phenomenological Idealism), published in the émigré journal Пyть (The Way) in 1939. In this article, Lossky presents and criticizes Husserl’s transcendental idealism. Like many successors of Husserl’s “Göttingen School,” Lossky interprets Husserl’s transcendental idealism as a Neo-Kantian idealism and he criticizes it on the ground that it leads to a form of solipsism. In light of his own epistemology (intuitivism) and his metaphysical system (ideal-realism), he also claims that, although Husserl is more radical than Descartes in his methodological doubt, he is not radical enough, because his abstention from existential judgment with regard to the external world is itself an existential judgment. In this regard, Lossky affirms that his own critically-informed defense of naive realism is in fact more radical than Husserl’s transcendental idealism. (Frédéric Tremblay) 相似文献
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Robert Hugo Ziegler 《Husserl Studies》2013,29(2):89-111
Although both Husserl and Deleuze declare themselves to be committed to the idea of transcendental philosophy, it is not clear how a constructive discussion between these two approaches to the transcendental question might begin. In this paper, the basis for such a productive confrontation will be sought in the concept of multiplicity as developed by nineteenth century mathematics. This concept serves as a crucial operational concept both in Husserl and in Deleuze. The following critical analysis clarifies the idea and the task of phenomenology as a philosophy of pure immanence whose fundamental metaphysical dimension can thus be no other than time. 相似文献
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Christian Lotz 《Continental Philosophy Review》2007,40(2):171-185
In this paper, I will present an argument against Husserl’s analysis of picture consciousness. Husserl’s analysis of picture
consciousness (as it can be found primarily in the recently translated volume Husserliana 23) moves from a theory of depiction in general to a theory of perceptual imagination. Though, I think that Husserl’s thesis
that picture consciousness is different from depictive and linguistic consciousness is legitimate, and that Husserl’s phenomenology
avoids the errors of linguistic theories, such as Goodman’s, I submit that his overall theory is unacceptable, especially
when it is applied to works of art. Regarding art, the main problem of Husserl’s theory is the assumption that pictures are
constituted primarily as a conflict between perception/physical picture thing and imagination/picture object. Against this
mentalist claim, I maintain, from a hermeneutic point of view, that pictures are the result of perceptual formations [Bildungen]. I then claim that Husserl’s theory fails, since it does not take into account what I call “plastic perception” [Bildliches Sehen], which plays a prominent role not only within the German tradition of art education but also within German art itself. In
this connection, “plastic thinking” [Bildliches Denken] was prominent especially in Klee, in Kandinsky, and in Beuys, as well as in the overall doctrine of the Bauhaus. Ultimately,
I argue that Husserl’s notion of picture consciousness and general perceptive imaginary consciousness must be replaced with
a more dynamic model of the perception of pictures and art work that takes into account (a) the constructive and plastic moment,
(b) the social dimension and (c) the genetic dimension of what it means to see something in something (Wollheim).
相似文献
Christian LotzEmail: |
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Deodáth Zuh 《Husserl Studies》2012,28(2):95-120
A comprehensive and agreed-upon account of Husserl??s relation to Gottlob Frege does not yet exist. In this situation we encounter interpretations that allow systematic dogmas to reappear that should have long been vanquished??for instance, that the author of the Logical Investigations was not only decisively influenced by Frege, but also that he had already retracted his sharpest Frege-critique by 1891. The present essay contains a largely historical response to W. Künne??s new monograph on Frege that advocates such views. We will concentrate on a small remark that turns out to reference a defining moment for any understanding of Husserl??s early philosophy. We shall argue that Husserl??s supposed self-criticism does not turn on the critique that he had earlier leveled at Frege??s Grundlagen der Arithmetik; rather, it has to do exclusively with his own earlier systematic positions on the grounding of arithmetic. In this context, an important particular of Husserl??s Philosophie der Arithmetik takes center stage: this book is a mosaic composed from old and new insights, a fact that becomes most evident in the two distinct concepts of ??equivalence?? that are founded there, which reflects Husserl??s transition from a theory of arithmetic based on the concept of number to one based on the parallelism between proper and symbolic (improper) presentations. This change involves a long historical development that goes back to a tradition marked by the work of Bolzano, Lotze, Brentano, and Stumpf, and it is closely tied to the problem of how to distinguish between the sense and the object of an act. Systematic neglect of the historical background of the Frege?CHusserl relation has led to disputes over who owns the copyright to the sense/reference distinction, but it has obscured the very core of the original line of questioning. 相似文献
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Clare McGrath-Merkle 《Journal of religion and health》2010,49(1):73-86
In this article, Erik Erikson’s and subsequent researchers’ ideas on generativity are applied to “the clerical abuse crisis,”
in which 111 U.S. Roman Catholic bishops protected priests rather than safeguard children. The goal was to discover what psychological
dispositions led bishops to act in the manner they did. A case is made that pre-existing tendencies coupled with an all-male,
celibate environment and formation indoctrination led to deficits in psychological development, moral judgment and leadership
capacity, revealing an Episcopal subculture characterized by pseudo-speciation and authoritism. 相似文献
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Matheson Russell 《Husserl Studies》2011,27(1):41-62
Over four decades, Habermas has put to paper many critical remarks on Husserl’s work as occasion has demanded. These scattered
critical engagements nonetheless do add up to a coherent (if contestable) position regarding the project of transcendental
phenomenology. This essay provides a comprehensive reconstruction of the arguments Habermas makes and offers a critical assessment
of them. With an eye in particular to the theme of intersubjectivity (a theme of fundamental interest to both thinkers), it
is argued that Habermas’s arguments do indeed show up deficiencies in Husserlian phenomenology and yet that they do not succeed
in proving that we must abandon the methods and tasks of phenomenological research. On the contrary, it is argued that phenomenological
methods may well be needed in order to investigate certain philosophical questions that Habermas’s theory of communication
has thus far only partially addressed. 相似文献
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Wenjing Cai 《Husserl Studies》2013,29(1):13-27
The article explores a gradual refinement of the notion of reflection in Husserlian phenomenology. In his early period, Husserl takes phenomenological reflection to attain adequate evidence, since its object is self-given in an absolute and complete manner. However, this conception of reflection does not remain unchanged. Husserl later realizes that immanent perception or phenomenological reflection also involves a certain horizonality and naivety that has to do with its temporal nature and must be queried in a further critical, apodictic reflection. Focusing more on the notion of apodicticity than adequacy, Husserl subsequently ascribes a new methodological role to reflection: instead of a mere epistemic warrant that guarantees for us the ultimate truth of our experiential life once and for all, phenomenological reflection ensures the strictness of phenomenology insofar as it entails an ethical-existential dimension as the norm of a life-form where the subject pursues full self-understanding and self-justification. 相似文献
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Husserl’s Discovery of Philosophical Discourse 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Robert Sokolowski 《Husserl Studies》2008,24(3):167-175
Husserl’s Idea of Phenomenology is his first systematic attempt to show how phenomenology differs from natural science and in particular psychology. He does
this by the phenomenological reduction. One of his achievements is to show that the formal structures of intentionality are
more akin to logic than to psychology. I claim that Husserl’s argument can be made more intuitive if we consider phenomenology
to be the study of truth rather than knowledge, and if we see the reduction as primarily a modification in our vocabulary
and discourse and not as simply a change in attitude. I briefly compare Husserl’s concept of philosophy with those of Plato
and Kant.
相似文献
Robert SokolowskiEmail: |
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Few have entertained the idea that Georg Cantor, the creator of set theory, might have influenced Edmund Husserl, the founder of the phenomenological movement. Yet an exchange of ideas took place between them when Cantor was at the height of his creative powers and Husserl in the throes of an intellectual struggle during which his ideas were particularly malleable and changed considerably and definitively. Here their writings are examined to show how Husserl's and Cantor's ideas overlapped and crisscrossed in the areas of philosophy and mathematics, arithmetization, abstraction, consciousness and pure logic, psychologism, metaphysical idealism, new numbers, and sets and manifolds. 相似文献
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Carlos Alberto Sanchez 《Human Studies》2007,30(4):377-393
In a journal entry from 1906, Husserl complains of lacking “internal stability” and of his desire to “achieve” it. My claim in this paper is that the “phenomenological method,” which he made public in his 1907 lectures Die Idee der Phänomenologie was, and is, a means to achieve the inner harmony that Husserl longed for. I do not provide an analysis of why Husserl might have felt the way he did; my aim is to show what internal stability might be and how one might achieve it. I conclude that the phenomenological method is the means, the “how,” to internal stability, which I characterize as “clarity” and “harmony” regarding our beliefs and, and ultimately, our authentic comportment. 相似文献