Seeking an Analytic Identity

Abstract

Rothstein has stimulated all analysts to rethink how we can better commit ourselves to our analytic work. In this paper I focus on factors in analysts' personalities and experiences in their training and practice that contribute to or distract from establishing an analytic identity.

First, I explore analysts' background and motivation. In admissions to psychoanalytic institutes we look for candidates who can see psychoanalysis as an intellectual puzzle to be solved and an emotional involvement to be experienced. We look for earlv conflicts that the candidate can sublimate in the service of analytic functioning. We assume that the capacity to sublimate is only partial and that analysts in their development continue to recognize conflicts in transference—countertransference reactions.

Second, I give some examples of experiences from analysts' training that stimulate the formation of their analytic identities. These include transient identifications and counter-identifications with the training analyst, supervisor, seminar leader, and favorite analytic authors.

Third, I discuss more external factors that influence the development of analytic identity. These include the climate in training and continuing education at the institute. How much does the institute support its members in immersion in psychoanalysis? Economic factors continue to he an important factor in determining individual choice in this immersion.

Finally, I review studies on the effectiveness of psychoanalysis. Dedicated analysts with considerable experience believe that analysis works despite some limitations. Part of high motivation to continue analytic work includes understanding how analytic results differ from the simpler solutions achieved by nonanalytic therapies.     

Meaning and beauty

What place do experiences of beauty have in a meaningful life? A marginal one, at best, it would seem, if one looks at the current literature in analytic philosophy. Treatments of beauty within so-called “analytic existentialism” tend to suffer from four limitations: beauty is neglected, reduced to artistic production, saddled to theology, or taken as a mere application of a broader theoretical framework. These discussions fail to engage with the rich tradition of philosophical aesthetics. In this essay, I begin by responding to the contention that experiences of beauty cannot lend life meaning because they are passive. Drawing on work in philosophical aesthetics, I then argue that encounters with the beautiful count as genuinely meaning-conferring because they have features commonly taken as marks of meaningfulness.     

A Holistically Deweyan Feminism

The argument that a holistic analysis of Dewey's work, drawing not only on the major portions subject to extensive commentary (such as Experience and Nature ) but also on his aesthetics, provides fuel for feminist theorizing is sustained by advertence to the standard commentary and also to new work in aesthetic feminism itself. Sleeper, Rorty, Hickman and Russell are cited, and the recent resurgence of interest in developing the intersection between analytic aesthetics and feminist aesthetics is alluded to. It is concluded that the enterprising feminist theorist may suffer from an embarrassment of riches in attempting to approach Dewey but that such an approach is well worth the effort.     

Immersion and emotion: their impact on the sense of presence.

The present study is designed to test the role of immersion and media content in the sense of presence. Specifically, we are interested in the affective valence of the virtual environments. This paper describes an experiment that compares three immersive systems (a PC monitor, a rear projected video wall, and a head-mounted display) and two virtual environments, one involving emotional content and the other not. The purpose of the experiment was to test the interactive role of these two media characteristics (form and content). Scores on two self-report presence measurements were compared among six groups of 10 people each. The results suggest that both immersion and affective content have an impact on presence. However, immersion was more relevant for non-emotional environments than for emotional ones.     

Buddhism and bell hooks: Liberatory Aesthetics and the Radical Subjectivity of No‐Self

This article engages bell hooks's concept of “radical black subjectivity” through the lens of the Buddhist doctrine of no‐self. Relying on the Zen theorist Dōgen and on resources from Japanese aesthetics, I argue that non‐attachment to the self clarifies hooks's claim that radical subjectivity unites our capacity for critical resistance with our capacity to appreciate beauty. I frame this argument in terms of hooks's concern that postmodernist identity critiques dismiss the identity claims of disempowered peoples. On the one hand, identity critique has an emotional component, as it involves questioning the self and possibly letting go of aspects of that self in which a person has inevitably made emotional investments. On the other hand, it has an aesthetic component, as it opens a space for the creative crafting and recrafting of identity. Japanese aesthetics emphasizes that all aesthetic appreciation is accompanied by feelings of mournfulness, for the object of aesthetic appreciation is transient. Linking hooks's liberatory aesthetics with the resources of the Japanese tradition suggests that mournfulness in the face of self‐loss necessarily accompanies all instances of critical resistance. Thus non‐attachment becomes a useful framework in which to understand both the emotional and aesthetic components of empowered identity critique.     

Psychic reality and the analytic relationship

In this article I have argued that the more linear transformations or desymbolized expressions of one's earliest relationships are always a part of psychic reality and represent a unique opportunity in the analytic situation to transform a person's emotional orientation to the world. A necessary condition for this to come about is the analyst's capacity for sustained interest in the patient. This interest, which goes well beyond an intellectual one, can be threatened by countertransference as well as certain assumptions the analyst has about the nature of the analytic process. The analyst's belief in the analytic process, a belief that can only come from his or her own analysis, is seen as crucial in helping the transformational process that occurs in a successful analysis.     

On psychoanalytic writing

Analytic writing constitutes a literary genre of its own. It involves the linking of an analytic idea (developed in a scholarly manner) with an analytic experience created in the medium of language. What makes this literary genre so demanding is that experience-including analytic experience-does not come to us in words. This fact generates a paradox that lies at the core of analytic writing: analytic experience (which cannot be said or written) must be transformed into 'fi ction' (an imaginative rendering of experience in words) in order to convey to the reader something of what is true to the emotional experience that the analyst had with the patient. The author discusses a clinical passage from one of his recently published papers in an effort to demonstrate some of the conscious and unconscious thinking that goes into his writing. He then looks closely at the way the language works in a successful piece of theoretical analytic writing. The paper concludes with a discussion of a number of facets of the author's experience with analytic writing including the psychological 'state of writing', which is at once a meditation and a wrestling match with language; experimenting with the form (structure) of an analytic essay; and the question of originality in analytic writing.     

The emotional and cognitive effect of immersion in film viewing

This brief report presents an experiment testing the effect of immersion on emotional responses and cognitive genre categorisation of film viewers. Immersion of a film presentation was varied by presenting an animated movie either in a 3D-viewing condition (low immersive condition) or in a CAVE condition (high immersive condition, comparable to virtual reality experience). Viewers rated their emotions and categorised the movies into four basic film genres (action, drama, comedy, and non-fiction). Two distinct types of emotion were measured: Fictional World emotions (e.g., sadness) in response to the presented fictional events and Artefact emotions in response to the film as an artefact (e.g., fascination). Results showed that stronger immersion led to more intense emotions but did not influence genre categorisation. In line with expectations, both types of emotional response were intensified by high immersion. The results are explained by suggesting that highly immersive cinema has its impact on a basic dimension of emotion, namely arousal that underlies both types of emotions.     

The waiting room as boundary and bridge between self-States and unformulated experience

For both patient and analyst, the waiting room serves containing and expressive functions. The waiting room may serve as both a boundary between the analytic couple and a bridge to engagement. At times it can provide a means of titrating the intensity and duration of the affects activated by immersion in the analytic process: it can also serve to extend the boundaries of the analytic frame by providing a holding environment to facilitate metabolizing the impact of comings and goings. It also may be viewed as a membrane between self-states through which oscillating facets of dissociated or unformulated experience are enacted. Clinical material from the analysis of an adolescent girl illustrates these ideas.     

The analyst's anxieties in the first interview: Barriers against analytic presence

To answer the questions: why don't more people enter analysis and how do we get more people to do so? Attention is drawn to anxieties in the analyst that become obstacles to the initiation of analysis. The main focus of the paper is how to understand why analysts, irrespective of patient characteristics, seem to have resistances against embarking on analysis. Being a meeting between strangers the consultation activates strong emotional reactions in both parties. One way of coping is defensively to diagnose, assess and exclude instead of being present as an analyst. The analytic frame of a consultation is ambiguous, and a secure analytic function is needed in order to meet the openness and unpredictability of this frame. A fragile psychoanalytic identity is seen as central to analysts' failure to create an analytic practice; it takes years to develop and maintain a robust analytic function, and analytic work continues to cause disturbing emotional reactions in the analyst. Analysts' vulnerable identity is also linked to the history of psychoanalysis that has fostered an ideal of analytic practice that is omnipotent and impossible to reach. Therefore it is no wonder that attempts to reach a convinced recommendation of analysis can become diverted in the process of consultation. Confronting these inner impediments in order to strengthen the analytic identity is suggested as a better way to get more analytic patients than to keep looking for so‐called analysability in patients.     

Psychoanalytic aesthetics: a defense and an elaboration

Psychoanalysis provides a middle ground that synthesizes opposing views in aesthetics. The opposition in question is between those who would assign primary importance to form in art and those who would assign it to content. Psychoanalysis can offer a psychological elaboration of the aesthetics of catharsis first set out by Aristotle. And it is in this tradition that psychoanalytic theory should be placed. Although Freud emphasized the thematic, emotional, and pleasure yielding aspects of the aesthetic experience, an elucidation of the aesthetics of form is inherent in and consistent with the basic findings of psychoanalysis.     

What's true and whose idea was it?

In this paper, the author explores the idea that psychoanalysis at its core involves an effort on the part of patient and analyst to articulate what is true to an emotional experience in a form that is utilizable by the analytic pair for purposes of psychological change. Building upon the work of Bion, what is true to human emotional experience is seen as independent of the analyst's formulation of it. In this sense, we, as psychoanalysts, are not inventors of emotional truths, but participant observers and scribes. And yet, in the very act of thinking and giving verbally symbolic 'shape' to what we intuit to be true to an emotional experience, we alter that truth. This understanding of what is true underlies the analytic conception of the therapeutic action of interpretation: in interpreting, the analyst verbally symbolizes what he feels is true to the patient's unconscious experience and, in so doing, alters what is true and contributes to the creation of a potentially new experience with which the analytic pair may do psychological work. These ideas are illustrated in a detailed discussion of an analytic session. The analyst makes use of his reverie experience-for which both and neither of the members of the analytic pair may claim authorship-in his effort to arrive at tentative understandings of what is true to the patient's unconscious emotional experience at several junctures in the session.     

SUPERVISION: A CONTAINERÆCONTAINED APPROACH

The authors illustrate an approach to the supervisory process as a learning experience for both supervisee and supervisor built on the containment of unconscious anxieties. It is argued that a core function of psychoanalytic supervision is to help contain the emotional turbulence and the unconscious anxieties arising and evolving in the two interacting domains of the analytic and the supervisory sessions. From this perspective, the analyst-patient interaction and that of the supervisee and supervisor can be understood as twin, tiered transformational arenas, the supervisory one being at the service of holding and grasping the roles the supervisee/analyst goes through as part of the analytic process. On the basis of detailed clinical material from a disturbed 7-year-old girl, the authors explore the interrelated issues and difficulties in containing anxieties and turbulence in both the analytic and the supervisory situation. When emotional containment is adequately handled, the supervision helps the understanding and development of the supervisee's use of his/her own personality as a treatment instrument, as advocated by Fleming and Benedek decades ago. The supervisory session thus furthers the resolution of clinical issues through symbol-formation, clinical sessions and supervision being twin domains for recording and understanding emotional evolution.     

The value of emotionally expressive visual art in medical education

This paper approaches the topic of visual art in medical education from a philosophical perspective, drawing on arguments from epistemology, philosophy of science, aesthetics, and contemporary ethical theory. Several medical ethicists have noted that the traditional clinical paradigm may increase the epistemic and emotional distance between patient and physician in part by focusing on the physical body and medical technology. Some of these same writers recommend a new approach to patients based on empathy and increased attention to suffering. After reviewing these arguments, supporting examples, and recommendations, I explain how visual art that expresses or symbolizes the emotional response to illness could be used to introduce an additional paradigm into medical education. This would be a paradigm based on empathetic attention to patients' emotional experiences in illness. My own argument is that this additional way of perceiving and relating to patients may reduce the distance between patient and physician and may allow physicians to better meet the ideal of treating the patient as a person.     

On psychoanalytic supervision

The author provides both a theoretical context for, and clinical illustrations of, the way in which he thinks and works as a psychoanalytic supervisor. The analytic supervisory experience is conceived of as a form of 'guided dreaming'. In the supervisory relationship, the supervisor helps the analyst to dream (to do conscious and unconscious psychological work with) aspects of the analytic relationship that the analyst is unable to dream or is only partially able to dream. It is the task of the supervisory pair to 'dream up' the patient, that is, to create a 'fi ction' that is true to the supervisee's emotional experience with the analysand. To carry out this work, the supervisor must provide a frame that ensures the supervisee's freedom to think and dream and be alive to what is occurring in the analytic and the supervisory relationship, as well as in the interplay between the two. In one of the clinical illustrations presented, the author illustrates his conception of the importance of the feeling on the part of supervisor and supervisee that (at least occasionally) they have 'time to waste'. Such a state of mind may provide an opportunity for a type of freely associative thinking that enhances the range and depth of what can be learned from the supervisory experience. In another clinical example, the author describes his own experience in supervision with Harold Searles, which contributed to his conception of the supervisory process.     

Motivations for play in online games.

An empirical model of player motivations in online games provides the foundation to understand and assess how players differ from one another and how motivations of play relate to age, gender, usage patterns, and in-game behaviors. In the current study, a factor analytic approach was used to create an empirical model of player motivations. The analysis revealed 10 motivation subcomponents that grouped into three overarching components (achievement, social, and immersion). Relationships between motivations and demographic variables (age, gender, and usage patterns) are also presented.     

The analytic state of consciousness as a form of play and a foundational transference

The analytic state of consciousness is a particular regressive altered state in the patient characterized by an increased sensitivity and reactivity to impressions arising from both the inner world and the analyst, a heightened sense of dependence and vulnerability, a permeability of boundaries in regard to the analyst, and a shift toward functioning on the basis of omnipotent fantasy in the analytic relationship. These changes are accompanied by a feeling of realness of one's psychic reality, but without any true loss of reality testing. Based on an analysis of the structure of play, this state can itself be understood as a kind of play; it serves as a foundational transference underlying more specific transference manifestations; and it is central to the analytic process. Over time, in response to physical aspects of the analytic setting, its safety, the analyst's emotional accompaniment, and a generally restrained analytic stance (an issue I discuss in some detail), it emerges in a more developed form that promotes symbolization and ownership of aspects of self, greater emotional presence, and a deeper sense of meaning in one's experience. Additionally, the concept of the analytic state of consciousness provides a new look at the role of abstinence and frustration in analytic process.     

Analgesic effect of Facebook: Priming with online social networking may boost felt relatedness that buffers against physical pain

Social networking sites (SNSs) are extremely popular for providing users with a convenient platform for acquiring social connections and thereby feeling relatedness. Plenty of literature has shown that mental representations of social support can reduce the perception of physical pain. The current study tested whether thinking about SNS would interfere with users’ perceptions of experimentally induced pain. Ninety‐six undergraduate Facebook users were recruited to participate in a priming‐based experiment. They were randomly assigned to one of the three study conditions (SNS prime, neutral prime, or no prime) via rating the aesthetics of logos. The results showed that participants exposed to SNS primes reported less pain of immersion in hot water than did both control groups (neutral‐ and no‐prime). Felt relatedness mediated the link between SNS primes and diminished pain perceptions. This research provides the first demonstration that thinking about SNS can lower experienced physical pain among Facebook users. Online social networking may serve as an analgesic buffer against pain experience than previously thought. The SNS‐enabled analgesia has far reaching implications for pain relief applications and the enhancement of well‐being in human‐interaction techniques.     

Affective Honesty and Compassion Come in Many Forms: Discussion of “Love (and Hate) With the Proper Stranger: Affective Honesty and Enactment,” By Holly Levenkron,L.I.C.S.W.

Holly Levenkron's work with her patient, Ali, beautifully illustrates one way that a creative analyst makes superb use of her own experience to communicate and negotiate with great affective honesty. Holly's analytic style emphasizes the effective use of a particular kind of self-disclosure and a way of thinking about intersubjectivity and enactment associated with the contemporary Relational movement. Yet, it may be Holly's personal willingness to allow the analytic relationship to profoundly destabilize and influence her that most engages Ali in their work.

An imaginary analytic scenario is described with an analyst, Dr. X, who like Holly is destabilized by Ali but whose thinking about intersubjectivity and enactment emphasizes an empathic immersion in Ali's experience of the analytic relationship. In contrast to Holly, Dr. X focuses primarily on grasping and interpreting the adaptive strivings that animate Ali's differently organized subjective world.

The underlying capacity to acknowledge and use the analyst's own version of the patient's issues may also characterize analyses such as that of the hypothetical Dr. X—in style that are more explicitly “interpretive” (less confrontative) than Holly's work. These two contrasting approaches highlight the wide range of ways to think about intersubjectivity, enactment, and affective honesty in the analytic process.     

Absorption as a therapeutic agent

The process of absorption is therapeutically adaptive for patients in a variety of contexts. Absorption is defined as the temporary loss of self through immersion in an object that eventuates in self-enhancement. Patients who become absorbed in animate and/or inanimate objects are better able to cope with a variety of problems and experience a heightened sense of well-being. Absorption is distinguished from symbiosis, mystic experiences and religion. The recognition, validation and employment of absorption in the analytic session is elucidated.