Carnap,Tarski, and Quine at Harvard: Conversations on Logic,Mathematics, and Science

This paper is both a survey and a review of the current state of the debate concerning verisimilitude. As a survey it is intended for the interested outsider who wants both easy access to and some comparison between the respective approaches. As a review it covers the first three books on the topic: those of Oddie. Niiniluoto and Kuipers.     

Philosophy,Logic, Science,History

Analytic philosophy is sometimes said to have particularly close connections to logic and to science, and no particularly interesting or close relation to its own history. It is argued here that although the connections to logic and science have been important in the development of analytic philosophy, these connections do not come close to characterizing the nature of analytic philosophy, either as a body of doctrines or as a philosophical method. We will do better to understand analytic philosophy—and its relationship to continental philosophy—if we see it as a historically constructed collection of texts, which define its key problems and concerns. It is true, however, that analytic philosophy has paid little attention to the history of the subject. This is both its strength—since it allows for a distinctive kind of creativity—and its weakness—since ignoring history can encourage a philosophical variety of “normal science.”     

Explaining the Success of Science: Kuhn and Scientific Realists

In this essay, I critically evaluate the approaches to explaining the success of science in Kuhn and the works of inference-to-the-best-explanation scientific realists. Kuhn’s challenge to realists, who invoke the truth of theories to explain their success, is two-fold. His paradigm-account of success confronts realists with the problem of theory change, and the historical fact of successful theories later rejected as false. Secondly, Kuhn’s account of the success of science has no need to bring truth into the explanation. In turn, I argue that weakness in Kuhn and the prevailing forms of scientific realism motivate a better account of realism which I characterize as ‘best current theory realism’ and defend against the pessimistic meta-induction and the problem of theory-change. This realism argues that the best explanation of the success of current and past scientific theories only requires the simple claim that our best current theories are true. Kuhn’s account can explain how normal science succeeds but cannot account for why its problem solutions work where they do and why they fail for other puzzles.     

The Relation between Formal and Informal Logic

The issue of the relationship between formal and informal logic depends strongly on how one understands these two designations. While there is very little disagreement about the nature of formal logic, the same is not true regarding informal logic, which is understood in various (often incompatible) ways by various thinkers. After reviewing some of the more prominent conceptions of informal logic, I will present my own, defend it and then show how informal logic, so understood, is complementary to formal logic.     

Philosophy of Science: Interfaces between Logic and Knowledge Representation

Abstract

In this inaugural lecture I offer, against the background of a discussion of knowledge representation and its tools, an overview of my research in the philosophy of science. I defend a relational model-theoretic realism as being the appropriate meta-stance most congruent with the model-theoretic view of science as a form of human engagement with the world. Making use of logics with preferential semantics within a model-theoretic paradigm, I give an account of science as process and product. I demonstrate the power of the full-blown employment of this paradigm in the philosophy of science by discussing the main applications of model-theoretic realism to traditional problems in the philosophy of science.

I discuss my views of the nature of logic and of its role in the philosophy of science today. I also specifically offer a brief discussion on the future of cognitive philosophy in South Africa. My conclusion is a general look at the nature of philosophical inquiry and its significance for philosophers today.     

认知科学视域下的归纳逻辑研究述评

在认知价值的引导和认知科学方法论的昭示下,归纳逻辑已经完成了从面向定性认知和定量认知到面向不足认知和复杂认知的转型。但是,认知价值始终是归纳逻辑不变的取向。古典归纳逻辑中的诸多逻辑方法以推进人们的认知为己任,而现代归纳逻辑更是一开始就直接期望建立满足定量认知需要的完善体系。面向不足认知和复杂认知的归纳逻辑研究,不仅是人类认知需要的深入拓展,更是归纳逻辑必然的发展方向。逻辑学不仅在认知召唤下走得更远,而且对于归纳逻辑而言,进一步发展的动力和方向都可能是认知。     

科学与历史之间的现代与后现代图景

在当今的现代与后现代之争中 ,焦点已不再如后现代运动于本世纪六、七十年代首先在诸如建筑学、电影、舞蹈和音乐等领域崭露头角时那样 ,仅仅是美学趣味和艺术风格问题。这种争论关涉到道德思考和哲学思辨 ,但又不局限于此。如今 ,战场已转移到现代文化最后的 ,也是最具代表性的堡垒 ,即科学。自从在广岛和长崎投放原子弹起 ,科学的运用就成为一般公众和科学家自身道德审查的对象。而从 5 0年代后期以来 ,对于科学的批评 ,已从对其使用或滥用的批评 ,拓展到对于其基本原则的批评 ,这种批评在美国由Ｔ .库恩、Ｈ .普特南和Ｒ .罗蒂所代表 ,在…     

略论因明学史学上的若干问题

因明学史研究目前仍是学术界的一个薄弱环节,很多问题一直没有得到解决,甚至有以讹传讹之处。本文对因明学何时传入汉地的问题、刘勰《文心雕龙》与因明学的关系、因明学在唐代佛道之争中的作用等问题进行了探讨。