Generalist genes: implications for the cognitive sciences

In the 'generalist genes' hypothesis, it is suggested that the same genes affect most cognitive abilities and disabilities. This recently proposed hypothesis is based on considerable multivariate genetic research showing that there is substantial genetic overlap between such broad areas of cognition as language, reading, mathematics and general cognitive ability. We assume that the hypothesis is correct and consider here its implications for cognitive neuroscience. In our opinion, the two key genetic concepts of pleiotropy (in which one gene affects many traits) and polygenicity (in which many genes affect a trait) that underlie the generalist genes hypothesis imply a 'generalist brain'. That is, the genetic input into brain structure and function is general not specific.     

The tortuous route from genes to behavior: A neuroconstructivist approach

In their excitement at using the human genome project to uncover the functions of specific genes, researchers have often ignored one fundamental factor: the gradual process of ontogenetic development. The view that there might be a gene for spatial cognition or language has emanated from a focus on the structure of the adult brain in neuropsychological patients whose brains were fully and normally developed until their brain insult. The developing brain is very different. It starts out highly interconnected across regions and is neither localized nor specialized at birth, allowing interaction with the environment to play an important role in gene expression and the ultimate cognitive phenotype. This article takes a neuro constructivist perspective, arguing that domain-specific end states can stem from more domain-general start states, that associations may turn out to be as informative as dissociations, and that genetic mutations that alter the trajectory of ontogenetic development can inform nature/nurture debates.     

Dual-process theories of reasoning: Contemporary issues and developmental applications

In this paper, I discuss the current state of theorising about dual processes in adult performance on reasoning and decision making tasks, in which Type 1 intuitive processing is distinguished from Type 2 reflective thinking. I show that there are many types of theory some of which distinguish modes rather than types of thinking and that assumptions about underlying cognitive architecture vary. I show that some dual-system theories have been replaced recently by the idea that we have two or more distinct ‘minds’ with different evolutionary histories. I also present the most recent formulation of my own account of dual processing within hypothetical thinking theory, at a level more easily applied to performance on specific tasks. I then consider implications for cognitive development, pointing out that while Type 2 thinking is clearly linked to the development of cognitive ability, it combines and competes with multiple Type 1 processing systems which persist in adult cognition, each of which could have their own developmental time course. Hence, while dual-process theories can and should inspire much research and theory in cognitive development, the derivation of predictions for cognitive development is far from straightforward.     

Recognizing group cognition

In this paper, we approach the idea of group cognition from the perspective of the “extended mind” thesis, as a special case of the more general claim that systems larger than the individual human, but containing that human, are capable of cognition (Clark, 2008, Clark and Chalmers, 1998). Instead of deliberating about “the mark of the cognitive” (Adams & Aizawa, 2008), our discussion of group cognition is tied to particular cognitive capacities. We review recent studies of group problem solving and group memory which reveal that specific cognitive capacities that are commonly ascribed to individuals are also aptly ascribed at the level of groups. These case studies show how dense interactions among people within a group lead to both similarity-inducing and differentiating dynamics that affect the group’s ability to solve problems. This supports our claim that groups have organization-dependent cognitive capacities that go beyond the simple aggregation of the cognitive capacities of individuals. Group cognition is thus an emergent phenomenon in the sense of Wimsatt (1986). We further argue that anybody who rejects our strategy for showing that cognitive properties can be instantiated at multiple levels in the organizational hierarchy on a priori grounds is a “demergentist,” and thus incurs the burden of proof for explaining why cognitive properties are “stuck” at a certain level of organizational structure. Finally, we show that our analysis of group cognition escapes the “coupling-constitution” charge that has been leveled against the extended mind thesis (Adams & Aizawa, 2008).     

Tangled webs: tracing the connections between genes and cognition

The rise of molecular genetics is having a pervasive influence in a wide variety of fields, including research into neurodevelopmental disorders like dyslexia, speech and language impairments, and autism. There are many studies underway which are attempting to determine the roles of genetic factors in the aetiology of these disorders. Beyond the obvious implications for diagnosis, treatment and understanding, success in these efforts promises to shed light on the links between genes and aspects of cognition and behaviour. However, the deceptive simplicity of finding correlations between genetic and phenotypic variation has led to a common misconception that there exist straightforward linear relationships between specific genes and particular behavioural and/or cognitive outputs. The problem is exacerbated by the adoption of an abstract view of the nature of the gene, without consideration of molecular, developmental or ontogenetic frameworks. To illustrate the limitations of this perspective, I select two cases from recent research into the genetic underpinnings of neurodevelopmental disorders. First, I discuss the proposal that dyslexia can be dissected into distinct components specified by different genes. Second, I review the story of the FOXP2 gene and its role in human speech and language. In both cases, adoption of an abstract concept of the gene can lead to erroneous conclusions, which are incompatible with current knowledge of molecular and developmental systems. Genes do not specify behaviours or cognitive processes; they make regulatory factors, signalling molecules, receptors, enzymes, and so on, that interact in highly complex networks, modulated by environmental influences, in order to build and maintain the brain. I propose that it is necessary for us to fully embrace the complexity of biological systems, if we are ever to untangle the webs that link genes to cognition.     

Tools from evolutionary biology shed new light on the diversification of languages

Computational methods have revolutionized evolutionary biology. In this paper we explore the impact these methods are now having on our understanding of the forces that both affect the diversification of human languages and shape human cognition. We show how these methods can illuminate problems ranging from the nature of constraints on linguistic variation to the role that social processes play in determining the rate of linguistic change. Throughout the paper we argue that the cognitive sciences should move away from an idealized model of human cognition, to a more biologically realistic model where variation is central.     

Genetic correlates of adult attachment style

Attachment theory attempts to explain effects of social experiences, not genes, on personality development. Most studies of the development of attachment insecurities support this emphasis on social experiences rather than genes, although there are exceptions. In the present study, the authors examine associations between attachment insecurities and particular genetic polymorphisms related to emotions and social behavior. They find that (a) anxious attachment is associated with a polymorphism of the DRD2 dopamine receptor gene, (b) avoidant attachment is associated with a polymorphism of the 5HT2A serotonin receptor gene, and (c) the rs53576 A polymorphism of the OXTR oxytocin receptor gene is not associated with attachment insecurities. These findings suggest that attachment insecurities are partially explained by particular genes, although there is still a great deal of individual difference variance that remains to be explained by other genes or social experiences.     

Spatial cognition: evidence from visual neglect

Recent work on human attention and representational systems has benefited from a growing interplay between research on normal attention and neuropsychological disorders such as visual neglect. Research over the past 30 years has convincingly shown that, far from being a unitary condition, neglect is a protean disorder whose symptoms can selectively affect different sensory modalities, cognitive processes, spatial domains and coordinate systems. These clinical findings, together with those of functional neuroimaging, have increased knowledge about the anatomical and functional architecture of normal subsystems involved in spatial cognition. We provide a selective overview of how recent investigations of visual neglect are beginning to elucidate the underlying structure of spatial processes and mental representations.     

Arctic cognition: a study of cognitive performance in summer and winter at 69°N

Evidence has accumulated over the past 15 years that affect in humans is cyclical. In winter there is a tendency to depression, with remission in summer, and this effect is stronger at higher latitudes. In order to determine whether human cognition is similarly rhythmical, this study investigated the cognitive processes of 100 participants living at 69°N. Participants were tested in summer and winter on a range of cognitive tasks, including verbal memory, attention and simple reaction time tasks. The seasonally counterbalanced design and the very northerly latitude of this study provide optimal conditions for detecting impaired cognitive performance in winter, and the conclusion is negative: of five tasks with seasonal effects, four had disadvantages in summer. Like the menstrual cycle, the circannual cycle appears to influence mood but not cognition. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Role of Cognitive Style in the Link Between Genes and Political Ideology

There is growing interest in how genes affect political beliefs. To better understand the role of genes in politics, we examine the relationship between cognitive style (the need for cognition, the need for cognitive closure) and various measures of political attitudes (issue‐based ideology, identity‐based ideology, social ideology, economic ideology, authoritarianism, and egalitarianism). We show, for the first time, that the need for cognition and the need for cognitive closure are heritable and are linked to political ideology primarily, perhaps solely, because of shared genetic influences; these links are stronger for social than economic ideology. Although prior research demonstrated that Openness to Experience shares genetic variance with political ideology, we find that these measures of cognitive style account for distinct genetic variance in political ideology. Moreover, the genetic Openness‐ideology link is fully accounted for by the need for cognition. This combination of findings provides a clearer understanding of the role of genes in political beliefs and suggests new directions for research on Big Five personality traits and ideology.     

Beyond cognitive deficits: how social class shapes social cognition

Lower social class is thought to contribute to poorer executive functioning and working memory. Nevertheless, lower social class individuals consistently outperform their higher-class counterparts on social cognitive tasks that rely on similar underlying cognitive processes (e.g., working memory and executive functioning). Why would lower social class inhibit such processes in one domain, but promote them in another? We argue that features of lower-class communities (e.g., resource scarcity) promote social cognition via cultural processes. We then argue that social cognition involves partially unique task and neural demands that are separate from nonsocial cognition. We conclude that unique task and neural demands, together with the distinctive cognitive proclivities of lower- and higher-class cultures, can explain variable associations between social class and cognitive functioning.     

The proactive brain: using analogies and associations to generate predictions

Rather than passively 'waiting' to be activated by sensations, it is proposed that the human brain is continuously busy generating predictions that approximate the relevant future. Building on previous work, this proposal posits that rudimentary information is extracted rapidly from the input to derive analogies linking that input with representations in memory. The linked stored representations then activate the associations that are relevant in the specific context, which provides focused predictions. These predictions facilitate perception and cognition by pre-sensitizing relevant representations. Predictions regarding complex information, such as those required in social interactions, integrate multiple analogies. This cognitive neuroscience framework can help explain a variety of phenomena, ranging from recognition to first impressions, and from the brain's 'default mode' to a host of mental disorders.     

Social psychology and the wrong revolution

Many social psychologists take increasing comfort in cognitive explanations of human action. This paper first attempts to demonstrate that cognitively based formulations not only delimit the possibilities for social understanding, but create a range of intractable conceptual problems. If real world events are reduced to cognitive representations of the world, then social events cease to exist for the discipline as legitimate foci of concern. Further, once the reality of cognition is granted, there is no conceptual means of viably explaining either the origins or acquisition of cognitive categories (schemas, representations, etc.), or the relationship between cognition and action. The paper then goes on to argue that the cognitive revolution in psychology blinds the discipline to the far more pervasive revolution occurring elsewhere in the intellectual world, that of social epistemology. When cognition is replaced by language as the major means for representing the world, then the individual is replaced by the social relationship as the central focus of concern. Theory and research within the framework of social epistemology are reviewed and their implications discussed.     

生成认知：理论基础与实践走向

生成认知是具身认知思潮中的一个新取向。它主张认知是通过身体活动“生成的” (enacted)。认知的起点不是一个怎样精确表征世界的信息加工问题, 而是行动者在情境中怎样利用知觉来指导自己的行动。认知不是通过精确的心理表征“恢复”世界, 而是通过知觉引导的行动“生成”或“造就”一个自己的世界。认知是具身的行动, 认知结构形成于经常和反复出现的感觉运动模式, 与身体构造和身体活动具有深刻连续性。梅洛·庞蒂的身体现象学对生成认知具有深刻影响。同时, 詹姆斯、杜威等人的实用主义哲学对于实践行动的强调也深刻影响了生成认知。这种认知观强调了“行动”对心智的意义, 引发许多争议, 也促进了心理学研究范式的转变。     

Contributions of Functional Neuroimaging to the Study of Social Cognition

ABSTRACT— Increasingly, researchers have been applying the methods of cognitive neuroscience—especially functional neuroimaging—to address questions about how humans make inferences about the mental states of others. At the same time, a number of critics have warned against the use of these new techniques by suggesting that functional neuroimaging has been unable to provide novel insights into the nature of social cognition. Addressing these critiques, this article briefly describes some of the ways in which functional neuroimaging has indeed redirected the study of the social mind, reviewing not only the novel data these techniques have provided but also the ways in which cognitive neuroscience has prompted researchers to consider entirely new questions about the organization of human social cognition. Such questions include whether or not there are cognitive processes dedicated for social thought; what the constituent parts of our social-cognitive system might be; how social cognition overlaps with other mental processes in previously unanticipated ways; and whether social cognition might play a privileged role in the human cognitive repertoire.     

Affective guidance of intelligent agents: How emotion controls cognition

How do emotions and moods color cognition? In this article, we examine how such reactions influence both judgments and cognitive performance. We argue that many affective influences are due, not to affective reactions themselves, but to the information they carry about value. The specific kind of influence that occurs depends on the focus of the agent at the time. When making evaluative judgments, for example, an agent’s positive affect may emerge as a positive attitude toward a person or object. But when an agent focuses on a cognitive task, positive affect may act like feedback about the value of one’s approach. As a result, positive affect tends to promote cognitive, relational processes, whereas negative affect tends to inhibit relational processing, resulting in more perceptual, stimulus-specific processing. As a consequence, many textbook phenomena from cognitive psychology occur readily in happy moods, but are inhibited or even absent in sad moods (149).     

语言如何进化

人类语言具有复杂多变的递归结构,漫长的物种进化过程中唯独人类精通语言。语言的进化始于大约两百万年前的“更新世时期”,语言在当时作为一种认知适应对于人类应对自然界带给人类的挑战（如动物掠食与森林毁坏）有很大帮助。人类进化过程中学习与文化因素形成一种选择压力促使人际交流语法化,人际交流语法化引发大脑容量增加,然而,最初的语言进化与基因无关。学习与文化压力也使交流的媒介依次变为手语模式、表情模式与语言模式。交流媒介的逐渐变化最终导致了FOXP2基因突变,FOXP2基因突变让智人具有了自主的言语能力。与地球上其它的人科动物相比,人类的语言能力使人类在进化中具有明显的优势