New Foundations for Imperative Logic I: Logical Connectives,Consistency, and Quantifiers*

Imperatives cannot be true or false, so they are shunned by logicians. And yet imperatives can be combined by logical connectives: “kiss me and hug me” is the conjunction of “kiss me” with “hug me”. This example may suggest that declarative and imperative logic are isomorphic: just as the conjunction of two declaratives is true exactly if both conjuncts are true, the conjunction of two imperatives is satisfied exactly if both conjuncts are satisfied—what more is there to say? Much more, I argue. “If you love me, kiss me”, a conditional imperative, mixes a declarative antecedent (“you love me”) with an imperative consequent (“kiss me”); it is satisfied if you love and kiss me, violated if you love but don't kiss me, and avoided if you don't love me. So we need a logic of three‐valued imperatives which mixes declaratives with imperatives. I develop such a logic.     

The Jewish emigration from palestine in the early twentieth century

Rabinovitch boarded the ship with all the others who were leaving the land of Israel because the land didn't absorb them, so they leave the Land and return outside the Land. Some are glad to get away from the suffering of the Land and some are sad for they don't know what they will do outside the Land. When they ascended to the Land, they knew why they ascended, when they descend and go outside the Land, they don't know why they are descending.     

Anecdotes for Practitioners

The purpose of this section is to allow our readers the chance to publish “anecdotes” concerning cases they have dealt with as counseling professionals. Stories about problems that you handled, either successfully or unsuccessfully, news of new programs or procedures, or comments on what is happening in the world of counseling—all are appropriate topics for upcoming issues. If you are or have been involved in something you think is interesting, write it down, and don't worry about the prose—that's our job. Send your material to Katy Bennight, 656 S.W. Fourth Terrace, Florida City, Florida 33034.     

Anecdotes for Practitioners

The purpose of this section is to allow our readers the chance to publish “anecdotes” concerning cases they have dealt with as counseling professionals. Stories about problems that you handled, either successfully or unsuccessfully, news of new programs or procedures, or comments on what is happening in the world of counseling—all are appropriate topics for upcoming issues. If you are or have been involved in something you think is interesting, write it down, and don't worry about the prose—that's our job. Send your material to Katy Bennight, 656 S.W. Fourth Terrace, Florida City, Florida 33034.     

Anecdotes for Practitioners

The purpose of this section is to allow our readers the chance to publish “anecdotes” concerning cases they have dealt with as counseling professionals. Stories about problems that you handled, either successfully or unsuccessfully, new of new programs or procedures, or comments on what is happening in the world of counseling—all are appropriate topics for upcoming issues. If you are or have been involved in something you think is interesting, write it down, and don't worry about the prose—that's our job. Send your material to Katy Bennight, 656 S. W. Fourth Terrace, Florida City, Florida 33034.     

Anecdotes for Practitioners

The purpose of this section is to allow our readers the chance to publish “anecdotes” concerning cases they have dealt with as counseling professionals. Stories about problems that you handled, either successfully or unsuccessfully, new of new programs or procedures, or comments on what is happening in the world of counseling—all are appropriate topics for upcoming issues. If you are or have been involved in something you think is interesting, write it down, and don't worry about the prose—that's our job. Send your material to Katy Bennight, 656 S. W. Fourth Terrace, Florida City, Florida 33034.     

Anecdotes for Practitioners

The purpose of this section is to allow our readers the chance to publish “anecdotes” concerning cases they have dealt with as counseling professionals. Stories about problems that you handled, either successfully or unsuccessfully, news of new programs or procedures, or comments on what is happening in the world of counseling—all are appropriate topics for upcoming issues. If you are or have been involved in something you think is interesting, write it down, and don't worry about the prose—that's our job. Send your material to Katy Bennight, 656 S.W. Fourth Terrace, Florida City, Florida 33034.     

DIFFERENTIAL REINFORCEMENT OF OTHER BEHAVIOR AND NONCONTINGENT REINFORCEMENT AS CONTROL PROCEDURES DURING THE MODIFICATION OF A PRESCHOOLER'S COMPLIANCE1

Differential reinforcement of other behavior (DRO) and noncontingent reinforcement were compared as control procedures during the modification of a 3-yr-old preschooler's compliance. The recorded reinforcer was teacher proximity (within 3 ft (0.9 m) of the subject for at least 5 sec) which was often accompanied by positive verbal comments that varied in content across experimental conditions. The verbal content during contingent reinforcement might have been: “Thank you for picking up the blocks”; during noncontingent reinforcement: “You're wearing a pretty dress”; and during DRO: “I don't blame you for not picking up because it isn't any fun”. Contingent reinforcement increased compliance in all manipulation conditions. Noncontingent reinforcement decreased compliance during two reversal conditions. However, the behavior was variable and did not decrease to the low levels reached during the two DRO reversals.     

Practical Moore Sentences*

I discuss what I call practical Moore sentences: sentences like ‘You must close your door, but I don't know whether you will’, which combine an order together with an avowal of agnosticism about whether the order will be obeyed. I show that practical Moore sentences are generally infelicitous. But this infelicity is surprising: it seems like there should be nothing wrong with giving someone an order while acknowledging that you do not know whether it will obeyed. I suggest that this infelicity points to a striking psychological fact, with potentially broad ramifications concerning the structure of norms of speech acts: namely, when giving an order, we must act as if we believe we will be obeyed.     

Narrative and the Stability of Intention

This paper addresses a problem concerning the rational stability of intention. When you form an intention to φ at some future time t, you thereby make it subjectively rational for you to follow through and φ at t, even if—hypothetically—you would abandon the intention were you to redeliberate at t. It is hard to understand how this is possible. Shouldn't the perspective of your acting self be what determines what is then subjectively rational for you? I aim to solve this problem by highlighting a role for narrative in intention. I'll argue that committing yourself to a course of action by intending to pursue it crucially involves the expectation that your acting self will be ‘swept along’ by its participation in a distinctively narrative form of self‐understanding. I'll motivate my approach by criticizing Richard Holton's and Michael Bratman's recent treatments of the stability of intention, though my account also borrows from Bratman's work. I'll likewise criticize and borrow from David Velleman's work on narrative and self‐intelligibility. When the pieces fall into place, we'll see how intending is akin to telling your future self a kind of story. My thesis is not that you address your acting self but that your acting self figures as a ‘character’ in the ‘story’ that you address to a still later self. Unlike other appeals to narrative in agency, mine will explain how as narrator you address a specifically intrapersonal audience.     

A Case for Uncertainty in Career Counseling

This article suggests that an important aspect of the career decision-making process is the awareness that uncertainty (i.e., “1 don't know”) is normal, natural, and most likely unavoidable. The essential message of this article is that it is as useful, and even vocationally mature, to be both certain and uncertain about making a career decision.     

Counting by Identity: A Reply to Liebesman

David Liebesman (AJP, 2015) argues that we never count by identity. He generalizes from an argument that we don't do so with sentences indicating fractions, or with measurement sentences on their supposed count readings. In response, I argue that measurement sentences aren't covered by the thesis that we count by identity, in part because they don't have count readings. Then I use the data to which Liebesman appeals, in his argument that we don't count by identity using measurement sentences, in order to rebut his argument that we don't count by identity using sentences indicating fractions.     

THE CLASS SPECIFIC EFFECTS OF COMPLIANCE TRAINING WITH “DO” AND “DON'T” REQUESTS: ANALOGUE ANALYSIS AND CLASSROOM APPLICATION

Two experiments are reported in which the relationship between compliance with “do” and “don't” requests was examined with developmentally disabled children. In Experiment 1, a multiple baseline design across subjects with counterbalanced treatment conditions was used to evaluate a compliance training program composed of four phases: (a) baseline, during which no consequences were delivered for compliance, (b) reinforcement for compliance with one targeted “do” request, (c) reinforcement for compliance with one targeted “don't” request, and (d) follow-up with reinforcement on a variable ratio schedule for compliance with any “do” or “don't” request. Results of probes conducted before and after training within each condition indicated that generalized compliance occurred only with requests of the same type as the target exemplar (“do” or “don't”). In Experiment 2, these results were replicated in a classroom setting. Following collection of baseline probe data on student compliance, a teacher training program was successfully implemented to increase reinforcement of compliance first with one “do” and subsequently with one “don't” request of a target student. Results of multiple baseline probes across “do” and “don't” requests indicated that the teacher generalized and maintained reinforcement of compliance with other requests of the same type and to other students, with a resulting increase in student compliance with the type of requests reinforced. The impact of treatment on both teacher and student behavior was socially validated via consumer ratings. Implications of these findings with respect to response class formation and compliance training programs are discussed.     

You don't have to go to church to be a good Christian: the implicit religion of the cathedral carol service congregation

The notion that you don't have to go to church to be a good Christian is accepted as an indicator of the form of implicit religiosity espoused by those who (in Bailey's analysis) say that they “believe in Christianity.” The present paper builds on the findings of a recently published survey of rural Anglican churchgoers celebrating harvest which suggested that de-institutionalised implicit religion may be superseding commitment to conventional explicit religious attendance. The responses of 1081 people who attended Christmas carol services in two English cathedrals in 2009 and 2010 are analysed. The findings of the previous paper that implicit religiosity is more prevalent among younger people and among those who attend church less frequently are replicated. Evidence is also found that women are more inclined to this view than men and that those who have a loose historical connection through baptism are more likely to endorse it than those with either no historical connections or stronger ones. Suggestions are made for further research.     

What New Wave Materialists Can't Say

Most phenomenal concept strategists, or concept dualists, trace the explanatory gap to “thin” phenomenal concepts that fail to represent phenomenal properties as physical entities. New Wave Materialists, a subgroup of concept dualists, claim that our physical and phenomenal concepts each represent experience completely and accurately, but nevertheless so differently that a priori links don't (and can't) hold between them. This paper argues that you can't have two distinct but nevertheless complete and accurate representations of the same thing. One (or both) of the representations must misrepresent, or the two representations must represent different things. The paper then puts its arguments in a wider context. It notes that our phenomenal concepts must be transparent, translucent, mildly opaque, or radically opaque (in senses reviewed in the paper). It canvasses arguments that a posteriori physicalists can't consider our phenomenal concepts opaque. Then it shows how its own arguments against New Wave Materialism have the result that a posteriori physicalists can't consider phenomenal concepts transparent or translucent. The paper thus advances its arguments as part of a broad‐based case against a posteriori physicalism.     

Surrender

I love to watch you fish with your feet firmly planted in soft sand and your long legs spread solidly above them. Your pole tilts away from your body and rises into a sky that is like denim jeans that have been washed too often. Ocean waves spend themselves at your feet and tap your strong profile quietly as they absorb you into their rhythm. I admire your familiar but sacred union with nature. Mountain cliffs reach down to the wet sand and embrace your presence because you are that place. You become a quiet stretch of beach that others rarely find their way to. You're the wet sand, the ocean, the wind, the scent, a wave rolling toward dark, wet boulders lining the shore. Your solitary surrender to nature always has soothed and nourished my admiring eyes, but one day it wasn't enough just to be a vicarious observer.     

Do you see what I know? On reasons,perceptual evidence,and epistemic status

Our epistemology can shape the way we think about perception and experience. Speaking as an epistemologist, I should say that I don't necessarily think that this is a good thing. If we think that we need perceptual evidence to have perceptual knowledge or perceptual justification, we will naturally feel some pressure to think of experience as a source of reasons or evidence. In trying to explain how experience can provide us with evidence, we run the risk of either adopting a conception of evidence according to which our evidence isn't very much like the objects of our beliefs that figure in reasoning (e.g., by identifying our evidence with experiences or sensations) or the risk of accepting a picture of experience according to which our perceptions and perceptual experiences are quite similar to beliefs in terms of their objects and their representational powers. But I think we have good independent reasons to resist identifying our evidence with things that don't figure in our reasoning as premises and I think we have good independent reason to doubt that experience is sufficiently belief‐like to provide us with something premise‐like that can figure in reasoning. We should press pause. We shouldn't let questionable epistemological assumptions tell us how to do philosophy of mind. I don't think that we have good reason to think that we need the evidence of the senses to explain how perceptual justification or knowledge is possible. Part of my scepticism derives from the fact that I think we can have kinds of knowledge where the relevant knowledge is not evidentially grounded. Part of my scepticism derives from the fact that there don't seem to be many direct arguments for thinking that justification and knowledge always requires evidential support. In this paper, I shall consider the three arguments I've found for thinking that justification and knowledge do always require evidential support and explain why I don't find them convincing. I think that we can explain perceptual justification, rationality, and defeat without assuming that our experiences provide us with evidence. In the end, I think we can partially vindicate Davidson's (notorious) suggestion that our beliefs, not experiences, provide us with reasons for forming further beliefs. This idea turns out to be compatible with foundationalism once we understand that foundational status can come from something other than evidential support.     

Puerto Rican youth speaks out: SOME QUOTATIONS

In April 1971 11 lively and perceptive Puerto Rican young people met with guest editor Uvaldo Palomares for a discussion. Nine of the young people were in high school and two were enrolled in universities in the New York City area. All of them were involved in the Aspira Club Federation¹, whose aim is to enlighten and encourage Puerto Rican students to attain the educational level to which they aspire. First Palomares explained to the group that he was preparing a special issue of this journal and would like their opinions about counselors. Then he asked them to respond to the following questions: (a) Are there problems that are special to the Puerto Rican? What do you think is the present situation? (b) What are some positive characteristics of Puerto Ricans that counselors and teachers usually don't know about? (c) Why don't counselors or teachers generally recognize these things? (d) What can they do to overcome this problem? What follows here are frank, forthright responses relating to a great variety of concerns, from culture and stereotyping to poverty and tokenism. The interview has been edited by Geraldine Palomares, who is a consultant at the Human Development Training Institute in San Diego.     

An emperor without clothes: The Church's views about treatment of domestic violence

Once upon a time there was an emperor who was very vain about his elegant clothing. Two swindlers convinced him that they could make him the finest clothes he ever had, and set to work on an empty loom. Rumors of their fame began to spread, and even the emperor's high officials were convinced that the invisible garments were the finest they had ever seen. One minister even decided, “I know I'm not stupid, so it must be my fine position I'm not fit for. Some people might think that rather funny, but I must take good care they don't get to hear of it.” And then he praised the material which he couldn't see and assured them of his delight in its charming shades and its beautiful design. The emperor finally went on parade with his new garments. Crowds gathered, and they all said how magnificently clad he was. No one dared admit they couldn't see the clothes, and many concluded there was simply something wrong with them that he appeared naked. Finally a little child said, “But he hasn't got anything on!” “Goodness gracious, do you hear what the little innocent says?” one whispered to another, until finally everyone shouted at last, “He hasn't got anything on!” The emperor was embarrassed, but he drew himself up and went on with the procession still more proudly, while his chamberlains walked after him carrying the train that wasn't there.     

Reply to Garrett

The paper contains four arguments to show that experiences don't represent. The first argument appeals to the fact that an experience can't occur without what the experience is of; the second appeals to the fact we can have an experience without having any awareness of what it is of, the third argument appeals to the fact that long experiences, such as the experience of being kidnapped, don't represent anything; and the fourth appeals to the fact that experiences often leave physical traces. The author rebuts several arguments for the conclusion that experiences represent. The author also considers some of the pitfalls involved in stipulating that experiences represent in a technical sense of “experience” or “represent”.