Absolute error revisited: an accuracy indicator in disguise

When target accuracy is defined as the probability that an individual will respond to an accuracy task within a fixed distance around the target, then the composite error measures, E and AE, are shown to be fairly strong indicators of target accuracy in a relative sense. When AE and E are compared, AE is shown to be an even stronger accuracy indicator than E for most reasonable accuracy requirements. This, plus the fact that AE has certain desirable properties in ANOVA procedures, suggests that AE is a good, composite measure of target accuracy and should be analyzed first to determine if target accuracy differences exist. Subsequent analyses of bias and/or variability are then recommended.     

Improving the spelling performance of students with disabilities

The present study examined the effects of an error correction strategy on the spelling accuracy of students with emotional and/or learning disabilities. The strategy, which asked students to spell a word, view a correct model, and then correct their errors, was compared to a traditional strategy that asked students to write words three times each while viewing a correct model. Results showed that students learned more words in the error correction condition than in the traditional condition. The error correction treatment was shown to be an effective strategy that reduced the number of repetitive spelling practice trials, and was preferred by students.     

Finding an unfamiliar face in a line-up: Viewing multiple images of the target is beneficial on target-present trials but costly on target-absent trials

When viewing unfamiliar faces, photographs of the same person often are perceived as belonging to different people and photographs of different people as belonging to the same person. Identity matching of unfamiliar faces is especially challenging when the photographs are of a person whose ethnicity differs from that of the observer. In contrast, matching is trivial when viewing familiar faces, regardless of race. Viewing multiple images of an own-race target identity improves accuracy on a line-up task when the target is known to be present (Dowsett et al., 2016, Q J Exp Psychol, 69, 1), suggesting that exposure to within-person variability in appearance is key to face learning. Across three experiments, we show that viewing multiple images of a target identity also improves accuracy for other-race faces on target-present trials. However, viewing multiple images decreases accuracy (i.e., increases false alarms) on target-absent trials for both own- and other-race faces. We discuss the implications of our findings for models of face recognition and for forensic settings.     

Reformulation of the hidden variable problem using entropic measure of uncertainty

Using a recently introduced entropy-like measure of uncertainty of quantum mechanical states, the problem of hidden variables is redefined in operator algebraic framework of quantum mechanics in the following way: if A, , E(A), E() are von Neumann algebras and their state spaces respectively, (, E()) is said to be an entropic hidden theory of (A, E(A)) via a positive map L from onto A if for all states E(A) the composite state ° L E() can be obtained as an average over states in E() that have smaller entropic uncertainty than the entropic uncertainty of . It is shown that if L is a Jordan homomorphism then (, E()) is not an entropic hidden theory of (A, E(A)) via L.     

Does the presentation of multiple facial composites improve suspect identification?

Previous research that has evaluated the accuracy of facial composites has reported low identification rates. Two studies are reported here that consider whether showing more than one composite of the same suspect might improve the rate of identification. Sixteen participant‐witnesses saw one of two staged events, each involving a different unfamiliar target. Each participant‐witness worked with a police operator to construct a composite of the target they had seen. One, four or eight composites depicting the same target were then shown to individuals familiar with the target. Overall, the results showed that presenting more than one composite increased the rate of identification. In addition, the results of Study 2 suggest that if the police must select just one composite from a number produced by witnesses, then a promising method might be to choose the one which bears most similarity to the other composites in the set. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Thermal-equilibrium processes and electronic transport in undoped hydrogenated amorphous silicon

Abstract

The temperature and time dependence of the d.c. conductivity of undoped hydrogenated amorphous silicon is presented. Measurements of the electronic transport are reported, with particular emphasis on the effects of annealing and cooling the samples. Two regimes of behaviour are observed. When samples are rapidly cooled from 200°C below a temperature T _E～145°C a non-equilibrium dark conductivity, higher than that corresponding to slow cooling, is observed. The electronic and atomic structure then slowly relax and the time dependence of the excess conductivity is well described by a stretched exponential function. The second regime above T _E corresponds to a relaxation time short compared to experimental times and the conductivity is independent of which order the annealing temperature is chosen. Thus the thermal equilibrium processes observed in undoped samples are qualitatively very similar to those observed in doped samples as recently reported in the literature.     

Absolute Error

The position that a composite error score is not an interpretable indicator of motor performance is supported and expanded. It is shown that Henry’s E² statistic possesses the same deficiencies as A ², and thus is equally invalid. Responses are made to a number of specific criticisms of the Schutz and Roy paper made by Henry.     

Looking for Wugs in all the Right Places: Children's Use of Prepositions in Word Learning

To help infer the meanings of novel words, children frequently capitalize on their current linguistic knowledge to constrain the hypothesis space. Children's syntactic knowledge of function words has been shown to be especially useful in helping to infer the meanings of novel words, with most previous research focusing on how children use preceding determiners and pronouns/auxiliary to infer whether a novel word refers to an entity or an action, respectively. In the current visual world experiment, we examined whether 28- to 32-month-olds could exploit their lexical semantic knowledge of an additional class of function words—prepositions—to learn novel nouns. During the experiment, children were tested on their ability to use the prepositions in, on, under, and next to to identify novel creatures displayed on a screen (e.g., The wug is on the table), as well as their ability to later identify the creature without accompanying prepositions (e.g., Look at the wug). Children overall demonstrated understanding of all the prepositions but next to and were able to use their knowledge of prepositions to learn the associations between novel words and their intended referents, as shown by greater-than chance looks to the target referent when no prepositional phrase was provided.     

An investigation of students' knowledge of the delayed judgements of learning effect

Judgements of learning (JOL) of paired associates can be made immediately after learning or after a delay, while viewing the first word (cue) only or both words (cue–target) in a pair. Delayed cue-only judgements are more related to subsequent memory performance than delayed cue–target, immediate cue-only, or immediate cue–target judgements. In two experiments we tested students' knowledge of this delayed JOL effect and whether their knowledge increases as a function of task experience (Experiment 2). The majority of the participants did not choose the more effective judgement strategy and they did not systematically alter their behaviour as a function of task experience. Instead, a subset of the participants selected judgement strategies on the basis of a learning goal, that is, a strategy that let them restudy both words in a pair. In sum, most students appear to be unaware of the powerful influence of delayed cue-only JOLs on monitoring accuracy.     

Conditional probability judgments: Effects of imagining vs experiencing the conditioning event

Applications of Bayesian conditionalization often involve two temporal aspects: a probability judgment is based on knowledge at a point in time and is revised over time in light of added information. Let t, t′, and t″ designate three chronological points in time. E designates a target event which occurs or not at t″, and C designates a conditioning event which occurs or not at t′. Suppose that an individual judges P(EC) at t. If C occurs, Bayesian conditionalization requires that a judgment of P(E) at t′ is equal to the earlier judgment of P(EC). However, inconsistencies may result because a judgment of P(EC) at t is based on imagining C, while a judgment of P(E) at t′ is based on experiencing C. This study examines two sources of such inconsistencies. First, C normally is an abstraction of what might happen between t and t′. What actually happens may differ, such that an individual observes extraconditional information which affects a judgment of P(E) at t′. Second, experiencing C may change an individual's affective state, leading to greater optimism or pessimism about the occurrence of E. We report an experiment which documents both effects.     

K ⊈ E

In a series of very influential works, Tim Williamson has advanced and defended a much discussed theory of evidence containing, among other claims, the thesis that, if one knows P, P is part of one's evidence (K ? E). I argue that K ? E is false, and indeed that it is so for a reason that Williamson himself essentially provides in arguing against the thesis that, if one has a justified true belief in P, P is part of one's evidence: together with a very plausible principle governing the acquisition of knowledge by non‐deductive inference based on evidence, K ? E leads, in a sorites‐like fashion, to what would seem a series of unacceptably bootstrapping expansions of one's evidence. I then develop some considerations about the functions of and conditions for evidence which are suggested by the argument against K ? E. I close by discussing the relationship of the argument with anti‐closure arguments of the style exemplified by the preface paradox: I contend that, if closure is assumed, it is extremely plausible to expect that the diagnosis of what goes wrong in the preface‐paradox‐style argument cannot be used to block my own argument.     

Personality predicts temporal attention costs in the attentional blink paradigm

Accuracy for a second target is reduced when it is presented within 500 msec of a first target. This phenomenon is called the attentional blink (AB). A diffused attentional state (via positive affect or an additional task) has been shown to reduce the AB, whereas a focused attentional state (via negative affect) has been shown to increase the AB, purportedly by influencing the amount of attentional investment and flexibility. In the present study, individual differences in personality traits related to positive affect, negative affect, and cognitive flexibility were used to predict individual differences in AB magnitude. As hypothesized, greater extraversion and openness predicted smaller ABs. Greater openness also predicted higher overall target accuracy. Greater neuroticism predicted larger ABs and lower overall target accuracy. Conscientiousness, associated with less cognitive flexibility, predicted lower overall target accuracy. Personality may modulate the AB by influencing overinvestment via dispositional tendencies toward more or less stringent or capable cognitive control.     

Making the Quantum of Relevance

Summary  The two Heisenberg Uncertainties (UR) entail an incompatibility between the two pairs of conjugated variables E, t and p, q. But incompatibility comes in two kinds, exclusive of one another. There is incompatibility defineable as: (p → − q) & (q→ − p) or defineable as [(p →− q) & (q →− p)] ↔ r. The former kind is unconditional, the latter conditional. The former, in accordance, is fact independent, and thus a matter of logic, the latter fact dependent, and thus a matter of fact. The two types are therefore diametrically opposed.In spite of this, however, the existing derivations of the Uncertainties are shown here to entail both types of incompatibility simultaneously. Δ E Δ t ≥ h is known to derive from the quantum relation E = hν plus the Fourier relation Δ ν Δ t ≥ 1. And the Fourier relation assigns a logical incompatibility between Δ ν = 0, Δ t = 0. (Defining a repetitive phenomenon at an instant t → 0 is a self contradictory notion.) An incompatibility, therefore, which is fact independent and unconditional. How can one reconcile this with the fact that Δ EΔ t exists if and only if h > 0, which latter supposition is a factual truth, entailing that a Δ E = 0, Δ t = 0 incompatibility should itself be fact dependent? Are we to say that E and t are unconditionally incompatible (via Δ ν Δ t ≥ 1) on condition that E = hν is at all true? Hence, as presently standing, the UR express a self-contradicting type of incompatibility.To circumvent this undesirable result, I reinterpret E = hν as relating the energy with a period. Though only one such period. And not with frequency literally. (It is false that E = ν . It is true that E = ν times the quantum.) In this way, the literal concept of frequency does not enter as before, rendering Δ ν Δ t ≥ 1 inapplicable. So the above noted contradiction disappears. Nevertheless, the Uncertainties are derived. If energy is only to be defined over a period, momentum only over a distance (formerly a wavelength) resulting during such period, thus yielding quantized action of dimensions Et = pq, then energies will become indefinite at instants, momenta indefinite at points, leading, as demanded, to (symmetric!) Δ E Δ t = Δ p Δ q ≥ h’s.     

Monitoring memory errors: The influence of the veracity of retrieved information on the accuracy of judgements of learning

The current study examined the degree to which predictions of memory performance made immediately or at a delay are sensitive to confidently held memory illusions. Participants studied unrelated pairs of words and made judgements of learning (JOLs) for each item, either immediately or after a delay. Half of the unrelated pairs (deceptive items; e.g., nurse–dollar) had a semantically related competitor (e.g., doctor) that was easily accessible when given a test cue (e.g., nurse–do_ _ _r) and half had no semantically related competitor (control items; e.g., subject–dollar). Following the study phase, participants were administered a cued recall test. Results from Experiment 1 showed that memory performance was less accurate for deceptive compared with control items. In addition, delaying judgement improved the relative accuracy of JOLs for control items but not for deceptive items. Subsequent experiments explored the degree to which the relative accuracy of delayed JOLs for deceptive items improved as a result of a warning to ensure that retrieved memories were accurate (Experiment 2) and corrective feedback regarding the veracity of information retrieved prior to making a JOL (Experiment 3). In all, these data suggest that delayed JOLs may be largely insensitive to memory errors unless participants are provided with feedback regarding memory accuracy.     

The Social Accuracy Model of Interpersonal Perception: Assessing Individual Differences in Perceptive and Expressive Accuracy

The social accuracy model of interpersonal perception (SAM) is a componential model that estimates perceiver and target effects of different components of accuracy across traits simultaneously. For instance, Jane may be generally accurate in her perceptions of others and thus high in perceptive accuracy—the extent to which a particular perceiver's impressions are more or less accurate than other perceivers on average across different targets. Just as well, Jake may be accurately perceived by others and thus high in expressive accuracy—the extent to which a particular target is accurately perceived on average across different perceivers. Perceptive and expressive accuracy can be further decomposed into their constituent components of normative and distinctive accuracy. Thus the SAM represents an integration of Cronbach's componential approach with Kenny's (1994) social relations model. The SAM is illustrated using both a half-block as well as a round-robin design. Key findings include reliable individual differences in several specific aspects of interpersonal perceptions.     

The Accuracy and Rationality of Imprecise Credences

It has been claimed that, in response to certain kinds of evidence (“incomplete” or “non‐specific” evidence), agents ought to adopt imprecise credences: doxastic states that are represented by sets of credence functions rather than single ones. In this paper I argue that, given some plausible constraints on accuracy measures, accuracy‐centered epistemologists must reject the requirement to adopt imprecise credences. I then show that even the claim that imprecise credences are permitted is problematic for accuracy‐centered epistemology. It follows that if imprecise credal states are permitted or required in the cases that their defenders appeal to, then the requirements of rationality can outstrip what would be warranted by an interest in accuracy.     

Do testing effects change over time? Insights from immediate and delayed retrieval speed

Retrieving information from memory improves recall accuracy more than continued studying, but this testing effect often only becomes visible over time. In contrast, the present study documents testing effects on recall speed both immediately after practice and after a delay. A total of 40 participants learned the translation of 100 Swahili words and then further restudied the words with translations or retrieved the translations from memory during testing. As in previous experiments, recall accuracy was higher for restudied words than for tested words immediately after practice, but higher for tested words after 7 days. Response times for correct answers, however, showed a different result: Learners were faster to recall tested words than restudied words both immediately after practice and after 7 days. These results are interpreted in light of recent suggestions that testing selectively strengthens cue–response associations. An additional outcome was that testing effects on recall accuracy were related to perceived retrieval success during practice. When several practice retrievals were successful, testing effects on recall accuracy were already significant immediately after practice. Together with the reaction time data, this supports recent models that attribute changes in testing effects over time to limited item retrievability during practice.