Rising Up From Down Under: A Response To Adams-Webber On Cognitive Psychology And Personal Construct Theory

This article is a response to Adams-Webber's (1990) critique of my discussion of the relation between personal construct theory and cognitive psychology (Warren, 7990). Several points of specific disagreement are raised in an effort to clarify my own position. Furthermore, this clarification highlights the need for “integrationist” perspectives to clearly and directly address the problems, as well as the prospects, of relating personal construct theory to other perspectives in psychology.     

Recovering Bartlett's social psychology of cultural dynamics

Despite the current treatment of Frederic C. Bartlett as a cognitive psychologist, his psychology was fundamentally socio‐cultural. More than half a century after the publication of Psychology and Primitive Culture (1923) and Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology (1932), his theoretical contribution has contemporary implications for a social psychology that takes culture seriously. This paper seeks to recover and appraise Bartlett's social psychology in light of the recent literature on culture and psychology, and discusses his relevance for a social psychology of cultural dynamics. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Wundt Myths

Three myths about Wundt have been perpetuated in English language accounts of his work. First, he is said to have founded a Psychologisches Institut (a formally recognized psychological research laboratory) in 1879. Second, he is said to be the first psychologist, as distinct from the first contributor to psychology. Third, he is said to have formulated an elementarist psychology of mental content or experience. The first and second are trivial myths which in isolation would be scarcely worth a comment. The third is a gross misrepresentation which ignores the purposivist-voluntarist underlay of his experimental cognitive psychology and the humanistic, cultural concern of his Völkerpsychofogie.     

Personal Construct Theory and Cognitive Science

Abstract

Warren (1990) claims to have formulated an argument “that personal construct psychology is not a cognitive psychology” (p. 379). Nonetheless, he presents very little in the way of logical demonstration or empirical evidence to support this conclusion. Moreover, the theoretical significance of the question posed in the title of his essay (“Is Personal Construct Psychology a Cognitive Psychology?”) is far from obvious. He asserts that “what is at dispute here is the proper characterization of a position” however, his listing several textbooks that refer to Kelly's theory as a “cognitive” approach to the study of personality does nothing at all to either clarify the specific implications of this question or explain its importance. Interestingly, in a recent introductory personality text by one of Kelly's former students (Phares, 1988), this theory is designated as a “phenomenological approach,” which is consistent with Warren's own notion that “he [Kelly] was more phenomenological than he himself believed” Kelly vigorously resisted all such attempts to classify his model in terms of the usual textbook categories (cf. Adams-Webber & Mancuso, 1983).     

Expressivism,representation, and the nature of conceptual analysis

Philosophers often hold that the aim of conceptual analysis is to discover the representational content of a given concept such as free will, belief, or law. In From Metaphysics to Ethics and other recent work, Frank Jackson has developed a theory of conceptual analysis that is one of the most advanced systematizations of this widespread idea. I argue that this influential way of characterizing conceptual analysis is too narrow. I argue that it is possible that an expressivist account could turn out to be correct as a genuine conceptual analysis of a genuine concept. I claim that since an expressivist analysis does not aim to discover the representational content of a given concept—and, indeed, might itself be based on the idea that the concept in question is not even representational in nature—the possibility of expressivist conceptual analysis shows that Jackson’s theory of conceptual analysis is incomplete as it currently stands. I conclude that Jackson needs to either shift his basic understanding of the nature of conceptual analysis or commit to a particular normative reinterpretation of his project.     

The role of position in object selection in vision

Summary Within contemporary visual-information-processing psychology, two classes of selective-attention theories can be distinguished: position-not-special theories and position-special theories. The position-not-special theories postulate that attentional selection by colour, by form, and by position are equivalent selective operations. The position-special theories assume that selection by position is more basic or direct than selection by colour or by form. Examples of both types of theory are briefly described, and irrelevant and relevant evidence is critically discussed. It is concluded that the relevant evidence is directly compatible with the position-special views and that the position-not-special theories require additional extraneous assumptions. The position-special model presented in Van der Heijden (1992) is elaborated in further detail. It is shown that this model is compatible with two important and often substantiated assumptions of the position-not-special theories: the assumption that pre-attentive analysers organize the visual scene in objects against a background, and the assumption that visual-selective attention can be directed at objects isolated in this way. This position-special theory is a parsimonious theory because it can identify the mentalistic conceptselective attention with the materialistic conceptspatial position.     

BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS AND ECOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY: PAST,PRESENT, AND FUTURE. A REVIEW OF HARRY HEFT'S ECOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY IN CONTEXT

Relations between behavior analysis and ecological psychology have been strained for years, notwithstanding the occasional comment on their affinities. Harry Heft's (2001) Ecological Psychology in Context provides an occasion for reviewing anew those relations and affinities. It describes the genesis of ecological psychology in James's radical empiricism; addresses Holt's neorealism and Gestalt psychology; and synthesizes Gibson's ecological psychology and Barker's ecobehavioral science as a means for understanding everyday human behavior. Although behavior analysis is excluded from this account, Heft's book warrants a review nonetheless: It describes ecological psychology in ways that are congruent and complementary with behavior analysis (e.g., nonmediational theorizing; the provinces of natural history and natural science). After introducing modern ecological psychology, I comment on (a) Heft's admirable, albeit selective, historiography; (b) his ecological psychology—past and present—as it relates to Skinner's science and system (e.g., affordances, molar behavior); (c) his misunderstandings of Skinner's behaviorism (e.g., reductionistic, mechanistic, molecular); and (d) the theoretical status of Heft's cognitive terms and talk (i.e., in ontology, epistemology, syntax). I conclude by considering the alliance and integration of ecological psychology and behavior analysis, and their implications for unifying and transforming psychology as a life science, albeit more for the future than at present.     

Intellectual intuition and Kant's epistemology

In order to construct culture‐inclusive theories of psychology to establish an autonomous academic tradition of Confucian humanism, this article provides a commentary on Zongshan Mou's philosophy of intellectual intuition (智的直覺) as well as his systematic bias in translating Kant's epistemology of transcendental idealism (先驗理念論) into Chinese as ‘transcendent idealism’ (超越觀念論). I will demonstrate that his systematic bias in translating Kant's epistemology into Chinese may hinder his followers in developing a comprehensive understanding of the dialectical relationships among various paradigms of the Western philosophy of science, while his philosophy of intellectual intuition not only deviates from the original philosophical stance of pre‐Qin Confucians towards Heaven (天) and Dao (道), but also leads to his misunderstanding of Zhu Xi's philosophy and exploration of human nature (性), which may help us to understand the necessity of a psychodynamic model of cultural psychology with its emphasis on collective unconsciousness instead of the metaphor of Height Psychology.     

The shape of things to come: Psychoneural reduction and the future of psychology

I contrast Bickle's new wave reductionismwith other relevant views about explanation across intertheoretic contexts. I then assess Bickle's empirical argument for psychoneural reduction. Bickle shows that psychology is not autonomous from neuroscience, and concludes that at least some versions of nonreductive physicalism are false. I argue this is not sufficient to establish his further claim that psychology reduces to neuroscience. Examination of Bickle's explanations reveals that they do not meet his own reductive standard. Furthermore, there are good empirical reasons to doubt that the cognitive approach to mind should be abandoned. I suggest that the near future will not see a reduction of psychology to neuroscience, so much as a replacement of both sciences by an improved form of neuropsychology.     

Cognitive theory,cognitive impairment and clinical practice

The aim of this paper is to present a practical model for investigating cognitive impairment which integrates the experimental-cogaitive-information processing-theory and the psychometric-intellectual-abilities-tradition in psychology to understanding cognitive functioning. It reviews developments in cognitive theory in terms of Processes, complex and simple, such as Intelligence and Information Processing, and Factors of attained Level and Learning ability in the Verbal and Performance modalities. The Savage Cognitive Impairment Model (SCIM) is outlined and types of cognitive impairment defined. Measures of cognitive impairment relevant to clinical practice and research are presented.     

Interbehavioral Perspectives: On Act Psychologies and the Psychological Nouns

In a recent paper, Lee contrasted “act psychologies” with cognitive psychology, alleging that the former are incomplete in their coverage of what most people consider really psychological. By including the contextual interactionist approach of J. R. Kantor with B. F. Skinner’s behaviorism under the “act psychology” umbrella, Lee has shown that she is unfamiliar with the fact that Kantor, during his 60-odd years of active writing, covered virtually every aspect of psychology. She is particularly concerned about the neglect of those psychological nouns that are meaningful abstractions without being aware that contextual interactionism (interbehavioral psychology) uses the very terms which she mentions as long as they are used in reference to interactions and not to faculties or other psychic entities.

     

Drawing the boundary between low-level and high-level mindreading

The philosophical world is indebted to Alvin Goldman for a number of reasons, and among them, his defense of the relevance of cognitive science for philosophy of mind. In Simulating minds, Goldman discusses with great care and subtlety a wide variety of experimental results related to mindreading from cognitive neuroscience, cognitive psychology, social psychology and developmental psychology. No philosopher has done more to display the resourcefulness of mental simulation. I am sympathetic with much of the general direction of Goldman’s theory. I agree with him that mindreading is not a single system based on a single mechanism. And I admire his attempt to bring together the cognitive neuroscientific discovery of mirror system phenomena and the philosophical account of pretense within a unique theoretical framework of mental simulation. To do so, Goldman distinguishes two types of mindreading, respectively, based on low-level and high-level simulation. Yet, I wonder in what sense they are really two distinct processes. Here, I will confine myself largely to spelling out a series of points that take issue with the distinction between low-level and high-level mindreading.     

Narcissism,psychic recognition,and affective validation: A homage to the “later Rosenfeld”

Abstract

Recalling his own participation in a daily group seminar with Rosenfeld and taking this experience as his starting point, the Author describes and discusses the later Rosenfeld’s approach to working with severely disturbed narcissistic patients. Through a detailed analysis of a supervision of a session with a psychotic patient, this paper essentially highlights how important it is to construct a (cognitive and affective) basic common ground in order to subsequently proceed to interpretations of transference. In particular, the paper brings to light those elements allowing the creation of that basic cognitive-affective ground that is necessary to profitably (in a manner useful to the patient) connect the relational events narrated and acted by the patient with the hic et nunc of analytic interaction.     

Illegitimate concept equating in the partial fusion of construct validation theory and latent variable modeling

There has come to exist a partial fusion of construct validation theory and latent variable modeling at the center of which is located a practice of equating concepts such as construct, factor, latent variable, concept, unobservable, unmeasurable, underlying, hypothetical variable, theoretical term, theoretical variable, intervening variable, cause, abstractive property, functional unity, and measured property. In the current paper we: a) provide a structural explanation of this concept equating; b) provide arguments to the effect that it is illegitimate; c) suggest that the singular reason for the presence of construct in the literature of the social and behavioral sciences is to mark an allowance taken by the social and behavioral scientist to obliterate the concept/referent distinction that is foundational of sound science.     

A critique of Dennett

This essay is intended to be a systematic exposition and critique of Daniel Dennett's general views. It is divided into three main sections. In section 1 we raise the question of the nature of a plausible scientific psychology, and suggest that the question of whether folk psychology will serve as an adequate scientific psychology is of special relevance in a discussion of Dennett. We then characterize folk psychology briefly. We suggest that Dennett's views have undergone at least one major change, and proceed to discuss both his earlier and his later views.In section 2 we suggest that Dennett is correctly perceived as an instrumentalist in his earlier works. We think that Dennett later abandons this position because of general worries about instrumentalism and, more importantly, because Dennett became convinced that an instrumentalist conception of folk psychology will not enable us to vindicate the notions of personhood, moral agency, and responsibility. This left Dennett with a dilemma. On the one hand, he does not think that beliefs, etc., will turn out to be genuine scientific posits. On the other hand, he thinks that moral agency would be impossible if we could not treat beliefs, etc. as causally efficacious in some suitable sense.In section 3 we discuss Dennett's resolution of this dilemma. The key to his current view, we suggest, is the illata-abstracta distinction. Dennett holds that both illata and abstracta are real and have causal powers, even though only illata are genuine scientific posits. He suggests that beliefs etc. are abstracta, and are the subject matter of what he calls intentional system theory. The subject matter of another theory, what Dennett calls subpersonal cognitive psychology, are illata, which are subpersonal intentional states. The important point is that this distinction lets Dennett have it both ways: (i) Since beliefs are mere abstracta, we need not commit ourselves to the thesis that beliefs will turn out to be posits of an adequate scientific psychology. (ii) Since beliefs have causal power, we are assured of moral and rational agency. We shall argue that Dennett's current view is untenable. If we are right in our arguments, then Dennett's program to produce a scientifically plausible psychology, one that will turn out to vindicate folk psychology (in some suitable sense), is a failure. It fails in the following important ways: (i) What Dennett sketches — intentional system theory cum subpersonal cognitive psychology — is not a plausible scientific psychology. (ii) As a consequence, Dennett also fails to provide a satisfactory foundation for moral and rational agency.     

The neurotic wandering mind: An individual differences investigation of neuroticism,mind-wandering,and executive control

Cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience have recently developed a keen interest in the phenomenon of mind-wandering. People mind-wander frequently, and mind-wandering is associated with decreased cognitive performance. But why do people mind-wander so much? Previous investigations have focused on cognitive abilities like working memory capacity and attention control. But an individual's tendency to worry, feel anxious, and entertain personal concerns also influences mind-wandering. The Control Failure?×?Concerns model of mind-wandering. Psychological Bulletin, 136, 188–197] argues that individual differences in the propensity to mind-wander are jointly determined by cognitive abilities and by the presence of personally salient concerns that intrude on task focus. In order to test this model, we investigated individual differences in mind-wandering, executive attention, and personality with a focus on neuroticism. The results showed that neurotic individuals tended to report more mind-wandering during cognitive tasks, lower working memory capacity, and poorer attention control. Thus the trait of neuroticism adds an additional source of variance in the tendency to mind-wander, which offers support for the Control Failure?×?Concerns model. The results help bridge the fields of clinical psychology, cognitive psychology, affective neuroscience, and cognitive neuroscience as a means of developing a more complete understanding of the complex relationship between cognition, personality, and emotion.     

L’alexithymie aujourd’hui : essai d’articulation avec les conceptions contemporaines des émotions et de la personnalité

More than thirty years after his introduction and despite many criticisms, the alexithymia concept is giving rise to a growing body of research and interest. Today, it is thought to reflect a deficit in the cognitive processing and regulation of emotion. After a brief historical introduction, this paper proposes an exploration of the links between the alexithymia construct, the multicomponent emotion theories and the five-factor model of personality. Specifically, the potential associations between alexithymia and emotion regulation are examined, referring to recent studies in psychology of emotions, neurobiology, cognitive psychology, developmental psychology and psychology of personality.     

Piaget's stages: the unfinished symphony of cognitive development

After a period during which Piaget's work in developmental psychology went into serious decline as a central force in the field, it has once again gained considerable interest to theorists and researchers. The purpose of the current discussion is to reconsider Piaget's stage construct so that a revised version is viable within the psychological part of the theory. The premise of the discussion is that Piaget fully intended his stages to remain at the heart of his psychology, but had difficulty meeting the objections of critics: that the stages as proposed were too vague, too broad, and too dependent on faith in a “miraculous” transition process. By shifting stage transitions to the midpoint of each stage, by adopting recursive transition processes from neo-Piagetian theories, by embracing decalage as systematic and necessary, and by using Piaget's idea of the taking of consciousness, some of the main problems of his stages can be resolved in a satisfying way. Although still not fully specified, the Piagetian stages can retain their place as general guides to cognitive development and as sources of constraints on what structures and functions are available to the developing mind.     

Cognitive psychology in sport: Progress and prospects

ProblemThere has been a recent upsurge of research interest in cognitive sport psychology or the scientific study of mental processes (e.g., mental imagery) in athletes. Despite this interest, an important question has been neglected. Specifically, is research on cognitive processes in athletes influential outside sport psychology, in the “parent” field of cognitive psychology or in the newer discipline of cognitive neuroscience?ObjectivesThe purpose of this paper is to explore the theoretical significance of research on expertise, attention and mental imagery in athletes from the perspective of cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience.MethodFollowing analysis of recent paradigm shifts in cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience, a narrative review is provided of key studies on expertise, attention and mental imagery in athletes.Results and conclusionsThis paper shows that cognitive sport psychology has contributed significantly to theoretical understanding of certain mental processes studied in cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience. It also shows that neuroscientific research on motor imagery can benefit from increased collaboration with cognitive sport psychology. Overall, I conclude that the domain of sport offers cognitive researchers a rich and dynamic natural laboratory in which to study how the mind works.