Australasian Journal of Philosophy Contents of Volume 88

Veritism says that the fundamental source of epistemic value for a doxastic state is the extent to which it represents the world correctly: that is, its fundamental epistemic value is determined entirely by its truth or falsity. The Swamping Problem says that Veritism is incompatible with two pre-theoretic beliefs about epistemic value: (I) a true justified belief is more (epistemically) valuable than a true unjustified belief; (II) a false justified belief is more (epistemically) valuable than a false unjustified belief. In this paper, I consider the Swamping Problem from the vantage-point of decision theory. I note that the central premise in the argument is what Stefánsson and Bradley call Chance Neutrality in Richard Jeffrey’s decision-theoretic framework. And I describe their argument that it should be rejected. Using this insight, I respond to the Swamping Problem on behalf of the veritist.     

Contents Volume 27 (1998)

Journal of Philosophical Logic -     

Index Contents of Volume 37 (1973)

The validity of various indicators of response distortion on the Personality Assessment Inventory–Adolescent (PAI–A; Morey, 2007a) and its potential usefulness to detect malingering were evaluated by having 17- and 18-year-old students complete the PAI–A attempting to simulate Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) under coached or noncoached conditions. Scores for these respondents on the Negative Impression and Positive Impression scales, the Malingering Index, and the Rogers Discriminant Function (RDF) were compared to those of 17- and 18-year-old patients receiving clinical diagnoses of ADHD. Simulating respondents also completed the Conners Adult ADHD Rating Scale (CAARS) to determine if they could successfully simulate self-reported symptoms of ADHD. A total of 45% of simulating participants obtained CAARS scores reflecting clinically significant symptoms of ADHD. All indicators demonstrated the ability to distinguish between actual patients and feigned responses of successful simulators, with the RDF demonstrating the greatest accuracy in distinguishing these groups.     

Index: Contents of Volume 35 (1971)

Subjects rated all pairs of eight TAT cards and ten Rorschach cards for similarity. They were also scored for n-Ach using imagery scoring on stories to TAT cards. Two similarity dimensions were found for the TAT stimuli, identified as number of persons and degree of strong affect. Those high and low on need for achievement for both sexes differed significantly on degree of salience afforded to each dimension, those high weighting the affect dimension more, and those low the person dimension more. Dimensions of the Rorschach found by Wainer et al. (1976) were replicated, but did not discriminate individuals on need for achievement. The results are discussed in terms of the interpretation of the dimensions, the possible relationship of affect to achievement motivation, and the possible practical implications for the use and measurement properties of projective tests.     

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