TRAINING CONSERVATION OF QUANTITY (LIQUIDS) IN WEST AFRICAN (BAOULE) CHILDREN

A developmental ‘lag’ is found in the Conservation of Quantity (Liquids) in a sample of 73 rural, schooled Baoulé children (Ivory Coast, West Africa) aged 7 to 14 years. This study was designed to investigate if this ‘lag’ could be reduced or bridged through training and whether it could be attributed to differences in ‘performance’ or in ‘competence’. A sub-sample of 28 children aged 7 to 9 years was divided into two matched groups, one being trained for Conservation of Liquids and the other for Class Inclusion (Lavallée and Dasen in press). Statistically significant training effects were observed, which generalized to other concrete operational concepts and remained stable over at least one month. Since no ‘actualization’ or very fast learning occurred, the ‘lag’ was attributed to differences in competence; the training was sufficient to bridge the developmental lag.     

3—7岁儿童不同类型的传递性推理的发展研究

本研究从发展的角度研究了3-7岁儿童在解决三类传递性推理问题时能力发展和策略发展状况,真传递性推理指推理的传递性是确定的,个体根据前提关系可以做出确定的传递性推理结论,不确定性传递性推理指该类推理的传递性是不确定的,关系是否传递需要根据实际的情况和社会经验来确定,否定性传递性推理指根据前提关系得出不能进行传递性的必然结论。结果表明：（1）三类传递性推理的解题能力随年龄的增长而不断增强,在7岁左右初步形成。（2）三类传递性推理,能力发展有不同的起始点、快速发展期以及初步形成期。真传递性推理发展最早最快,不确定传递性推理最晚最慢。（3）3-7岁儿童解决三类传递性推理问题时使用了猜测、视觉判断、定向反应、经验推测和逻辑推理等策略,然而随着年龄的增大,主导策略由准策略向真策略转换。     

Factors and processes in children's transitive deductions

Transitive tasks are important for understanding how children develop socio-cognitively. However, developmental research has been restricted largely to questions surrounding maturation. We asked 6-, 7- and 8-year-olds (N?=?117) to solve a composite of five different transitive tasks. Tasks included conditions asking about item-C (associated with the marked relation) in addition to the usual case of asking only about item-A (associated with the unmarked relation). Here, children found resolving item-C much easier than resolving item-A, a finding running counter to long-standing assumptions about transitive reasoning. Considering gender perhaps for the first time, boys exhibited higher transitive scores than girls overall. Finally, analysing in the context of one recent and well-specified theory of spatial transitive reasoning, we generated the prediction that reporting the full series should be easier than deducing any one item from that series. This prediction was not upheld. We discuss amendments necessary to accommodate all our earlier findings.     

Transitivity for height versus speed: To what extent do the under-7s really have a transitive capacity?

Transitive inference underpins many human reasoning competencies. The dominant task (the “extensive training paradigm”) employs many items and large amounts of training, instilling an ordered series in the reasoner's mind. But findings from an alternative “three-term paradigm” suggest transitivity is not present until 7 + years. Interestingly, a second alternative paradigm (the “spatial task”), using simultaneously displayed height relationships to form premise pairs, can uphold the 4-year estimate. However, this paradigm risks cueing children and hence is problematic. We investigated whether a height-task variant might correspond to a more ecologically valid three-term task. A total of 222 4–6-year-olds either completed a modified height task, including an increased familiarisation phase, or a computer-animated task about cartoon characters running a race in pairs. Findings confirmed that both tasks were functionally identical. Crucially, 4-year-olds were at chance on both, whereas 6-year-olds performed competently. These findings contrast with estimates from all three paradigms considered. A theoretical evaluation of our tasks and procedures against previous ones, leads us to two conclusions. First, our estimate slightly amends the 7-year estimate offered by the three-term paradigm, with the difference explained in terms of its greater relevance to child experiences. Second, our estimate can coexist alongside the 4-year estimate from the extensive training paradigm. This is because, applying a recently developed “dual-process” conception of reasoning, anticipates that extensive training benefits a species-general associative system, while the spatial paradigm and three-term paradigm can potentially index a genuinely deductive system, which has always been the target of transitive research.     

Developmental changes in application of the majority rule in group decisions

This study examined age-related changes in the child's application of the principle of majority rule in group decisions. Following a problem posed by Moessinger (1981), we enquired whether children routinely apply the majority rule when the majority consists of a shifting (variable) set of members across decisions, and alternate between majority and minority when the majority and minority is fixed, i.e. consists of the same individuals each time. In Geneva, Moessinger found that 8-year-olds failed to discriminate between fixed and shifting majorities, while most 13-year-olds (75 per cent) did so. An altered replication was conducted in Australia modifying Moessinger's procedure to control for extraneous variables such as ‘set’ and the need for variety in choice. It was found that on the task 7 per cent of 8-year-olds, 20 per cent of 10-year-olds, 32 per cent of 12-year-olds, and 39 per cent of 14-year-olds discriminated on a behavioural criterion between fixed and shifting majorities. Ten per cent of 8-year-olds, 40 per cent of 10-year-olds, 52 per cent of 12-year-olds, and 55 per cent of 14-year-olds made the discrimination on Moessinger's cognitive ‘reason’ criterion. The results show that development of the conceptual distinction between fixed and shifting majorities is gradual and continuous.     

The development of memory for own- and other-race faces

This study demonstrates that experience and development interact to influence the "cross-race effect." In a multination study (n=245), Caucasian children and adults of European ancestry living in the United States, Norway, or South Africa, as well as biracial (Caucasian-African American) children and adults living in the United States, were tested for recognition of Asian, African, and Caucasian faces. Regardless of national or biracial background, 8- to 10-year-olds, 12- to 14-year-olds, and adults recognized own-race faces more accurately than other-race faces, and did so to a similar extent, whereas 5- to 7-year-olds recognized all face types equally well. This same developmental pattern emerged for biracial children and adults. Thus, early meaningful exposure did not substantially alter the developmental trajectory. During young childhood, developmental influences on face processing operate on a system sufficiently plastic to preclude, under certain conditions, the cross-race effect.     

The role of action-initiation in young children's causal explanations of action

Four studies examined preschoolers' use of the cue of action initiation to infer another's desired goal. In two studies, children watched as one protagonist self-initiated movement to a target while a second person was propelled there by an external force. Older 3-year-olds (M = 3;10) and 5-year-olds consistently judged only the self-initiated actor's movement as desire based. In the second study, however, younger 3-year-olds (M = 3;3 also participated, and they were equally likely to say that either movement was goal directed, even when the passive mover appeared to resist movement toward the goal. A third study, featuring only one protagonist, yielded no improvement among younger 3-year-olds. A fourth study emphasizing the single protagonist's persistence in approaching a target via repeated self-initiated movements revealed some improvement among younger 3-year-olds; older 3-year-olds were near ceiling performance. Altogether, these results suggest that differences in action initiation play an increasingly important role in 3-year-olds' mentalistic explanations of action. This development may be related to other critical changes occurring in 3-year-olds' developing theory of mind.     

Miniature linguistic systems as tests of the use of universal operating principles in second-language learning by children and adults

This study examined four universal operating principles for first language acquisition proposed by Slobin (1973) and MacWhinney (1978). The applicability of these principles to second-language acquisition was tested by teaching children and adults a miniature linguistic system. The results suggested that the four principles played a major role in the learning of the system by 5- to 7-year-olds but not by adults. Modifications were made in the standard miniature linguistic system technique in order in maximize linguistic naturalness and referentiality. The result was a complex system that could still be taught even to 5-year-olds in the space of a few hours.     

Children's Understanding of the Causal Origins of Disability

This study explores children's understanding of the causal origins of disabilities. Using a forced-choice explanation task, children's understanding of social-psychological, physical, and biological causal explanations of disabilities was considered. We presented 79 children (26 4- to 5-year-olds, 26 6- to 7-year-olds, and 27 10- to 11-year-olds) with 4 vignettes describing a child with a particular disability (physical disability, blindness, learning disability, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder). Participants rated their agreement with a variety of causal explanations of disability. Results showed significant age, disability, and causal explanation differences in children's causal understandings of disability. Children of all ages showed a preference for physical and biological causes of disability and rejected social-psychological causal explanations. These findings highlight the usefulness of employing a forced-choice methodology to examine young children's concepts of the causal origins of disabilities.     

Development of the self-system: How children perceive their own and others' ideas about themselves

The purpose of this article is to present a model for the development of the self-system in which six concepts within and related to the self-system are distinguished as follows: Four intraindividual self-concepts involving the real and the ideal self-concepts, the perceived real concepts of others about the self, and the perceived ideal concepts or expectancies of others about the self and two environmental concepts involving the actual ideas of others about the child and the others' ideal concepts of or expectancies toward the child. The development and interrelationships among these concepts were studied with 204 children from six age groups (i.e., 6-, 8-, 10-, 12-, 14- and 16-year-olds) with respect to their fit. The intraindividual self-concepts of the children were assessed by means of a Repertory Grid procedure presented to the children. The environmental concepts were obtained by interviewing both parents. The results suggest that although adolescents believe that they do not fulfill their parents expectations, their parents are reasonably satisfied with the extent to which their children have met their ideal expectations.     

Age-related trends of stroop-like interference in animal size tests in 5- to 12-year-old children and young adults

Few studies have examined the development of Prepotent Response Inhibition (Nigg's interference control) from childhood to adulthood. This cross-sectional study examined differences in Prepotent Response Inhibition among children of 5 age groups: twenty 5- to 6-year-olds, twenty-one 7- to 8-year-olds, twenty-two 9- to 10-year-olds, eighteen 11- to 12-year-olds, and 24 young adults (18- to 24-year-olds). Participants were administered two Stroop-like tasks: the Real Animal Size Test described in 2009 by Catale and Meulemans, which requires that participants decide the real size of animals (big vs. small) displayed in a mismatching pictorial size; and the Pictorial Animal Size Test (an original test), which requires that participants report the pictorial size of the animals. Results showed clear differences between the tests. The Pictorial Animal Size Test elicited robust interference whereas the Real Animal Size Test elicited no interference. The Pictorial Animal Size Test also revealed the development of Prepotent Response Inhibition in children of 5–12 years and between children and young adults. These results were discussed with respect to differences in strengths of processing. The Pictorial Animal Size Test can be a useful tool for assessment of Prepotent Response Inhibition in children older than 5 years of age.     

The relationship among sex-role stereotyping,sex-role preference,and the sex difference in spatial visualization

At an early age, children attain concepts of sex-appropriate activities, behaviors, attitudes, and goals, i.e., sex-role stereotypes. These conceptual stereotypes seem to assign a less favorable role to females. Thus it seems plausible that their acceptance (by both sexes) might be at least partly responsible for the performance differences that begin to arise in adolescence and adulthood. In view of the importance of early adolescence as a transitional period during which sex-role requirements are augmented and intellectual sex differences emerge, 105 11-year-olds and 102 14-year-olds were selected as subjects. Their spatial abilities, sex-role concepts, and sex-role preferences were assessed. Stereotyping sex roles (in general) was not associated with spatial performance; stereotyping sex roles that included information regarding subjects' views about intellectual competence was related to performance. The sex difference in spatial ability that emerged at age 14 was among subjects with own-sex preferences only; there were no sex differences among subjects who preferred to be boys.This article is based upon a doctoral dissertation presented to the Department of Psychology of Columbia University. The author would like to express her thanks to her advisers, Phillip Shaver and Deanna Kuhn; to her committee members, Robert Krauss, Norma Graham, Patrick Lee, and Wayne Proudfoot; to Carol Jacklin and Ruth Wylie for their advice and support; and to Flora Churnin, Douglas Churnin, and Carl Nash for their invaluable assistance during all phases of this study.     

The Trapezoidal Illusion as a Function of Age,Intellectual Status,Size Constancy,and Form Discrimination

One hundred twenty-two, middle-class white boys and girls aged 3 through 12 years were interviewed to determine the nature and the development of their concepts of death and the impact of experience on those concepts.

Five conclusions were drawn from the results of this inquiry: (a) children's concepts of death were found to be constituted of components which were suggested prior to the study; (b) children's understanding of each of the components developed from absence to incomplete presence to complete presence; (c) children's concepts of death developed as a function of age maturity; (d) children's experiences with death accelerated death concept development only in 6-year-olds and below; and (e) children's concepts of death developed in three stages clearly related to the preoperational, concrete operations, and formal operations stages suggested by Piaget. In contrast with Nagy's results, children did not reify death; furthermore, children 8-years-old and above were consistent in showing adult ideas of death.     

The format of children’s mental images: Penetrability of spatial images

To investigate the format of mental images and the penetrability of mental imagery performance to top-down influences in the form of gravity information, children (4-, 6-, 8- and 10-year-olds) and adults (N = 112) performed mental rotation tasks. A linear increase in response time with rotation angle emerged at 6-years, suggesting that spatial properties are represented in children’s mental images. Moreover, 6-, 8-, and 10-year-olds, but not 4-year-olds or adults, took longer to respond to rotated stimuli pairs when gravity information was incongruent with the direction of rotation rather than congruent. Overall, findings suggest that in contrast to adults’, 6- to 10-year-olds’ mental rotation performance was penetrated by top-down information. This research (a) provides insight into the format of young children’s mental images and (b) shows that children’s mental rotation performance is penetrable by top-down influences.     

Extinction of conservation and transitivity of weight

This study attempted to determine whether children will relinquish their belief in Piagetian concepts upon presentation of disconfirming evidence. Two age groups were tested: third- and fourth-grade, and sixth-grade. Conservation of weight and transitivity of weight were the concepts examined; the discrepant feedback consisted of three trials with either non-conservation or nontransitivity outcomes. Resistance or extinction was inferred from the subject's explanations for the outcomes, his responses on subsequent trials, and his performance on a one-month delayed posttest. Conservation subjects showed only moderate resistance by any of these measures; furthermore, there was no evidence of a developmental increase in resistance. Transitivity subjects, in contrast, were much less likely than conservers to change their judgments on either the initial or the delayed test; they also showed the expected developmental increase in resistance to extinction. The results are interpreted as indicating that Piagetian concepts may vary in the extent to which they entail feelings of logical necessity.     

Influence of intensity on children’s sensitivity to happy, sad, and fearful facial expressions

Most previous studies investigating children’s ability to recognize facial expressions used only intense exemplars. Here we compared the sensitivity of 5-, 7-, and 10-year-olds with that of adults (n = 24 per age group) for less intense expressions of happiness, sadness, and fear. The developmental patterns differed across expressions. For happiness, by 5 years of age, children were as sensitive as adults even to low intensities. For sadness, by 5 years of age, children were as accurate as adults in judging that the face was expressive (i.e., not neutral), but even at 10 years of age, children were more likely to misjudge it as fearful. For fear, children’s thresholds were not adult-like until 10 years of age, and children often confused it with sadness at 5 years of age. For all expressions, including even happy expressions, 5- and 7-year-olds were less accurate than adults in judging which of two expressions was more intense. Together, the results indicate that there is slow development of accurate decoding of subtle facial expressions.     

Symbols and Similarity: You Can Get Too Much of a Good Thing

A method for eliciting extended explanations was used to evaluate predictions from the “theory-theory” account of developing psychological reasoning. Children were repeatedly asked to explain the actions or emotions of story characters with false beliefs. Questioning elicited false belief attributions in half of 3-year-olds (Study 1, N = 16, age M = 3;6) and most 4-year-olds who failed belief prediction tasks (Study 2, N = 30, M = 4;5). In Study 3, 30 prediction failers (M = 5;1) gave significantly more false belief explanations for emotions than for actions. Across the studies, desire and emotion explanations emerged early and often, reflecting the primacy of these constructs in the children's understanding of psychological causality. Results are discussed in terms of their implications for developmental mechanism.     

Children's profiles of addition and subtraction understanding

The current research explored children's ability to recognize and explain different concepts both with and without reference to physical objects so as to provide insight into the development of children's addition and subtraction understanding. In Study 1, 72 7- to 9-year-olds judged and explained a puppet's activities involving three conceptual relations: (a) a+b=c, b+a=c; (b) a-b=c, a-c=b; and (c) a+b=c, c-b=a. In Study 2, the self-reports and problem-solving accuracy of 60 5- to 7-year-olds were recorded for three-term inverse problems (i.e., a+b-b=?), pairs of complementary addition and subtraction problems (i.e., a+b=c, c-b=?), and unrelated addition and subtraction problems (e.g., 3-2). Both studies highlighted individual differences in the concepts that children understand and the role of concrete referents in their understanding. These differences were related to using efficient procedures to solve unrelated addition and subtraction problems in Study 2. The results suggest that a key advance in children's conceptual understanding is incorporating subtractive relations into their mental representations of how parts are added to form a whole.     

Keeping the reader's mind in mind: Development of perspective-taking in children's dictations

This study investigated when children can take the perspective of their reader if the information-processing demands of writing are removed by means of dictation to a scribe. Participants (N = 96) aged 5, 6 and 7 years dictated letters to an addressee who possessed requisite content knowledge, and then revised the letter or dictated a new letter to an addressee who lacked this knowledge (counterbalanced). Results showed that 19% of 5-year-olds, 41% of 6-year-olds, and 72% of 7-year-olds considered their reader's missing knowledge. Children's awareness of their reader's knowledge was neither related to performance on higher-order theory of mind tasks, nor to measures of executive function. Significantly greater perspective-taking was demonstrated in children's new letters than revised letters. However, although revision is considered a late-developing skill, half of even the 5-year-olds were able to make revisions (albeit few revisions demonstrated actual perspective-taking). Findings have significant implications for the emergent-literacy curriculum.     

Young children's reasoning about the order of past events

Four studies are reported that employed an object location task to assess temporal-causal reasoning. In Experiments 1-3, successfully locating the object required a retrospective consideration of the order in which two events had occurred. In Experiment 1, 5- but not 4-year-olds were successful; 4-year-olds also failed to perform at above-chance levels in modified versions of the task in Experiments 2 and 3. However, in Experiment 4, 3-year-olds were successful when they were able to see the object being placed first in one location and then in the other, rather than having to consider retrospectively the sequence in which two events had happened. The results suggest that reasoning about the causal significance of the temporal order of events may not be fully developed before 5 years.