Multidimensional locus of control in sociopolitical activists of conservative and liberal ideologies.

Three studies were conducted to examine the relationship between a multi-dimensional measure of locus of control and sociopolitical activism, controlling for the effects of political ideology. In Study 1, 98 male college students completed a measure of conservatism-liberalism. Kerpelman's Activism scale, and locus of control scales designed to differentiate between two types of externals: belief in powerful others versus belief in chance forces. In Studies 2 and 3, female college students (Ns=26 and 40) who differed in the extent of their participation in leftist political activities or feminist causes responded to the multidimensional locus of control scales. As predicted, results from analyses of variance and trend analyses indicate that for liberals, increases in expectancies of control by powerful others are positively associated with increases in activism, while for conservatives, there is a negative relationship. The importance of controlling for ideology and the implications of the differentiated view of externality for understanding social action are discussed.     

Verbally Expressed Wishes of Children and College Women Students

This research examined the relationship between locus of control and two academic-related variables: study habits and attitudes, and college academic performance. Subjects were administered (a) the Brown-Holtzman Survey of Study Habits and Attitudes and (b) the Levenson Internal, Powerful Others, and Chance scales, the latter providing separate measures of two external control dimensions. Results indicated that internal control was related positively to effective study habits and attitudes and to college academic success, while the opposite was true for powerful others and chance control. Additional findings demonstrated significant differences between powerful others and chance control as related to study habits and attitudes and to college grade-point averages.     

Methodological and theoretical improvements in the study of superstitious beliefs and behaviour

Via four studies (N = 901), we developed an improved Belief in Superstition Scale (BSS) composed of three distinct components (belief in bad luck, belief in good luck, and the belief that luck can be changed), whose structure was supported through exploratory (Study 1) and confirmatory (Studies 2 and 3) factor analyses using divergent samples. We found that among theoretical predictors, higher ‘chance’ locus of control (i.e., the belief that chance/fate controls one's life) best predicted all three BSS subscales (Studies 2–3). In Study 3, we found that BSS subscale scores were reliable, but largely invariant across age and education with a non‐general psychology sample. In Study 4, the BSS subscales best predicted participants’ superstitious attitudes and behaviour in a new lottery drawing paradigm among other commonly used superstition scales. Taken together, our results indicate that the BSS is a valuable addition to the burgeoning research on superstitious attitudes and behaviour.     

Multidimensional Locus of Control in Prison Inmates1

This study examined public offenders' generalized expectancies of control as they relate to length of time in prison and behavior within the institution, in order to demonstrate the usefulness of a multidimensional modification of Rotter's locus of control scale with a prison sample. Inmates (N= 145) serving sentences in a large, state prison responded to three locus of control scales designed to measure separately expectancies of internality, of control by powerful others, and of control by chance forces. It was reasoned that if the separation of control into these three orientations is meaningful, then changes in perceptions of control by powerful others should be particularly relevant to the prison experience. As predicted, scores on the Powerful Others scale were significantly related to length of time in prison and number of times punished by solitary confinement.     

Depression and attributions for problems and solutions in college students

50 adult clients at college counseling centers completed scales measuring depression, attributions for their primary problem and its expected improvement, and locus of control. Subjects who were more depressed made relatively internal and stable attributions for their primary problems, were less likely to believe they would improve, and expressed more belief in the importance of chance and powerful others. As a group, subjects tended to view their improvement as more internal and controllable than the cause of their problems. The results suggest that knowledge of clients' attributions for their problems could prove relevant to the treatment of depression.     

Health locus of control and health behaviour: results from a nationally representative survey

The present study aims to examine the association between sociodemographic variables and health locus of control (HLC) as well as HLC and health behaviour. Data from a representative sample of the German adult population, the Telephone Health Survey 2006 (GSTel06; N=5542), were used. A German version of the MHLC (multidimensional HLC) scales was used. Associations between sociodemographic variables and three dimensions of HLC (internal, powerful others and chance) and between HLC and health behaviour were calculated. In particular, higher age, low socioeconomic status and migration background were associated with higher HLC scores on the powerful others and chance dimension. Subjects scoring high on the chance dimension did less sports activity (OR: 0.8; CI: 0.7-0.9), had less medical teeth protection (0.7; 0.6-0.9), fewer health courses (0.8; 0.7-0.9) and conducted less systematic information-seeking (0.8; 0.6-0.9), while results regarding internal and powerful others HLC remained mainly insignificant. High chance HLC can be regarded as risk factor of adequate health behaviour. The associations between high chance HLC, low socioeconomic status and migration background emphasise the need for treatments and prevention programmes tailored to modify the high chance HLC of socially disadvantaged populations.     

Power and perceived influence: I caused your behavior,but I'm not responsible for it

There are numerous examples of powerful people denying responsibility for others' (mis)conduct in which they played—and acknowledge playing—a causal role. The current article seeks to explain this conundrum by examining the difference between, and powerful people's beliefs about, causality and responsibility. Research has shown power to have numerous psychological consequences. Some of these consequences, such as overconfidence, are likely to increase an individual's belief that he or she caused another person's behavior. However, others, such as decreased perspective‐taking, are likely to decrease an individual's belief that he or she was responsible for another person's behavior. In combination, these psychological consequences of power may lead powerful people to believe that they instigated another's behavior while simultaneously believing that the other person could have chosen to do otherwise. The dissociation between these two attributions may help to explain why people in positions of power often deny responsibility for others' behavior—unethical or otherwise—that they undeniably caused.     

Validation of health locus of control patterns in Swedish adolescents

The purpose of the present study was to investigate the relationships between Health Locus of Control (HLOC) questionnaire subscales (Internal, Powerful Others, Chance) and self-esteem in Swedish adolescents (N = 506). Results from traditional correlational analyses were compared with findings using an alternative method of clustering individuals according to their pattern of scores on the three HLOC subscales. One-way analysis of variance, with eight possible groupings of high and/or low scores on the three subscales, indicated that those with a combination of strong belief in internal control of health, high degree of belief that health is determined by powerful others, and low degree of belief that health is a function of chance/luck had better self-esteem than those with a quite opposite pattern, involving high belief in chance and low belief in internal control. The potential benefit to researchers and clinicians of using this method of combining the HLOC subscales, instead of the traditional correlational method, is discussed.     

Locus of control in aging research: a case for multidimensional and domain-specific assessment

Do locus of control beliefs change in later life? Is locus of control related to aging-relevant outcomes involving intelligence and health? In past research on these topics, the use of unidimensional and generalized measures of locus of control has led to a set of inconsistent findings. Three studies were conducted to examine the usefulness of multidimensional and domain-specific measures of locus of control for examining age differences and correlates. College students and elderly adults were compared on Levenson's multidimensional and generalized (internal, chance, and powerful others) locus of control scales and two domain-specific versions related to intelligence and health. As predicted, no age differences were found with generalized measures, but the elderly were more external on intelligence- and health-specific locus of control dimensions. Age differences were found most often on the chance and powerful others control dimensions, suggesting that the elderly acknowledge the importance of external sources of control and at the same time preserve their sense of internal control. In addition, the domain-specific scales were better predictors of behavioral outcomes within their respective domains for the elderly but not for the young. The findings suggest that multidimensional and domain-specific conceptions of control are advantageous for aging research.     

Influence of Response Mode on Order Effects in the Interview

Two experiments involving students (N = 142 and N = 174, respectively) were conducted to investigate the effects of response mode and order on the evaluation of a hypothetical interviewee. Response mode (step-by-step or end-of-sequence) and order of positive and negative interview responses were manipulated in both studies. Competing hypotheses based on the belief adjustment model and predecisional distortion were tested. In both studies, the evaluation of the hypothetical candidate was more consistent with predictions of the belief adjustment model than with predecisional distortion. The results suggest that structured interviews are not immune to order effects. Furthermore, the belief adjustment model may be used to predict whether primacy or recency effects in interviews are likely to occur.     

An Experimental Study Using the Ophthalm-O-Graph and Metron-O-Scope in the Diagnosis and Treatment of Reading Defects

Changes in self-esteem and belief in internal versus external control of reinforcement (skill versus chance) were investigated among 24 black male and female youngsters, aged 12 through 19, from diverse backgrounds and geographical locations. Age, socioeconomic status, geographical location, and achievement in flight training were varied. Results showed significant gains in self-esteem by Ss under 16 years of age (p < .05) and Ss from middle income families (p < .005). There was no significant change in belief in internal versus external control among any of the subgroups.     

Additional cross‐cultural evidence on the selective usage of nonmaterial beliefs in explaining life events

Two studies, one conducted in the Netherlands (N=87) and one in Italy with two samples—Catholic Youth (N=41) and Young Communists (N=41)—assessed the cross‐cultural generality of the previously confirmed hypothesis (Pepitone & Saffiotti, 1997) that six universal nonmaterial beliefs—fate, God, luck, chance, just punishment, and just reward—are used selectively to interpret life events. A ‘selective correspondence’ between the six beliefs and the standard life event cases specifically constructed to engage the belief‐specializations was predicted. All three samples showed the predicted correspondence in terms of significant ordinal correlations in a 6 nonmaterial belief ×9 life events classification. In addition, the findings are consistent with the assumption that the degree of selective correspondence depends upon the importance of beliefs in the sample under study. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Children's counterfactual inferences about long and short causal chains

Recent findings on counterfactual reasoning in children have led to the claim that children's developing capacities in the domain of ‘theory of mind’ might reflect the emergence of the ability to engage in counterfactual thinking over the preschool period (e.g. Riggs, Peterson, Robinson & Mitchell, 1998 ). In the study reported here, groups of 3- and 4-year old children were presented with stories describing causal chains of several events, and asked counterfactual thinking tasks involving changes to different points in the chain. The ability to draw successful counterfactual inferences depended strongly on the inferential length of the problem, and the age of the children; while 3-year-olds performed above chance on short inference counterfactuals, they performed below chance on problems involving longer inference chains. Four-year-old children were above chance on all problems. Moreover, it was found that while success on longer chain inference problems was significantly correlated with the ability to pass tests of standard false belief, there was no such relationship for short inference problems, which were significantly easier than false belief problems. These results are discussed in terms of the developmental relationships between causal knowledge, counterfactual thinking and calculating the contents of mental states.     

Self‐specific Optimism Bias in Belief Updating Is Associated with High Trait Optimism

People learn more from new information when it leads to favorable future outlooks and thus can maintain optimism despite conflicting evidence. In two studies (N = 20 and 26), we investigated whether this optimism bias in belief updating is self‐specific by modifying a recently introduced learning paradigm. In each trial, participants had to estimate the probability of experiencing a negative future event, were then presented with the population base rate of that event, and were subsequently asked for a second, updated estimation. In half of the 88 trials with varying events, estimations were made for oneself, in the other half for a similar other. We tested whether the updates (differences between the first and second estimates) following undesirable base rate were lower than those following desirable base rates, and whether this difference was greater for self relative to other. In both studies, the overall results support the presence of a self‐specific optimism bias in belief updating. However, taking into account trait optimism (TO) as a moderator variable revealed that this was the case only in participants with high TO, whereas those with low TO showed optimistic belief updating for both self and other. In Study 2, we additionally controlled for possible misclassifications of base rate desirability. Taken together, the optimism bias in belief updating was demonstrated by a selective neglect of unfavorable information. A self‐specific influence of this bias in individuals with high TO may ultimately cause the impression of a more positive future outlook relative to others. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Personal efficacy, external locus of control, and perceived contingency of parental reinforcement among depressed, paranoid, and normal subjects

Bandura (1982) suggested that judgments of personal efficacy and outcome expectancies (i.e., locus of control) jointly affect behavior. We hypothesized that different combinations of these two sets of beliefs would characterize the thought structures of normal subjects and of psychiatric patients suffering from distinctly different disorders. Normal subjects, depressed subjects, and paranoid subjects completed scales with which we measured beliefs in personal efficacy and beliefs that outcomes are controlled either by chance or by powerful others, as well as a scale with which we assessed perceived contingency of parental reinforcement. The major findings were as follows: Normals judged themselves to be more efficacious than did psychiatric subjects; whereas depressives expected outcomes to be controlled by chance, paranoids expected outcomes to be under the control of powerful others; among the normals, outcome expectancies were strongly associated with personal efficacy, but among the psychiatric patients, these beliefs were unrelated; depressives and paranoids equally reported more noncontingent parental reinforcement than did normals; and perceived contingency of parental reinforcement was predictive of outcome expectancies but not of personal efficacy. The data suggest that low personal efficacy may be a distinguishing characteristic of all psychiatric patients, whereas outcome expectancies may determine the specific nature of the psychiatric disorder.     

The persistence of loneliness: Self and other determinants1

Four studies (total n= 469) examined correlates of loneliness in order to explore explanations for the persistence of loneliness among college students. Self-report and attitude scales, ratings of others following dyadic interactions, and self and other ratings at two points during an extended period of group interactions indicated that lonely students (a) rated themselves more negatively and reported deficits in social skills and self-concept, (b) rated specific others and people-in-general more negatively and were more alienated and externalized, (c) expected others to rate them negatively, but (d) in general were not differentially rated by others except in the initial phase of group interactions and by lonely others following dyadic interactions. Results suggested that loneliness may be perpetuated by its cognitive and affective concomitants, with some evidence for gender differences, whereas inconclusive evidence was found regarding responses of others to the lonely person.     

THE MODERATING EFFECTS OF ACTIVITY LEVEL AND LOCUS OF CONTROL IN THE PERSONAL CONTROL-JOB STRESS RELATIONSHIP

The present study examines the moderating effects of two personality types in the personal control-job stress relationship. Individuals with a high activity level and belief in powerful others (dimension of external locus of control) had the strongest negative relationship between personal control and psychological anxiety. In addition, individuals with a high belief in chance or fate (dimension of external locus of control) had the strongest negative relationship between personal control and pulse rate. The findings suggest that employees with a high activity level and/or external locus of control benefit the most from having control over their work environment.     

Locus of control predicts appraisals and cardiovascular reactivity to a novel active coping task

These two studies investigated the influence of dispositional locus of control (LOC) on subjective and physiological responses to a novel laboratory stressor task. Across two studies, 64 healthy undergraduate students, ages 18-22, completed Levenson's (LOC) scales for internal, powerful others, and chance prior to performing a video-game task. Participants rated pretask and posttask stressfulness and coping ability (i.e., measures of primary and secondary appraisal). Cardiovascular measures (heart period, HP; preejection period, PEP; respiratory sinus arrhythmia, RSA; cardiac output, CO; systolic blood pressure, SBP; diastolic blood pressure, DBP & total peripheral resistance, TPR) were recorded during 4-minute baseline and 4-minute stressor task periods. The internal LOC factor predicted pretask reports of coping ability as well as posttask reports of stressfulness. In contrast, the powerful-others LOC factor predicted cardiac changes (HP, PEP, and RSA) during the task but not cardiac output or any other vascular change measure. These results underscore the importance of using the three subscales of the Levenson LOC to assess relationships between dispositional LOC and the response to stressors because self-reported appraisals of a task are predicted by a different component of dispositional LOC than are task-related cardiovascular functions.     

Advice for fallibilists: put knowledge to work

We begin by asking what fallibilism about knowledge is, distinguishing several conceptions of fallibilism and giving reason to accept what we call strong epistemic fallibilism, the view that one can know that something is the case even if there remains an epistemic chance, for one, that it is not the case. The task of the paper, then, concerns how best to defend this sort of fallibilism from the objection that it is “mad,” that it licenses absurd claims such as “I know that p but there’s a chance that not p” and “p but it there’s a chance that not p.” We argue that the best defense of fallibilism against this objection—a “pragmatist” defense—makes the following claims. First, while knowledge that p is compatible with an epistemic chance that not-p, it is compatible only with an insignificant such chance. Second, the insignificance of the chance that not-p is plausibly understood in terms of the irrelevance of that chance to p’s serving as a ‘justifier’, for action as well as belief. In other words, if you know that p, then any chance for you that not p doesn’t stand in the way of p’s being properly put to work as a basis for action and belief.

Gricean Belief Change

One of the standard principles of rationality guiding traditional accounts of belief change is the principle of minimal change: a reasoner's belief corpus should be modified in a minimal fashion when assimilating new information. This rationality principle has stood belief change in good stead. However, it does not deal properly with all belief change scenarios. We introduce a novel account of belief change motivated by one of Grice's maxims of conversational implicature: the reasoner's belief corpus is modified in a minimal fashion to assimilate exactly the new information. In this form of belief change, when the reasoner revises by new information p ∨ q their belief corpus is modified so that p∨q is believed but stronger propositions like p∧q are not, no matter what beliefs are in the reasoner's initial corpus. We term this conservative belief change since the revised belief corpus is a conservative extension of the original belief corpus given the new information.