The memory drum theory after twenty years: comments on Henry's note

The difference between the Henry "memory-drum" theory and our version is that ours includes, an additional assumption that, after programming has occurred, the resultant representation can be stored in short-term memory. Otherwise, the essential ideas are the same in the two theories. Implications of the presently available data for the distinction between the theories are discussed. Regardless of how one evaluates our added assumption, it is clear that the essential insight of the Henry theory has fared very well in the 20 years since the theory first appeared in print.     

Alternatives to the fixed-set model: A review of appraisal models of emotion

Over several decades, appraisal theory has emerged as a prominent theoretical framework explaining the elicitation and differentiation of emotions, and has stimulated a great deal of theorising and empirical research. Despite the large amount of research in this area, there are many aspects of appraisal theory and research that remain unclear or problematic. In this review, we identify a common assumption of many appraisal theories—the fixed appraisal set—and argue that this assumption, combined with a lack of explicit theorising about the predicted relationship between appraisals and emotions, leads to a lack of clarity in both appraisal models and the empirical testing of those models. We recommend that appraisal theorists move in a direction already taken by a small number of theorists, and adopt the starting assumption of a variable appraisal set. We further suggest that theories of concepts and categorisation may inform theorising about appraisal–emotion relationships.     

Temporary and Long-Term Consequences of Bereavement on Happiness

In this article, we examine the temporary and long-term consequences of the death of a parent or child on happiness. According to set-point theory external conditions are expected to only have a short-term or limited influence on happiness. This directly contradicts the basic assumption of affective theories on happiness, which states that major life-events have a lasting influence on well-being. Moreover, we test whether the association between bereavement and happiness is equally strong across the life course. To test our hypotheses we make use of the fourth wave of the European Values Study. Our research findings demonstrate that people who lost their father, mother or child are more likely to feel unhappy than people without this experience. Ten years after the death of a parent or child we still find a significant difference in happiness between people who have and have not experienced this loss. The assumption of set-point theory, that major life evens only have a temporary impact on SWB, is not supported by our data. Moreover, the association between bereavement and SWB strongly differs across the life-course. We might even conclude that the age at which the loss occurred is more decisive for the strength of the association between bereavement and SWB than the duration of the loss.     

Epistemic Presuppositions and their Consequences

Traditional epistemology has, in the main, presupposed that the primary task is to give a complete account of the concept knowledge and to state under what conditions it is possible to have it. In so doing, most accounts have been hierarchical, and all assume an idealized knower. The assumption of an idealized knower is essential for the traditional goal of generating an unassailable account of knowledge acquisition. Yet we, as individuals, fail to reach the ideal. Perhaps more important, we have epistemic goals not addressed in the traditional approach – among them, the ability to reach understanding in areas we deem important for our lives. Understanding is an epistemic concept. But how we obtain it has not traditionally been a focus. Developing an epistemic account that starts from a set of assumptions that differ from the traditional starting points will allow a different sort of epistemic theory, one on which generating understanding is a central goal and the idealized knower is replaced with an inquirer who is not merely fallible but working from a particular context with particular goals. Insight into how an epistemic account can include the particular concerns of an embedded inquirer can be found by examining the parallels between ethics and epistemology and, in particular, by examining the structure and starting points of virtue accounts. Here I develop several interrelated issues that contrast the goals and evaluative concepts that form the structure of both standard, traditional epistemological and ethical theories and virtue–centered theories. In the end, I sketch a virtue–centered epistemology that accords with who we are and how we gain understanding.     

Epistemic Presuppositions and their Consequences

Traditional epistemology has, in the main, presupposed that the primary task is to give a complete account of the concept knowledge and to state under what conditions it is possible to have it. In so doing, most accounts have been hierarchical, and all assume an idealized knower. The assumption of an idealized knower is essential for the traditional goal of generating an unassailable account of knowledge acquisition. Yet we, as individuals, fail to reach the ideal. Perhaps more important, we have epistemic goals not addressed in the traditional approach – among them, the ability to reach understanding in areas we deem important for our lives. Understanding is an epistemic concept. But how we obtain it has not traditionally been a focus. Developing an epistemic account that starts from a set of assumptions that differ from the traditional starting points will allow a different sort of epistemic theory, one on which generating understanding is a central goal and the idealized knower is replaced with an inquirer who is not merely fallible but working from a particular context with particular goals. Insight into how an epistemic account can include the particular concerns of an embedded inquirer can be found by examining the parallels between ethics and epistemology and, in particular, by examining the structure and starting points of virtue accounts. Here I develop several interrelated issues that contrast the goals and evaluative concepts that form the structure of both standard, traditional epistemological and ethical theories and virtue–centered theories. In the end, I sketch a virtue–centered epistemology that accords with who we are and how we gain understanding.     

The role of position in object selection in vision

Summary Within contemporary visual-information-processing psychology, two classes of selective-attention theories can be distinguished: position-not-special theories and position-special theories. The position-not-special theories postulate that attentional selection by colour, by form, and by position are equivalent selective operations. The position-special theories assume that selection by position is more basic or direct than selection by colour or by form. Examples of both types of theory are briefly described, and irrelevant and relevant evidence is critically discussed. It is concluded that the relevant evidence is directly compatible with the position-special views and that the position-not-special theories require additional extraneous assumptions. The position-special model presented in Van der Heijden (1992) is elaborated in further detail. It is shown that this model is compatible with two important and often substantiated assumptions of the position-not-special theories: the assumption that pre-attentive analysers organize the visual scene in objects against a background, and the assumption that visual-selective attention can be directed at objects isolated in this way. This position-special theory is a parsimonious theory because it can identify the mentalistic conceptselective attention with the materialistic conceptspatial position.     

Drop it like it’s HOT: a vicious regress for higher-order thought theories

Higher-order thought (HOT) theories of consciousness attempt to explain what it takes for a mental state to be conscious, rather than unconscious, by means of a HOT that represents oneself as being in the state in question. Rosenthal (in: Liu, Perry (eds) Consciousness and the self: new essays, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011) stresses that the way we are aware of our own conscious states requires essentially indexical self-reference. The challenge for defenders of HOT theories is to show that there is a way to explain the required reference-fixing mechanisms that is compatible with the theory. According to Rosenthal, the reference to oneself as such is grounded in the disposition to identify the individual the HOT refers to as the individual who has that HOT. I argue that this leads to a vicious infinite regress on the more than plausible assumption that our cognitive capacities are limited. This leaves such theories without a foundation, since self-reference is thought essential to consciousness.

     

Material objects and essential bundle theory

In this paper we present a new metaphysical theory of material objects. On our theory, objects are bundles of property instances, where those properties give the nature or essence of that object. We call the theory essential bundle theory. Property possession is not analysed as bundle-membership, as in traditional bundle theories, since accidental properties are not included in the object’s bundle. We have a different story to tell about accidental property possession. This move reaps many benefits. Essential bundle theory delivers a simple theory of the essential properties of material objects; an explanation of how object coincidence can arise; an actual-world ground for modal differences between coincident objects; a simple story about intrinsic properties; and a plausible account of certain ubiquitous cases of causal overdetermination.     

Arrows,Balls and the Metaphysics of Motion

The arrow paradox is an argument purported to show that objects do not really move. The two main metaphysics of motion, the At–At theory of motion and velocity primitivism, solve the paradox differently. It is argued that neither solution is completely satisfactory. In particular it is contended that there are no decisive arguments in favor of the claim that velocity as it is constructed in the At–At theory is a truly instantaneous property, which is a crucial assumption to solve the paradox. If so the At–At theory faces the threat that most of our physical theories turn out to be non-Markovian. Finally it is considered whether all those threats and paradoxes are dispelled if only a new metaphysics of persistence is taken into account, namely four-dimensionalism.     

阅读过程的眼动理论综述

该文介绍了解释阅读过程的主要眼动理论,并对早期的视觉缓冲器加工理论、直接假说和眼-脑假说、聚光灯理论、Morrison的眼动理论模型等眼动理论和新近的战略战术模型和E-Z模型等眼动理论进行了评述。最后,对眼动理论的发展方向进行了展望。     

Dimensions of Black Suicide: A Theoretical Model

ABSTRACT: This paper has two purposes: (1) to develop a theoretical model of suicide, based on the previous work of Henry and Short, and (2) to apply that model in the study of black suicides in Orleans Parish, Louisiana. In so doing, we are focusing on suicide among a traditionally low-status, low-suicide population group, one which Henry and Short cited in support of the positive relationship between status and suicide. The generality of the theory is thus examined in this and other ways. The theory of “external restraints” is only weakly sustained by this analysis. More adequate testing of the theory must await further data, with careful attention to the subjective aspects of hypothesized structural relationships.     

The global workspace theory,the phenomenal concept strategy,and the distribution of consciousness

Peter Carruthers argues that the global workspace theory implies there are no facts of the matter about animal consciousness. The argument is easily extended to other cognitive theories of consciousness, posing a general problem for consciousness studies. But the argument proves too much, for it also implies that there are no facts of the matter about human consciousness. A key assumption is that scientific theories of consciousness must explain away the explanatory gap. I criticize this assumption and point to an alternative strategy for defending scientific theories of consciousness, one that better reflects the ongoing scientific practice. I argue there are introspectable inferential connections from phenomenal concepts to functional concepts that scientists can use to individuate the global workspace in terms of capacities that animals and humans share.     

From Standard Scientific Realism and Structural Realism to Best Current Theory Realism

I defend a realist commitment to the truth of our most empirically successful current scientific theories—on the ground that it provides the best explanation of their success and the success of their falsified predecessors. I argue that this Best Current Theory Realism (BCTR) is superior to preservative realism (PR) and the structural realism (SR). I show that PR and SR rest on the implausible assumption that the success of outdated theories requires the realist to hold that these theories possessed truthful components. PR is undone by the fact that past theories succeeded even though their ontological claims about unobservables are false. SR backpeddles to argue that the realist is only committed to the truth about the structure of relations implied by the outdated theory, in order to explain its success. I argue that the structural component of theories is too bare-bones thin to explain the predictive/explanatory success of outdated theories. I conclude that BCTR can meet these objections to PR and SR, and also overcome the pessimistic meta-induction.     

Basic Assumptions Concerning Human Nature Underlying Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (Rebt) Personality Theory

In this article it is argued that all major theories of personality, including the currently developing REBT personality theory, rest upon certain basic philosophic assumptions concerning human nature made by the theorist. If REBT theory preferably is to develop into a more comprehensive theory of personality, then it would be helpful in that effort to identify the basic philosophic assumptions underlying it. For that purpose Ellis' basic assumptions in this regard are here identified, articulated, and documented. Theoretical and treatment implications are also explored. In the case of each philosophic assumption it is briefly indicated how Ellis' position on that assumption may translate into the theory and practice of REBT.     

A preliminary sketch of a Jungian socioanalysis – an emerging theory combining analytical psychology,complexity theories,sociological theories,socio- and psycho-analysis,group analysis and affect theories1

This paper presents a preliminary sketch of what we have termed a Jungian socioanalysis – an emerging theory combining analytical psychology, complexity theories, sociological theories, socio- and psycho-analysis, group analysis and affect theories. Our assumption is that Jungian theory and practice need to attend to and focus more on social contexts, sociality and the influence of societal developments. But also, on the other hand, that analytical psychology, primarily Jung’s theory of individuation and the transcendent function as well as the broad complexity perspective of his theory of psyche, can be extended to a ‘socio’ and not just a ‘psycho’ perspective. The paper presents five foundational assumptions for a Jungian socioanalysis, with the following headings: 1) A Jungian socioanalysis calls for a complex psychology; 2) (Un)consciousness is social and sociality has a dimension of (un)consciousness; 3) A Jungian socioanalysis explores social fields ‘from within’ by smaller groups; 4) A Jungian socioanalysis enables and is enabled by emerging metaphors and affect-imagery; 5) Socio-cultural fields have an impulse toward individuation. This is the first of two papers in the present edition of the journal – the second paper gives socio-clinical illustrations of our thesis in this paper.     

The Quest for a Unified Psychoanalytic Theory: A Retreat from Uncertainty

There has been a historical shift in psychoanalysis from an earlier time of certainty to our present state of uncertainty with the coexistence of multiple theories competing for our attention. We realize retrospectively how entrenched groups ruled our institutions by maintaining faith in their authority as the keepers of “pure” psychoanalysis. Despite struggles between competing ideologies, there has been progress in integrating clinical theories. As no psychoanalytic theory or technique has been proved superior, we advocate an inclusive approach with all psychoanalysts keeping an open mind about the value of competing theories. This integration of disparate theories has led to a resurgence of interest in psychoanalytic training. Examples are given of some of the difficulties encountered when competing ideas are introduced in psychoanalytic groups.     

The Miraculous Choice Argument for Realism

The miracle argument for scientific realism can be cast in two forms: according to the miraculous theory argument, realism is the only position which does not make the empirical successes of particular theories miraculous. According to the miraculous choice argument, realism is the only position which does not render the fact that empirically successful theories have been chosen a miracle. A vast literature discusses the miraculous theory argument, but the miraculous choice argument has been unjustifiably neglected. I raise two objections to Richard Boyd's defense of the latter: (1) we have no miracle free account of the emergence of take-off theories and (2) the anti-realist can account for the non-miraculous choice of empirically successful theories by attributing mere empirical adequacy to background theory. I argue that the availability of extra-empirical criteria that are arguably truth conductive but not theory-laden suffices to answer (1), and the unavailability of extra-empirical criteria that are conductive to empirical adequacy but not necessarily to truth (and are also not theory-laden) constitutes to reply to (2). The prospects for a realist victory are at least somewhat promising, on a controversial assumption about the rate at which empirically successful theories emerge.     

Letter information and orthographic context in word perception

Theories of word perception in reading can be categorized in terms of the assumption made about whether or not a word context modifies the feature analysis of its component letters. Independence theories assume that the visual information passed on by feature analysis is independent of word context. Nonindependence theories assume that a word context directly influences visual analysis. Some nonindependence theories have assumed that word context enhances feature analysis of letters, others have assumed that word context overrides feature analysis of letters, and some have assumed that word context directs which letters are analyzed. The present experiment provided a critical test between the two classes of theories by independently varying orthographic context and visual letter information in a letter recognition task. The results contradict the qualitative predictions of the class of nonindependence theories and are accurately described by a quantification of independence theory.