How to Use Cognitive Faculties You Never Knew You Had

Norman forms the belief that the president is in New York by way of a clairvoyance faculty he doesn’t know he has. Many agree that his belief is unjustified but disagree about why it is unjustified. I argue that the lack of justification cannot be explained by a higher‐level evidence requirement on justification, but it can be explained by a no‐defeater requirement. I then explain how you can use cognitive faculties you don’t know you have. Lastly, I use lessons from the foregoing to compare Norman's belief, formed by clairvoyance, with Sally's theistic belief, formed by a sensus divinitatis.     

If You Can't Change What You Believe,You Don't Believe It

I develop and defend the view that subjects are necessarily psychologically able to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Specifically, subjects can revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence, given their current psychological mechanisms and skills. If a subject lacks this ability, then the mental state in question is not a belief, though it may be some other kind of cognitive attitude, such as a supposition, an entertained thought, or a pretense. The result is a moderately revisionary view of belief: while most mental states we thought were beliefs are beliefs, some mental states which we thought were beliefs are not beliefs. The argument for this view draws on two key claims: First, subjects are rationally obligated to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Second, if some subject is rationally obligated to revise one of her mental states, then that subject can revise that mental state, given her current psychological mechanisms and skills. Along the way to defending these claims, I argue that rational obligations can govern activities which reflect on one's rational character, whether or not those activities are under one's voluntary control. I also show how the relevant version of epistemic ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ survives an objection which plagues other variants of the principle.     

You can get here from there

During one of the several unsuccessful admission interviews I had before finally being admitted to a graduate program, an interviewer asked me what kind of research I would like to do as a psychologist. "I plan to validate the Rorschach" was my reply. "And what will you do if you find the Rorschach isn't valid?" was the interviewer's next question. I don't recall my answer but it was obviously inadequate because such an unlikely possibility hadn't occurred to me, and I wasn't admitted to that program. Looking back, it is very clear how one thing led to another so that instead of validating the Rorschach, I ended up exploring the contribution of genetic factors to stress ulcers in rats and children's personality.     

Fission May Kill You (But Not for the Reasons You Thought)

If a person, A, branches into B and C, then it is widely held that B and C are not identical to one another. Many think that this is because B and C have contradictory properties at the same time. In this paper, I show why this explanation cannot be right. I argue that contradictory properties at times are not necessary for non‐identity between descendants, and that contradictory properties at times are not sufficient for non‐identity. I also argue that the standard explanation cannot be salvaged by a shift to personal time. Appeals to a lack of continuity, or to the absence of unity of consciousness likewise fail. Rather, B and C are non‐identical simply because A branched into B and C. Why branching should be problematic for personal identity remains a deep puzzle though I offer some tentative suggestions.     

You Must Have Thought This Book Was About You1: Reply to Daniel Dennett

Daniel Dennett's review 2 of my book, Human Nature and the Limits of Science, 3 was apparently conceived as part of a multiple review, anticipating an author's response, so I am grateful for the opportunity to satisfy this expectation. Indeed, Dennett uses this excuse to justify devoting his own contribution to responding to those parts of the book directed explicitly at his own work, leaving other imagined reviewers to take care of other issues. Since he has things to say about most of the topics in the book he evidently interpreted this remit widely, in fact taking the book as “presented as an antidote of sorts to [his] own world view” (p. 482). Let me begin, therefore, by reassuring Dennett that, while I certainly had some critical things to say about some of his views, the book most certainly was not intended as an ad hominem attack. The nine pages (out of 187) on which his work is cited fairly accurately reflects the extent to which his views figured in my thinking. Curiously, his ire seems most strongly aroused by my assault on his views on free will in which, apparently, I agree with nearly everything he says and, worse still, fail to cite him at all.     

Meaning Naturalism, Meaning Irrealism, and the Work of Language

I defend the hypothesis that organisms that produce and recognize meaningful utterances tend to use simpler procedures, and should use the simplest procedures, to produce and recognize those utterances. This should be a basic principle of any naturalist theory of meaning, which must begin with the recognition that the production and understanding of meanings is work. One measure of such work is the minimal amount of space resources that must go into storing a procedure to produce or recognize a meaningful utterance. This cost has an objective measure, called Kolmogorov Complexity. I illustrate the use of this measure for a naturalist theory of meaning by showing how it offers a straight solution to one of the most influential arguments for meaning irrealism: the skeptical challenge posed by Kripke’s Wittgenstein.     

What You Don't Know Can Help You: The Ethics of Placebo Treatment

Is it permissible for a doctor or nurse to knowingly administer a placebo in a clinical setting? There is certainly something suspicious about it: placebos are typically said to be ‘sham’ treatments, with no ‘active’ properties and so giving a placebo is usually thought to involve tricking or deceiving the patient who expects a genuine treatment. Nonetheless, some physicians have recently suggested that placebo treatments are sometimes the best way to help their patients and can be administered in an honest way. These physicians conclude that placebo treatments are a perfectly acceptable, and ethically unproblematic, mode of treatment. While I grant the common idea that placebos are deceptive is correct, I argue that widespread misunderstandings concerning why this is so has led proponents of placebo treatments to respond to the charge of deception in a way that misses the mark entirely. My goal in this paper, then, is to develop a precise conception of what makes something a placebo, which in turn will clarify the central charge concerning the ethics of placebo treatment, viz. that it is deceptive.     

Careful What You Wish

Dilip Ninan has raised a puzzle for centered world accounts of de re attitude reports extended to accommodate what he calls “counterfactual attitudes.” As a solution, Ninan introduces multiple centers to the standard centered world framework, resulting in a more robust semantics for de re attitude reports. However, while the so-called multi-centered world proposal solves Ninan’s counterfactual puzzle, this additional machinery is not without problems. In Section 1, I present the centered world account of attitude reports, followed by the extension to counterfactual attitudes which Ninan targets with his puzzle. In Section 2, I pose the counterfactual puzzle and present Ninan’s multi-centered world solution, emphasizing similarities and differences between multi-centered and centered world accounts of attitude reports. In Section 3, I argue the counterfactual attitude wishing falls under the purview of the multi-centered proposal, but that the proposal generates false predictions for wish reports concerning unsatisfiable content. I canvass responses, ultimately concluding Ninan’s proposal requires substantial revisions.     

Developing the Receptive and Productive Use of Pronouns in an Autistic Child:

In Experiment I, a preschooler with language delays and unable to answer “my-your” questions was successfully trained to answer “my-your” questions when reinforced for modeling an adult's answers to questions about possessive pronouns. Despite acquisition of the expressive use of the possessive case, generalization probes under conditions of nonmodeling and nonreinforcement showed no transfer at the receptive and expressive levels. Modeling and reinforcement training procedures in Experiment II improved the receptive use of “my-your” performance, but generalization probes revealed no receptive transfer. These same procedures in Experiment III improved the expressive use of “his-her” answers and, this time, immediate generalization of training for “his-her” occurred at the expressive and receptive levels. To facilitate generalization from the expressive to the receptive level, special programming-for-generalization procedures were used, involving reduced rated of reinforcement during training (Experiment I) and intermixing training trails with generalization probe trails (Experiment II).     

You and me

Are there distinctively second-personal thoughts? I clarify the question and present considerations in favour of a view on which some second-personal thoughts are distinctive. Specifically, I suggest that some second-personal thoughts are distinctive in also being first-personal thoughts. Thus, second-personal thinking provides a way of sharing another person's first-personal thoughts.     

Structural equation models are modelling tools with many ambiguities: Comments acknowledging the need for caution and humility in their use

My goal is to provide background and perspective on the use and interpretation of structural equation models (SEMs). SEMs are complex procedures with many assumptions, intricacies, and pitfalls. I hope to give a commentary that complements the primers done by Iacobuci and deepen the users' knowledge of the procedures. But I acknowledge that this effort is at best an incomplete introduction into SEMs and cannot do justice to the many issues (and controversies) associated with it.     

You meta believe it

Because of the privileged place of beliefs in explaining behaviour, mismatch cases—in which agents sincerely claim to believe that p, but act in a way that is inconsistent with that belief—have attracted a great deal of attention. In this paper, I argue that some of these cases, at least, are at least partially explained by agents believing that they believe that p, while failing to believe that p. Agents in these cases do not believe that ~p; rather, they have an indistinct first‐order, beliefy, representation that p. The indistinctness of this first‐order representation provides the leeway for the inconsistency seen in their behaviour.     

MMPI Correlates with Locus of Control in a Psychiatric Population

In this article, I review the empirical status of the Rorschach as it relates to potential use of the instrument in personnel selection procedures. As part of this review, I outline developing trends in personnel selection practices, discuss the Rorschach literature relevant to organizational performance, and weigh the benefits and drawbacks of using the instrument in this capacity. Based on this analysis, I argue that the Rorschach may represent a unique and potentially valuable tool for assessing personality as part of comprehensive personnel selection procedures. I conclude with a proposed trajectory for Rorschach research intended to better determine the instrument's viability in organizational settings.     

Enhancing accuracy in observational test scoring: the comprehensive system as a case example

Inaccuracies in administration and scoring can potentially compromise the validity of any standardized psychosocial measure. The threat is particularly pertinent to methods involving behavioral observation, a category that includes many intelligence tests, neuropsychological measures, personality assessment instruments, and diagnostic procedures. Despite evidence and conjecture that errors in testing procedure are common for at least some of these measures and that these errors are often severe enough to influence interpretation, the topic has received relatively little attention. In particular, the absence of any safeguard against inaccurate test use in clinical situations can put the respondent at risk and violates ethical standards for the use of tests. In this article, I review some issues surrounding accuracy in testing procedures, including a discussion of what is known about the problem, an evaluation of several approaches to improving testing practices, and a review of recommendations for the statistical evaluation of rater accuracy. In this article, I use the Rorschach Comprehensive System (Exner, 1993) to demonstrate the concepts discussed.     

A signal detection framework for the evaluation of probabilistic forecasts

In this paper I formulate an approach for evaluating probabilistic forecasts in terms of signal detection theory. Signal detection theory provides a powerful perspective for this type of problem, and a rich empirical background including methodological tools as well as an extensive body of research in many domains. I propose procedures which emphasize the maximization of expected utility for the decision maker who uses the forecasts. Further, I suggest approaches to obtaining indices of calibration and resolution within this framework. I also present arguments that the proposed indices will exhibit the same basic properties as do decompositions of Brier's (1950, Monthly Weather Review, 78, 1–3) mean probability score. However, the properties may be reflected in different ways, and hence, the present methods may lead to different conclusions about forecasting ability. Finally, I argue that the use of an expected utility loss function makes this approach more appropriate for practical applications as well as for theoretical research than other procedures with more arbitrary loss functions.     

INCREASING SEAT BELT USE ON A COLLEGE CAMPUS: AN EVALUATION OF TWO PROMPTING PROCEDURES

Seat belt use is an important factor in the prevention of automobile accidents involving injuries and fatalities. The current study used a multielement design to compare the “Click It or Ticket” and “Please Buckle Up—I Care” procedures. Results indicate that the Click It or Ticket prompt resulted in a 20‐percentage‐point increase in seat belt use, and Please Buckle Up—I Care resulted in a 14‐percentage‐point increase.     

You Ought to Know Better: the Morality of Political Engagement

I argue that, from the liberal perspective, citizens have a pro tanto moral duty to cultivate and maintain a readiness to participate in politics when such an action is called for from the moral perspective—I will call it “the pro tanto duty of political engagement.” It requires a citizen to (i) monitor what the government is doing (or not doing), (ii) evaluate its actions, and (iii) learn what she can do to intervene politically. In Section 1, I will discuss some doubts on the pro tanto duty of political engagement. In Section 2, I will describe Alexander Guerrero’s account of culpable ignorance and argue from his account that the pro tanto duty of political engagement is derived from a general moral duty to properly manage one’s morally relevant beliefs. In Section 3, I will argue that to properly assess the moral significance of any government policy or policy proposal, one must learn about the lives and personal values of those who would be affected by the policy.     

The nonuse of psychological research at two federal agencies

In 1994 the Government Accounting Office (GAO) issued a report critical of some features of the proposal review processes at the National Science Foundation and the National Institutes of Health. I provide two examples of procedures the agencies could have adopted to address the GAO's criticisms. I also relate the history of the two agencies' reluctance to use the psychological research literature to guide them as their new review procedures were instituted. Finally, I enumerate possible reasons for the agencies' decision not to follow or even test suggestions based on the judgment and decision-making research literature.