The scientific error of Friedman's poor scholarship: A rejoinder

A recent article by Friedman published in this journal alleges that a study by Whitcher and Fisher (1979) in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology is sexist research. An examination of his critique reveals that the facts are not as he purports. A reading of the Whitcher and Fisher (1979) study shows that the authors followed explicitly APA (1977) guidelines for nonsexist language in writing their article.In his article, Friedman makes a number of critical comments of a general nature that bear no relationship to the focus of our study (e.g., his comments about being touched by doctors; and patients' expectations about the role of doctors, both on p. 749). Unfortunately, he does not clarify which of his comments are aimed at our study and which are not. Therefore, we encourage readers unfamiliar with our research to review our original article.     

Naive misconceptions of Cooke and Breedin’s research: response to Ranney

In this paper, we respond to Ranney's (1994) comment on our paper on naive physics (Cooke & Breedin, 1994). In his comment, Ranney criticizes our methods and analyses, as well as our claims of theoretical inconsistency. In response to Ranney, we show that mast of his criticisms can be traced to several misconceptions. Some of these misconceptions seem to stem from his drawing of inappropriate similarities between his own research and ours. Specifically, ftanney seems to hall faun' misconceptions about our research: (1) the belief that trajectory responses in our study were relevant to our claims about theoretical consistency, (2) tie belief that aggregation of theoretical variations weakens claims of inconsistency, (3) the belief that the method of written reports is inferior to the method of structured interviews, and (4) the belief that our proposal of on-the-fly theorizing is at odds with temporal consistency and nonimpetus beliefs.     

The lives of Mary Foote: painter and Jungian

Mary Foote (1872‐1968) was a successful early twentieth century American artist who suddenly closed her New York studio in 1926 to go to Zurich to study with Jung. There she joined his ‘Interpretation of Visions’ seminars (1930‐1934), which she recorded and edited. This work won Jung's praise and his friendship, but all too often Foote was seen merely as a secretary or background figure. Deirdre Bair's biography of Jung suggested that Foote's life and work deserved fuller study, if only to rebalance our view of Jung's early women followers. This paper takes up that work to ask how Foote's early life and career led to her important work in preserving and describing Jung's earliest attempts to apply his theories to clinical practice.     

Prologue: Encounters with Mircea Eliade and his legacy for the 21st century

To mark the centennial of Mircea Eliade, the articles in this special issue of Religion analyze various aspects of his life and his scholarship, and suggest what may be of value in Eliade's legacy for the study of religion in the 21st century. In my study, using one of Eliade's favorite terms, ‘the encounter,’ I suggest what my encounters with Eliade reveal about Eliade, his scholarship, and especially his legacy. By delineating and analyzing encounters that were remarkable, disturbing, complex, and contradictory, we may assess both strengths and weaknesses in Eliade's history and phenomenology of religion and what remains in Eliade's legacy that may be of value for the contemporary study of religion. Although Eliade's influence has certainly waned, my position is that there is much of value in his legacy, often in need of more critical reformulation, that offers a valuable critique of much of contemporary scholarship, provides valuable insights, and can serve as a catalyst allowing us to rethink our approaches to the study of religion.     

Representing the internal world: Response to Seligman

Two major points raised by Seligman in his commentary are discussed. First, attachment research has developed empirical methods for studying internal representations. In our view, this adds to our understanding rather than overvalues attachment as a construct or as a methodological approach. Second, we suggest that nomothetic (the study of general laws which hold for groups of individuals) and idiographic (the study of specific laws which hold for individuals) approaches to knowledge are complementary rather than competitive and that each will make use of certain observations in different ways. We point out that the purpose of the Journal's Special Issue that occasioned Seligman's commentary was to acquaint readers with empirical advances in the study of internal representations. We look forward to a continuing dialogue among clinicians, researchers, and theoreticians.     

Harm,risk, and doping analogies: A counter-response to Kious

Brent Kious has objected to our previous criticism of his views on doping, maintaining that we, by and large, misrepresented his position. In this response, we strengthen our original misgivings, arguing that (1) his views on risk of harm in sport are either uncontroversially true (not inconsistent with the views of many doping opponents) or demonstrably false (attribute to doping opponents an overly simplistic view), (2) his use of analogies (still) indicates an oversimplification of many issues surrounding the question of doping in sports, and (3) his doping analogies are insufficiently precise to support his conclusions.     

The Duluth model: A data-impervious paradigm and a failed strategy

Gondolf has criticized our review as being selective and suggests that the Duluth model is more promising than we had concluded. We note that his own outcome study showed a failure rate for a Duluth program of 40% – identical to the mean rate of the studies we reviewed. We see his critiques as representative of the very mindset we described in our original paper – that of the gender paradigm. We review some of the shortcomings of Gondolf's critique as representative of this mindset. Our conclusion about the failure of the Duluth program remains unchanged.     

ANIMALS AS KIN: THE RELIGIOUS SIGNIFICANCE OF MARC BEKOFF'S WORK

Abstract. Although the disciplines of religion and science often may seem to be at cross purposes with each other, some individuals are attempting to bridge the gap, particularly with regard to animals. Cognitive ethologist Marc Bekoff, who studies animals in their natural habitat, has addressed in his work the implications of the findings of animal study for religion and ethics. I provide here an overview of some of his most important ideas for the study of religion and animals. Bekoff argues that the differences between humans and animals are primarily ones of degree rather than kind and that our similarities are greater than our differences‐and that this reality should influence our actions. I explore three issues in particular. First, Bekoff's work, with his view of evolution, challenges the traditional Christian hierarchy of beings. Second, this evolutionary connection needs to move us in the direction of modifying our treatment of animals to make it more ethical. Third, our understanding of and relationship with animals can deepen our own spirituality. Applying some of Bekoff's findings to our religious and ethical understandings of and treatment of animals can move us closer to the peaceable kingdom toward which we all strive.     

Ethics of Immigration: The Issue of Convicted Criminals

In this paper, I explore and probe Joseph Carens’ remarks, in his recent book The Ethics of Immigration, on the immigration status of foreign convicted criminals who have served their sentence, and who wish either to immigrate into our country or who are already here. Carens rejects deportation when it is not called for by considerations of national security, and agrees that considerations of public order can justify barring convicted foreign criminals from entering the country. I broadly agree with his arguments against deportation: my remarks in this respect are clarificatory and exploratory as much as anything else. But (I argue) both his argument for open borders and his scepticism with respect to radical cosmopolitanism are in tension with his claim that past criminal convictions can act as a bar to entry.     

Desiring (With) Bion: An Experience in Reading

This article considers my experience of reading Wilfred R. Bion’s book Learning from experience (1962) and how transference operates in and around his work. I argue that Bion’s work cannot simply be read but must be felt. I highlight the importance of Learning from experience for psychoanalytic practitioners becoming more self-reflexive about our theoretical and clinical practices, but also to bring attention to the process through which many of us come to Bion’s insights “first hand” if you like, which is through his writings, in our position as readers.     

Aesthetic Experience in Shaftesbury: Anthony Savile

(1) If Shaftesbury is to be seen as the doyen of modern aesthetics, his most valuable legacy to us may not so much be his viewing aesthetic response as a sui generis disinterested delight as his insistence on its turning 'wholly on [experience of] what is exterior and foreign to ourselves'. Not that we cannot experience ourselves, or what is our own, as a source of such admiration. Rather our responses, favourable or no, are improperly grounded in any essentially reflexive, or first-personal, ways of taking what engages us. The suggestion is tested against the case of Narcissus. (2) Glauser interestingly emphasizes Shaftesbury's neo-Platonic conception of a hierarchy of aesthetic experience that culminates in the joyful contemplation of God. That hierarchy must be something that is less unitary and systematic than Shaftesbury himself had supposed, even when his emphasis on the tie between aesthetic pleasure and contemplative experience is allowed to extend beyond perception and to encompass episodes of thought itself.     

Avoiding Epistemic Hell: Levi on Pragmatism and Inconsistency

Isaac Levi has claimed that our reliance on the testimony of others, and on the testimony of the senses, commonly produces inconsistency in our set of full beliefs. This happens if what is reported is inconsistent with what we believe to be the case. Drawing on a conception of the role of beliefs in inquiry going back to Dewey, Levi has maintained that the inconsistent belief corpus is a state of ``epistemic hell'': it is useless as a basis for inquiry and deliberation. As he has also noticed, the compatibility of these two elements of his pragmatist epistemology could be called into question. For if inconsistency means hell, how can it ever be rational to enter that state, and on what basis could we attempt to regain consistency? Levi, nonetheless, has tried to show that the conflict is only apparent and that no changes of his theory are necessary. In the main part of the paper I argue, by contrast, that his attempts to reconcile these components of his view are unsuccessful.The conflict is real andthus presents a genuine threat to Deweyan pragmatism, as understood by Levi. After an attempt to pinpoint exactly where the source of the problem lies, I explore some possibilities for how to come to grips with it. I conclude that Levi can keep his fundamental thesis concerning the role of beliefs in inquiry and deliberation, provided that he (i) gives up the view that the agent can legitimately escape from inconsistency, and (ii) modifies his account of prediction alias deliberate expansion by acknowledging a third desideratum, besides probability and informational value, namely, not to cause permanent breakdown further down the line of inquiry. The result is a position which is more similar to Peter Gärdenfors's than is Levi's original theory, while retaining the basic insights of the latter.     

Shaping and Discovering: Thoughts About Marc Rehm's Meditations

Marc Rehm invites us to muse about the theme of undue influence as it affects our relationships with our patients and children. Marc suggests that alongside our good intentions and loving vision of their future lie feelings of hate and destructiveness that complicate our efforts on their behalf. I address Marc's thesis, its Winnicottian roots, and then turn his question back on itself by musing about how his paper—which was born and nurtured in my writing group—might have itself been shaped (as much as discovered) by the group. I raise the question of undue influence as it affects the process of mentoring.     

The Home Observation for Measurement of the Environment: A comment on Zimmerman's critique

This paper is a reply to an article in this journal by M. Zimmerman titled “The Home Observation for Measurement of the Environment: A Comment on Elardo and Bradley's Review”. We found Zimmerman's critique of our original review article (Developmental Review, 1981, 1, 113–145) to contain points which were well taken, and several which seemed pedantic. Specifically, we address his concerns about our discussion of the HOME scale's interrater reliability, test-retest stability, concurrent validity, and predictive validity; and we reply to his comments about the uses of the HOME scale for purposes of screening and matching environments.     

Reaping the Right Fruits: Luther's Meditation on the 'Earnest Mirror, Christ'

Abstract:  To meditate aright, for Luther, is not to arouse in us an emotive piety for the crucified, but to be acquainted with the knowledge of our sinnerhood, and be devastated by it. Thus there is no natural knowledge of sin. The knowledge of sin flows directly from Christ, whom he called 'the earnest mirror'. This mirror causes sin to surface in our conscience so that it might cause it to disappear from it. This is made possible in Christ's atoning efficacy, where Christ, after exposing our sins, appears to us as our sin-bearer, the one who suffers our sins but suffers them into defeat in his cross and resurrection, if only we believe. The mirror then leads us beyond Christ's heart to the friendly heart of God, the one and same heart, which from eternity beats with such earnest love for us. Thus to grasp God aright, as the mirror reveals, is to grasp him not in his power and majesty, which might be terrifying, but in his opposites, that is, in his weakness and humility. God's way of being 'most himself' is by being for us ( pro nobis ), bearing and suffering the judgement of sin, and eventually dying on the cross. Then our faith and salvation stand immovably certain.     

Review Essay: Constructivism with a Human Face

Irwin Hoffman's book Ritual and Spontaneity includes, but goes well beyond, his series of seminal papers—written over the past several decades—developing a psychoanalytic, constructivist perspective. A new, existential framework depicts what Hoffman calls the “psychobiological bedrock” at the core of the human process of constructing meaning—the lifelong effort to create a livable, subjective world in face of our ever present sense of loss, suffering, and, ultimately, mortality.

This review describes Hoffman's encompassing, existential perspective and discusses how, within this framework, he uses his dialectical sensibility to frame our understanding of both parenting and analysis as “semisacred” activities. The “dialectic of ritual and spontaneity”—the vital clash between disciplined adherence to the analytic frame and personally expressive deviations from it—represents the creative tension between the “magical” dimension of analytic authority and the healing influence of a genuinely expressive human relationship. Hoffman's perspective on the self-interested, “dark side” of the analytic relationship is compared with Winnicott's views on the vital, therapeutic role of “hate” and the paradoxical process by which the patient comes to “use” the analyst.

Unlike most postmodernist “constructivists,” Hoffman openly reveals his underlying belief in certain “transcultural, transhistorical universals”—his “psychobiological bedrock.” In acknowledging these “essentials” (assumptions about human nature) that in some form are integral, yet often hidden, elements of any system of thought, Hoffman saves his own dialectical constructivism from falling into dichotomous (constructivist vs. essentialist) thinking.     

One, two or three memories: some comments and new findings

Comments are presented on a paper by Tore Helstrup, ‘One, two or three memories? A problem-solving approach to memory for performed acts’ (Acta Psychologica, 1987, 66, 37–68). There he proposed that a monistic strategy-based explanation is sufficient to explain memory for performed acts and that a multi-code (e.g. Engelkamp and Zimmer 1985) is not necessary and raises a number of problems. We claim that his findings do not disconfirm our multi-code model. Using our model, we would predict the same results in nearly all of the experiments. Because there are some results which are contradictory to a strategy-free code redundancy model, and also further results which cannot be accounted for solely by a monistic model, we propose that a valuable approach would be to combine his assumption that subjects behave strategically with our multi-code approach.     

The Curious Case of the De-ICD: Negotiating the Dynamics of Autonomy and Paternalism in Complex Clinical Relationships

This article discusses the response of our ethics consultation service to an exceptional request by a patient to have his implantable cardioverter defibrillator (ICD) removed. Despite assurances that the device had saved his life on at least two occasions, and cautions that without it he would almost certainly suffer a potentially lethal cardiac event within 2 years, the patient would not be swayed. Although the patient was judged to be competent, our protracted consultation process lasted more than 8 months as we consulted, argued with, and otherwise cajoled him to change his mind, all to no avail. Justifying our at times aggressive paternalistic intervention helped us to reflect on the nature of autonomy and the dynamics of the legal, moral, and personal relationships in the clinical decision-making process.