Infinite Epistemic Regresses and Internalism

This article seeks to state, first, what traditionally has been assumed must be the case in order for an infinite epistemic regress to arise. It identifies three assumptions. Next it discusses Jeanne Peijnenburg's and David Atkinson's setting up of their argument for the claim that some infinite epistemic regresses can actually be completed and hence that, in addition to foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism, there is yet another solution (if only a partial one) to the traditional epistemic regress problem. The article argues that Peijnenburg and Atkinson fail to address the traditional regress problem, as they don't adopt all of the three assumptions that underlie the traditional regress problem. It also points to a problem in the notion of making probable that Peijnenburg and Atkinson use in their account of justification.     

Finite Reasons Without Foundations

This article develops a theory of reasons that has strong similarities to Peter Klein's infinitism. The view it develops, Framework Reasons, upholds Klein's principles of avoiding arbitrariness (PAA) and avoiding circularity (PAC) without requiring an infinite regress of reasons. A view of reasons that holds that the “reason for” relation is constrained by PAA and that PAC can avoid an infinite regress if the “reason for” relation is contextual. Moreover, such a view of reasons can maintain that skepticism is false by the maintaining that there is more to epistemic justification than can be expressed in any reasoning session. One crucial argument for Framework Reasons is that justification depends on a background of plausibility considerations. The final section of the article applies this view of reasons to Michael Bergmann's argument that any nonskeptical epistemology must embrace epistemic circularity.     

Paradigms and Russell's Resemblance Regress

Resemblance Nominalism is the view that denies universals and tropes and claims that what makes F-things F is their resemblances. A famous argument against Resemblance Nominalism is Russell's regress of resemblances, according to which the resemblance nominalist falls into a vicious infinite regress. Aristocratic Resemblance Nominalism, as opposed to Egalitarian Resemblance Nominalism, is the version of Resemblance Nominalism that claims that what makes F-things F is that they resemble the F-paradigms. In this paper I attempt to show that a recently advocated strategy to stop Russell's regress by using paradigms does not succeed.     

The Regress of Pure Powers Revisited

The paper aims to elucidate in better detail than before the dispute about whether or not dispositional monism—the view that all basic properties are pure powers—entails a vicious infinite regress. Particular focus is on Alexander Bird's and George Molnar's attempts to show that the arguments professing to demonstrate a vicious regress are inconclusive because they presuppose what they aim to prove, notably that powers are for their nature dependent on something else. I argue that Bird and Molnar are mistaken. It is true that dispositional monism is popularly assumed to characterize powers as dependent entities, but this is not what the arguments aim to prove. They merely aim to demonstrate that it would be absurd to assume that all properties are dependent in this way. Finally, it is argued that there is an unresolved tension in Bird's and Molnar's accounts of powers. They characterize them as being for their nature dependent on the manifestations that they are for, and yet ontologically independent of those same manifestations. Until that tension is resolved, their accounts are not equipped to remove the threat of vicious regress.     

Regress Argument Reconstruction

If an argument can be reconstructed in at least two different ways, then which reconstruction is to be preferred? In this paper I address this problem of argument reconstruction in terms of Ryle’s infinite regress argument against the view that knowledge-how requires knowledge-that. First, I demonstrate that Ryle’s initial statement of the argument does not fix its reconstruction as it admits two, structurally different reconstructions. On the basis of this case and infinite regress arguments generally, I defend a revisionary take on argument reconstruction: argument reconstruction is mainly to be ruled by charity (viz. by general criteria which arguments have to fulfil in order to be good arguments) rather than interpretation.     

An infinite temporal regress is compatible with the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Doctrine of Creatio Originans</Emphasis>

In this paper I show that the existence of an infinite temporal regress does not undermine the soundness of Craigs version of the Kalam Cosmological Argument. To this end I shall focus on a particular complication that Craig raises against one of his arguments in support of a finite temporal regress. I will show that this complication can be made innocuous by extending the notion of A-theoretic time, which is presupposed by Craigs argument, to include a notion of temporal becoming that is compatible with the existence of an infinite regress of temporal events. All this shows that God could have created an infinite temporal regress a finite time in the past without this entailing a contradiction.     

The Virtuous Tortoise

There is no philosophically interesting distinction to be made between inference‐rules and premises. That there is such a distinction is often held to follow from the possibility of infinite regress illustrated by Carroll's story of Achilles and the tortoise. I will argue that this is wrong on three separate grounds. Consequently, Carroll's fable provides no motivation to abandon the traditional logical separation of arguments into their premises and conclusions. There is no proposition that must be taken to be a rule and must not be taken as a premise.     

The physical self-concept across childhood: Measurement development and meaning for physical activity

The physical self-concept is considered a significant predictor of physical activity and persistence in childhood and youth. Based on Shavelson, Stanton, and Hubner's (1976) hierarchical structure of self-concept, several approaches have been developed to measure physical self-perception. A multi-dimensional fitness-based approach by Marsh (1990) shows a valid method for measuring physical self-concept in all age groups from 8 years old to adulthood. Furthermore, following standard childhood fitness test dimensions, instruments have been developed for middle to late childhood (Dreiskämper, Tietjens, Honemann, Naul, & Freund, 2015a) and early childhood (Tietjens et al., 2018). However, based on Harter's (1980) approach of a more global and general skills-summarizing self-perception profile, other studies – preliminary coming from a motor development perspective – focused on measuring children's self-perception based on fundamental movement skills such as object control, locomotion, and stability. In this line, Estevan and Barnett (2018) proposed an adaption of Fox and Corbin's (1989) model. However, several research questions have remained unanswered because these different research directions have not been integrated yet: 1) How is the physical self-concept in childhood constructed, and how can it be measured? 2) How does the physical self-concept develop across childhood (and is this consistent with the assumptions about the self-concept as defined by Shavelson et al., 1976)? And 3) What is the role of physical self-concept in behavior (i.e., PA) and its antecedents in childhood (and how)? The purpose of this discussion paper is to address these three more or less open questions from a self-concept research perspective. To this end, the models of Shavelson et al. (1976) and Marsh (1990) will be drawn upon to integrate the recent research developments into a new classification of the physical self-concept and its development throughout childhood.     

The Consistency of Probabilistic Regresses. A Reply to Jeanne Peijnenburg and David Atkinson

In a recent paper, Jeanne Peijnenburg and David Atkinson [Studia Logica, 89(3):333-341 (2008)] have challenged the foundationalist rejection of infinitism by giving an example of an infinite, yet explicitly solvable regress of probabilistic justification. So far, however, there has been no criterion for the consistency of infinite probabilistic regresses, and in particular, foundationalists might still question the consistency of the solvable regress proposed by Peijnenburg and Atkinson.     

Infinite barbarians

This paper discusses an infinite regress that looms behind a certain kind of historical explanation. The movement of one barbarian group is often explained by the movement of others, but those movements in turn call for an explanation. While their explanation can again be the movement of yet another group of barbarians, if this sort of explanation does not stop somewhere we are left with an infinite regress of barbarians. While that regress would be vicious, it cannot be accommodated by several general views about what viciousness in infinite regresses amounts to. This example is additional evidence that we should prefer a pluralist approach to infinite regresses.     

Viciousness and the structure of reality

Given the centrality of arguments from vicious infinite regress to our philosophical reasoning, it is little wonder that they should also appear on the catalogue of arguments offered in defense of theses that pertain to the fundamental structure of reality. In particular, the metaphysical foundationalist will argue that, on pain of vicious infinite regress, there must be something fundamental. But why think that infinite regresses of grounds are vicious? I explore existing proposed accounts of viciousness cast in terms of contradictions, dependence, failed reductive theories and parsimony. I argue that no one of these accounts adequately captures the conditions under which an infinite regress—any infinite regress—is vicious as opposed to benign. In their place, I suggest an account of viciousness in terms of explanatory failure. If this account is correct, infinite grounding regresses are not necessarily vicious; and we must be much more careful employing such arguments to the conclusion that there has to be something fundamental.     

The Trouble with Infinitism

One way to solve the epistemic regress problem would be to show that we can acquire justification by means of an infinite regress. This is infinitism. This view has not been popular, but Peter Klein has developed a sophisticated version of infinitism according to which all justified beliefs depend upon an infinite regress of reasons. Klein's argument for infinitism is unpersuasive, but he successfully responds to the most compelling extant objections to the view. A key component of his position is his claim that an infinite regress is necessary, but not sufficient, for justified belief. This enables infinitism to avoid a number of otherwise compelling objections. However, it commits infinitism to the existence of an additional feature of reasons that is necessary and, together with the regress condition, sufficient for justified belief. The trouble with infinitism is that any such condition could account for the connection between justification and truth only by undermining the rationale for the regress condition itself.     

A Note on Schema and Exemplar Approaches to Motor Skill Representation in Memory

Given the need for a memory representation of well-learned motor skills, a common assumption in motor behavior is that this knowledge is stored in a central, abstracted form. Active production of motor skills has not been used in experimental designs that have provided empirical support for this view of representation, however. Much of the faith in centralized, abstracted forms of memory representation for motor skills is due to the popularity of Schmidt's schema theory, which has adapted the prototype abstraction model from category learning research to the representation of motor skills. Since schema theory was proposed, however, an alternative view that seriously questions the preeminence of the prototype abstraction model for the central representation of knowledge has arisen in the category learning literature. This particular view, termed the specific exemplar model, has led a number of researchers in cognition to develop mixed models that involve both prototypic abstraction and specific exemplar elements. This note, then, identifies what can be perceived as a gap in the empirical knowledge base in motor behavior and discusses the possibility of using the debate about representation for category learning as a stimulus for initiating a similar investigation into the representation of motor skills. A hypothetical specific exemplar model for the memory representation of motor skills is outlined, and possible empirical comparisons between this model and the schema abstraction model are suggested.     

Regarding a Regress

Is there a successful regress argument against intellectualism? In this article I defend the negative answer. I begin by defending Stanley and Williamson's (2001) critique of the contemplation regress against Noë (2005). I then identify a new argument – the employment regress – that is designed to succeed where the contemplation regress fails, and which I take to be the most basic and plausible form of a regress argument against intellectualism. However, I argue that the employment regress still fails. Drawing on the previous discussion, I criticise further regress arguments given by Hetherington (2006) and Noë (2005).     

Symbolically speaking: a connectionist model of sentence production

The ability to combine words into novel sentences has been used to argue that humans have symbolic language production abilities. Critiques of connectionist models of language often center on the inability of these models to generalize symbolically (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988; Marcus, 1998). To address these issues, a connectionist model of sentence production was developed. The model had variables (role‐concept bindings) that were inspired by spatial representations (Landau & Jackendoff, 1993). In order to take advantage of these variables, a novel dual‐pathway architecture with event semantics is proposed and shown to be better at symbolic generalization than several variants. This architecture has one pathway for mapping message content to words and a separate pathway that enforces sequencing constraints. Analysis of the model's hidden units demonstrated that the model learned different types of information in each pathway, and that the model's compositional behavior arose from the combination of these two pathways. The model's ability to balance symbolic and statistical behavior in syntax acquisition and to model aphasic double dissociations provided independent support for the dual‐pathway architecture.     

Throwing in the dark: improved prediction of action outcomes following motor training without vision of the action

Traditional models of action understanding emphasise the idea that long-term exposure to a wide array of visual patterns of particular actions allows for effective action anticipation or prediction. More recently, a greater emphasis has been placed on the motor system’s role in the perceptual understanding and prediction of action outcomes. There have been attempts to isolate the contributions of visual and motor experience in action prediction, but to date, these studies have relied on comparisons of motor-visual experience to visual-only (observational) experience. We conducted a learning study, where visual experience was directly manipulated during practice. Novice participants practised throwing darts to 3 specific areas of a dartboard. A group trained without vision of their action, only feedback about the final landing position, significantly improved in their ability to predict the landing position of a thrown dart, from temporally occluded video clips. The performance of this ‘no-vision’ group did not differ from a Full-vision group and was significantly more accurate than an observation-only and a no-practice control group (with the latter two groups not improving pre- to post-practice). These results suggest that motor experience specifically modulates the perceptual prediction of action outcomes. This is thought to occur through simulative mechanisms, whereby observed actions are mapped onto the observer’s own motor representations.     

Counterfactual thinking in mock juror assessments of negligence: A preliminary investigation

This Research Report presents an initial attempt to apply the theory of counterfactual thinking to study the cognitive processes that underlie judgments of negligence. Subjects reviewed a summary of an appellate case involving a work accident and listed all the ways in which the accident could have been undone (mutated). Participants' evaluations of the defendant's behavior were influenced by the ease of mutation of the negligent act and other mutations of the defendant's behavior, but not by the number of mutations of the plaintiffs conduct. Exploratory path analysis suggested that counterfactual thinking may have its greatest impact not as a direct influence on verdicts and damages, but rather as an indirect influence impacting verdicts through lower level judgments about the normality of the defendant's behavior and the standard of care. The results also suggest that contrary to the law, subjects base their negligence verdicts on assessments of normal care along with due care.