Mind control? Creating illusory intentions through a phony brain–computer interface

Can one be fooled into believing that one intended an action that one in fact did not intend? Past experimental paradigms have demonstrated that participants, when provided with false perceptual feedback about their actions, can be fooled into misperceiving the nature of their intended motor act. However, because veridical proprioceptive/perceptual feedback limits the extent to which participants can be fooled, few studies have been able to answer our question and induce the illusion to intend. In a novel paradigm addressing this question, participants were instructed to move a line on the computer screen by use of a phony brain–computer interface. Line movements were actually controlled by computer program. Demonstrating the illusion to intend, participants reported more intentions to move the line when it moved frequently than when it moved infrequently. Consistent with ideomotor theory, the finding illuminates the intimate liaisons among ideomotor processing, the sense of agency, and action production.     

Moving arms: the effects of sensorimotor information on the problem-solving process

Embodied cognition postulates a bi-directional link between the human body and its cognitive functions. Whether this holds for higher cognitive functions such as problem solving is unknown. We predicted that arm movement manipulations performed by the participants could affect the problem-solving solutions. We tested this prediction in quantitative reasoning tasks that allowed two solutions to each problem (addition or subtraction). In two studies with healthy adults (N?=?53 and N?=?50), we found an effect of problem-congruent movements on problem solutions. Consistent with embodied cognition, sensorimotor information gained via right or left arm movements affects the solution in different types of problem-solving tasks.     

When mirrors lie: “Visual capture” of arm position impairs reaching performance

If we stand at a mirror’s edge, we can see one half of our body reflected in the mirror, as if it were the other half of our body, seen “through” the mirror. We used this mirror illusion to examine the effect of conflicts between visually and proprioceptively specified arm positions on subsequent reaching movements made with the unseen right arm. When participants viewed their static left arm in the mirror (i.e., as if it were their right arm), subsequent right-arm reaching movements were affected significantly more when there was conflict between the apparent visual and the proprioceptively specified right-arm positions than when there was no conflict. This result demonstrates that visual capture of arm position can occur when individual body parts are viewed in the mirror and that this capture has a measurable effect on subsequent reaching movements made with an unseen arm. The result has implications for how the brain represents the body across different sensory modalities.     

Speech-associated gestures, Broca’s area, and the human mirror system

Speech-associated gestures are hand and arm movements that not only convey semantic information to listeners but are themselves actions. Broca’s area has been assumed to play an important role both in semantic retrieval or selection (as part of a language comprehension system) and in action recognition (as part of a “mirror” or “observation–execution matching” system). We asked whether the role that Broca’s area plays in processing speech-associated gestures is consistent with the semantic retrieval/selection account (predicting relatively weak interactions between Broca’s area and other cortical areas because the meaningful information that speech-associated gestures convey reduces semantic ambiguity and thus reduces the need for semantic retrieval/selection) or the action recognition account (predicting strong interactions between Broca’s area and other cortical areas because speech-associated gestures are goal-direct actions that are “mirrored”). We compared the functional connectivity of Broca’s area with other cortical areas when participants listened to stories while watching meaningful speech-associated gestures, speech-irrelevant self-grooming hand movements, or no hand movements. A network analysis of neuroimaging data showed that interactions involving Broca’s area and other cortical areas were weakest when spoken language was accompanied by meaningful speech-associated gestures, and strongest when spoken language was accompanied by self-grooming hand movements or by no hand movements at all. Results are discussed with respect to the role that the human mirror system plays in processing speech-associated movements.     

Distinct eye movements for different cognitive processes as expressed in the face recognition task

Contemporary research literature indicates that eye movements during the learning and testing phases can predict and affect future recognition processes. Nevertheless, only partial information exists regarding eye movements in the various components of recognition processes: Hits, Correct rejections, Misses and False Alarms (FA). In an attempt to address this issue, participants in this study viewed human faces in a yes/no recognition memory paradigm. They were divided into two groups – one group that carried out the testing phase immediately after the learning phase (n?=?30) and another group with a 15-minute delay between phases (n?=?28). The results showed that the Immediate group had a lower FA rate than the Delay group, and that no Hit rate differences were observed between the two groups. Eye movements differed between the recognition processes in the learning and the testing phases, and this pattern interacted with the group type. Hence, eye movement measures seem to track memory accuracy during both learning and testing phases and this pattern also interacts with the length of delay between learning and testing. This pattern of results suggests that eye movements are indicative of present and future recognition processes.     

Schizotypal personality traits and prediction of one's own movements in motor control: what causes an abnormal sense of agency?

Background. Positive schizophrenic symptoms, especially passivity phenomena, including auditory hallucinations, may be caused by an abnormal sense of agency, which people with schizotypal personality traits also tend to exhibit. A sense of agency asserts that it is oneself who is causing or generating an action. It is possible that this abnormal sense of self-agency is attributable to the abnormal prediction of one’s own movements in motor control. Method. We conducted an experiment using the “disappeared cursor” paradigm in which non-clinical, healthy participants were required to click on a target using an invisible mouse cursor. Prediction error was defined as the distance between the target and the click point. Results. The results showed that schizotypal personality traits, but not depressive or anxious traits, were correlated with deficits in predicting movements of the subjects’ left hand. In particular, auditory hallucination proneness had the strongest relationship with movement prediction error. In this report, we also discuss the error tendency (overestimations or underestimations of one’s own movements). Conclusions. This finding is in accordance with the idea that passivity phenomena or proneness may be caused by the abnormal prediction of one’s own actions or movements.     

Implicit motor sequence learning is not represented purely in response locations

This study employed a novel variant of the serial reaction time task, focused on sequencing one element of movement—direction. During the task a repeated pattern of alternating directions (right–left–right, etc.) was embedded in the stimuli, and there was no series of response locations. Responses were made via two effector systems: single-finger responding (necessitates lateral arm movements between response keys), and four-fingered responding (4 individual fingers on 4 individual keys; requires no lateral arm movement). The sequence of directions was only learned by participants who performed lateral movements during training, indicating that learning was contingent on the particular motor effector used. Participants with low levels of sequence awareness displayed the same pattern of results.     

Can false memories prime alternative solutions to ambiguous problems?

Research has demonstrated that false memories are capable of priming and facilitating insight-based problem-solving tasks by increasing solution rates and decreasing solution times. The present research extended this finding by investigating whether false memories could be used to bias ambiguous insight-based problem-solving tasks in a similar manner. Compound remote associate task (CRAT) problems with two possible correct answers, a dominant and a non-dominant solution, were created and normed (Experiment 1). In Experiment 2, participants were asked to solve these CRAT problems after they were given Deese/Roediger-McDermott lists whose critical lures were also the non-dominant solution to half of the corresponding CRATs. As predicted, when false memories served as primes, solution rates were higher and solution times were faster for non-dominant than dominant CRAT solutions. This biasing effect was only found when participants falsely recalled the critical lure, and was not found when participants did not falsely recall the critical lure, or when they were not primed. Results are discussed with regard to spreading activation models of solution competition in problem-solving tasks and current theories of false memory priming effects.     

Action information from classification learning

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, Illinois Much of our learning comes from interacting with objects. Two experiments investigated whether or not arbitrary actions used during category learning with objects might be incorporated into object representations and influence later recognition judgments. In a virtual-reality chamber, participants used distinct arm movements to make different classification responses. During a recognition test phase, these same objects required arm movements that were consistent or inconsistent with the classification movement. In both experiments, consistent movements were facilitated relative to inconsistent movements, suggesting that arbitrary action information is incorporated into the representations.     

How to eliminate illusions in quantified reasoning

The mental model theory postulates that reasoners build models of situations described in premises. These models normally make explicit only what is true according to the premises. The theory has an unexpected consequence. It predicts the existence ofillusions in inferences: Certain inferences should have compelling but erroneous conclusions. Previous studies have corroborated the existence of such illusions. The present study reports the first effective antidote to them. For example, most people incorrectly answer “yes” to the following problem:Only one of the following statements is true . . . /At least some of the plastic beads are not red. /None of the plastic beads are red. /Is it possible that none of the red beads are plastic? In two experiments, we progressively eliminated this fallacy and others by using instructions designed to overcome the bias toward truth. The difference between the illusory and the control problems disappeared when the participants were instructed to work out both the case in which the first premise was true and the second premise was false and the case in which the second premise was true and the first premise was false.     

Descartes’ debt to Teresa of Ávila,or why we should work on women in the history of philosophy

Despite what you have heard over the years, the famous evil deceiver argument in Meditation One is not original to Descartes (1596–1650). Early modern meditators often struggle with deceptive demons. The author of the Meditations (1641) is merely giving a new spin to a common rhetorical device. Equally surprising is the fact that Descartes’ epistemological rendering of the demon trope is probably inspired by a Spanish nun, Teresa of Ávila (1515–1582), whose works have been ignored by historians of philosophy, although they were a global phenomenon during Descartes’ formative years. In this paper, I first answer the obvious question as to why previous early modernists have missed something so important as the fact that Descartes’ most famous publication relies on a well-established genre and that his deceiver argument bears a striking similarity to ideas in Teresa’s final work, El Castillo Interior (Interior Castle, 1588)? I discuss the meditative tradition at the end of which Descartes’ Meditations stands, present evidence to support the claim that Descartes was familiar with Teresa’s proposals, contrast their meditative goals, and make a point-by-point comparison between the meditative steps in Teresa’s Interior Castle and those in Descartes’ Meditations which constitute (what I call) their common deceiver strategy. My conclusion makes a case for a broader and more inclusive history of philosophy.     

Recording supervision: Educational,therapeutic, and enhances the supervisory working alliance?

Aims: To explore the impact of listening to an audio‐recording of their latest supervision session on supervisees. Method: Participants recorded a supervision session, listened to it and were interviewed about this experience of listening to it within seven days of listening to the recording. The phenomenological interviews informed by the researcher's knowledge were analysed using grounded theory. Participants: Fifteen participants with 0–20 years’ experience, representing person‐centred, CBT, psychodynamic and integrative approaches, and qualifications ranging from student to doctorate formed the theoretical sample. Findings: Listening to the audio‐recording allowed participants to re‐experience their thoughts and emotions. Participants recalled and re‐experienced events which had been forgotten, unnoticed or (arguably) repressed. This re‐experiencing was usually less emotive than in real‐time; but suppressed emotions could be more intense. As participants integrated both these noticed and unnoticed events, they were able to accept what had been unacceptable, gaining self‐awareness, which was potentially therapeutic. Noticing what had been unnoticed permitted insights into many aspects of therapy and supervision, which was more than just ‘reflection‐on‐action’. Conclusion: Listening to an audio‐recording of the latest supervision may be educational for any supervisee; it may be therapeutic by facilitating challenge of maladaptive beliefs and behaviours; and it also seems to strengthen the supervisory working alliance.     

The prevalence of declarative and indirect yes/no Questions when children testify in criminal cases of child sexual abuse in the United States

The present study assessed how attorneys questioned children in cases of child sexual abuse in the United States tried between 2005 and 2015. Trial testimonies (N = 134) of 5- to 17-year-olds (M = 12 years old) were coded for the linguistic form of attorneys' questions and children's subsequent responses. Three fourths of all questions were closed ended. Both declarative (statement question; e.g., “And he hit you?”; 21% of questions) and indirect yes/no questions (beginning with an indirect speech act; e.g., “Do you remember X?”; 11% of questions) were common, and produced potentially problematic responses, in comparison with forced-choice and yes/no questions. Declarative questions elicited the highest rates of unelaborative responses whereas indirect yes/no questions elicited the highest rate of nonsubstantive responses. The findings highlight the importance for researchers to better assess children's responses to declarative questions and for prosecuting attorneys to cautiously use declarative and indirect yes/no questions when questioning children.     

Adolescents' evaluations of those who challenge exclusive and inclusive peer norms

Early and middle adolescents' judgements and reasonings about peers who challenge exclusive and inclusive peer group norms were examined across three studies with varying intergroup contexts. Study 1 participants included (N = 199) non-Arab American participants responding to an Arab American/non-Arab American intergroup context. Study 2 included (N = 123) non-Asian and (N = 105) Asian American participants responding to an Asian/non-Asian American intergroup context. Study 3 included (N = 275) Lebanese participants responding to an American/Lebanese intergroup context. Across all three studies participants responded to ingroup and outgroup deviant group members who challenged their peer groups to either include or exclude an outgroup peer with similar interests. Findings indicated that adolescents approved of peers who challenged exclusive peer norms and advocated for inclusion of an ethnic and cultural outgroup, and disapproved of peers who challenged inclusive group norms and advocated for exclusion. Non-Arab and non-Asian American adolescents displayed ingroup bias when evaluating a deviant advocating for exclusion. Additionally, age differences were found among Asian American adolescents. Findings will be discussed in the light of intergroup research on those who challenge injustices.     

Rhythmic priming across effector systems: A randomized controlled trial with Parkinson’s disease patients

This study investigated the immediate effects of auditory-motor entrainment across effector systems by examining whether Rhythmic Auditory Stimulation training of arm or finger movements would modulate gait speed. Forty-one participants with idiopathic Parkinson’s Disease were randomly assigned to 3 groups. Participants in the finger-tapping group tapped in synchrony with a metronome set to 20% faster pace than the pre-training walking cadence, whereas participants in the other group were asked to swing both arms in an alternating motion in synchrony with the metronome. Participants in the control condition did not receive training. To assess gait parameters pre- and post-training, participants walked on a 14-meter flat walkway at his/her preferred walking cadence with no auditory cueing. Results indicated that there was a significant increase in gait velocity after the finger tapping training (p < .005), whereas no differences were observed in the arm swing (p = .802) and in the control conditions (p = .525). Similarly, there were significant changes in gait cadence post-training in the finger tapping group (p < .005), but not after arm swing training (p = .879) or control (p = .759). There were no significant changes in stride length post-training in none of the groups. These findings suggest that auditory-motor entrainment in one effector system may prime a second effector system. Interestingly, however, the priming effect on gait was only observed in the finger tapping condition and not with synchronized arm swing movements. These findings have significant implications for motor rehabilitation and open new avenues for further investigation of the mechanisms underlying cross-effector coupling.     

Out of your hand's reach, out of my eyes' reach

When witnessing another's action, people recruit the same motor resources that enable them to efficiently perform that action, thus gazing at its target well before the agent's hand. But just to what extent does this recruitment help people in grabbing another's action target? If the latter seems to be out of the agent's reach, will this impact on people's gaze behaviour? We recorded proactive eye movements while participants witnessed someone else trying to reach for and grasp objects located either within or outside his reach. Proactivity of gaze was impaired when the targets were just out of the agent's reach. This effect is likely to be due to an interpersonal bodily space representation that allows one to map another's reaching space, thus prompting proactive eye movements towards the target just in case the agent is in the position to act upon it.     

Does test‐induced priming play a role in the creation of false memories?

We investigated the role of test‐induced priming in creating false memories in the Deese/Roediger‐McDermott (DRM) paradigm, in which subjects study lists of related words (bed, rest, awake) and then falsely recall or recognise a related word (sleep) on a later test. However, in experiments using three different procedures, we found that the number of related words tested prior to the critical word had surprisingly little impact on false recall and recognition. We manipulated the location of the critical item in tests of yes/no recognition, word‐stem cued recall, and part‐set cued recall. We consistently obtained high probabilities of false recall and recognition, but the probability was unaffected by the number of related items presented prior to the test of the critical item. Surprisingly, test‐induced priming of the critical item does not seem to play a large role in this memory illusion.     

Violinists Run Amuck in South Dakota: Screen Doors Down in the Badlands!

Abstract

This paper proposes and defends an account of what it is to act for reasons. In the first part, I will discuss the desire-belief and the deliberative model of acting for reasons. I will argue that we can avoid the weaknesses and retain the strengths of both views, if we pursue an alternative according to which acting for reasons involves taking something as a reason. In the main part, I will develop an account of what it is to take something as a reason for action. On the basis of this, I will then offer a new account of what it is to act for reasons.