The expertise reversal effect: cognitive load and motivational explanations

The expertise reversal effect occurs when a learner's expertise moderates design principles such as the redundancy principle (i.e., redundant information should be excluded rather than included) derived from the cognitive load theory. Although this effect is supported by numerous experiments, indicating an overall large effect size, a variety of explanations have been proposed. The present experiment tested a cognitive load and a motivational explanation with 104 students, who reported a lack of experience in the presented instructional contents. They spent about 30 min with the instructional material to learn fundamental concepts about the gradient descent (a mathematical optimization algorithm), and with a retention and transfer test used as dependent measures. Each learner was randomly assigned to one cell of a 2 (either novices or experts introduced to through the instructional design presented previously) × 2 (either with or without additional text explaining the animations) between-subjects factorial design. The expertise reversal effect concerning the redundancy principle was replicated. Novices receiving additional text scored higher on retention and transfer than did novices without additional text, while this result was reversed for experts. Results suggest that this effect can be explained by the learner's cognitive load differences rather than overall motivation differences. Furthermore, a partial overlap was found between the motivational subdimension, "probability of success," and a cognitive load measure. On the practical side, instructional designers should consider the learner's level of expertise and their cognitive load when applying design principles. Further implications for adaptive learning environments are discussed.     

Fitness effects on the cognitive function of older adults: a meta-analytic study

A meta-analytic study was conducted to examine the hypothesis that aerobic fitness training enhances the cognitive vitality of healthy but sedentary older adults. Eighteen intervention studies published between 1966 and 2001 were entered into the analysis. Several theoretically and practically important results were obtained. Most important, fitness training was found to have robust but selective benefits for cognition, with the largest fitness-induced benefits occurring for executive-control processes. The magnitude of fitness effects on cognition was also moderated by a number of programmatic and methodological factors, including the length of the fitness-training intervention, the type of the intervention, the duration of training sessions, and the gender of the study participants. The results are discussed in terms of recent neuroscientific and psychological data that indicate cognitive and neural plasticity is maintained throughout the life span.     

Interpersonal cognitive self-focus as a function of neuroticism: Basal tendencies and priming effects

Self-focus is one mechanism that may account for the social-evaluative anxiety of individuals high in neuroticism. The present two studies (total N = 183) sought to cognitively model interpersonal self-focus. The cognitive task was a simple one in which participants simply categorized dyadic interpersonal pronouns, with reaction times as the dependent measure. When others engage us, the pronoun “me” refers to the other and the pronoun “you” refers to the self. Study 1 found a neuroticism by pronoun interaction on categorization time consistent with implicit interpersonal self-focus at high (but not low) levels of neuroticism establishing a basal tendency. Study 2 examined boundary conditions. Individuals high in neuroticism exhibited implicit self-focus particularly to the extent that they had been primed to think of themselves as submissive rather than dominant in their interpersonal interactions. Implications for understanding neuroticism, self-focus, and relationship functioning are discussed.     

Reaction to trauma: a cognitive processing model.

We integrated existing cognitive processing models of posttrauma reactions into a longitudinal model. Data were obtained after a multiple shooting in a city office block. The subject group comprised 158 office workers who were in the building at the time of the shootings. The methodology of this research was a repeated measures survey, with data collection at 4, 8, and 14 months posttrauma. Measures included the Impact of Events Scale (IES) and the Symptom Checklist-90-Revised. A path analysis was performed with the IES as an indication of cognitive processing. Intrusion and avoidance were shown to mediate between exposure to trauma and symptom development. Intrusion was also found to be negatively related to subsequent symptom levels. The findings provide provisional support for a cognitive processing model.     

The screen function of unconscious fantasy

Although being a fundamental concept in psychoanalysis, fantasy is an ambiguous term. It covers a vast field of conscious and unconscious phenomena, from daydreaming, the manifest narration of the patient’s world of imagination to unconscious fantasy and primal fantasy. Further, it introduces the delicate alternatives of imaginary versus real, subject versus object and internal versus external. Following Freud’s reflections on the ambiguity of fantasy, we arrive at an idea introduced by Freud himself, but elaborated years later by Lacan. Fantasy, accordingly, is seen as a screen which both reveals and conceals. Our aim is to demonstrate, theoretical as well as clinical, how unconscious fantasy serves as a window into not only repressed wishes and conflicts, but also the most primary scenes where the subject may not even have a specific place. Simultaneously, it is the site of protection and defence, including projection and denial, but also repetition of what we will call the identical. A clinical case will be presented to illustrate our theoretical ideas and their clinical implications.     

The effects of rumination and negative cognitive styles on depression: a mediation analysis

Research on cognitive models of depression has identified negative cognitive styles and rumination as risk factors for depression. The present study examined the hypothesis that rumination mediates the effect of negative cognitive styles on depression. Specifically, we evaluated the differential effects of two aspects of rumination, characterized by brooding and reflection, on the relationship between negative cognitive styles and level of depressive symptoms. A total of 115 college students and 38 patients suffering from depressive disorders completed a battery of questionnaires measuring levels of depressive symptoms, brooding, reflection, and negative cognitive styles. The results support the notion that there exist two distinct dimensions of rumination and that, of the two, it is brooding and not reflection that mediates the relationship between negative cognitive styles and depression and contributes to its negative outcomes.     

The emergent coordination of cognitive function

1/f scaling has been observed throughout human physiology and behavior, but its origins and meaning remain a matter of debate. Some argue that it is a byproduct of ongoing processes in the brain or body and therefore of limited relevance to psychological theory. Others argue that 1/f scaling reflects a fundamental aspect of all physiological and cognitive functions, namely, that they emerge in the balance of independent versus interdependent component activities. In 4 experiments, series of key-press responses were used to test between these 2 alternative explanations. The critical design feature was to take 2 measures of each key-press response: reaction time and key-contact duration. These measures resulted in 2 parallel series of intrinsic fluctuations for each series of key-press responses. Intrinsic fluctuations exhibited 1/f scaling in both reaction times and key-contact durations, yet the 2 measures were uncorrelated with each other and separately perturbable. These and other findings indicate that 1/f scaling is too pervasive to be idiosyncratic and of limited relevance. It is instead argued that 1/f scaling reflects the coordinative, metastable basis of cognitive function.     

The overtraining reversal effect in rats: A function of task difficulty

Two experiments were conducted with rats. The first study showed that in the T-maze a brightness discrimination learning problem was more difficult than a spatial learning problem, but in a Ross-maze a brightness problem was less difficult than a spatial task. T-maze brightness and Ross-maze spatial tasks were found to be of equal difficulty.

In the second experiment rats were trained either on a brightness or spatial discrimination reversal problem in the Ross-maze. It was found that overtraining facilitated reversal performance in the spatial task but not in the brightness problem. The theoretical implications of these results were discussed.     

Illusion reversal rate as a function of subjective depth

Undergraduate students (N = 48) served as subjects in a test of Gregory's theory of illusions. Twenty-four students made judgments about the subjective depth of three reversible illusions--Necker cube, Book, and Pyramid--under the conditions of complete versus incomplete illusions and illusions without depth cues versus with depth cues. An additional 24 subjects recorded the three illusion reversal rates under slightly altered conditions. Differences were found among the various illusions with respect to complete versus incomplete illusions, reversal rate, subjective judgments of depth, and certain correlation values. Support for Gregory's theory of illusion as displaced or misleading depth perception is offered by these results.     

Individual differences in religiosity as a function of cognitive ability and cognitive style

The current study examines the degree to which individual differences in cognitive ability and cognitive style (rational thinking vs. experiential thinking) uniquely and jointly account for differences in religiosity. Using an array of measures of religiosity, results show that cognitive ability has a medium to large negative effect on various aspects of religiosity. Though also negatively related to religiosity, rational thinking style did not add significant unique effects, nor did it convey a significant indirect effect from cognitive ability. Experiential thinking was generally unrelated to ability but was positively related to some aspects of religiosity. Overall the results confirm that those with higher cognitive ability are less likely to accept religious doctrine or engage in religious behaviors and those with lower ability are more likely to accept religious doctrine and exhibit higher levels of fundamentalism. Cognitive style appears to play a lesser role in explaining individual differences in religiosity than cognitive ability.     

The relation of hypertension to cognitive function

Hypertension is an established risk factor for stroke. However, prior to such a major clinical event, hypertension exerts a more subtle impact on the brain that is revealed by diminished cognitive function. Studies comparing the performance of people with high and normal blood pressure levels have shown that high blood pressure or hypertension is related to poorer performance on tests of attention, learning and memory, executive functions, visuospatial skills, psychomotor abilities, and perceptual skills. Hypertension is also predictive of cognitive decline. Variables that may alter (i.e., moderate) the relation of hypertension to cognitive function include age, education, several biological characteristics of hypertension, and the presence of concurrent diseases. Although hypertensives are not clinically impaired, their diminished levels of cognitive performance could affect their perceived quality of life. Various brain mechanisms may explain the relation of hypertension to lower levels of cognitive function. Further understanding of the relation between hypertension and cognition is critical to the preservation of cognitive function across the life span.     

Social regulation and individual cognitive function: Effects of individuation on cognitive performance

Numerous experiments have illustrated the intervention of social regulations in individual cognitive functioning, applying such concepts as social co-ordination, socio-cognitive conflict and social marking. Two experiments, involving secondary school pupils are presented within this general framework. The first tests the hypothesis that individual cognitive functioning, highlighted in a task requiring mobilization of knowledge learned to that end, can under certain conditions be regulated by experimentally induced social resources. The second experiment uses the same paradigm to compare the information processing, under anonymous versus individuated conditions, of pupils respectively with successful and unsuccessful academic histories. The results of both experiments indicate that cognitive functioning is strongly influenced by the social situations created within the experimental settings. These results are discussed in terms of the social meta systems which may intervene in cognitive processes.     

The impact of affective and cognitive focus on attitude formation

We examined the effects of unobtrusive affective and cognitive focus on attitude formation. To induce focus, participants worked on a word-search puzzle consisting of either affective (e.g., emotion) or cognitive (e.g., reasoning) words. They then read positive and negative affective and cognitive information about a new attitude object. In the affective focus condition, evaluations were more congruent with the valence of the affective information than they were in the cognitive focus condition, where evaluations were more congruent with the valence of the cognitive information than they were in the affective focus condition. Affective focus also resulted in enhanced recall of affective information. The effects on evaluations remained stable over time, whereas effects on memory disappeared. Finally, affective focus was associated with faster response times, suggesting enhanced accessibility of affect-based attitudes. The present research shows that an affective or cognitive focus leads to the formation of different attitudes.