The aimless rationality of science 1

It is usually attempted teleologically to demonstrate the rationality of the so‐called scientific method. Goals or aims are posited (and their specification defended) and it is then argued that conformity with some body of methodological rules is conducive to the realization of these goals or aims. A ‘ deontological’ alternative to this approach is offered, adapting insights of contemporary political philosophers, especially John Rawls and Bruce Ackerman. The ‘circumstances of method’ are defined as those circumstances in which it alone makes sense to seek some method for the resolution of disputed issues. It is then shown that individuals who find themselves in these circumstances have reason to conduct themselves in conformity with certain simple rules of argumentation—have reason, indeed, in the very fact that they do so find themselves and altogether without reference to any goals or aims which it might be hoped to achieve. These rules require non‐interference, responsiveness, relevance, and publicity, and are, arguably, the rules which define the concept (and which therefore provide a framework for various conceptions,) of scientific method.     

Philosophical conceptions of rationality and psychiatric notions of competency

Psychiatrists are frequently called upon to make assessments of the rationality or irrationality of persons for a variety of medical-legal purposes. A key category is that of evaluations of a patient's capacity to grant informed consent for a medical procedure. A diagnosis of mental illness is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a finding of incompetence. The notion of competency to grant consent, which is a mixed psychiatric-legal concept, shares some features with philosophical conceptions of rationality, but differs from them in a number of important respects. This article describes the actual practice of psychiatrists when making such judgments, along with the standards of competency they employ. A comparison is made between those notions of competency and predominant philosophical conceptions of rationality.     

The rationality of science,critical thinking,and science education

This paper considers two philosophical problems and their relation to science education. The first involves the rationality of science; it is argued here that the traditional view, according to which science is rational because of its adherence to (a non-standard conception of) scientific method, successfully answers one central question concerning science's rationality. The second involves the aims of education; here it is argued that a fundamental educational aim is the fostering of rationality, or its educational cognate, critical thinking. The ramifications of these two philosophical theses for science education are then considered, and a science education which takes reasons in science as its fundamental feature is sketched.It is notwhat the man of science believes that distinguishes him, buthow andwhy he believes it. His beliefs are tentative, not dogmatic; they are based on evidence, not on authority or intuition (Russell 1945, p. 527).I believe ... that all teaching [in science] on the University level (and if possible below) should be training and encouragement in critical thinking (Popper 1970, pp. 52–53).This paper is mainly drawn from other publications. The first section is taken from my (1985); the second from (1988), Chapter 2; and the third from (1988), Chapter 6. Since what appears here are truncated versions of those discussions, I urge interested readers to look to those other works for fuller treatments of the issues here discussed.     

Institutional rationality: The complex norms of science

The claim is made that the norms for justified belief in science require a complex structure of practices and institutional arrangements, that these arrangements have a history which, at crucial junctures, are subject to severe stress, that such severe stress puts at issue the whole epistemic structure of science, and that at present science faces one of these periods, and its future is in doubt.     

The impact of chess research on cognitive science

Summary Although chess research has not been a mainstream activity in cognitive science, it has had a significant impact on this field because of the experimental and theoretical tools it has provided. The two most-cited references in chess research, de Groot (1965) and Chase and Simon (1973 a), have accumulated over 250 citations each (SSCI andSCI sources summed), with the majority of citations coming a decade or more from their publication dates. Both works are frequently cited in contemporary cognitive-psychology textbooks. Chess playing provides a model task environment for the study of basic cognitive processes, such as perception, memory, and problem solving. It also offers a unique opportunity for the study of individual differences (chess expertise) because of Elo's (1965, 1978) development of a chess-skill rating scale. Chess has also enjoyed a privileged position in Artificial-Intelligence research as a model domain for exploring search and evaluation processes.     

The antinomy of science and democracy in modern China

Up to now Chinese academia has been addicted to inviting the twin goddesses of democracy and science, but has regrettably ignored the innate incongruity between them, which has led to the rise of scientism. May 4th pioneers first introduced this value system, but tension between these values subsequently led to a prevailing preference for science over freedom. The early Marxists defined freedom as obedience to social laws formulated in Marxist ‘science’, while Maoism finalized the Sinicization of Marxism with a belief in iron‐bound social laws and in human beings as mere political means, mercilessly suppressing any expression of free will.     

Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science

Several recently developed philosophical approaches to the self promise to enhance the exchange of ideas between the philosophy of the mind and the other cognitive sciences. This review examines two important concepts of self: the 'minimal self', a self devoid of temporal extension, and the 'narrative self', which involves personal identity and continuity across time. The notion of a minimal self is first clarified by drawing a distinction between the sense of self-agency and the sense of self-ownership for actions. This distinction is then explored within the neurological domain with specific reference to schizophrenia, in which the sense of self-agency may be disrupted. The convergence between the philosophical debate and empirical study is extended in a discussion of more primitive aspects of self and how these relate to neonatal experience and robotics. The second concept of self, the narrative self, is discussed in the light of Gazzaniga's left-hemisphere 'interpreter' and episodic memory. Extensions of the idea of a narrative self that are consistent with neurological models are then considered. The review illustrates how the philosophical approach can inform cognitive science and suggests that a two-way collaboration may lead to a more fully developed account of the self.     

The impact of conflict of interest on trust in science

Conflicts of interest have an erosive effect on trust in science, damaging first the attitude of the public toward scientists and their research, but also weakening the trusting interdependence of scientists. Disclosure is recognized as the key tool for management of conflicts, but rules with sanctions must be improved, new techniques for avoidance of financial conflicts by alternative funding of evaluative research must be sought, and there must be new thinking about institutional conflicts of interest. Our profession is education, and both the public and research professionals of all ages would benefit from greater understanding of how science should and does work. An earlier version of this paper was presented at an International Conference on “Conflict of Interest and its Significance in Science and Medicine” held in Warsaw, Poland on 5–6 April, 2002.     

The impact of adopting ethnic or civic conceptions of national belonging for others' treatment

National belonging is often defined in terms of "ethnic" ancestry and "civic" commitment (with the latter typically implying a more inclusive conception of belonging). The authors report three Scottish studies manipulating the prominence of these criteria. In Study 1 (N = 80), a Chinese-heritage target was judged more Scottish (and his criticisms of Scotland better received) when Scotland was defined in civic terms. In Study 2 (N = 40), a similar manipulation in a naturalistic setting showed a civic conception of belonging resulted in more help being given to a Chinese-heritage confederate. Study 3 (N = 71) replicated Study 2 and showed the effect was mediated by judgments of the confederate's Scottishness. These studies emphasize the importance of exploring how ingroup identity is defined.     

The rationality of reasonableness

Rationality and reasonableness are often sharply distinguished from one another and are even held to be in conflict. On this construal, rationality consists in means-end calculation of the most efficient means to one's ends (which are usually taken to be self-interested), while reasonableness consists in equitableness whereby one respects the rights of other persons as well as oneself. To deal with this conflict, it is noted that both rationality and reasonableness are based on reason, which is analyzed as the power of attaining truth, and especially necessary truth. It is then shown that, by the rationality involved in reason, the moral principle of reasonableness, the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC), has a stringently rational justification in that to deny or violate it is to incur self-contradiction. Objections are considered bearing on relevance and motivation. It is concluded that, where reasonableness and egoistic rationality conflict, the former is rationally superior.