观察者公正敏感性对不公正信息加工的影响

为考查观察者公正敏感性对不公正信息加工（注意、解释）的影响,该研究开展了两个实验研究。在实验一中,让被试观看不公正影片剪辑或中性剪辑后,要求他们完成视觉探测任务,判断探测刺激是在不公正词汇还是中性词汇的左边或右边;在实验二中,让被试对一个模糊的暗含不公正意义的影片剪辑中的主角进行公正性评价。结果表明,当被试不公正概念被激活后,观察者公正敏感性高的被试比观察者公正敏感性低的被试对不公正信息的注意加工更集中和更自动,同时他们对模糊的信息解释为更不公正。     

Justice‐sensitive interpretations of ambiguous situations

The accessibility of concepts related to justice and injustice is proposed as a basic cognitive mechanism underlying the personality trait of justice sensitivity. To provide evidence for this assertion, the manner in which justice sensitivity shapes the interpretation of an ambiguous situation was investigated. It was found that, without priming, and after injustice is primed, persons high in justice sensitivity tend to perceive greater injustice in an ambiguous situation than persons low in justice sensitivity. If the restoration of justice is primed, however, persons high in justice sensitivity tend to interpret the ambiguous situation as more just when compared to persons low in justice sensitivity. Results are discussed with regard to a process‐oriented explanation of emotional and behavioural effects of justice sensitivity.     

Life Satisfaction and Job‐Seeking Behavior of the Unemployed: The Effect of Individual Differences in Justice Sensitivity

This study examines the effect of justice sensitivity on the life satisfaction and job‐seeking behavior of unemployed individuals and considers the likelihood of experiencing long‐term unemployment. We focus on two facets of dispositional justice sensitivity that reflect individual differences in perception and reactions to perpetrating injustice against others (perpetrator sensitivity) or suffering from the injustice of others as an innocent victim (victim sensitivity). We hypothesised that the negative effect of unemployment on life satisfaction is stronger among individuals with higher levels of victim sensitivity and perpetrator sensitivity. The former are more likely to perceive themselves as victims of an unjust situation, such as fate or the employer's decisions, whereas the latter are more likely to perceive themselves as perpetrators against the rules of social justice. Using survey data from approximately 400 participants, we found that unemployed individuals were less satisfied with life than employed individuals and that this relationship was stronger for perpetrator‐sensitive individuals. Unemployed perpetrator‐sensitive individuals were more likely to engage in active job‐seeking behavior and faced a lower likelihood of long‐term unemployment. The results are discussed in terms of the importance of justice‐related personality aspects of unemployed individuals for their well‐being and labor market outcomes.     

Justice sensitivity and forgiveness in close interpersonal relationships: the mediating role of mistrustful, legitimizing, and pro-relationship cognitions

The purpose of the present investigation was to explore and better understand the relationship between justice sensitivity from a victim's perspective (JS‐victim) and interpersonal forgiveness. In particular, we aimed to identify the cognitive mechanisms mediating this relationship and test the moderating influence of post‐transgression perpetrator behavior. We used data from a questionnaire study employing a Swiss community sample (N = 450) and 2 scenario‐based studies employing German online samples, in the context of romantic (N = 242) and friendship relationships (N = 974). We consistently found JS‐victim to be negatively related to dispositional (Study 1) and situational forgiveness (Studies 2 and 3). Study 2 demonstrated the relationship between JS‐victim and reduced forgiveness to be partly mediated by mistrustful interpretations of the partner's post‐transgression behavior. In Study 3, cognitions legitimizing one's own antisocial reactions and a lack of pro‐relationship cognitions were identified as further mediators. These variables mediated the negative effect of JS‐victim on forgiveness largely independent of whether the friend perpetrator displayed reconciliatory behavior or not. Findings suggest that the cognitive mechanisms mediating victim‐sensitive individuals' unforgiveness could barely be neutralized. Future research should investigate their malleability in light of qualitatively different perpetrator behaviors as well as their broader relational implications.     

The Performer's Reactions to Procedural Injustice: When Prosocial Identity Reduces Prosocial Behavior1

Considerable research has examined how procedural injustice affects victims and witnesses of unfavorable outcomes, with little attention to the “performers” who deliver these outcomes. Drawing on dissonance theory, we hypothesized that performers' reactions to procedural injustice in delivering unfavorable outcomes are moderated by prosocial identity—a helping‐focused self‐concept. Across 2 experiments, individuals communicated unfavorable outcomes decided by a superior. Consistent with justice research, when prosocial identities were not primed, performers experienced greater negative affect and behaved more prosocially toward victims when a superior's decision‐making procedures were unjust. Subtly activating performers' prosocial identities reversed these reactions. Results highlight how roles and identities shape the experience and delivery of unfavorable outcomes: When procedures are unjust, prosocial identity can reduce prosocial behavior.     

The “Meta” Level of Integrity: Integrity in the Context of Structural Injustice

This essay argues for a new, “meta,” level of integrity that is created by the context of structural injustice. The essay will draw from Margaret Walker to bring out a defining social value of integrity, namely, its ability to facilitate reliable response to harms caused by “moral luck.” The essay will then argue that, when bad luck is caused by complex social‐structural function, traditional advice for maintaining one's integrity fails to provide adequate guidance; following such advice facilitates unjust social‐structural function, and so unreliability in response to harm. The essay will address this problem by arguing that in the context of structural injustice, a “meta‐level” meaning of integrity emerges. This new meta‐level of integrity, unlike the more traditional first‐level integrity, does not instruct an individual to disassociate herself from structural harms; instead, it instructs an individual to manage the way in which she participates in unjust social structures. Meta‐level integrity, unlike first‐level integrity, does not facilitate an end to structural harm, but it does promote a reliable presence of social‐justice movements within unjust structures.     

The Effects of Moral and Pragmatic Arguments Against Torture on Demands for Judicial Reform

Torture can be opposed on the basis of pragmatic (e.g., torture does not work) or moral arguments (e.g., torture violates human rights). Three studies investigated how these arguments affect U.S. citizens' attitudes toward U.S.‐committed torture. In Study 1, participants expressed stronger demands for redressing the injustice of torture when presented with moral rather than pragmatic or no arguments against torture. Study 2 replicated this finding with an extended justice measure and also showed the moderating role of ingroup glorification and attachment. Moral arguments increased justice demands among those who typically react most defensively to ingroup‐committed wrongdoings: the highly attached and glorifying. Study 3 showed that the effect of moral arguments against torture on justice demands and support for torture among high glorifiers is mediated by moral outrage and empathy but not guilt.     

The Other Side of Injustice: When Unfair Procedures Increase Group-Serving Behavior

ABSTRACT— Greater group identification and higher levels of procedural justice typically work together to encourage group members to engage in group-serving cooperative behavior. However, when people who already identify with a group receive information indicating that the group is procedurally unjust, their motivation to engage in group-serving behavior may increase. This article reports two studies in which college students' identification with their university was measured and information about the procedural justice of the university was manipulated. Study 1 used an explicit measure of group identification and a deliberative measure of group-serving behavior. Study 2 used an implicit measure of group identification and both deliberative and spontaneous measures of group-serving behavior. The findings of both studies support the hypothesis that among people who are highly identified with a group, learning about the group's injustice leads to short-term increases in group-serving behavior.     

理性-经验加工对不公正情绪和行为反应的影响:公正敏感性的调节作用

基于认知-经验理论,采用行为实验法和情境故事法,探讨了不同信息加工方式对不公正情绪和行为反应的影响,以及受害者敏感性对两者关系的调节作用。结果表明,与理性加工相比,经验加工下个体对不公正有更强烈的负性情绪反应,合作意向更低;受害者敏感性调节加工方式与不公正行为反应之间的关系,即受害者敏感性低时,加工方式与人际公正对合作意向交互作用显著,受害者敏感性高时,加工方式与人际公正对合作意向没有交互作用。     

Wealth inequality and activism: Perceiving injustice galvanizes social change but perceptions depend on political ideologies

What motivates people to engage in activism against wealth inequality? The simple answer is perceiving injustice. However, the current work demonstrates that these perceptions depend on political ideologies. More specifically, for political liberals who frequently question the fairness of the economic system, messages simply describing the extent of the inequality (distributive injustice) are enough to motivate activism (Study 1). For political conservatives, who are inclined to believe that inequality results from fair procedures, messages must also detail how the system of economic forces is unjust (procedural injustice; Studies 2 and 3). Together, these studies suggest perceiving injustice can galvanize social change, but for conservatives, this means more than simply outlining the extent of the inequality.     

Prosocial thinkers and the social transmission of justice

Feeling the sting of another's injustice is a common human experience. We adopt a motivated information processing approach and explore how individual differences in social motives (e.g., high vs. low collectivism) and epistemic motives (e.g., high vs. low need for closure) drive individuals' evaluative and behavioral reactions to the just and unjust treatment of others. In two studies, one in the laboratory (N = 78) and one in the field (N = 163), we find that the justice treatment of others has a more profound influence on the attitudes and behaviors of prosocial thinkers, people who are chronically higher (vs. lower) in collectivism and lower (vs. higher) in the need for closure. In all, our results suggest that chronically higher collectivism and a lower need for closure work in concert to make another's justice relevant to personal judgment and behavior.     

The justice and injustice of life events

An experiment employing a sample (N=280) of undergraduates from an urban university was designed to test the general hypothesis that the perception of justice and injustice in life events depends upon the relationship between two variables that are part of the stimulus situation: the valence of the person being observed (good or bad), and the valence of the outcome experienced by that person (positive or negative). The findings from both qualitative (analysis of spontaneous comments) and quantitative scale ratings supported the prediction that justice and injustice perceptions depend respectively on whether the signs of the person–outcome valences are the same or different. Two perceptual biases were revealed by the analysis. The first was a positive outcome bias: respondents rated as more just outcomes that were positive regardless of the goodness or badness of the person in the life event. The second was a justice bias: respondents in both measures found the just life events to be more just than unjust life events to be unjust. Finally the more religious respondents perceived the life events as more just regardless of the patterns of person–outcome valences than did the less religious, suggesting a third, religiosity bias. A number of theoretical implications and questions for future research were discussed, including the quantification of the hypothesis and its cross-cultural generality.     

The Epistemology of Justice

In arguing about justice, different sides often accept common moral principles, but reach different conclusions about justice because they disagree about facts. I argue that motivated reasoning, epistemic injustice, and ideologies of injustice support unjust institutions by entrenching distorted representations of the world. Working from a naturalistic conception of justice as a kind of social contract, I suggest some strategies for discovering what justice demands by counteracting these biases. Moral sentiments offer vital resources to this end.     

Fairness in Knowing: Science Communication and Epistemic Justice

Science communication, as a field and as a practice, is fundamentally about knowledge distribution; it is about the access to, and the sharing of knowledge. All distribution (science communication included) brings with it issues of ethics and justice. Indeed, whether science communicators acknowledge it or not, they get to decide both which knowledge is shared (by choosing which topic is communicated), and who gets access to this knowledge (by choosing which audience it is presented to). As a result, the decisions of science communicators have important implications for epistemic justice: how knowledge is distributed fairly and equitably. This paper presents an overview of issues related to epistemic justice for science communication, and argues that there are two quite distinct ways in which science communicators can be just (or unjust) in the way they distribute knowledge. Both of these paths will be considered before concluding that, at least on one of these accounts, science communication as a field and as a practice is fundamentally epistemically unjust. Possible ways to redress this injustice are suggested.     

For better or for worse: the congruence of personal and group outcomes on targets' responses to discrimination

This paper reports two studies examining how (in‐) congruence between personal and group outcomes affects emotional well‐being, outcome attributions and procedural justice perceptions of individuals who are exposed to subtle discrimination. In Study 1 (N = 82) participants are either accepted or rejected in a (bogus) job application procedure, and either do or do not receive additional information indicating group‐level disadvantage. In Study 2 (N = 79), participants were either accepted or rejected, and received information indicating either advantage or disadvantage for members of their group. Results of both studies reveal that not only emotional well‐being and outcome attributions, but also procedural justice perceptions are primarily guided by personal outcomes. That is, being informed of group‐level disadvantage does not intensify but can instead alleviate negative affect resulting from personal rejection. Furthermore, group disadvantage is only seen as an indicator of an unjust procedure by individual group members who have personally suffered rejection. Results are discussed in relation to current insights on discrimination, tokenism and social justice. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Benefiting from Injustice and the Common-Source Problem

According to the Beneficiary Pays Principle, innocent beneficiaries of an injustice stand in a special moral relationship with the victims of the same injustice. Critics have argued that it is normatively irrelevant that a beneficiary and a victim are connected in virtue of the same unjust 'source'. The aim of this paper is to defend the Beneficiary Pays Principle against this criticism. Locating the principle against the backdrop of corrective justice, it argues that the principle is correct in saying that innocent beneficiaries of an injustice may have an extra reason to assist the victims of that injustice. This is because it may be necessary to defeat the immoral plan of the perpetrator of the injustice and because it may satisfy weak restitution. The conclusion is that the principle is distinctive from related views, such as that property should be returned to its rightful owner or that tainted benefits should be given up for general use.     

Justice for whom, exactly? Beliefs in justice for the self and various others

The present studies examine why people think the world is more just to themselves than to others generally. Beliefs in justice for the self were uniquely associated with psychological adjustment, consistent with the theoretical motive to believe in justice for the self (Studies 1 and 2). However, this "justice motive" did not appear to affect the relative strength of justice beliefs. Instead, self-other differences in justice beliefs appeared to reflect objective assessments of the justice received by various demographics. Undergraduates believed the world to be more just to themselves than to others but not their undergraduate peers specifically (Study 1). Participants of both genders believed the world to be more just to men, and to themselves, than to women (Study 2). Women did not exempt themselves individually from injustice but believed, similar to men, that undergraduate women receive as much justice as men (Study 3).     

Considering self‐interests and symbolism together: How instrumental and value‐expressive motives interact to influence supervisors’ justice behavior

Drawing upon functional theories of attitudes and the organizational justice literature, the current research suggests that people's attitudes toward justice likely serve an instrumental function (grounded in self‐interest, rewards maximization, and punishment minimization) as well as a value‐expressive function (grounded in the expression of self‐concept and values). Importantly, these two functions co‐exist and interact to influence supervisors’ justice behavior and the consistency of such behavior via supervisors’ justification for unjust behavior. Findings from a set of experimental and correlational studies confirmed these predictions. The positive effects of supervisors’ value‐expressive function on justice behavior and its consistency were stronger when their instrumental function was lower (vs. higher), and justification for unjust behavior mediated these effects. Also, supplementary analyses showed that the consistency of supervisors’ justice behavior positively predicted subordinates’ overall justice perceptions beyond the effects of the overall level of justice behavior. We conclude by discussing the theoretical and practical implications of these findings.