Inhibiting responses when switching: Does it matter?

In the present study, cued task-switching was combined with the stop-signal paradigm in order to investigate the interaction between response inhibition and task-switching. In line with earlier findings from Schuch and Koch (2003), the results show that switch and repetition trials following inhibited responses were processed equally fast. This confirms the hypothesis of Schuch and Koch (2003) that after signal-inhibit trials there is less interference, resulting in a disappearance of the switch cost. Furthermore, stopping performance was not affected by task-switching. The estimated stop-signal latencies were similar for switch and repetition trials, while the stop-signal delays were longer for switch compared to repetition trials. This result suggests that response inhibition and the inhibition processes in cued task-switching are not relying upon a common mechanism.     

The immoral gene: Does it really exist?

Over the last years several European patents were opposed for protecting technology violating the morality requirement under Article 53(a) EPC. Attempts have been made by the Appeal Boards of the European Patent Office (EPO), as well as by amendments introduced into the Implementing Regulations of the European Patent Convention (EPC), to address this sensitive patentability requirement more precisely. The most recent hot topic coming up in this context is the patentability of stem cells. It is to be expected that this discussion will still go on in the field of biotechnological inventions for the next several years. An earlier version of this paper was presented at an international conference, “The Ethics of Intellectual Property Rights and Patents,” held in Warsaw, Poland on 23–24 April, 2004.     

Where does attention go when you blink?

Many studies have shown that covert visual attention precedes saccadic eye movements to locations in space. The present research investigated whether the allocation of attention is similarly affected by eye blinks. Subjects completed a partial-report task under blink and no-blink conditions. Experiment 1 showed that blinking facilitated report of the bottom row of the stimulus array: Accuracy for the bottom row increased and mislocation errors decreased under blink, as compared with no-blink, conditions, indicating that blinking influenced the allocation of visual attention. Experiment 2 showed that this was true even when subjects were biased to attend elsewhere. These results indicate that attention moves downward before a blink in an involuntary fashion. The eyes also move downward during blinks, so attention may precede blink-induced eye movements just as it precedes saccades and other types of eye movements.     

Can expressivism have it all?

Philosophical Studies - Quasi-realist expressivists (or simply “expressivists”) set themselves the task of developing a metaethical theory that at once captures what they call the...     

How does it feel to act together?

This paper on the phenomenology of joint agency proposes a foray into a little explored territory at the intersection of two very active domains of research: joint action and sense of agency. I explore two ways in which our experience of joint agency may differ from our experience of individual agency. First, the mechanisms of action specification and control involved in joint action are typically more complex than those present in individual actions, since it is crucial for joint action that people coordinate their plans and actions. I discuss the implications that these coordination requirements might have for the strength of the sense of agency an agent may experience for a joint action. Second, engagement in joint action may involve a transformation of agentive identity and a partial or complete shift from a sense of self-agency to a sense of we-agency. I discuss several factors that may contribute to shaping our sense of agentive identity in joint action.     

Which one made it go? The emergence of diagnostic reasoning in preschoolers

We evaluate the hypothesis that children's diagnostic causal reasoning becomes more sophisticated as their understanding of uncertainty advances. When the causal status of candidate causes was known, 3- and 4-year-olds were capable of diagnostic inference (Experiment 1) and could revise their beliefs when told their initial diagnosis was incorrect (Experiment 2). In Experiments 3 and 4, only 4-year-olds made successful inferences when the causal status of candidate causes was uncertain. The results suggest that by age 3, children appreciate that an effect can have multiple candidate causes, but it is not until age 4 that they begin to reason correctly when the causal status of candidate causes is unknown.     

Why don't they just let it go?

Discrepancies between what children expect about physical causality (indexed by looking time) and how they act on that knowledge have led to criticisms of claims about what infants "know." Baillargeon [Baillargeon, R. (1999). Young infants' expectations about hidden objects: A reply to three challenges. Developmental Science, 2, 115-163] advocates examining more tasks before revising views of early cognitive development. We report another discrepancy which suggests an additional indicator of what is salient for preverbal infants. While examining the Uzgiris-Hunt test performances of 40 children (26 females), 7.6-26.9-months-old, infants appeared captivated by the bouncing of a small rubber ball. However, most infants reproduced the motion of the bounce event itself, repeatedly hitting the ball against the table, rather than the experimenter's action (dropping). Comparing performances of those who did and did not imitate the drop, two possibly interrelated interpretations remained consistent with the data: infants perform goal-directed imitation of interesting phenomena, perhaps because they believe they must apply force to make them happen.     

The Educational Reform Movement: What Does it Mean for Counseling?

Case, C.W., Lanier, J.E., & Miskel, C.G. (1986). The Holmes Group report: Impetus for gaining professional status for teachers. Journal of Teacher Education, 37(4), 36–43.     

Is it all because of a story?

A very popular account of various behaviors among journalists and humanities scholars and is that such behaviors were caused by stories that people read or heard. In this paper, I argue that such explanations are seldom justified, and speculate about what makes story-based accounts so popular when there is so little evidence for them.     

Long-term caregiving: what happens when it ends?

Data from a longitudinal study were used to examine what happens to caregivers in the years after their cognitively impaired spouse dies. Comparisons of 42 current caregivers, 49 former caregivers, and 52 noncaregivers over a 4-year period showed that former caregivers did not improve on several measures of psychological well-being. Although former caregivers experienced decreases in stress and negative affect, their scores on depression, loneliness, and positive affect did not rebound to levels comparable to noncaregivers and, in fact, remained similar to those of current caregivers up to 3 years after caregiving had ceased. The most consistent predictors of postcaregiving outcomes were social support and intrusive-avoidant thinking about caregiving. The data suggest that some consequences of long-term caregiving may be long-term as well. The needs of former spousal caregivers warrant greater attention both in research and in practice.     

Collaborative recall and collective memory: what happens when we remember together?

Studies of collective memory have traditionally been the domain of philosophers and sociologists, while cognitive psychologists have largely investigated memory at the level of the individual. However, within cognitive psychology there is a variety of psychological theories and experimental paradigms that have been used to study the process and outcomes of remembering in groups. In this paper we review the research on group remembering and draw together findings from different traditions. In doing so, we aim to answer a series of questions about the outcomes and consequences of recalling in groups, and the particular features of groups and of memories that may be conducive to the formation of a collective memory. In clarifying what we know and what is yet to be studied about group memory, we point the way forward for a cognitive psychological study of collective memory.     

What do you do when things go right? The intrapersonal and interpersonal benefits of sharing positive events

Four studies examined the intrapersonal and interpersonal consequences of seeking out others when good things happen (i.e., capitalization). Two studies showed that communicating personal positive events with others was associated with increased daily positive affect and well-being, above and beyond the impact of the positive event itself and other daily events. Moreover, when others were perceived to respond actively and constructively (and not passively or destructively) to capitalization attempts, the benefits were further enhanced. Two studies found that close relationships in which one's partner typically responds to capitalization attempts enthusiastically were associated with higher relationship well-being (e.g., intimacy, daily marital satisfaction). The results are discussed in terms of the theoretical and empirical importance of understanding how people "cope" with positive events, cultivate positive emotions, and enhance social bonds.