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The problem, or cluster of problems, of the unity of the proposition, along with the cluster of problems that tend to go under the name of Bradley’s regress, has recently again become a going concern for philosophers, after having for some time been regarded as primarily of historical interest. In this paper, I distinguish between the different problems that tend to be brought up under the heading of the unity of the proposition, and between different related regress arguments. I present my favored solutions to these problems.
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Marek Piwowarczyk 《European Journal of Philosophy》2023,31(1):118-136
This paper is devoted to Kazimierz Twardowski's thesis that the unity of a compound object (a whole) can be ensured only by the relations between its parts and the object itself. Twardowski's idea of unity raises many difficulties, especially the threat of petitio principii: the whole is presupposed as furnishing the ground for the unification of its parts, and yet it also seems to be the result of this unification. To avoid these problems, Edmund Husserl sought to refute Twardowski's thesis, and ascribed the role of a principle of unity to the foundational relationships which directly hold between the parts of a whole. Roman Ingarden then seemed to return to Twardowski's concept of unity, but employed it within a different theory of objects, according to which to be an object is to be a subject of properties. I seek to demonstrate that: (1) Twardowski's thesis is sound if a compound object is something over and above its parts; (2) with respect to Husserl's solution, it is not clear as to whether the whole is really something over and above its parts; (3) Ingarden's conception of the subject-properties structure saves Twardowski's thesis; (4) Ingarden's theory of higher-order objects is invalid. 相似文献
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Marya Schechtman 《Synthese》2008,162(3):405-423
In the spirit of the discussion in Daniel Kolak’s I Am You: The Metaphysical Foundation for Global Ethics, I consider the way in which divisions that we usually think of as borders between distinct people occur within a single
life. Starting with the dispute between constructionist and non-constructionist views of persons, I argue for a view that
places the unity of persons in the dynamic generated by simultaneously taking a constructionist and non-constructionist view
of oneself. In order to unify ourselves as agents we need to treat past and future selves as others, but to motivate this
endeavor we need to think of ourselves as temporally extended agents, and so identify with past and future selves. Understanding
this dynamic illuminates the structure of our agency and the unity of the self. 相似文献
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Oliver Rashbrook 《Philosophical Studies》2013,164(2):465-484
There are two different varieties of question concerning the unity of consciousness: questions about unity at a time, and unity over time. A recent trend in the debate about unity has been to attempt to provide a ‘generalized’ account that purports to solve both problems in the same way. This attempt can be seen in the accounts of Barry Dainton and Michael Tye. In this paper, I argue that there are crucial differences between unity over time and unity at a time that make it impossible to provide a generalized account of unity. The source of these crucial differences is the phenomenon of the ‘continuity of consciousness’. I argue that accounts of unity over time have to provide an account of this continuity, and that there is no phenomenon analogous to continuity in the case of unity at a time. Attention to the continuity of consciousness reveals crucial structural differences between the two varieties of unity. These structural differences make it impossible to provide a generalized account of unity. I show that the problems faced by Dainton’s and Tye’s accounts in the light of the structural differences make their accounts of unity appear far less appealing than they might initially have looked. I conclude by noting that, in the light of the important differences between the two varieties of unity, it is a mistake to attempt to model accounts of unity over time on accounts of unity at a time. 相似文献
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Silver Bronzo 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2017,25(4):750-771
This paper identifies a tension in Frege’s philosophy and offers a diagnosis of its origins. Frege’s Context Principle can be used to dissolve the problem of propositional unity. However, Frege’s official response to the problem does not invoke the Context Principle, but the distinction between ‘saturated’ and ‘unsaturated’ propositional constituents. I argue that such a response involves assumptions that clash with the Context Principle. I suggest, however, that this tension is not generated by deep-seated philosophical commitments, but by Frege’s occasional attempt to take a dubious shortcut in the justification of his conception of propositional structure. 相似文献
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Justin C. Clark 《Canadian journal of philosophy》2015,45(4):445-470
For Socrates, the virtues are a kind of knowledge, and the virtues form a unity. Sometimes, Socrates suggests that the virtues are all ‘one and the same’ thing. Other times, he suggests they are ‘parts of a single whole.’ I argue that (i) the ‘what is x?’ question is sophisticated, it gives rise to two distinct kinds of investigations into virtue, a conceptual investigation into the ousia and a psychological investigation into the dunamis, (ii) Plato recognized the difference between definitional accounts of the ousia and a psychological accounts of the dunamis, and (iii) the distinction between these two investigations can effectively resolve various interpretive puzzles regarding the unity of the virtues. It is argued that the virtues are ‘one and the same’ psychologically, while they are ‘parts of a single whole’ conceptually. 相似文献
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Philosophical Studies - The unity of consciousness has so far been studied only as a relation holding among the many experiences of a single subject. I investigate whether this relation could hold... 相似文献
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Thomas A. Long 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》1986,7(1):75-92
Alasdair MacIntyre's recent thinking both about the concept of a practice and the existence of narrative unity in human life raises important questions about how we should view clinical medicine today. Is it possible for clinical medicine to pursue patient well-being in a society (allegedly) afflicted with what he calls ‘modernity’? Here it is argued that MacIntyre's pessimistic view of the individual in contemporary society makes his call for patient autonomy in the clinical setting pointless. Finally, recent work in gerontology is cited to make three points: first, MacIntyre's pessimism about us is too extreme; second, the concept of a ‘fictionalized’ personal history is closer to reality than either MacIntyre's notion of narrative unity or the ideas of his imagined opponent (Sartre); and finally, we should not expect clinical medicine to produce patient well-being, when this is understood narratively. 相似文献
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Seok B 《Cognitive Science》2006,30(2):347-380
Since the publication of Fodor's (1983) The Modularity of Mind, there have been quite a few discussions of cognitive modularity among cognitive scientists. Generally, in those discussions, modularity means a property of specialized cognitive processes or a domain-specific body of information. In actuality, scholars understand modularity in many different ways. Different characterizations of modularity and modules were proposed and discussed, but they created misunderstanding and confusion. In this article, I classified and analyzed different approaches to modularity and argued for the unity of modularity. Modularity is a multidimensional property consisting of features from several dimensions specifying different aspects of cognition. Among those, there are core features of modularity, and these core features form a cross-dimensional unity. Despite the diverse and liberal characterizations, modularity contributes to cognitive science because of the unity of the core features. 相似文献
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The paper addresses the question of how the unity of science can adequately be characterized. A mere classification of scientific fields and disciplines does not express the unity of science unless it is supplemented with a perspective that establishes a systematic coherence among the different branches of science. Four ideas of this kind are discussed. Namely, the unity of scientific language, of scientific laws, of scientific method and of science as a practical‐operational enterprise. Whereas reference to the unity of scientific language and of scientific laws does not provide a viable basis for the unity of science, the methodological and practical unity might. The unity of science can be characterized by the way in which methodological criteria enter into the assessment or evaluation of theories, and, moreover, by a transdisciplin‐ary approach to problems. Accordingly, the unity of science is not expressed by theoretical uniformity but by the unity of scientific practice. 相似文献
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《New Ideas in Psychology》1987,5(3):329-339
Arguments for unifying psychology's disparate elements are examined in relation to the actualities of scientific practice. These arguments are often based on such implicit unexamined assumptions as: (1) psychology resembles physics conceptually and historically; (2) there is an underlying rational order to knowledge which will define and justify the direction unification will take; (3) there is a knowable reality independent of our perceptions; (4) the outcome of unification will resemble a harmonious family working for the common good of “knowledge” and “truth.” While these assumptions have plausibility, it is argued that alternative views have equally legitimate claims and if we accept them, the possibility of unifying psychology becomes more problematic. Psychology's desire for unification appears parallel to a similar yearning within society that seeks to counteract the fragmentation of social life and consciousness that characterizes modernity. 相似文献
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Fabian Dorsch 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2010,9(2):171-191
My primary aim in this article is to provide a philosophical account of the unity of hallucinations, which can capture both
perceptual hallucinations (which are subjectively indistinguishable from perceptions) and non-perceptual hallucinations (all
others). Besides, I also mean to clarify further the division of labour and the nature of the collaboration between philosophy
and the cognitive sciences. Assuming that the epistemic conception of hallucinations put forward by M. G. F. Martin and others
is largely on the right track, I will focus on two main tasks: (a) to provide a satisfactory phenomenology of the subjective
character of perceptions and perceptual hallucinations and (b) to redress the philosophers’ neglect of non-perceptual hallucinations.
More specifically, I intend to apply one of the central tenets of the epistemic conception—that hallucinations can and should
be positively characterised in terms of their phenomenological connections to perceptions—to non-perceptual hallucinations
as well. That is, I will try to show that we can positively specify the class of non-perceptual hallucinations by reference
to the distinctive ways in which we first-personally experience them and perceptions in consciousness. The task of saying
more about their underlying third-personal nature may then be left to the cognitive sciences. 相似文献
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Oskari Kuusela 《European Journal of Philosophy》2020,28(2):428-444
This paper discusses the problem of the unity of moral good, concerning the kind of unity that moral good or the concept thereof constitutes. In particular, I am concerned with how Wittgenstein's identification of various complex modes of conceptual unity, and his introduction of a methodology of clarification for dealing with such complex concepts, can help with the problem of unity, as it rises from the moral philosophical tradition. Relating to this I also address the disputed question, whether Wittgenstein regards good as a family‐resemblance concept, and make an attempt to characterize family‐resemblance concepts generally by way of their similarities and differences from certain other complex modes of conceptual unity. I argue that whilst Wittgenstein does regard good as a family‐resemblance concept, in the Philosophical Investigations he seeks to make a more general methodological point. I conclude with a suggestion of how Wittgenstein's methodological points can help us to put into a broader perspective famous criticisms of the moral philosophical tradition by Michael Stocker and Bernard Williams, and how Wittgenstein's methods more generally can help to address the problem of the unity of good. This illustrates one way in which Wittgensteinian methods can help resolve disputes in moral philosophy, where the main approaches, Aristotelian, Kantian and utilitarian theories, seem to be locked in a stalemate. As I argue, this situation has to do with their assumptions about the unity of moral good. The response isn't to reject those theories, however, but to re‐interpret them in a way consistent with the Wittgensteinian methodology. 相似文献