Construction of preferences by constraint satisfaction

Participants were given a choice between two multiattribute alternatives (job offers). Preferences for the attributes were measured before, during, and after the choices were made. We found that over the course of decision making, the preferences shifted to cohere with the choice: The attributes of the option that was eventually chosen came to be rated more favorably than they had been rated initially, while the attributes of the rejected option received lower preference ratings than before. These coherence shifts were triggered by a single attribute that decisively favored one option (Experiment 1), and occurred spontaneously in the absence of a decisive attribute (Experiment 2). The coherence shift preceded commitment to choice. These findings favor constraint-satisfaction models of decision making.     

Structure Compatibility and Restructuring in Judgment and Choice

The use of different response modes has been found to influence how subjects evaluate pairs of alternatives described by two attributes. It has been suggested that judgments and choices evoke different kinds of cognitive processes, leading to an overweighing of the prominent attribute in choice (Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988; Fischer & Hawkins, 1993). Four experiments were conducted to compare alternative cognitive explanations of this so-called prominence effect in judgment and choice. The explanations investigated were the structure compatibility hypothesis and the restructuring hypothesis. According to the structure compatibility hypothesis, it was assumed that the prominence effect is due to a lack of compatibility between the required output from subjects and the structure of information in input. The restructuring hypothesis stated that the decision maker uses mental restructuring operations on a representation of decision options to make the options more clearly differentiated. In Experiment 1, a matching procedure was used to provide pairs of equally attractive options (medical treatments) for the following experiments. In Experiments 2, 3, and 4, preferences were elicited with two different response modes, choice and preference rating. Value ranges on the prominent and nonprominent attributes were manipulated to test the structure compatibility hypothesis. Accountability was also subject to manipulation as it was assumed to stimulate restructuring. Since the prominence effect was not restricted to choices, and effects of value ranges were obtained but not of accountability, the results were interpreted in line with the structure compatibility hypothesis.     

Which is the compromise option? Information format and task format as determinants

When consumers must make a decision but are uncertain of their preferences, they often select a compromise choice. Early studies emphasized the relational properties of choice alternatives and indicated that the middle option, whose attribute values fall between the values of other alternatives, is always the compromise option. More recent studies have suggested that when consumers rate two attributes with the same metrics, the attribute–balance choice whose two attributes have equal ratings, might represent the compromise choice. We propose that the different characteristics of the middle and attribute–balance options—which may be compatible with certain determinants such as information and task formats—might be more salient and affect the relative attractiveness of each option. The results of three experiments confirmed this prediction: the middle option was more attractive in list‐by‐attributes and rejecting conditions, whereas the attribute–balance option was more attractive in list‐by‐alternatives and choosing conditions. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Basic psychological needs and neurophysiological responsiveness to decisional conflict: an event-related potential study of integrative self processes

Fulfillment of the basic psychological needs for competence, relatedness, and autonomy is believed to facilitate people’s integrative tendencies to process psychological conflicts and develop a coherent sense of self. The present study therefore used event-related potentials (ERPs) to examine the relation between need fulfillment and the amplitude of conflict negativity (CN), a neurophysiological measure of conflict during personal decision making. Participants completed a decision-making task in which they made a series of forced choices according to their personal preferences. Three types of decision-making situations were created on the basis of participants’ unique preference ratings, which were obtained prior to ERP recording: low-conflict situations (choosing between an attractive and an unattractive option), high-conflict approach-approach situations (choosing between two similarly attractive options), and high-conflict avoidance-avoidance situations (choosing between two similarly unattractive options). As expected, CN amplitudes were larger in high- relative to low-conflict situations, and source localization analyses suggested that the anterior cingulate cortex was the generating structure of the CN. Most importantly, people reporting higher need fulfillment exhibited larger CN amplitudes in avoidance–avoidance situations relative to low-conflict situations; to a lesser extent, they also exhibited larger CN amplitudes in approach–approach situations relative to low-conflict situations. By contrast, people reporting lower need fulfillment exhibited CN amplitudes that poorly discriminated the three decision situations. These results suggest that need fulfillment may promote self-coherent functioning by increasing people’s receptivity to and processing of events that challenge their abilities to make efficient, self-congruent choices.     

Processing Product Unique Features: Alignability and Involvement in Preference Construction

Consumers often form preferences based on the presented attributes of choice options. Previous research has suggested that consumers tend to form their preferences using the attributes that are related to common aspects between the options (i.e., alignable differences) and ignore attributes that are unique to individual options (i.e., nonalignable differences). We combine cognitive psychology and motivation research from social psychology and propose that consumers’ preference formation can be systematically affected by whether they focus more on alignable differences or more on nonalignable differences of the options as a function of consumers’ involvement with the task. The results of 3 experiments show that preference judgment favors alignable differences over nonalignable differences in a low‐motivation condition. In contrast, high motivation to process information enables consumers to increase their use of nonalignable differences in preference formation, which can result in a preference reversal relative to the low‐motivation condition. The results suggest that a preference reversal occurs when the nonalignable differences of the target option are superior to both the nonalignable differences and the alignable differences of the reference option. However, the reversal does not occur when the nonalignable differences of the target option are superior only to the nonalignable differences of the reference option. Theoretical and managerial implications relating to differentiation, positioning, and communication strategies for innovative brands are discussed.     

Hedonic contrast and condensation: Good stimuli make mediocre stimuli less good and less different

Loud sounds make soft sounds softer (contrast) and also make them less discriminable (which we callcondensation). We report on parallel phenomena in hedonics: Good stimuli reduce the pleasantness of less good stimuli, and also reduce people’s preferences among the less good stimuli. In Experiment 1, subjects rated the pleasantness of fruit juices diluted to approximate hedonic neutrality. Subjects who had just previously drunk and rated some good-tasting full-strength juices rated the diluted juices lower than did subjects who had not (hedonic contrast). In Experiment 2, subjects drank pairs of diluted juices and rated their preference for one juice over the other. Subjects who had just previously drunk and rated pairs of full-strength juices gave lower preference ratings between the diluted juices than did subjects who had not (condensation). Thus the same stimulus set produced contrast in Experiment 1 and condensation in Experiment 2, paralleling results in loudness.     

When mixed options are preferred in multiple‐trial decisions

We report three studies showing that in prospective multiple‐trial decisions people often select a mix of sure and risky options over pure bundles of either option. Such a preference is not ‘rational’ because a mixed option cannot be the EV‐maximizing choice. Experiment 1 confirmed a mixed‐option preference for gains but not for losses. Showing a graph of the multiple‐trial outcome distribution reduced but did not eliminate this effect, suggesting that it is not due purely to a failure to aggregate correctly over the multiple trials. Experiment 2 replicated the mixed option preference using a wider range of problems. Experiment 3 compared choices in the trinary choice conditions used in Experiments 1 and 2 with binary choices between pairs of the multiple‐trial sure, mixed, and risky options. In the binary choice condition the mixed option was no longer the modal choice, suggesting that the strong mixed option preference found in the trinary choice conditions is mainly due to a compromise effect. However, the binary choice probabilities did show violations of strong stochastic transitivity in a pattern that suggested a slight bias toward the mixed option. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Preference for rich,random tactile stimulation in woodlice (Porcellio scaber)

All living beings exhibit preferences for a variety of biologically significant stimuli. Interestingly, stimuli without biological significance, such as saccharine, are also able to induce preferences in vertebrates. Can invertebrates show preferences for biologically neutral cues as well – i.e. independently of any conditioning process? Experiment 1 aimed to determine the preference of woodlice (Porcellio scaber Latreille 1804) exposed to floor textures that differed in tactile cues, how they expressed their tactile preference, and whether they were able to inhibit that preference when a shelter of variable quality was available on the non-preferred floor texture. Experiment 2 provided additional information relative to the strength of woodlice's tactile preference as well as the way of measuring it. Experiment 3 complemented the previous one in attempting to determine woodlice's preference for regular versus random tactile cues. Taken together, the results suggest that (i) woodlice are able to process sensory information relative to biologically non-significant stimuli and (ii) that, because the motivation induced can interact with sheltering as a survival-related behavior, the processing of both types of motivation might depend on the same brain systems.     

Reinforcement and punishment effects in concurrent schedules: A test of two models

The joint effects of punishment and reinforcement on the pigeon's key-peck response were examined in three choice experiments conducted to compare predictions of Farley and Fantino's (1978) subtractive model with those made by Deluty's (1976) and Deluty and Church's (1978) model of punishment. In Experiment 1, the addition of equal punishment schedules to both alternatives of a concurrent reinforcement schedule enhanced the preference exhibited for the more frequent reinforcement alternative. Experiment 2 demonstrated decreases in the absolute response rate for each member of a concurrent reinforcement schedule when increasing frequencies of punishment were added to each alternative. Experiment 3 found that preference for the denser of two reinforcement schedules diminished when the absolute frequencies of reinforcement were increased by a constant factor and conditions of punishment for both alternatives were held constant. Diminished preferences were obtained regardless of whether the frequency of punishment associated with the denser reinforcement schedule was greater or less than that associated with the lean reinforcement alternative. The results from all three experiments uniquely supported Farley and Fantino's (1978) subtractive model of punishment and reinforcement.     

North is up(hill): Route planning heuristics in real-world environments

Navigators use both external cues and internal heuristics to help them plan efficient routes through environments. In six experiments, we discover and seek the origin of a novel heuristic that causes participants to preferentially choose southern rather than northern routes during map-based route planning. Experiment 1 demonstrates that participants who are tasked to choose between two equal-length routes, one going generally north and one south, show reliable decision preferences toward the southern option. Experiment 2 demonstrates that participants produce a southern preference only when instructed to adopt egocentric rather than allocentric perspectives during route planning. In Experiments 3-5, we examined participants’ judgments of route characteristics and found that judgments of route length and preferences for upper relative to lower path options do not contribute to the southern route preference. Rather, the southern route preference appears to be a result of misperceptions of increased elevation to the north (i.e., north is up). Experiment 6 further supports this finding by demonstrating that participants provide greater time estimates for north- than for equivalent south-going routes when planning travel between U.S. cities. Results are discussed with regard to predicting wayfinding behavior, the mental simulation of action, and theories of spatial cognition and navigation.     

Using the regulation of accuracy to study performance when the correct answer is not known

We examined memory performance in multiple‐choice questions when correct answers were not always present. How do participants answer when they are aware that the correct alternative may not be present? To answer this question we allowed participants to decide on the number of alternatives in their final answer (the plurality option), and whether they wanted to report or withhold their answer (report option). We also studied the memory benefits when both the plurality and the report options were available. In two experiments participants watched a crime and then answered questions with five alternatives. Half of the questions were presented with the correct alternative and half were not. Participants selected one alternative and rated confidence, then selected three alternatives and again rated confidence, and finally indicated whether they preferred the answer with one or with three alternatives (plurality option). Lastly, they decided whether to report or withhold the answer (report option). Results showed that participants’ confidence in their selections was higher, that they chose more single answers, and that they preferred to report more often when the correct alternative was presented. We also attempted to classify a posteriori questions as either presented with or without the correct alternative from participants’ selection. Classification was better than chance, and encouraging, but the forensic application of the classification technique is still limited since there was a large percentage of responses that were incorrectly classified. Our results also showed that the memory benefits of both plurality and report options overlap.     

Remembering chosen and assigned options

Recent studies have shown systematic choice-supportive memory for past choices, wherein people tend to overattribute positive features to options they chose and negative features to unchosen options (Mather & Johnson, 2000, Mather, Shafir, & Johnson, 2000). In contrast, the present experiments showed no choice-supportive memory bias for assigned options. Rather than having a general motivation to recall the chosen or the assigned option in a more positive light, people appear to be influenced by heuristics that vary with context: In recalling past choices, people expect the chosen option to contain more positive and fewer negative features than do its competitors. In recalling past assignments, in contrast, people expect the assigned option to be remembered better than the unassigned alternatives. This vividness heuristic leads to systematic misattribution of new features to unassigned alternatives, but not in a manner supportive of the assigned option. Some implications of these findings are discussed.     

Collecting information: Optimizing outcomes, screening options, or facilitating discrimination?

Collection of information prior to a decision may be integrated into a compensatory choice process; if it is, the information packet that is collected should be the one that produces the highest net gain. Alternatively,information may be collected in order to screen out options that fail to meet minimum standards; if this is the case, people should not choose options on which they have not collected available information. We tested these and other predictions from the two approaches in four experiments. Participants were given specific information about three attributes of each choice option but only probabilistic information about a fourth one. They rated attractiveness of options, decidedwhether to collect specific information about the fourth attribute of each one, rated options again, and then selected one of them. Data were consistent with neither of the above approaches. Instead they suggested that people collect information in order to facilitate their ability to discriminate between the attractiveness of options.     

If you have a choice,you have trouble: Stimulus valence modulates presentation‐order effects in preference judgment

It is well known that the presentation order of choice options often affects decision outcomes to a significant degree. However, despite the significance and wide occurrence of the effects, they are ignored in most preference models. Furthermore, psychophysical findings of stimulus‐magnitude dependent presentation‐order effects have not been acknowledged previously in the cognitive literature on preference judgments. Thus, the potential moderating effect of the level of stimulus magnitude (here, valence) on the direction and size of order effects in preference judgment has not been investigated previously. In two experiments, participants (117 and 204, respectively) rated their preference for pairs of everyday‐type objects and phenomena (e.g., apple–pear, headache–stomachache). Stimuli were spaced horizontally, and each participant received them in one of two opposite within‐pair presentation orders. Participants also rated the stimuli's valence on a scale from very bad to very good. The results showed a positive correlation between the rated valence and the tendency to prefer the first‐mentioned (left) stimulus; that is, the effect was greatest, and opposite, for choices between the most attractive and the most unattractive options, respectively. In terms of Hellström's ( 1979 ) sensation‐weighting model, the positive correlation is caused by a higher weight (i.e., impact on the preference judgment) for the left stimulus than for the right, which is possibly due to the left stimulus being compared to the right. The results suggest that researchers may have failed previously to find important moderators of presentation‐order effects in preference judgment due to the failure to use sufficiently attractive or unattractive stimuli. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Regulation of memory accuracy with multiple answers: the plurality option

We report two experiments that investigated the regulation of memory accuracy with a new regulatory mechanism: the plurality option. This mechanism is closely related to the grain-size option but involves control over the number of alternatives contained in an answer rather than the quantitative boundaries of a single answer. Participants were presented with a slideshow depicting a robbery (Experiment 1) or a murder (Experiment 2), and their memory was tested with five-alternative multiple-choice questions. For each question, participants were asked to generate two answers: a single answer consisting of one alternative and a plural answer consisting of the single answer and two other alternatives. Each answer was rated for confidence (Experiment 1) or for the likelihood of being correct (Experiment 2), and one of the answers was selected for reporting. Results showed that participants used the plurality option to regulate accuracy, selecting single answers when their accuracy and confidence were high, but opting for plural answers when they were low. Although accuracy was higher for selected plural than for selected single answers, the opposite pattern was evident for confidence or likelihood ratings. This dissociation between confidence and accuracy for selected answers was the result of marked overconfidence in single answers coupled with underconfidence in plural answers. We hypothesize that these results can be attributed to overly dichotomous metacognitive beliefs about personal knowledge states that cause subjective confidence to be extreme.     

How does preference reversal appear and disappear? Effects of the evaluation mode

Preference reversal is a systematic change in the preference order between options when different response methods are used (e.g., choice vs. judgment). The present study focuses on procedures used to elicit preferences according to an evaluability hypothesis. Two experiments compared joint vs. separate evaluations and explicit vs. non‐explicit joint evaluations. Subjects had to express preferences between high‐variance gambles (HVGs) and low‐variance gambles (LVGs) either by choosing one gamble to play in a lottery or by assigning gambles minimum selling prices. We show that HVGs are preferred in both choice and pricing conditions when gambles are evaluated separately, and LVGs are preferred in both choice and selling conditions when gambles are evaluated in pairs: i.e., when the evaluation mode is held constant, classic preference reversal disappears. These results support the evaluability hypothesis, and suggest that preferences depend on whether subjects are allowed to compare the options they are asked to choose from or judge, independently of the nature of the scale (i.e., attractiveness vs. minimum selling price) they are required to adopt. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Sizing up information distortion: quantifying its effect on the subjective values of choice options

When choosing between options, people often distort new information in a direction that favors their developing preference. Such information distortion is widespread and robust, but less is known about the magnitude of its effects. In particular, research has not quantified the effects of distortion relative to the values of the choice options. In two experiments, we manipulated participants’ initial preferences in choices between risky three-outcome monetary gambles (win, lose, or neither) by varying the order of five information items (e.g., amount to win, chance of losing). In Experiment 1 (N = 397), the effect of initial information on gambles’ certainty equivalents (subjective values) was mediated by the distortion of later information. The indirect effect on the difference between gambles’ certainty equivalents averaged 27% of the gambles’ mean expected value. In Experiment 2 (N = 791), we increased the difference between gambles on a later information item to overcome the effect of initial information on participants’ choices. The required change averaged 31% of the gambles’ mean expected value. We conclude that the effects of information distortion can be substantial.     

Effects of the beholder's age on the perception of facial attractiveness

Children have been shown to prefer faces rated as highly attractive by adults over faces rated as quite unattractive. We investigated to what extent this agreement holds not only for the general direction of preferences but for preference strengths as well. In a choice experiment, we presented 40 nine-year-old girls and their mothers and 40 twelve-year-old girls and their mothers with pairs of women's and girls' faces and asked the subjects to pick the face that appeared prettier to them. Preference frequencies and simple attractiveness scales derived from these preference frequencies by fitting the Bradley-Terry-Luce rule (Luce, D. R. (1959). Individual choice behavior: a theoretical analysis. New York: Wiley) were compared across subject groups. For the women's faces, we found no difference in preferences between nine-year-olds, twelve-year-olds, and adults, neither in direction nor in strength. For the girls' faces, we also found no major differences in preference direction, however, we did find reliable differences in preference strengths. To a considerable part these differences were due to the fact that the children showed less pronounced preferences between face stimuli than the adults. These results suggest a role of developmental factors in the perception of facial attractiveness.     

Piece of cake? Allocating rewards to third parties when fairness is costly

Reactions to third-party inequality were investigated in three experiments. In Experiment 1, 52 undergraduates allocated money between themselves and two others. Preferences for equal and unequal distributions were also rated. The results show that people are averse to inequalities between themselves and others, and to inequalities between others. Post-experimental ratings indicate that egocentric equality, third-party equality, and max–min preferences are important motives. The findings were replicated in Experiment 2, where 74 undergraduates allocated compensation for a previously conducted task, and in Experiment 3, where 112 participants rated preferences. In these experiments random determination of rewards to third parties altered participants’ behavior and preferences. The results indicated that random determination decreases the importance of all fairness motives while increasing the importance of monetary payoff. While people still care about economic equality under these conditions, contextual factors, such as perceived responsibility for unfair outcomes, seem to alter the impact of fairness.