学前儿童的现实性监测对易受暗示性的预测

对学前儿童的现实性监测与易受暗示性发展之间的关系进行了考察.结果表明,在控制了年龄、对事件的初始编码和提取能力后,现实性监测能力可以显著地预测记忆的易受暗示性.那些现实性监测能力较低的儿童更容易接受误信息,相反,那些现实性监测能力较强的儿童,更能抵制误信息的干扰.     

暗示条件下的错误记忆研究概述

心理学家通过采用事后提供误导信息的方法以及临床治疗中的催眠、想象等暗示性程序发现的记忆歪曲和记忆移植现象,说明记忆的改变并不局限于对经历的或记得的情节的某方面的修改,它还能创造虚假的自传性事件记忆。     

Reasoning About Games

A mixture of propositional dynamic logic and epistemic logic that we call PDL + E is used to give a formalization of Artemov??s knowledge based reasoning approach to game theory, (KBR), [4, 5]. Epistemic states of players are represented explicitly and reasoned about formally. We give a detailed analysis of the Centipede game using both proof theoretic and semantic machinery. This helps make the case that PDL + E can be a useful basis for the logical investigation of game theory.     

The Role of Domain-Specific Knowledge in Generative Reasoning About Complicated Multileveled Phenomena

Promoting the ability to reason generatively about novel phenomena and problems students may encounter in their everyday lives is a major goal of science education. This goal proves to be a formidable challenge in domains, such as molecular genetics, for which the accumulated scientific understandings are daunting in both amount and complexity. To develop effective instruction that fosters generative reasoning we need to have a sound understanding of the types of knowledge in the domain that are critical for such reasoning. In this study I examined the ensemble of knowledge, both general and domain-specific, undergraduate students employed in reasoning about problems in genetics. I found that students initially formulate a solution in terms that are not domain specific and that serve as a frame–solution frame–that outlines and constrains a more specific and domain-appropriate explanation. This solution frame is then filled in with two powerful forms of domain-specific knowledge I term: domain-specific heuristics and domain-specific explanatory schemas. These knowledge forms embody understandings of central mechanisms and entities in molecular genetics. By invoking these domain-specific knowledge forms, students were able to reason about a variety of both familiar and novel genetics problems. I present a cognitive model that highlights the role of these powerful conceptual understandings in promoting generative reasoning in genetics.     

目击证人暗示感受性的研究及进展

暗示感受性指一个人对误导信息的易感性或抵抗力.在目击证人记忆研究领域,有两种暗示感受性:延迟的提取错误和立即的误导信息接受.研究者用不同方法对这两种类型的暗示感受性及影响因素进行研究,并进行整合.这对司法实践中证人证词真实性鉴别有重要理论和实践意义.     

Reasoning About Permitted Announcements

We formalize what it means to have permission to say something. We adapt the dynamic logic of permission by van der Meyden (J Log Comput 6(3):465–479, 1996) to the case where atomic actions are public truthful announcements. We also add a notion of obligation. Our logic is an extension of the logic of public announcements introduced by Plaza (1989) with dynamic modal operators for permission and for obligation. We axiomatize the logic and show that it is decidable.     

Reasoning About Uncertain Conditionals

There is a long tradition in formal epistemology and in the psychology of reasoning to investigate indicative conditionals. In psychology, the propositional calculus was taken for granted to be the normative standard of reference. Experimental tasks, evaluation of the participants’ responses and psychological model building, were inspired by the semantics of the material conditional. Recent empirical work on indicative conditionals focuses on uncertainty. Consequently, the normative standard of reference has changed. I argue why neither logic nor standard probability theory provide appropriate rationality norms for uncertain conditionals. I advocate coherence based probability logic as an appropriate framework for investigating uncertain conditionals. Detailed proofs of the probabilistic non-informativeness of a paradox of the material conditional illustrate the approach from a formal point of view. I survey selected data on human reasoning about uncertain conditionals which additionally support the plausibility of the approach from an empirical point of view.     

Knowledge About Hand Shaping and Knowledge About Objects

Our two experiments investigated associations between cognitive representations of objects and hand-shape categories. Hand configurations were partitioned according to prehensility and the size of the contacting surface, resulting in the classes: pinch, poke, palm, and clench. Experiment 1 elicited object names in response to configuration-name cues, provided ratings of the relevance of each configuration to a set of objects, and probed for the functions determining such relevance. Cueing with a configuration class elicited an associated object category with substantial intersubject agreement, and vice versa. Both the object categories and the functions associated with the four hand-configuration classes differed substantially, although the same object could be associated to some extent with multiple configurations, given variations in function. Experiment 2 elicited the names of hand-configuration classes in response to unfamiliar forms, which varied systematically in depth and the size of the projecting picture-plane surface. The modal response, response time, and degree of intersubject agreement were directly related to these variables. These structural variables, however, did not adequately predict shaping responses to real objects, as ascertained from Experiment 1. The results have implications for cognitive representation of motor categories and hand shaping in response to objects.     

Rules for Reasoning from Knowledge and Lack of Knowledge

In this paper, the traditional view that argumentum ad ignorantiam is a logical fallacy is challenged, and lessons are drawn on how to model inferences drawn from knowledge in combination with ones drawn from lack of knowledge. Five defeasible rules for evaluating knowledge-based arguments that apply to inferences drawn under conditions of lack of knowledge are formulated. They are the veridicality rule, the consistency of knowledge rule, the closure of knowledge rule, the rule of refutation and the rule for argument from ignorance. The basic thesis of the paper is that knowledge-based arguments, including the argument from ignorance, need to be evaluated by criteria for epistemic closure and other evidential rules that are pragmatic in nature, that need to be formulated and applied differently at different stages of an investigation or discussion. The paper helps us to understand practical criteria that should be used to evaluate all arguments based on knowledge and/or ignorance.

Reasoning About Social Choice Functions

We introduce a logic specifically designed to support reasoning about social choice functions. The logic includes operators to capture strategic ability, and operators to capture agent preferences. We establish a correspondence between formulae in the logic and properties of social choice functions, and show that the logic is expressively complete with respect to social choice functions, i.e., that every social choice function can be characterised as a formula of the logic. We prove that the logic is decidable, and give a complete axiomatization. To demonstrate the value of the logic, we show in particular how it can be applied to the problem of determining whether a social choice function is strategy-proof.     

Children's Social and Moral Reasoning About Exclusion

ABSTRACT— Developmental research on social and moral reasoning about exclusion has utilized a social-domain theory, in contrast to a global stage theory, to investigate children's evaluations of gender- and race-based peer exclusion. The social-domain model postulates that moral, social-conventional, and personal reasoning coexist in children's evaluations of inclusion and exclusion, and that the priority given to these forms of judgments varies by the age of the child, the context, and the target of exclusion. Findings from developmental intergroup research studies disconfirm a general-stage-model approach to morality in the child, and provide empirical data on the developmental origins and emergence of intergroup attitudes regarding prejudice, bias, and exclusion.     

Reasoning About Collectively Accepted Group Beliefs

A proof-theoretical treatment of collectively accepted group beliefs is presented through a multi-agent sequent system for an axiomatization of the logic of acceptance. The system is based on a labelled sequent calculus for propositional multi-agent epistemic logic with labels that correspond to possible worlds and a notation for internalized accessibility relations between worlds. The system is contraction- and cut-free. Extensions of the basic system are considered, in particular with rules that allow the possibility of operative members or legislators. Completeness with respect to the underlying Kripke semantics follows from a general direct and uniform argument for labelled sequent calculi extended with mathematical rules for frame properties. As an example of the use of the calculus we present an analysis of the discursive dilemma.     

A One-to-One Bias and Fast Mapping Support Preschoolers' Learning About Faces and Voices

A multimodal person representation contains information about what a person looks like and what a person sounds like. However, little is known about how children form these face-voice mappings. Here, we explored the possibility that two cognitive tools that guide word learning, a one-to-one mapping bias and fast mapping, also guide children's learning about faces and voices. We taught 4- and 5-year-olds mappings between three individual faces and voices, then presented them with new faces and voices. In Experiment 1, we found that children rapidly learned face-voice mappings from just a few exposures, and furthermore spontaneously mapped novel faces to novel voices using a one-to-one mapping bias (that each face can produce only one voice). In Experiment 2, we found that children's face-voice representations are abstract, generalizing to novel tokens of a person. In Experiment 3, we found that children retained in memory the face-voice mappings that they had generated via inference (i.e., they showed evidence of fast mapping), and used these newly formed representations to generate further mappings between new faces and voices. These findings suggest that preschoolers' rapid learning about faces and voices may be aided by biases that are similar to those that support word learning.     

A Comparison of Preschoolers' Memory,Knowledge, and Anticipation of Events

This study examined the development of the episodic and semantic memory systems, with an emphasis on the emergence of the two aspects of the former: episodic memory (the ability to re-experience a past event) and episodic future thinking (the ability to pre-experience a future event). Three-, 4-, and 5-year olds were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: past, semantic, or future. Children were asked questions about the same eight events, phrased in past, generalized present, or future tense. Half of these events were ones for which parents rated their children as having a high level of control (or input) over how the event unfolds, whereas the other half were rated as “low control.” Responses were scored with respect to their specificity and accuracy. Results revealed age differences in children's accuracy scores across all three conditions. Children's episodic future thinking and episodic memory, but not semantic memory, were less accurate for low-control events compared with high-control events. These results offer a new perspective on the development of the episodic and semantic memory systems and the methods used to assess them.     

Reasoning About Relations: Spatial and Nonspatial Problems

Two experiments investigated the mental representation of spatial and nonspatial two-dimensional problems. The experiments were designed to contrast opposite predictions of the model theory of reasoning and the formal rules of inference theories. Half of the problems required more inferential steps but only one model, whereas the other half required fewer inferential steps but two models. According to the inference rules, theory problems that require more inferential steps should be harder, whereas the model-based theory predicts that problems that require two models should be harder. In Experiments 1a and 1b we measured the problem solving time and the percentage of errors. In Experiments 2a and 2b the problems were presented segmented in two different displays. We measured the comprehension time for each display, the question answering times, and the percentage of errors. The results of all experiments supported the model theory predictions in both spatial and nonspatial domains.     

Preschoolers' understanding of knowing-that and knowing-how in the United States and Hong Kong

Two experiments on preschoolers' understanding of the effects of exposure on knowing-that and knowing-how were conducted with 3-, 4-, and 5-year-old children (N=388) in 2 locations: a small midwestern city in the United States and a suburban area of Hong Kong, China. By using both English- and Chinese-speaking samples, the authors examined differences in children's understanding of knowing-that and knowing-how as well as the impact of different types of linguistic markers on the understanding of these concepts. Across both studies, in both locations, and for judging the knowledge of self or of others, children's understanding for knowing-that preceded their understanding for knowing-how. Implications of these findings both for universal patterns of theory-of-mind development and for how culture may impact on that development are discussed.