Verbal probabilities: a question of frame?

Verbal expressions of probability and uncertainty are of two kinds: positive (‘probable’, ‘possible’) and negative (‘not certain’, ‘doubtful’). Choice of term has implications for predictions and decisions. The present studies show that positive phrases are rated to be more optimistic (when the target outcome is positive), and more correct, when the target outcome actually occurs, even in cases where positive and negative phrases are perceived to convey the same probabilities (Experiments 1 and 2). Selection of phrase can be determined by linguistic frame. Positive quantifiers (‘some’, ‘several’) support positive probability phrases, whereas negative quantifiers (‘not all’) suggest negative phrases (Experiment 3). Positive frames induced by numeric frequencies (e.g. the number of students to be admitted) imply positive probability phrases, whereas negative frames (e.g. the number of students to be rejected) call for negative probability phrases (Experiment 4). It is concluded that choice of verbal phrase is based not only on level of probability, but also on situational and linguistic cues. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

社会评价影响错误后调整效应

现有研究主要采用结果评价或结果反馈的方式考察评价对错误后调整效应的影响,但是任务前的社会评价怎样影响错误后调整效应尚不清楚。本研究采用社会评价任务,以错误后反应时和错误后正确率为指标,在两个实验中考察正性和负性评价对错误后调整效应的影响。结果发现,实验1和实验2中正性和负性评价条件下错误后减慢效应差异均不显著,说明正性和负性评价对错误后调整的作用是一致的,且不受实验任务的影响。在实验1中通过和无评价条件比较发现,评价条件下的正确后反应显著慢于无评价条件,但是评价条件下的错误后反应与无评价条件无差异,说明社会评价加速了个体错误后调整。而且在实验2中发现高低自我效能组个体错误后调整效应差异不显著,说明当前结果不受个体自我效能感的影响。因此,当前研究说明任务前的社会评价促进了个体错误后行为调整,但是错误后调整效应不受社会评价效价的影响。     

The role of visual form in lexical access: Evidence from Chinese classifier production

The interface between the conceptual and lexical systems was investigated in a word production setting. We tested the effects of two conceptual dimensions – semantic category and visual shape – on the selection of Chinese nouns and classifiers. Participants named pictures with nouns (“rope”) or classifier–noun phrases (“one-classifier–rope”) in three blocked picture naming experiments. In Experiment 1, we observed larger semantic category interference with phrases than with nouns, suggesting comparable semantic categorical effects on classifier and noun selection. In Experiments 2 and 3, items with similar shapes produced an interference effect when they were named with classifier–noun phrases, but not with bare nouns. This indicates that object shape modulates classifier (but not noun) selection. We conclude that object shape properties can by themselves influence word selection processes just as semantic relationships (captured by semantic category) do. The factors operating during word selection may be more diverse than has been previously thought.     

Tragedy or tragicomedy: Mixed feelings induced by positive and negative emotional events

Based on the theory of appraisal, we predicted that positive and negative events happening to the same people or things in a specific chronological order (i.e., a negative event following a positive event) would induce different mixed feelings than the same events happening to different people or things. Pairs of emotional pictures with different captions were used to create two event groups. In the “tragic event” group, the positive and negative events happened to the same person or things, and in the “tragicomic event” group, the positive and negative events happened to different people or things. We designed two experiments to explore and compare the generation of mixed feelings in those two groups. In Experiment 1, the negative event was shown first, and in Experiment 2, the negative event was shown second (although the chronological order of the depicted events was the same). The participants were 381 undergraduates: 195 in Experiment 1 and 186 in Experiment 2. In both experiments, we found that tragic events introduced less intense mixed feelings than did tragicomic events due to fewer pleasurable feelings induced by the tragic events. There was no significant difference in the report of negative emotions between the groups. Appraisal theory and negative bias effects may explain these results.     

Detection errors in a task with articulatory suppression: Phonological receding and reading

In two experiments, subjects read passages of text and circled instances of a target letter under normal conditions or while engaged in articulatory suppression. In Experiment 1, subjects searching for the letter e made a disproportionately large number of errors on the word “the” and more errors when e occurred in unstressed than in stressed syllables of three-syllable words. In Experiment 2, subjects searching for the letter f made an exceedingly large number of errors on the word “of.” Articulatory suppression significantly reduced the stress effect in the three-syllable words but did not reduce the tendency to make errors on “the” or “of,” suggesting that phonological recoding is responsible for this effect of stress but does not influence the unitization processes of reading.     

Emotion,Decision, and Risk: Betting on Gambles versus Betting on People

We examined the effects of two emotions, fear and anger, on risk‐taking behavior in two types of tasks: Those in which uncertainty is generated by a randomizing device (“lottery risk”) and those in which it is generated by the uncertain behavior of another person (“person‐based risk”). Participants first completed a writing task to induce fear or anger. They then made choices either between lotteries (Experiment 1) or between actions in risky two‐person decisions (Experiments 2 and 3). The experiments involved substantial real‐money payoffs. Replicating earlier studies (which used hypothetical rewards), Experiment 1 showed that fearful participants were more risk‐averse than angry participants in lottery‐risk tasks. However—the key result of this study—fearful participants were substantially less risk‐averse than angry participants in a two‐person task involving person‐based risk (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 offered options and payoffs identical to those of Experiment 2 but with lottery‐type risk. Risk‐taking returned to the pattern of Experiment 1. The impact of incidental emotions on risk‐taking appears to be contingent on the class of uncertainty involved. For lottery risk, fear increased the frequency of risk‐averse choices and anger reduced it. The reverse pattern was found when uncertainty in the decision was person‐based. Further, the effect was specifically on differences in willingness to take risks rather than on differences in judgments of how much risk was present. The impact of different emotions on risk‐taking or risk‐avoiding behavior is thus contingent on the type, as well as the degree, of uncertainty the decision maker faces. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Spatial and temporal separation fails to counteract the effects of low prevalence in visual search

Recent research has shown that, in visual search, participants can miss 30–40% of targets when they only appear rarely (i.e., on 1–2% of trials). Low target prevalence alters the behaviour of the searcher. It can lead participants to quit their search prematurely (Wolfe, Horowitz, & Kenner, 2005), to shift their decision criteria (Wolfe et al., 2007), and/or to make motor or response errors (Fleck & Mitroff, 2007). In this paper we examine whether the low prevalence (LP) effect can be ameliorated if we split the search set in two, spreading the task out over space and/or time. Observers searched for the letter “T” among “L”s. In Experiment 1, the left or right half of the display was presented to the participants before the second half. In Experiment 2, items were spatially intermixed but half of the items were presented first, followed by the second half. Experiment 3 followed the methods of Experiment 2 but allowed observers to correct perceived errors. All three experiments produced robust LP effects with higher errors at 2% prevalence than at 50% prevalence. Dividing up the display had no beneficial effect on errors. The opportunity to correct errors reduced but did not eliminate the LP effect. Low prevalence continues to elevate errors even when observers are forced to slow down and permitted to correct errors.     

汉语惯用语的产生机制

惯用语是固定表达的一种。非构造观点认为, 惯用语已经词汇化, 惯用语理解是提取过程; 构造观点认为, 惯用语意义是建构的, 成分的字面意义对惯用语理解起重要作用。混合模型认为, 惯用语既有整体表征, 又有成分单词表征, 二者都可以成为表征和通达的单元。通过三个实验, 考察了汉语惯用语的产生机制。实验1考察在惯用语产生中是否存在整体表征和成分表征; 实验2考察在惯用语产生中是否存在从成分单词或成分词素表征到整体表征的激活; 实验3考察在惯用语产生中是否存在从整体表征到成分单词或成分词素的激活。结果表明: (1) 汉语惯用语属于混合表征, 既有整体表征, 又有成分单词、成分词素表征; (2)成分词素表征是惯用语整体表征和成分单词表征联结的桥梁; (3) 语义可分性影响惯用语表征。     

Do verb bias effects on sentence production reflect sensitivity to comprehension or production factors?

Speakers should be motivated to produce easy-to-understand sentences, but they must successfully say sentences that are harder to produce. Four experiments assessed how verb bias influences the mention of the optional “that” in sentence-complement structures. Without the “that”, such sentences can be incorrectly interpreted as including direct objects (garden paths), and especially so after direct-object-biased verbs (compared to embedded-clause-biased verbs). But direct-object-biased verbs are rarely produced as sentence-complement structures, and so they might be harder to produce as such. Experiments 1 and 2 show that speakers mention the “that” more after direct-object-biased verbs than after embedded-clause-biased verbs. Experiment 3a shows that sentences with verbs biased toward neither direct objects nor embedded subjects were often produced with the “that”, and Experiment 3b shows that postverbal noun phrases after neither-biased verbs are interpreted as direct objects less than direct-object-biased verbs and so should cause a milder garden path. Thus, frequent “that” mention is not sensitive to the tendency of a verb to be followed by a direct object, but by how rarely the verb has been produced in the formulated structure.     

Spatial location and emotion modulate voice perception

ABSTRACT

How do we perceive voices coming from different spatial locations, and how is this affected by emotion? The current study probed the interplay between space and emotion during voice perception. Thirty participants listened to nonverbal vocalizations coming from different locations around the head (left vs. right; front vs. back), and differing in valence (neutral, positive [amusement] or negative [anger]). They were instructed to identify the location of the vocalizations (Experiment 1) and to evaluate their emotional qualities (Experiment 2). Emotion-space interactions were observed, but only in Experiment 1: emotional vocalizations were better localised than neutral ones when they were presented from the back and the right side. In Experiment 2, emotion recognition accuracy was increased for positive vs. negative and neutral vocalizations, and perceived arousal was increased for emotional vs. neutral vocalizations, but this was independent of spatial location. These findings indicate that emotional salience affects how we perceive the spatial location of voices. They additionally suggest that the interaction between spatial (“where”) and emotional (“what”) properties of the voice differs as a function of task.     

One Frog, Two Frog, Red Frog, Blue Frog: Factors Affecting Children's Syntactic Choices in Production and Comprehension

Two experiments are reported which examine children's ability to use referential context when making syntactic choices in language production and comprehension. In a recent on-line study of auditory comprehension, Trueswell, Sekerina, Hill, and Logrip (1999) examined children's and adults' abilities to resolve temporary syntactic ambiguities involving prepositional phrases (e.g., “Put the frog on the napkin into ¨”). Although adults and older children used the referential context to guide their initial analysis (pursuing a destination interpretation in a one-frog context and a modifier interpretation in a two-frog context), 4 to 5-year olds' initial and ultimate analysis was one of destination, regardless of context. The present studies examined whether these differences were attributable to the comprehension process itself or to other sources, such as possible differences in how children perceive the scene and referential situation. In both experiments, children were given a language generation task designed to elicit and test children's ability to refer to a member of a set through restrictive modification. This task was immediately followed by the “put” comprehension task. The findings showed that, in response to a question about a member of a set (e.g., “Which frog went to Mrs. Squid's house?”), 4- to 5-year-olds frequently produced a definite NP with a restrictive prepositional modifier (e.g., “The one on the napkin”). These same children, however, continued to misanalyze put instructions, showing a strong avoidance of restrictive modification during comprehension. Experiment 2 showed that an increase in the salience of the platforms that distinguished the two referents increased overall performance, but still showed the strong asymmetry between production and comprehension. Eye movements were also recorded in Experiment 2, revealing on-line parsing patterns similar to Trueswell et al.: an initial preference for a destination analysis and a failure to revise early referential commitments. These experiments indicate that child–adult differences in parsing preferences arise, in part, from developmental changes in the comprehension process itself and not from a general insensitivity to referential properties of the scene. The findings are consistent with a probabilistic model for uncovering the structure of the input during comprehension, in which more reliable linguistic and discourse-related cues are learned first, followed by a gradually developing ability to take into account other more uncertain (or more difficult to learn) cues to structure.     

Ambiguous probabilities: when does p=0.3 reflect a possibility,and when does it express a doubt?

Verbal phrases denoting uncertainty are usually held to be more vague than numerical probability statements. They are, however, directionally more precise, in the sense that they are either positive, suggesting the occurrence of a target outcome, or negative, drawing attention to its non‐occurrence. A numerical probability will, in contrast, sometimes be perceived as positive and sometimes as negative. When asked to complete sentences such as ‘The operation has a 30% chance of success, because’ some people will give reasons for success (‘the doctors are expert surgeons’), whereas others will give reasons for failure (‘it is a difficult operation’). It is shown in two experiments that positive reasons are given more often than negative ones, even for p values below 0.5, especially when the probability is higher than expected, and the target outcome is non‐normal, undesirable, and phrased as a negation. We conclude that the directionality of numerical probabilities (as opposed to verbal phrases) is context‐dependent, but biased towards a positive interpretation. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Role of Conscious Recollection in Recognition of Affective Material: Evidence for Positive-Negative Asymmetry

The process-dissociation procedure developed by Jacoby (1991) was used to assess the relative roles of recollection and familiarity in recognition of affectively positive and affectively negative stimuli. The procedure involves two phases of word encoding and a third (recognition) phase, during which some participants are told to ignore information from an earlier phase. Failure to ignore the information is taken as evidence of a low recollective component in the recognition decisions. Results showed that the role of recollection was lower in recognition of positive items than in recognition of negative items, suggesting that positive-negative asymmetries in stimulus impact, such as those discussed by Taylor (1991), can be extended to the components of recognition memory. A valence-based difference in the magnitude of the recollective component also suggests a solution to the “puzzle” about affect and recognition memory described by Ortony, Turner, and Antos (1983), who reported an “unpredicted and puzzling asymmetry” such that affectively positive stimuli consistently produced a lower correct rejection rate than negative stimuli did.     

Why Self-enhancement Provokes Dislike: The Hubris Hypothesis and the Aversiveness of Explicit Self-superiority Claims

Most people believe that they are in many respects superior to others. When they publicly express their superiority, they may do so in an explicitly or implicitly comparative manner (“I am better than others” vs. “I am good”). According to the hubris hypothesis, observers dislike explicit self-superiority claims, because these suggest a negative view of others and hence of the observers. The results of two experiments were consistent with the hubris hypothesis. Participants evaluated explicit self-superiority claimants more unfavorably than implicit self-superiority claimants (Experiments 1–2). They attributed less warmth, but not less competence, to explicit than implicit self-superiority claimants (Experiment 2), and this occurred to the extent that participants inferred a negative view of others (Experiments 1–2) and hence of them (Experiment 2).     

“None of the above” as a correct and incorrect alternative on a multiple-choice test: Implications for the testing effect

Both positive and negative testing effects have been demonstrated with a variety of materials and paradigms (Roediger & Karpicke, 2006b). The present series of experiments replicate and extend the research of Roediger and Marsh (2005) with the addition of a “none-of-the-above” response option. Participants (n=32 in both experiments) read a set of passages, took an initial multiple-choice test, completed a filler task, and then completed a final cued-recall test (Experiment 1) or multiple-choice test (Experiment 2). Questions were manipulated on the initial multiple-choice test by adding a “none-of-the-above” response alternative (choice “E”) that was incorrect (“E” Incorrect) or correct (“E” Correct). The results from both experiments demonstrated that the positive testing effect was negated when the “none-of-the-above” alternative was the correct response on the initial multiple-choice test, but was still present when the “none-of-the-above” alternative was an incorrect response.     

Changing the focus of attention: The interacting effect of valence and arousal

We examined how valence and arousal of an image influence visual attention. “Spotlight of attention” theory suggests that positive affect broadens, and negative affect narrows, one's aperture of attention, whereas the arousal theory literature suggests that arousal level is what modulates attentional focus, with highly arousing affect capturing attention, regardless of valence. In two experiments, a digit parity task was used to index the influence of valence, and arousal, on visual attention. Positive or negative images were displayed centrally on each trial, with single digits presented more peripherally (Experiment 1) or more centrally (Experiment 2) to the image. In both Experiments participants were slower, and less accurate at making parity decisions (e.g., both digits odd or both even) when the image was negative relative to positive, and of high arousal. For low arousal images, positive, relative to negative, valence images led to greater impairment of the digit parity task. Findings suggest that arousal level of images modulates the influence of valence on distribution of visual attention. Highly negative emotional images may command or capture attention, but there are other factors that can lead to attention capture, even in low arousing positive stimuli.     

The influence of parafoveal typographical errors on eye movements in reading

Three experiments are reported, examining the effects of a typographical error in parafoveal vision on aspects of foveal inspection time and saccade targeting. All the experiments involved reading for comprehension. A contingent presentation procedure ensured that typographical errors were restored to their correct form before they were viewed in foveal vision: They were never available for foveal processing. In Experiment 1, the error was formed by replacing the first letter of the target word with a second occurrence of its second letter, producing an illegal nonword. This manipulation had no significant effect on foveal inspection time, but lowered the probability that a short word (“de” or “du”) prior to the target would be skipped. In Experiment 2 the familiarity of the target's initial letters was maintained constant across conditions. This manipulation removed the target 1 skipping effect, suggesting that the outcome of Experiment 1 was due to orthographic rather than lexical illegality, but revealed shorter foveal inspection times as a function of the presence of the error. Experiment 3 manipulated lexical and sublexical properties of the parafoveal typing error. Properties of the parafoveal error again influenced prior foveal inspection times. The pattern of results suggested that the determining properties were sublexical rather than lexical. The results as a whole are incompatible with a view of information processing in reading in which foveal processing remains immune from concurrent parafoveal influences.     

大学生对穷人的消极刻板印象及猜测偏向

主要考察大学生对穷人的消极刻板印象及猜测偏向。实验1中的两个单类内隐联想测验结果与前人研究基本一致：虽然被试对穷人热情的评价相对积极,但总体上认为穷人低能力、低热情。实验2通过源监测任务发现,在忘记特质词来源的情况下,被试倾向于猜测消极特质词来自贫困者,积极特质词来自小康者。研究不仅证实了大学生对穷人的消极刻板印象,而且进一步发现大学生存在对穷人的消极猜测偏向。     

The reward value of near-miss situations

Svartdal, F. (2011). The reward value of near‐miss situations. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology52, 209–217. What is a “positive” outcome? Clearly, obtaining something attractive is regarded as positive, but so is avoiding something negative. The present paper compared these two types of situations in scenario‐type evaluations. Participants rated positive (P), avoiding negative (AN), and negative (N) outcomes in terms of luck (Experiment 1) and overall positive/negative evaluations (Experiments 2 and 3). The results demonstrated that evaluations of P and AN outcomes were judged as equally positive, but the emotional basis for these evaluations was very different: The feeling of relief was the dominating emotion in AN situations, whereas joy was the dominating emotion in P situations. Overall, these results indicate that avoidance‐induced reward value may be important as a motivating factor in cognition and action.