Losing sight of oneself in the above-average effect: When egocentrism, focalism, and group diffuseness collide

Four experiments examined the relative influence of three causal processes in the above-average effect (AAE) and related comparative biases: (a) egocentrism, (b) focalism, and (c) referent group diffuseness. By manipulating the inclusion or exclusion of the self from the referent group (Experiments 1-3) or target group (Experiment 4), the relative contributions of each influence were assessed. In direct comparisons, single peers were systematically judged more favorably relative to groups including the self, suggesting that egocentrism plays a lesser role than focalism or group diffuseness. Thus, in response to the question such as “How friendly is Nancy compared to the rest of us?” the answer tends to be “More friendly.”     

任务类型与信息清晰度对社会比较中认知偏差的影响

社会比较中的认知偏差是指个体在社会比较中表现出的过度自信与不自信现象.本研究在前人研究的基础之上,以在校大学生为被试,采用两个系列实验,探讨了社会比较中认知偏差现象的原因以及对判断和决策的影响.研究结果发现:在社会比较中,面对不同类型的问题,会出现不同的认知偏差;在社会比较中,不同类型的问题和信息清晰度共同影响认知偏差,且二者之间存在交互作用;社会比较中的认知偏差会影响个体的决策意图.     

Social desirability, personality questionnaires, and the “better than average” effect

It is well established that respondents are much more likely to rate themselves highly on personality questionnaire items with high social desirability (SD) than on items with low SD. However, conflicting explanations have been offered for this phenomenon. In the present study, 286 participants were randomly assigned to four groups that rated 119 items from two well-known personality questionnaires. One group of participants rated themselves, a second group rated their family and friends, a third rated “people in general,” and a fourth rated the items’ SD. It was found that mean SD ratings of personality items were highly correlated with mean self-ratings and with mean ratings of family and friends for the same items (all rs > .800), but not with mean ratings of “people in general.” In other words, participants strongly tended to rate themselves, their family, and their friends as high on socially desirable qualities, but this tendency did not extend to ratings of people in general. These results support the conclusion that respondents’ personality ratings of themselves, their family and friends, but not of people in general, are influenced by the form of self-serving bias known as the “better than average effect.”     

Not so above average after all: When people believe they are worse than average and its implications for theories of bias in social comparison

Recent research calls into question the generally accepted conclusion that people believe themselves to be better than average. This paper reviews the new theories that have been proposed to explain the fact that better-than-average effects are isolated to common behaviors and abilities, and that people believe themselves to be below average with respect to rare behaviors and uncommon abilities. These new theories are then used to revisit prior findings of better-than-average effects. When viewed in light of recent work, the evidence suggests that prior findings overstated the degree to which people engage in self-enhancement by believing that they are better than others when in fact they are not. Prior studies have often confounded desirability with commonness and have used subjective measures of comparative judgment that capitalize on people’s tendency to conflate relative with absolute self-evaluation.     

Social comparison and confidence: When thinking you’re better than average predicts overconfidence (and when it does not)

A common social comparison bias—the better-than-average-effect—is frequently described as psychologically equivalent to the individual-level judgment bias known as overconfidence. However, research has found “Hard–easy” effects for each bias that yield a seemingly paradoxical reversal: Hard tasks tend to produce overconfidence but worse-than-average perceptions, whereas easy tasks tend to produce underconfidence and better-than-average effects. We argue that the two biases are in fact positively related because they share a common psychological basis in subjective feelings of competence, but that the “hard–easy” reversal is both empirically possible and logically necessary under specifiable conditions. Two studies are presented to support these arguments. We find little support for personality differences in these biases, and conclude that domain-specific feelings of competence account best for their relationship to each other.     

Social comparisons in the classroom: an investigation of the better than average effect among secondary school children

The better than average (BTA) effect refers to the tendency for the majority of people to rate themselves as being higher on positive attributes and lower on negative attributes than other people. The present study examined the occurrence of the BTA effect on five important characteristics among 15,806 first-year secondary school Dutch students. In addition, it explored the influence of students' gender, cultural background, and ability level on their evaluations of characteristics relative to their classmates. Results yielded small BTA effects, with the exception of the item “being eager to get high grades,” on which the effect was much larger. In addition, larger BTA effects were found among boys than girls, but this difference could not be attributed to actual differences in performance. Likewise, larger BTA effects were found among ethnic minority students from Turkish and Moroccan backgrounds than ethnic majority students, but this difference also could not be attributed to actual differences in performance. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.     

Coaction and upward social comparison reduce the illusory conjunction effect: Support for distraction-conflict theory

This article proposes an integration of Festinger’s (1954) social comparison theory and Baron’s (1986) distraction-conflict theory of the social facilitation-inhibition effect, which successfully predicts attentional focusing in coaction when social comparison represents a distraction. Two experiments confronted participants with the illusory conjunction task (Treisman, 1998), where illusions occur because of the lack of attentional processing of central cues. If coaction, like upward comparison, is distracting and thereby enhances the attention allocated to central cues (here the target’s features) at the expense of peripheral cues (here distractors), then a reduction should be found in the illusions. Experiment 1 indeed showed a lower rate of conjunctive errors under upward comparison than under downward comparison. Experiment 2 specified that this effect was due to downward comparison effectively reducing distraction, with upward comparison only maintaining it, as compared to mere coaction.     

The harmful and beneficial impacts of weight bias on well-being: the moderating influence of weight status

Weight bias is evident among normal weight and obese individuals. This weight bias may be associated with comparisons to others, which may enhance feelings of self-worth. However, the ego-enhancing versus ego-diminishing influence of these evaluations may be moderated by the individual's weight status, and the strength of these effects may be moderated by gender. Eight-five participants completed the Implicit Associations Test, questionnaires assessing explicit weight bias, body image, and self-esteem, and height and weight assessments. Implicit weight bias was prevalent among all individuals, p < .001, and was associated with a more positive body image, ps < .05, and higher self-esteem, ps < .01, for thinner individuals but a more negative body image and lower self-esteem for heavier individuals. Gender moderation effects were not observed. It is arguably problematic that the positive benefits to normal weight individuals’ self-esteem and body image appear to come via negative comparisons with overweight individuals.     

The influence of social comparison on career decision-making: Vocational identity as a moderator and regret as a mediator

This study investigated the influence of social comparison on career choice certainty and its potential mechanisms: regret as a mediator and vocational identity as a moderator. Before the formal experiment, 30 pairs of vocational values representing typical conflicts in career decision-making for Chinese university students were obtained. The formal experiment adopted a single-factor (social comparison VS no comparison) between-subject design with vocational identity as an independent covariate. Ninety-eight junior and senior undergraduate students and graduate students in a university in China were invited to participate in the computer-controlled experiment, which involved vocational identity assessment, social comparison manipulation, and analogue career-choice scenario tests. Path analysis showed that: (a) Social comparison significantly and negatively predicted career choice certainty; (b) Regret partially mediated the effect of social comparison on career choice certainty; and (c) Vocational identity did not moderate the path between social comparison and regret, but significantly moderated the negative effect of regret on career choice certainty. These results indicated that in the collectivistic Chinese culture, individuals' career development trajectories may not be totally independent and are subject to influences by other people's choices, while emotion of regret and vocational identity development all play significant roles in this intricate process.     

Mood acknowledgment and correction for the mood-congruency bias in social judgment

Past research has revealed a mood-congruency bias wherein people evaluate other individuals more positively when they are experiencing good moods than when they are experiencing bad moods. At times, however, people may attempt to prevent their transient mood states from biasing their evaluations of other people. It was proposed that the capacity to attend openly to one’s moods is an important precursor to such mood correction efforts. Two studies supported this hypothesis. People who were encouraged to attend to their feelings (Study 1), as well as people who are naturally inclined to acknowledge their feelings (Study 2), were more likely than their counterparts to prevent their positive and negative moods from biasing their judgments of a target person.     

Social comparison: The end of a theory and the emergence of a field

The past and current states of research on social comparison are reviewed with regard to a series of major theoretical developments that have occurred in the past 5 decades. These are, in chronological order: (1) classic social comparison theory, (2) fear-affiliation theory, (3) downward comparison theory, (4) social comparison as social cognition, and (5) individual differences in social comparison. In addition, we discuss a number of expansions of research on social comparison as they are currently occurring, and we outline what we see as likely and desirable future directions, including an expansion of areas, methods, and conceptualizations, as well as a stronger focus on cognitive, neuroscientific, and evolutionary aspects of social comparison.     

Why good thoughts block better ones: the mechanism of the pernicious Einstellung (set) effect

The Einstellung (set) effect occurs when the first idea that comes to mind, triggered by familiar features of a problem, prevents a better solution being found. It has been shown to affect both people facing novel problems and experts within their field of expertise. We show that it works by influencing mechanisms that determine what information is attended to. Having found one solution, expert chess players reported that they were looking for a better one. But their eye movements showed that they continued to look at features of the problem related to the solution they had already thought of. The mechanism which allows the first schema activated by familiar aspects of a problem to control the subsequent direction of attention may contribute to a wide range of biases both in everyday and expert thought - from confirmation bias in hypothesis testing to the tendency of scientists to ignore results that do not fit their favoured theories.     

Integrating social exchange and affective explanations for the receipt of help and harm: A social network approach

We integrated theories of social exchange and emotion to explain the receipt of interpersonal citizenship (help) and counterproductive behaviors (harm). Using social network methodology, data on a total of 534 relationships were obtained from three samples of employees working for a food services organization. Results were consistent across all three samples. Employees received help and harm from coworkers toward whom they engaged in those behaviors, as well as from coworkers in whom they elicited positive and negative affective states, respectively. Additionally, affective states predicted the receipt of help and harm controlling for engagement, suggesting a means by which social exchanges may become imbalanced. Overall, findings demonstrate the validity of social exchange and affective explanations for the receipt of help and harm in the workplace.     

Short-term memory for temporal intervals: Contrasting explanations of the choose-short effect in pigeons

To better understand short-term memory for temporal intervals, we re-examined the choose-short effect. In Experiment 1, to contrast the predictions of two models of this effect, the subjective shortening and the coding models, pigeons were exposed to a delayed matching-to-sample task with three sample durations (2, 6 and 18 s) and retention intervals ranging from 0 to 20 s. Consistent with the coding model, the results suggested a sudden forgetting of memories for duration. In Experiment 2, to test the confusion hypothesis, the characteristics of the ITI and the retention interval differed. Contrary to the confusion hypothesis, a choose-short effect was obtained. In both experiments, a test with only two of the three comparison keys was performed. The results suggest three effects that may be controlling the birds’ responses: stimulus generalization when no retention interval is present; an increase in random responding at longer retention intervals; and, similarly, an increase in preference for the “short-sample” key at longer retention intervals.     

Visual expertise does not predict the composite effect across species: A comparison between spider (Ateles geoffroyi) and rhesus (Macaca mulatta) monkeys

Humans are subject to the composite illusion: two identical top halves of a face are perceived as “different” when they are presented with different bottom halves. This observation suggests that when building a mental representation of a face, the underlying system perceives the whole face, and has difficulty decomposing facial features. We adapted a behavioural task that measures the composite illusion to examine the perception of faces in two nonhuman species. Specifically we had spider (Ateles geoffroyi) and rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) perform a two-forced choice, match-to-sample task where only the top half of sample was relevant to the task. The results of Experiment 1 show that spider monkeys (N = 2) process the faces of familiar species (conspecifics and humans, but not chimpanzees, sheep, or sticks), holistically. The second experiment tested rhesus monkeys (N = 7) with the faces of humans, chimpanzees, gorillas, sheep, and sticks. Contrary to prediction, there was no evidence of a composite effect in the human (or familiar primate) condition. Instead, we present evidence of a composite illusion in the chimpanzee condition (an unfamiliar primate). Together, these experiments show that visual expertise does not predict the composite effect across the primate order.     

Testing sociometer theory: Self-esteem and the importance of acceptance for social decision-making

The present study examined the sociometer’s role in guiding social behavior. The authors hypothesized that low self-esteem people (LSEs), but not high self-esteem people (HSEs), base their social decision-making on acceptance. Undergraduate participants were invited to join a social group and were led to believe that acceptance either was guaranteed, or was likely but not guaranteed. HSEs always were eager to join the group, whereas LSEs were keen to join the group only when acceptance was guaranteed. Furthermore, mediation analyses indicated that LSEs’ willingness to join the group was dependent on their anticipated social outcomes, which were contingent on acceptance from the group, whereas acceptance did not affect HSEs’ decision-making. These results support a sociometer account of social decision-making.     

Connecting theory to fat talk: Body dissatisfaction mediates the relationships between weight discrepancy,upward comparison,body surveillance,and fat talk

The fat talk literature is meager in terms of offering theoretical explanations for women's self-disparaging communication. The research presented here sought to establish a relationship between three prominent body image theories – self-discrepancy theory, social comparison theory, and objectification theory – and fat talk by proposing body dissatisfaction as a potential mediating mechanism. Young adult women (N = 201) completed an online questionnaire. As predicted, results revealed that body dissatisfaction significantly mediated the relationships between weight discrepancy, upward comparison, body surveillance and fat talk. Effect size estimates indicated that the size of each indirect effect was medium in magnitude.     

Mapping numerical magnitudes onto symbols: the numerical distance effect and individual differences in children's mathematics achievement

Although it is often assumed that abilities that reflect basic numerical understanding, such as numerical comparison, are related to children’s mathematical abilities, this relationship has not been tested rigorously. In addition, the extent to which symbolic and nonsymbolic number processing play differential roles in this relationship is not yet understood. To address these questions, we collected mathematics achievement measures from 6- to 8-year-olds as well as reaction times from a numerical comparison task. Using the reaction times, we calculated the size of the numerical distance effect exhibited by each child. In a correlational analysis, we found that the individual differences in the distance effect were related to mathematics achievement but not to reading achievement. This relationship was found to be specific to symbolic numerical comparison. Implications for the role of basic numerical competency and the role of accessing numerical magnitude information from Arabic numerals for the development of mathematical skills and their impairment are discussed.     

The disjunction effect reexamined: Relevant methodological issues and the fallacy of unspecified percentage comparisons

Leonard J. Savage’s sure-thing principle (1954) is a key assumption of the consequentialist conception of decision making under uncertainty, which more-or-less assumes that decision makers are rational and thorough. The sure-thing principle states that if some option x is preferred given some other event A occurs, and if option x is preferred given this event A does not occur, then x should be preferred even when the outcome of A is unknown. Tversky and Shafir [Tversky, A., &; Shafir, E. (1992). The disjunction effect in choice under uncertainty. Psychological Science, 3(5) 305–309] claim that this basic principle is frequently violated in two-step gambles. They call such violations disjunction effects. Kuhberber, Komunska, and Perner [Kuhberber, A., Komunska, D., &; Perner, J. (2001). The disjunction effect: does it exist for two step gambles? Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 85(2) 250–264] attempted to replicate Tversky and Shafir’s findings and claim their results show that people do not violate the sure-thing principle in repeated gambles. This article evaluates Kuhberger, Komunska, and Perner’s claims, suggesting they did not appropriately analyze their results, and further provides evidence that people do regularly violate the sure-thing principle in two-step gambles, providing further evidence for the reality of disjunction effects.