个体权力高低对其损失规避的影响

摘 要 以中国大学生为被试,采用问卷的方式,探讨权力对损失规避倾向的影响。实验一发现,与低权力被试相比,高权力被试具有较少的损失规避。实验二进一步考察权力影响损失规避的原因机制,结果发现,权力对收益的价值估计没有影响,但降低了个体对损失的价值估计,从而导致损失规避的减少。结果表明,权力除了激活个体对收益的趋近,还可能抑制个体对损失的感知,权力也是影响决策的因素之一。 关键词 权力 损失规避 估计价值     

Choice by value encoding and value construction: processes of loss aversion

Loss aversion and reference dependence are 2 keystones of behavioral theories of choice, but little is known about their underlying cognitive processes. We suggest an additional account for loss aversion that supplements the current account of the value encoding of attributes as gains or losses relative to a reference point, introducing a value construction account. Value construction suggests that loss aversion results from biased evaluations during information search and comparison processes. We develop hypotheses that identify the influence of both accounts and examine process-tracing data for evidence. Our data suggest that loss aversion is the result of the initial direct encoding of losses that leads to the subsequent process of directional comparisons distorting attribute valuations and the final choice.     

Predicting the intensity of losses vs. non-gains and non-losses vs. gains in judging fairness and value: A test of the loss aversion explanation

Three studies examined the predictions that in the context of evaluation of fairness and concessions in negotiations, losses would be perceived as more intensely negative than non-gains, and that non-losses would be perceived as more positive than gains. Extant studies tested only the first of these predictions. These predictions derive from the principle of loss aversion (LA), according to which losses are experienced more intensely than gains of similar objective magnitude. In this view, losses and non-losses are measured against the steep loss part of the value curve, whereas gains and non-gains are measured against the shallow part of the value curve. Our studies replicated extant studies in confirming the first prediction but failed to confirm the second prediction. Specifically, opposite to the prediction of LA, gains were perceived as more intensely positive than non-losses. It seems, therefore, that LA is not a sufficient explanation of why losses are perceived as more averse than gains. Feature positive and regulatory focus effects are discussed as additional potential contributors to the phenomenon.     

得失程数的变化: 损失规避现象的新视点

损失规避是预期理论的核心部分之一, 指等量的损失和获得产生的心理效用并不相同, 前者大于后者。大量研究从生理、认知、情感等角度探讨损失规避的内在机制和规律, 以期认识、预测并控制损失规避导致的偏差。本研究假设损失规避与获得或损失的“程数”(route)有关, 以往研究发现了损失规避现象, 是由于其采用的“双程损失-单程获得”典型情境中, 损失程数多于获得程数。为检验该假设, 本研究设计了不同于传统范式的“获得和损失程数相等”的镜像情境、“单程损失－双程获得”及“三程获得”三种不同的得失情境。研究结果支持本假设: 当损失的程数等于或少于获得的程数时, 损失规避现象消失; 获得或损失的程数越多, 个体对其的心理感受强度趋于越高。建议未来研究进一步检验心理感受强度在程数和损失规避行为之间的中介作用。     

The behavioural components of risk aversion

There have been few theoretical investigations of risk attitude within Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT). Unlike expected utility theory, in CPT risk attitude is affected by loss aversion and decision weight distortions as well as utility curvature for both gains and losses. We introduce two variants of the risk premium—the total risk premium relative to expected value, and the behavioural risk premium relative to the imputed behavioural expected value. Approximate solutions for each using Pratt's [(1964). Risk aversion in the small and in the large. Econometrica, 32, 122-136] methodology show that the CPT risk premium is composed of two components: the first, analogous to the Pratt-Arrow coefficient of risk aversion, governs the contribution of the curvature of the value function to risk aversion; the second governs the first-order contribution of loss aversion. Both of these terms are made more complex by the introduction of decision weights. We analyse the contribution of each component and provide sufficient conditions to ensure risk aversion in CPT.     

基于预期理论的风险决策的神经机制

预期理论基于对期望效用理论的批判与发展,提出了价值函数与权重函数,对以往风险决策研究中所发现的现象进行了很好的预测与解释。预期理论的核心概念包括参照依赖、损失规避与权重函数。基于预期理论的一些决策偏差包括框架效应、禀赋效应和默认偏差也部分揭示了与人们风险决策有关的脑区。近年来,通过采用功能性核磁共振等脑成像手段对预期理论的一些核心成分进行的研究表明,涉及到人们风险决策的脑区主要有前额叶、纹状体、脑岛与杏仁核。未来的研究可以从预期理论的产生根源、个体发展以及遗传基因等角度进行进一步的探讨。     

行为经济学中的损失规避

损失规避是指,人们总是强烈倾向于规避损失：一定数额的损失所引起的心理感受,其强烈程度约相当于两倍数额的获益感受。这种强烈的心理与行为倾向广泛存在于风险与非风险领域,在该两个领域中损失规避的研究范式也不同。损失规避常见于经济和消费等领域,可用于解释行为决策中有悖于规范化理论的诸多现象,如禀赋效应、现状偏差、股权溢价之迷和赢者的诅咒等。然而,损失规避的机制研究还存在许多尚未解决的问题,如损失规避的本质以及适用条件。今后的研究不仅要注重认知角度和情感依恋,还要结合认知过程来研究损失规避的性质和内在机制,以期帮助人们认识、预测及干预由损失规避造成的经济损失和非理性决策。     

Dissociable effects of basolateral amygdala lesions on decision making biases in rats when loss or gain is emphasized

Individuals switch from risk seeking to risk aversion when mathematically identical options are described in terms of loss versus gains, as exemplified in the reflection and framing effects. Determining the neurobiology underlying such cognitive biases could inform our understanding of decision making in health and disease. Although reports vary, data using human subjects have implicated the amygdala in such biases. Animal models enable more detailed investigation of neurobiological mechanisms. We therefore tested whether basolateral amygdala (BLA) lesions would affect risk preference for gains or losses in rats. Choices in both paradigms were always between options of equal expected value—a guaranteed outcome, or the 50:50 chance of double or nothing. In the loss-chasing task, most rats exhibited strong risk seeking preferences, gambling at the risk of incurring double the penalty, regardless of the size of the guaranteed loss. In the betting task, the majority of animals were equivocal in their choice, irrespective of bet size; however, a wager-sensitive subgroup progressively shifted away from the uncertain option as the bet size increased, which is reminiscent of risk aversion. BLA lesions increased preference for the smaller guaranteed loss in the loss-chasing task, without affecting choice on the betting task, which is indicative of reduced risk seeking for losses, but intact risk aversion for gains. These data support the hypothesis that the amygdala plays a more prominent role in choice biases related to losses. Given the importance of the amygdala in representing negative affect, the aversive emotional reaction to loss, rather than aberrant estimations of probability or loss magnitude, may underlie risk seeking for losses.     

The response dynamics of preferential choice

The ubiquity of psychological process models requires an increased degree of sophistication in the methods and metrics that we use to evaluate them. We contribute to this venture by capitalizing on recent work in cognitive science analyzing response dynamics, which shows that the bearing information processing dynamics have on intended action is also revealed in the motor system. This decidedly “embodied” view suggests that researchers are missing out on potential dependent variables with which to evaluate their models—those associated with the motor response that produces a choice. The current work develops a method for collecting and analyzing such data in the domain of decision making. We first validate this method using widely normed stimuli from the International Affective Picture System (Experiment 1), and demonstrate that curvature in response trajectories provides a metric of the competition between choice options. We next extend the method to risky decision making (Experiment 2) and develop predictions for three popular classes of process model. The data provided by response dynamics demonstrate that choices contrary to the maxim of risk seeking in losses and risk aversion in gains may be the product of at least one “online” preference reversal, and can thus begin to discriminate amongst the candidate models. Finally, we incorporate attentional data collected via eye-tracking (Experiment 3) to develop a formal computational model of joint information sampling and preference accumulation. In sum, we validate response dynamics for use in preferential choice tasks and demonstrate the unique conclusions afforded by response dynamics over and above traditional methods.     

Loss-aversion or loss-attention: The impact of losses on cognitive performance

Losses were found to improve cognitive performance, and this has been commonly explained by increased weighting of losses compared to gains (i.e., loss aversion). We examine whether effects of losses on performance could be modulated by two alternative processes: an attentional effect leading to increased sensitivity to task incentives; and a contrast-related effect. Empirical data from five studies show that losses improve performance even when the enhanced performance runs counter to the predictions of loss aversion. In Study 1–3 we show that in various settings, when an advantageous option produces large gains and small losses, participants select this alternative at a higher rate than when it does not produce losses. Consistent with the joint influence of attention and contrast-related processes, this effect is smaller when a disadvantageous alternative produces the losses. In Studies 4 and 5 we find a positive effect on performance even with no contrast effects (when a similar loss is added to all alternatives). These findings indicate that both attention and contrast-based processes are implicated in the effect of losses on performance, and that a positive effect of losses on performance is not tantamount to loss aversion.     

How beliefs influence the relative magnitude of pleasure and pain

Loss aversion is an economic assumption about utility—people value giving up a good more than they value getting it. It also has hedonic meaning—the pain of a loss is greater in magnitude than the pleasure of a comparable gain. But value and pleasure are not necessarily identical. We test the hedonic interpretation of loss aversion in experimental markets. With hedonic forecasts, sellers imagine the pain of losing their endowment, and buyers imagine the pleasure of being endowed. With hedonic experiences, sellers rate the pleasure of having the endowment, and buyers rate the pain of being without it. Contrary to loss aversion, predicted pleasure is greater in magnitude than predicted pain, and experienced pleasure surpasses experienced pain. We show that the relative magnitude of pleasure and pain depends on beliefs about the likelihood of outcomes, as well as utilities. Surprise makes gains more pleasurable and losses more painful. With surprising gains and expected losses, pleasure can surpass pain. But when gains and losses are equally likely (or losses are surprising and gains are expected), the opposite pattern can occur. Finally, within‐group and between‐group prices are significantly correlated with hedonic experiences. Sellers who feel better with their endowments assign higher selling prices, and buyers who feel worse about the absence of endowment assign higher buying prices. Despite the fact that hedonic experiences deviate from loss aversion, these emotions predict the endowment effect. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Loss aversion,diminishing sensitivity,and the effect of experience on repeated decisions

Three experiments are presented that explore the assertion that loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity drive the effect of experience on choice behavior. The experiments are focused on repeated choice tasks where decision makers choose repeatedly between alternatives and get feedback after each choice. Experiments 1a and 1b show that behavioral tendencies that were previously interpreted as indications of loss aversion in decisions from experience are better described as products of diminishing sensitivity to absolute payoffs. Experiment 2 highlights a nominal magnitude effect: A decrease in the magnitude of the nominal payoffs eliminates the evidence for diminishing sensitivity. These and related previous results can be captured with a model that assumes reliance on small samples of subjective experiences, and an increase in diminishing sensitivity with payoff variability. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Moderating Loss Aversion: Loss Aversion Has Moderators,But Reports of its Death are Greatly Exaggerated

Loss aversion, the principle that losses impact decision making more than equivalent gains, is a fundamental idea in consumer behavior and decision making, though its existence has recently been called into question. Across five unique samples (N_total = 17,720), we tested several moderators of loss aversion, which supported a preference construction account. Across studies, more domain knowledge and experience were associated with lower loss aversion, though people of all knowledge and experience levels were loss averse. Among car buyers, those who knew more about a particular car attribute (e.g., fuel economy) were less loss averse for that attribute but not other attributes (e.g., comfort), consistent with the idea that people with less attribute knowledge are more likely to construct preferences, thereby increasing loss aversion. Additionally, older consumers were more loss averse across different loss aversion measures and studies. We discuss implications for several accounts of loss aversion, including accounts rooted in status quo bias, emotion, or ownership. In addition to discovering loss aversion moderators, we cast doubt on recent claims that loss aversion is a fallacy or is fully explained by status quo bias, risk aversion, or the educated laboratory samples often used to study loss aversion.     

社会价值取向对自我-他人风险决策的影响及其机制

以往关于为自己和代他人决策的冒险行为研究结果不一致, 这可能是因为以往的研究没有考虑决策情境和决策者人际特质等因素对于决策行为的影响。社会价值取向(social value orientation, SVO)是一种典型的人际特质, 是个体在对自我和他人资源分配时所表现出的社会偏好, 通常分为亲社会者和亲自我者。为探究SVO对自我-他人风险决策的影响及其机制, 采用为自己和陌生人分别完成多轮混合赌博游戏的任务。结果发现亲自我比亲社会者代他人决策更冒险。用模型量化的损失厌恶和对潜在损失的敏感度部分中介了自我-他人风险决策差异, 但只有对他人潜在损失的敏感度部分中介自我-他人决策的SVO效应。说明SVO会影响自我-他人风险决策, 且该效应可以通过对他人利益的关心程度起作用, 所以在自我-他人风险决策的研究中应将SVO这一决策者的人际特质因素考虑在内。     

Psychological determinants of decision attitude

Decision attitude — an analog of risk attitude — is the propensity to make (or avoid making) a decision: in decision aversion, a person finds it more desirable to receive through fiat the better of two options than to have a choice between them; in decision seeking, the choice is more desirable, even though it can lead to nothing better than the best option. Both decision aversion and decision seeking were found in hypothetical scenarios. Experimental manipulations and subjects' justifications point to anticipated regret, fear of blame for poor outcomes, and desire for equitable distributions as sources of decision aversion. One source of decision seeking (for self) and decision aversion (when deciding for others) appears to be the desire for the self-determination of the affected parties. We consider the implications of our results for personal choice and public policy decisions.     

Reducing exposure to trust-related risks to avoid self-blame

Three studies demonstrated that anticipated self-blame elicits more conservative decisions about risks that require trust than about otherwise economically identical risks that do not. Participants were more reluctant to invest money in a company when it risked failure due to fraud versus low consumer demand (Study 1), and to risk points in an economic game when its outcome ostensibly depended on another participant versus chance (Studies 2 and 3). These effects were mediated by anticipated self-blame (Studies 1 and 2). Additionally, participants who actually experienced a loss felt more self-blame when the loss violated their trust and became even more conservative in subsequent risk decisions relative to participants whose loss did not violate their trust (Study 3). No support emerged for alternative explanations based on either the perceived probability of incurring a loss or an aversion to losses that profit others. The motivational power of trust violations is discussed.     

The differential processing of price in gains and losses: the effects of frame and need for cognition

Perhaps the most fundamental principle of decision theory is that more money is preferred to less: the principle of desired wealth. Based on this and other principles such as reference dependence and loss aversion, researchers have derived and demonstrated mental accounting (MA) rules for multiple outcome situations. Experiment 1 tested the invariance of the desired wealth principle and two mental accounting rules (mixed gain, e.g. $100 gain and a $50 loss; mixed loss, e.g. $100 loss and a $50 gain) across types of decision maker and frame. The desired wealth principle and the MA rule for mixed gains were found to vary depending upon (1) the thoughtfulness of the decision maker (need for cognition, NC), and (2) the frame used to describe gains and losses (e.g. a gain of $x versus a gain of y%). The MA rule for mixed losses, however, was found to be immune to framing effects, even among people who are generally less thoughtful. The differential processing of gains and losses across frames (dollar versus percentage) and individuals (less versus more thoughtful) was tested further in Experiment 2 where evaluations of mixed losses were made at the level of the gestalt as well as the constituent (the gain and the loss being evaluated separately). Framing effects were evidenced only among subjects lower in NC and only when the constituent gain was evaluated. Evaluations of the overall mixed loss and the constituent loss were comparable across situation and individual, suggesting that losses motivate greater processing among people otherwise inclined toward cognitive miserliness. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Loss of Loss Aversion: Will It Loom Larger Than Its Gain?

Loss aversion, the principle that losses loom larger than gains, is among the most widely accepted ideas in the social sciences. The first part of this article introduces and discusses the construct of loss aversion. The second part of this article reviews evidence in support of loss aversion. The upshot of this review is that current evidence does not support that losses, on balance, tend to be any more impactful than gains. The third part of this article aims to address the question of why acceptance of loss aversion as a general principle remains pervasive and persistent among social scientists, including consumer psychologists, despite evidence to the contrary. This analysis aims to connect the persistence of a belief in loss aversion to more general ideas about belief acceptance and persistence in science. The final part of the article discusses how a more contextualized perspective of the relative impact of losses versus gains can open new areas of inquiry that are squarely in the domain of consumer psychology.     

Living large: the powerful overestimate their own height

In three experiments, we tested the prediction that individuals' experience of power influences their perceptions of their own height. High power, relative to low power, was associated with smaller estimates of a pole's height relative to the self (Experiment 1), with larger estimates of one's own height (Experiment 2), and with choice of a taller avatar to represent the self in a second-life game (Experiment 3). These results emerged regardless of whether power was experientially primed (Experiments 1 and 3) or manipulated through assigned roles (Experiment 2). Although a great deal of research has shown that more physically imposing individuals are more likely to acquire power, this work is the first to show that powerful people feel taller than they are. The discussion considers the implications for existing and future research on the physical experience of power.