The effect of generic statements on children's causal attributions: questions of mechanism

Generic statements, or generics, express generalizations about entire kinds (e.g., "Girls are good at a game called 'tooki'"). In contrast, nongeneric statements express facts about specific (sets of) individuals (e.g., "Jane is good at tooki"). Aside from simply conveying information, generics and nongenerics also instill different causal perspectives on the facts expressed, implying that these facts stem from deep, inherent causes (e.g., talent) or from external, mechanistic causes (e.g., instruction), respectively. In the present research (with samples of 4- to 7-year-olds and undergraduates, N = 220), we proposed that children's causal attributions for the facts learned through these statements are determined not by the generic/nongeneric format of the statements themselves but rather by the generic/nongeneric format of the beliefs relevant to these statements. This proposal led to two specific predictions. First, the influence of the generic belief induced by a novel generic statement should be detected in any subsequent context that falls under its scope--even in circumstances that involve particular individuals. Confirming this prediction, participants often attributed a fact conveyed in a nongeneric statement (e.g., a particular girl's tooki ability) to deep, inherent causes if they had previously formed a relevant generic belief (e.g., by hearing that girls are good at tooki). Second, we predicted that nongeneric statements such as "Most girls are good at tooki" should also promote attributions to deep causes because they often ultimately give rise to generic beliefs, as suggested by recent evidence. This prediction was confirmed as well. These results clarify and expand our knowledge of the influence of language on children's understanding of the world.     

Brown on Mackie: Echoes of the Lottery Paradox

In “The possibility of morality,” Phil Brown considers whether moral error theory is best understood as a necessary or contingent thesis. Among other things, Brown contends that the argument from relativity, offered by John Mackie—error theory’s progenitor—supports a stronger modal reading of error theory. His argument is as follows: Mackie’s is an abductive argument that error theory is the best explanation for divergence in moral practices. Since error theory will likewise be the best explanation for similar divergences in possible worlds similar to our own, we may conclude that error theory is true at all such worlds, just as it is in the actual world. I contend that Brown’s argument must fail, as abductive arguments cannot support the modal conclusions he suggests. I then consider why this is the case, concluding that Brown has stumbled upon new and interesting evidence that agglomerating one’s beliefs can be epistemically problematic—an issue associated most famously with Henry Kyburg’s lottery paradox.     

Accounting for occurrences: a new view of the use of contingency information in causal judgment

When people make causal judgments from contingency information, a principal aim is to account for occurrences of the outcome. When 2 causes are under consideration, the capacity of either to account for occurrences is judged from how likely the cause is to be present when the outcome occurs and from the rate at which the outcome occurs when that cause alone is present, which gives an estimate of the strength of the cause. These propositions are formalized in a weighted averaging model, which successfully predicted several judgmental phenomena not predicted by other models of causal judgment. These include a tendency for judgment of one cause (A) to be reduced as the number of occurrences of when only the other one (B) increases and a tendency for A to receive higher judgments than B if A is better able to account for occurrences than B is even if B has a higher contingency with the outcome than A does. Overshadowing, a tendency for judgments of B to be depressed if A has a higher contingency, is weak or absent when B is better able to account for occurrences than A. Results of several experiments support these and related predictions derived from the accounting for occurrences hypothesis.     

Causal powers and preventers: An explanatory account of cue interaction effects in human causal judgement

According to the causal powers theory, all causal relations are understood in terms of causal powers of one thing producing an effect by acting on liability of another thing. Powers can vary in strength, and their operation also depends on the presence of preventers. When an effect occurs, there is a need to account for the occurrence by assigning sufficient strength to produce it to its possible causes. Contingency information is used to estimate strengths of powers and preventers and the extent to which they account for occurrences and nonoccurrences of the outcome. People make causal judgements from contingency information by processes of inference that interpret evidence in terms of this fundamental understanding. From this account it is possible to derive a computational model based on a common set of principles that involve estimating strengths, using these estimates to interpret ambiguous information, and integrating the resultant evidence in a weighted averaging model. It is shown that the model predicts cue interaction effects in human causal judgement, including forward and backward blocking, second and third order backward blocking, forward and backward conditioned inhibition, recovery from overshadowing, superlearning, and backward superlearning.     

Causal judgements about two causal candidates: Accounting for occurrences,estimating strength,and the importance of interaction judgements

When two possible causes of an outcome are under consideration, contingency information concerns each possible combination of presence and absence of the two causes with occurrences and nonoccurrences of the outcome. White (2008) proposed that such judgements could be predicted by a weighted averaging model integrating these kinds of contingency information. The weights in the model are derived from the hypothesis that causal judgements seek to meet two main aims, accounting for occurrences of the outcome and estimating the strengths of the causes. Here it is shown that the model can explain many but not all relevant published findings. The remainder can be explained by reasoning about interactions between the two causes, by scenario-specific effects, and by variations in cell weight depending on quantity of available information. An experiment is reported that supports this argument. The review and experimental results support the case for a cognitive model of causal judgement in which different kinds of contingency information are utilised to satisfy particular aims of the judgement process.     

The Differential Impact of Abstract vs. Concrete Information on Decisions1

Recent findings from research on judgment and attribution processes indicate that people regard base rate data, i.e., statistical summaries of populations, as if they were uninformative. It is suggested that base rate information lacks impact because of its abstract, pallid nature. In a demonstration of the inefficacy of abstract information, undergraduates were given mean course evaluations based on ratings of students who previously took the courses. This information had little impact on course choices. In contrast, brief, face-to-face comments about the courses had a substantial impact on course choices. The results suggest that information is utilized in proportion to its vividness.     

A note on the system of propositional calculus with primitive rule of extensionality

Summary The present paper deals with a systemS of propositional calculus, conjunction, equivalence and falsum being its primitive terms. The only primitive rule inS is the rule of extensionality defined by the scheme:      

The explanatory power of the substance view of persons.

The purpose of this essay is to offer support for the substance view of persons, the philosophical anthropology defended by Patrick Lee in his essay. In order to accomplish this the author (1) presents a brief definition of the substance view; (2) argues that the substance view has more explanatory power in accounting for why we believe that human persons are intrinsically valuable even when they are not functioning as such (e.g., when on is temporarily comatose), why human persons remain identical to themselves over time, and why it follows from these points that the unborn are human persons; and (3) responds to two arguments that attempt to establish the claim that the early human being is not a unified substance until at least fourteen days after conception.     

Ambiguity aversion: the explanatory power of indeterminate probabilities

Daniel Ellsberg presented in Ellsberg (The Quarterly Journal of Economics 75:643–669, 1961) various examples questioning the thesis that decision making under uncertainty can be reduced to decision making under risk. These examples constitute one of the main challenges to the received view on the foundations of decision theory offered by Leonard Savage in Savage (1972). Craig Fox and Amos Tversky have, nevertheless, offered an indirect defense of Savage. They provided in Fox and Tversky (1995) an explanation of Ellsberg’s two-color problem in terms of a psychological effect: ambiguity aversion. The ‘comparative ignorance’ hypothesis articulates how this effect works and explains why it is important to an understanding of the typical pattern of responses associated with Ellsberg’s two-color problem. In the first part of this article we challenge Fox and Tversky’s explanation. We present first an experiment that extends Ellsberg’s two-color problem where certain predictions of the comparative ignorance hypothesis are not confirmed. In addition the hypothesis seems unable to explain how the subjects resolve trade-offs between security and expected pay-off when vagueness is present. Ellsberg offered an explanation of the typical behavior elicited by his examples in terms of these trade-offs and in section three we offer a model of Ellsberg’s trade-offs. The model takes seriously the role of imprecise probabilities in explaining Ellsberg’s phenomenon. The so-called three-color problem was also considered in Fox and Tversky (1995). We argue that Fox and Tversky’s analysis of this case breaks a symmetry with their analysis of the two-color problem. We propose a unified treatment of both problems and we present a experiment that confirms our hypothesis.     

The impact of self-efficacy on stressor-strain relations: coping style as an explanatory mechanism.

The present study was designed to examine whether coping style influences the impact of self-efficacy on stressor-strain relations. It was hypothesized that high self-efficacy would weaken stressor-strain relations when accompanied by frequent use of active coping and infrequent use of avoidance coping. Data collected from 2,293 members of the U.S. Army revealed 3-way interactions among self-efficacy, role clarity, and active coping and among self-efficacy, work overload, and avoidance coping. As predicted, self-efficacy mitigated the effects of low role clarity on strain only when active coping was high. Also as expected, strain levels were lower for participants with high self-efficacy than for participants with lower self-efficacy when work overload was low but avoidance coping was high. Implications of these findings for occupational stress research are discussed.     

Explanations versus applications: the explanatory power of valuable beliefs

People hold beliefs that vary not only in their perceived truth, but also in their value to the believer--their meaning, relevance, and importance. We argue that a belief's value is determined, at least in part, by its explanatory power. Highly valuable beliefs are those that can uniquely explain and organize a diverse set of observations. Less valuable beliefs, in contrast, are those that can be explained by other observations, or that explain and organize few observations. The results of three experiments are consistent with these hypotheses. These experiments demonstrate that applying either scientific or religious beliefs to explain other observations increases the perceived value of those beliefs, whereas generating explanations for the existence of beliefs decreases their perceived value. Discussion focuses on the implications of these findings for people's resistance to explaining their own beliefs, for the perceived value of science and religion, and for culture wars between people holding opposing beliefs.     

系统合理化何以形成——三种不同的解释视角

系统合理化理论认为, 人们会自然地将其所在的社会系统感知为公平合理的, 这一倾向即系统合理化。而系统合理化形成之原因, 一直是该领域理论和研究关注的重点。为此, 研究者先后提出了三种解释思路。认知失调视角认为, 系统合理化之所以产生是因为个体想要缓解因系统无法满足他们的需求而产生的焦虑。补偿性控制视角认为, 系统合理化源于个体自身控制感的缺乏。社会认知视角则认为人们固有的认知倾向特别是对于社会经济差异的内归因倾向是造成系统合理化的根源。未来可以考虑在同一个研究中包含来自于不同理论视角的解释变量, 借鉴相近领域的发现探索其他可能存在的系统合理化的形成机制, 探究中国文化特有的系统合理化的来源, 同时对积极的合理化与消极的合理化作出区分, 并在此基础上针对社会现实问题加强应用研究的开展。     

Persistent symptoms among survivors of Hodgkin's disease: an explanatory model based on classical conditioning.

Persistent symptoms of nausea, distress, and vomiting triggered by reminders of cancer treatment were examined among 273 Hodgkin's disease survivors, 1 to 20 years posttreatment. Prevalence rates were high for distress and nausea but low for vomiting. Retrospective report of anticipatory symptoms during treatment was the strongest predictor of persistent symptoms, suggesting that treatment-induced symptoms are less likely to persist if conditioning does not occur initially. Time since treatment was also a significant predictor, with patients more recently treated more likely to experience persistent symptoms. Thus, an explanatory model based on classical conditioning theory successfully predicted presence of persistent symptoms. Symptoms also were associated with ongoing psychological distress, suggesting that quality of life is diminished among survivors with persistent symptoms. Recommendations for prevention and treatment of symptoms are discussed.     

Mechanisms of eyewitness suggestibility: tests of the explanatory role hypothesis

In a recent paper, Chrobak and Zaragoza (Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 142(3), 827–844, 2013) proposed the explanatory role hypothesis, which posits that the likelihood of developing false memories for post-event suggestions is a function of the explanatory function the suggestion serves. In support of this hypothesis, they provided evidence that participant-witnesses were especially likely to develop false memories for their forced fabrications when their fabrications helped to explain outcomes they had witnessed. In three experiments, we test the generality of the explanatory role hypothesis as a mechanism of eyewitness suggestibility by assessing whether this hypothesis can predict suggestibility errors in (a) situations where the post-event suggestions are provided by the experimenter (as opposed to fabricated by the participant), and (b) across a variety of memory measures and measures of recollective experience. In support of the explanatory role hypothesis, participants were more likely to subsequently freely report (E1) and recollect the suggestions as part of the witnessed event (E2, source test) when the post-event suggestion helped to provide a causal explanation for a witnessed outcome than when it did not serve this explanatory role. Participants were also less likely to recollect the suggestions as part of the witnessed event (on measures of subjective experience) when their explanatory strength had been reduced by the presence of an alternative explanation that could explain the same outcome (E3, source test + warning). Collectively, the results provide strong evidence that the search for explanatory coherence influences people’s tendency to misremember witnessing events that were only suggested to them.