Intergenerational transmission of violence: Is violence a pathology of intersubjective contact?

In this article, I look at violence as a pathology of the intersubjective contact. In particular, I claim that one possible explanation of violence is lack of recognition on a societal, intersubjective level. I propose an explanation based on Honneth’s concept of struggle for recognition and Merleau-Ponty’s account of intersubjectivity. The article takes the following course: I first give a short outline of the concept of intergenerational transmission of violence, as understood by psychology at the level of an individual, followed by a brief presentation a summary of sociological research on the concept. Then, I proceed with a discussion of Honneth’s three modes of recognition, viz. love, rights, and solidarity, as modes of intersubjective contact, leading to the development of self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem. I claim that the lack of these kinds of recognition leads to the decrease in confidence and trust and consequently to abusive behaviour, that it affects social integrity and brings about the destruction of social functions, and that it results in an individual and a society which have lost their “honour” and dignity. Finding his account of intersubjectivity lacking in its philosophical aspect, I complement Honneth’s account of intersubjectivity with that of Merleau-Ponty, based in his understanding of the intertwining of the subject and the world and the reversible contact between and among subjects within the world. Considering the negative effects of misrecognition as described by Honneth, in the light of Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of intersubjective contacts among subjects, I conclude that a country where all three modes of recognition have been disturbed houses a society lacking self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem, and consequently shows all the signs of Honneth’s forms of disrespect, i.e. abuse and rape, denial of rights and exclusion, as well as denigration and insult, all of which are forms of intergenerationally transmitted violence.     

Leaping Ahead of Heidegger: Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity in Being and Time

Abstract

This article challenges Honneth’s reading of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right in The Pathologies of Individual Freedom: Hegel’s Social Theory (2001/2010). Focusing on Hegel’s method, I argue that this text hardly offers support for the theory of mutual recognition that Honneth purports to derive from it. After critically considering Honneth’s interpretation of Hegel’s account of the family and civil society, I argue that Hegel’s text does not warrant Honneth’s tacit identification of mutual recognition with symmetrical instances of mutual recognition, let alone his subsequent projection of symmetrical forms of mutual recognition onto the various spheres of the Philosophy of Right as a whole. I conclude by indicating an alternative way in which Hegel’s text might be used to understand contemporary society.     

Solidarity and Social Moral Rules

The value of solidarity, which is exemplified in noble groups like the Civil Rights Movement along with more mundane teams, families and marriages, is distinctive in part because people are in solidarity over, for or with regard to something, such as common sympathies, interests, values, etc. I use this special feature of solidarity to resolve a longstanding puzzle about enacted social moral rules, which is, aren’t these things just heuristics, rules of thumb or means of coordination that we ‘fetishize’ or ‘worship’ if we stubbornly insist on sticking to them when we can do more good by breaking them? I argue that when we are in a certain kind of solidarity with others, united by social moral rules that we have established among ourselves, the rules we have developed and maintain are a constitutive part of our solidary relationships with one another; and it is part of being in this sort of solidarity with our comrades that we are presumptively required to follow the social moral rules that join us together. Those in the Polish Revolution, for example, were bound by informally enforced rules about publicity, free speech and the use of violence, so following their own rules became a way of standing in a valuable sort of solidarity with one another. I explain why we can have non-instrumental reasons to follow the social moral rules that exist in our own society, improve our rules and even sometimes to break the otherwise good rules that help to unite us.     

Ferenczi as social trauma thinker*

In the 21st century, the notion of trauma is so commonly used that one can speak of a culture of trauma. Today, a wide variety of people claim victimhood, pointing to their traumas as validation. Fassin and Rechtman denounce the way in which recognition strategies make use of the identity of victim to justify compensation policies and financial reparations. This paper presents Sándor Ferenczi’s contributions on trauma, showing how his theory takes into consideration relational and political aspects that were underemphasized by Freud. When Ferenczi is compared to contemporary recognition thinkers (such as Honneth, Fraser and Butler), one can see that what is at stake in his theory is neither identity nor victimization. It is deeper: Ferenczi shows the importance of the vulnerable dimension in all of us, suggesting that recognizing mutual vulnerability is a basis of the sense of connectedness and solidarity with the other.     

Realizing Honneth: redistribution,recognition, and global justice

The purpose of this article is to explore the potential contribution of Axel Honneth's critical theory of recognition to empirical and normative debates on global justice. I first present, very briefly, an overview of recent theories of global distributive justice. I argue that theorists of distributive justice do not pay enough attention to sources of self-respect and conditions for identity formation, and that they are blind toward the danger of harming people's sense of self even by well-intentioned redistributive policies. Honneth's theory suffers from complementary shortcomings; it is anti-technocratic but largely oblivious to the global nature of many contemporary justice claims. Given this situation, I seek to broaden the theory's scope by outlining transnational extensions of the recognition principles of love, rights and solidarity identified by Honneth. In conclusion, I show how utilizing a broadened conceptualization of the struggle for recognition allows us to better understand the changing logic of justice-oriented foreign policies.     

The rebalancing act: Injured varsity women athletes’ experiences of global and sport psychological well-being

ObjectivesThe purpose of this study was to explore how seriously injured women athletes perceive and experience global and sport psychological well-being (PWB) during sport injury recovery.MethodAdopting an interpretivist constructionist approach, we conducted one semi-structured interview with twelve participants (12 interviews total), aged 18–23. All participants were currently seriously injured, with a range of six months out of sport. Through a reflexive thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2019) we analyzed patterns within the data related to how injured athletes perceived and experienced global and sport specific PWB during sport injury recovery.ResultsFour overarching themes were developed: (1) my life is chaos and out of control, (2) pressures shaping response to sport injury, (3) maybe I can: adaptation from the disruption of sport injury, and (4) sport injury growth (SIG). Participants experienced an initial disruption of sport PWB and global PWB, however once they were able to adapt, they could rebalance their PWBs. Once rebalanced, participants reappraised the injury experience to be an opportunity for psychological growth and development, leading to the possibility of SIG. Findings suggest that sport injury can initially hinder one’s PWB, however once one can rebalance their PWB sport injury is perceived as a positive event that can lead to SIG.ConclusionThese findings reveal that it is important to consider the role of PWB during sport injury, as it has been identified that there are disruptions to one’s PWB. These findings help further our understanding of injured athletes’ experiences of PWB during sport injury and how athletes could be better supported to protect their PWB and mental health during recovery.     

Parental involvement in competitive youth sport settings

ObjectivesBased on ecological systems theory [Bronfenbrenner, U. (2005). Making human beings human: Bioecological perspectives on human development. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage], the purpose of this study was to examine parents’ involvement in competitive youth sport settings.DesignData were collected through two distinct phases of fieldwork. Phase 1 involved longitudinal data collection with four families. Phase 2 involved observations of youth soccer settings.MethodData were collected from four families via individual interviews and audio-diaries and were supplemented through 120 h of observation. Data were transcribed verbatim and analyzed using grounded theory methodology.ResultsParents’ verbal reactions to their children's sport performance behaviors were placed on a continuum moving from more supportive to more controlling comments. These comments were categorized as praise/encouragement, performance contingent feedback, instruction, striking a balance, negative comments, and derogatory comments. Parents experienced empathy in that they perceived sharing the emotions their children felt in sport, and these emotions appeared to change in relation to dynamic game and contextual circumstances. Parents also thought that they possessed knowledge and expertise of sport, which they perceived enabled them to make comments to their children.ConclusionA series of reciprocal and bi-directional relationships were central to parents’ involvement in competitive youth sport.     

Negative freedom or integrated domination? Adorno versus Honneth

According to Axel Honneth, Adorno's very idea of social critique is self‐defeating. It tries to account for what is wrong, deformed, or pathological without providing any positive yardstick. Honneth's idea of critique is a diagnosis of chronic dysfunctions in the relations of recognition upon which the society in question is grounded. Under such conditions of misrecognition, institutions that embody what he calls social freedom regress to negative freedom. However, such a deficit‐based notion of critique does not square with Honneth's own diagnosis of our present: namely, the transformation from welfare capitalism to neoliberalism. In fact, Honneth's diagnosis is very much in line with Adorno's idea of late capitalism as a society of “total integration.” Adorno's matching conception of critique, it is argued, avoids the problems Honneth runs into. At the basis of Adorno's critical idiom are two key points: an explanation of how social relations can be functional while contradictory and an account of social domination that is diffused throughout society while being differentially experienced by different classes. Adorno's answer to Honneth's concern, regarding the lack of a positive yardstick, is that it is domination that gives meaning to our idea of freedom, rather than the other way around.     

Sport,Craft Or Technique? The Case of competitive aeromodelling

This essay takes competitive aeromodelling as a test case for certain contentious issues in philosophy of sport. More specifically, I look at the challenge it presents to prevailing ideas of what properly counts as ‘sport’, which in turn have their source in other, more basic or deep-rooted preconceptions. Among them are a range of ‘common-sense’ beliefs about the properly (naturally) human, the mind/body relationship, the role (if any) of scientific-technological innovation as a means of performance enhancement, and – most fundamentally – the distinction between nature and culture in so far as it bears on these questions. My approach is broadly deconstructionist in taking them as genuine questions and in pressing hard on those unresolved problems thrown up by any attempt to secure a definition of ‘sport’ that would pre-emptively exclude any kind of advanced technological adjunct (or Derridean ‘supplement’) that seemed to lead outside and beyond the realm of ‘natural’ human powers, capacities and skills. On the other hand I acknowledge – as against ‘strong’-conventionalist (e.g. Wittgensteinian) approaches – that the category ‘sport’ cannot be relativised or culturally contextualised to the point where it loses all determinate sense or normative significance. My main purpose here is to assess various claims and counter-claims by running them past a fairly detailed account of competitive aeromodelling – or one particular branch thereof – and the kinds of difficulty it creates not only for conservative, essentialist or naturalising definitions but also for that other reactive trend towards all-out cultural-relativist or social-constructivist doctrines. In addition, though far from incidentally, I want to make the case that this is indeed a sport on any reasonable, fair, or adequately informed reckoning and that its recognition as such might help to clarify certain obscure corners of current philosophical thinking about these issues.     

The reality of the other: Dreaming of the analyst1

The author discusses the obstacles to symbolization encountered when the analyst appears in the first dream of an analysis: the reality of the other is represented through the seeming recognition of the person of the analyst, who is portrayed in undisguised form. The interpretation of this first dream gives rise to reflections on the meaning of the other’s reality in analysis: precisely this realistic representation indicates that the function of the other in the construction of the psychic world has been abolished. An analogous phenomenon is observed in the countertransference, as the analyst’s mental processes are occluded by an exclusively self‐generated interpretation of the patient’s psychic world. For the analyst too, the reality of the other proves not to play a significant part in the construction of her interpretation. A ‘turning‐point’ dream after five years bears witness to the power of the transforming function performed by the other throughout the analysis, by way of the representation of characters who stand for the necessary presence of a third party in the construction of a personal psychic reality. The author examines the mutual denial of the other’s otherness, as expressed by the vicissitudes of the transference and countertransference between analyst and patient, otherness being experienced as a disturbance of self‐sufficient narcissistic functioning. The paper ends with an analysis of the transformations that took place in the analytic relationship.     

“Dying for a Baby” and Other “Confusions of Tongues”: A Discussion of “Childless”

This paper discusses the beautiful case presented by Rebeccca Harrington in “Childless.” This discussion focuses on Harrington’s narrated ambivalences around reproduction and the traumatic repetitions experienced by her patient Shira. As her case unfolds, Harrington recognizes the ways her silences around Shira’s engagement with assisted reproductive technologies reenacted a form of a parental blindness to abuse. Building on Harrington’s ideas, this discussion integrates queer and psychoanalytic theory to ponder some ways the fetus has become a fetish for U.S. culture and how this shift appears to be a form of temporally based affect regulation that collapses spaces of ambivalence around maternity for women. Within these cultural dynamics, this discussion emphasizes Harrington’s call for psychoanalysis as a field to analyze its own pronatalist agenda.     

Three ways of watching a sports video

It does not typically seem to be worthwhile rewatching a sport match, for example, in a video recording, once the result is known. Sports matches are like detective stories. Once one knows ‘whodunit’, there seems little point in revisiting the tale. By drawing on an argument from musicologist Edward T. Cone, this paper argues that certain sports matches may be revisited with profit. The initial experience of a game may be of a series of events that are often ambiguous or confusing as to their meaning or purpose. The full appreciation of a sport match requires, not just this initial familiarity with the immediately perceived events of the game, but also an awareness of the tactics being deployed by both sides. An understanding of tactics and strategy is akin to the analysis of a piece of music (or other art work). A further (third) viewing of the game, during which one can appreciate how the tactics inform the events naively experienced in the first viewing, will yield, it will be argued, an aesthetic pleasure. This takes the experience of sport beyond the merely entertaining or exciting. In certain games, the third viewing may also transcend an appreciation of the merely formal qualities of the game, and so offer substantial insights into what it is to be human.     

On ascetic practices and hermeneutical cycles

Sports reflection is rather locked into a binary view of narrow and broad internalists. Narrow internalists, or formalists, argue that sports are solely constituted by their rules: the ‘autotelic’ stance. Broad internalists, or interpretivists, on the other hand, reason that sport is more than just a lusory end in itself. This paper will revitalize reflection on sports as a locus of the human condition by breaking through this binary opposition. It will focus on the positive aspects of the concept of ‘agon’ (suffering, enduring). As an ‘agonal’ or competitive social practice, sport may be a means to a ‘heterotelic’ end that surpasses the concept of sport as self-referential play: seeking knowledge, understanding the human condition and cultivating virtue. As such, self-improvement through repetitive practice (‘askesis’) has always been a key theme of human existence. Our ‘ascetic planet’ is inhabited by individuals who are constantly and relentlessly training themselves for the better. This may be self-focused, but it may also have a broader scope: we train ourselves to become better humans, contributing to a just and sustainable society. Paradoxically, however, this will only work when we become aware of our exercises as forms of life that engage the practising person. A hermeneutics of endurance cycling can enrich our understanding of this sports activity as a form of asceticism. As such, it will elaborate a view on cycling as an upwardly oriented ‘spiral’ that can contribute not only to self-knowledge and self-improvement on the individual level (‘metanoia’), but also to an ‘ecosophical renaissance’ on the collective level.     

COUNTERTRANSFERENCE DREAMING: LIFE IN THE INTERSUBJECTIVE THIRD

In this paper the author asks, “How long is the life of an intersubjective field?” She proposes that it is possible for the field to remain active and instructive even after formal sessions have ended: This occurs in her case of Carla, a young woman who terminates prematurely. Carla enters treatment in a downward spiral of severe trauma symptoms that began subsequent to her rape, a decade earlier. Although Carla’s symptoms diminish and the analysis continues to be productive, it suddenly ends in an impasse, leaving the analyst perplexed and feeling professionally insufficient. Months later, she has three dreams pertaining to Carla and her rape. Largely employing Jessica Benjamin’s recognition theory and her representation of the intersubjective third, as well as contemporary Bionian thinking, the paper depicts how countertransference dreaming is one example of how the intersubjective field can carry on the psychoanalytic function—even outside of formal treatment.     

The early appearance and intergenerational transmission of maternal traumatic experiences in the context of mother-infant interaction

The paper describes the case of a girl of 8 weeks, referred by her mother because of 'intolerable hysterical attacks' triggering maternal impulses of abuse. Maternal perception of her infant was distorted to the extent that the mother was re-experiencing encounters with her own intrusive and traumatizing mother in the face of her screaming child. She also perceived the infant's motor impulses as physical attacks on herself and expressed intense anxieties about her daughter's future aggressive potential. The infant was viewed by her mother as extraordinarily and dangerously greedy. Even neutral infantile vocalizations were perceived as manipulating and sadistic. She tried to ward off these anxieties by employing a rigid scheme of rules and obsessively controlling the father's and grandmother's interaction with the child. The mother feared being overwhelmed by the infant's needs if she were to yield to them in a flexible way. The mother's background of early neglect and trauma is described, in the light of recent literature about the early intergenerational transmission of traumatic experiences, in order to demonstrate possible treatment modalities and the need to consider both protective and risk factors.     

Levinas,recognition and judaism

I seek to draw out the unique character of Levinas’ theory of recognition by highlighting its transitional character in a double sense. It is transitional, firstly, in that it stands between two models of recognition: the earlier agonistic model of Kojeve and the later model of Honneth which takes as its point of departure a primordial relation of mutual affirmation between individuals. It is transitional secondly in the sense that, while Levinas initially employs the concept of recognition, he is later explicit in his rejection of it. The interest of Levinas’ transitional model of recognition for the philosophy of religion is that Levinas negotiates both transitions by calling on archetypes borrowed from the Jewish tradition. An exploration of this model thus provides us with a fresh vantage point from which to address anew the question of the articulation of social philosophy and the philosophy of religion in his work.     

Before the rules are written: navigating moral ambiguity in performance enhancement

In 1984, a number of US cyclists used blood transfusions to boost their performance at the Los Angeles Olympic Games. The cyclists broke no rules and dominated the Games, yet were later maligned as cheaters and dopers—they had, it seemed, violated some important norm, albeit one which was neither an official rule nor otherwise easily identifiable. Their case illustrates the moral ambiguity that arises when a performance enhancement is employed in a sport that has not addressed it. This article takes up the crucial question posed by such moral ambiguity: is it ethical to enhance performance through a substance or technology when no rules exist to prohibit it? We first examine ordinary ethical obligations that athletes carry based on their status as moral agents. We conclude that such obligations provide some guidance, but cannot resolve the issue. We then examine arguments that take sport as a unique social practice that presents its own moral obligation not to use performance enhancers. We argue that these ‘spirit of sport’ arguments, developed by McNamee and Loland and Hoppeler cannot resolve the issue either. We conclude that when the rules governing sport are silent on the issue of performance enhancement the constraints on its ethical use are limited at best.     

The Neo‐Hegelian Theory of Freedom and the Limits of Emancipation

This paper critically evaluates what it identifies as ‘the institutional theory of freedom’ developed within recent neo‐Hegelian philosophy (by Robert Pippin and, in a different way, Axel Honneth). While acknowledging the gains made against the Kantian theory of autonomy as detachment it is argued that the institutional theory ultimately undermines the very meaning of practical agency. By tying agency to institutionally sustained recognition it effectively excludes the exercise of practical reason geared toward emancipation from a settled normative order. Adorno's notion of autonomy as resistance is enlisted to develop an account of practical reason that is neither institutionally constrained nor without appropriate consideration of the historical location of the practical agent.