Does theory have value in clinical child psychology?

Examines the value and importance of theory in child psychology, particularly with respect to clinical practice. Although it is readily apparent that theory is not an essential element of treatment, the role of theory is to provide a coherent framework for clinical intervention. Theory provides a foundation for understanding the presenting pathology, the factors that affect it, the patient's and therapist's roles within the context of treatment, and the specific intervention strategies to be utilized. Therapeutic commonalities are considered as they may affect treatment outcome, but they are not viewed as the essential factors in efficacy. The value and meaning of eclecticism are also discussed.     

Does the brain calculate value?

How do people choose between options? At one extreme, the 'value-first' view is that the brain computes the value of different options and simply favours options with higher values. An intermediate position, taken by many psychological models of judgment and decision making, is that values are computed but that the resulting choices depend heavily on the context of available options. At the other extreme, the 'comparison-only' view argues that choice depends directly on comparisons, with or even without any intermediate computation of value. In this paper, we place past and current psychological and neuroscientific theories on this spectrum, and review empirical data that have led to an increasing focus on comparison rather than value as the driver of choice.     

Does natural law have non-normative foundations?

This paper addresses one aspect of the natural law theory of Germain Grisez. According to Grisez, practical reason identifies the goods of human life prior to the invocation of any moral or normative notions. It can thus provide a non-normative foundation for moral theory. I present Grisez’s position and argue that the apparently non-normative aspect of natural law cannot support the moral position built upon it. I argue, in particular, that practical principles, as Grisez understands them, are best understood as speech acts. If this is correct, it is possible to develop a sceptical challenge to Grisez’s position. I am grateful to Michael Frede, Robert George, Richard Holton, Philip Pettit, and two anonymous reviewers for many helpful comments on this paper. This paper was presented at a seminar in the Department of Philosophy at Princeton University in November 1987, and I am grateful for the comments I received from the audience—in particular, Germain Grisez—on that occasion.     

Does Octopus vulgaris have preferred arms?

Previous behavioral studies in Octopus vulgaris revealed lateralization of eye use. In this study, the authors expanded the scope to investigate arm preferences. The octopus's generalist hunting lifestyle and the structure of their arms suggest that these animals have no need to designate specific arms for specific tasks. However, octopuses also show behaviors, like exploration, in which only single or small groups of arms are involved. Here the authors show that octopuses had a strong preference for anterior arm use to reach for and explore objects, which points toward a task division between anterior and posterior arms. Four out of 8 subjects also showed a lateral bias. In addition, octopuses had a preference for a specific arm to reach into a T maze to retrieve a food reward. These findings give evidence for limb-specialization in an animal whose 8 arms were believed to be equipotential.     

Does reliabilism have a temporality problem?

Philosophical Studies - Matthew Frise claims that reliabilist theories of justification have a temporality problem—the problem of providing a principled account of the temporal parameters of...     

Does luck have a place in epistemology?

Some epistemologists hold that exploration and elaboration of the nature of luck will allow us to better understand knowledge. I argue this is a mistake.     

Does the human odometer use an extrinsic or intrinsic metric?

It is commonly assumed that path integration is based on an extrinsic measure of the objective distance traversed during locomotion. In contrast, biological odometers may rely on embodied intrinsic measures, such as idiothetic information specific to an action mode. We investigated this question using a distance reproduction task in which participants traveled an outbound distance and then reproduced that distance using the same or a different action mode. The extrinsic model predicted that distance reproduction should be invariant across action modes, whereas the intrinsic model predicted invariance only within an action mode. In Experiment 1, we held the outbound mode constant while varying the response mode (walk–walk, walk–throw) and corrected for response production error (view–walk, view–throw). In Experiment 2, we crossed different gaits in the outbound and response modes (walk, gallop). In both cases, we found that distance reproduction was significantly more accurate when the outbound and response modes matched, consistent with the intrinsic model. The results indicate that the human odometer preferentially relies on an intrinsic, rather than an extrinsic, metric. This solution is sufficient to support successful path integration within an action mode (but not across action modes), without the difficulties of objective distance estimation.     

Does an intrinsic work value orientation strengthen the impact of job resources? A perspective from the Job Demands–Resources Model

Based on assumptions of the Job Demands–Resources model and the Person–Environment fit literature, the present research conceptualizes an intrinsic relative to an extrinsic work value orientation as a personal resource. We examine whether such an orientation may strengthen the relations of classical job resources (i.e., autonomy and learning opportunities) with well-being outcomes. The results in a large, representative sample of Dutch employees (N = 4009) show that a predominant intrinsic work orientation strengthened the negative association of learning opportunities with emotional exhaustion as well as the buffering role of autonomy for the health-impairing impact of workload. With respect to work engagement, a predominant intrinsic work orientation strengthened the positive association of autonomy, the expected boosting impact of workload on the stimulating association of autonomy, as well as the—rather unexpected—attenuating impact of workload on the positive association of learning opportunities with work engagement. Although not all hypotheses were confirmed, in general, results point at the importance and practical relevance of personal resources in the realm of the Job Demands–Resources model.     

Does the Total Principle have any Repugnant Implications?

On the Total Principle, the best state of affairs ( ceteris paribus ) is the one with the greatest net sum of welfare value. Parfit rejects this principle, because he believes that it implies the Repugnant Conclusion, the conclusion that for any large population of people, all with lives well worth living, there will be some much larger population whose existence would be better, even though its members all have lives that are only barely worth living. Recently, however, a number of philosophers have suggested that the Total Principle does not imply the Repugnant Conclusion provided that a certain axiological view (namely, the 'Discontinuity View') is correct. Nevertheless, as I point out, there are three different versions of the Repugnant Conclusion, and it appears that the Total Principle will imply two of the three even if the Discontinuity View is correct. I then go on to argue that one of the two remaining versions turns out not to be repugnant after all. Second, I argue that the last remaining version is not, as it turns out, implied by the Total Principle. Thus, my arguments show that the Total Principle has no repugnant implications.     

Does working memory training have to be adaptive?

This study tested the common assumption that, to be most effective, working memory (WM) training should be adaptive (i.e., task difficulty is adjusted to individual performance). Indirect evidence for this assumption stems from studies comparing adaptive training to a condition in which tasks are practiced on the easiest level of difficulty only [cf. Klingberg (Trends Cogn Sci 14:317–324, 2010)], thereby, however, confounding adaptivity and exposure to varying task difficulty. For a more direct test of this hypothesis, we randomly assigned 130 young adults to one of the three WM training procedures (adaptive, randomized, or self-selected change in training task difficulty) or to an active control group. Despite large performance increases in the trained WM tasks, we observed neither transfer to untrained structurally dissimilar WM tasks nor far transfer to reasoning. Surprisingly, neither training nor transfer effects were modulated by training procedure, indicating that exposure to varying levels of task difficulty is sufficient for inducing training gains.     

Anagram solving: Does effort have an effect?

The purpose of these studies was to explore the role of effort in remembering anagrams and their solutions. In Experiment 1, we compared the effects on memory of copying words, typing them as solutions for easy anagrams, or typing them as solutions for difficult anagrams. Solving anagrams involved more effort than did simply typing words, as indexed by response time. However, this effort facilitated recall for solutions to easy anagrams but not for solutions to difficult anagrams. In Experiment 2, we compared memory for anagrams and their solutions using a frequency-judgment task. Memory for solutions was better than memory for anagrams, and this difference was not affected by anagram difficulty. The results of these studies have implications for our understanding of the role of effort in remembering.     

Does the repugnant conclusion have any probative force?

In engaging with the repugnant conclusion many contemporary philosophers, economists and social scientists make claims about what a minimally good life is like. For example, some claim that such a life is quite good by contemporary standards, and use this to defend classical utilitarianism, whereas others claim that it is not, and use this to uphold the challenge that the repugnant conclusion poses to classical utilitarianism. I argue that many of these claims—by both sides—are not well-founded. We have no sufficiently clear sense of what a minimally good life is like. It is a result of this that the repugnant conclusion doesn’t license us in drawing any interesting conclusions.     

Does Han Fei have a conception of justice?

Han Fei’s political theory is widely characterized as eschewing any connection with morality; so, can he have any conception of justice? In this paper, I accept the interpretation of Han Fei jettisoning any moral commitment, but I argue that he gives heed to an understanding of justice. This conception of justice arises naturally from the ordinary human sentiment of resentment for wrongs done and becomes a moral staple in the consciousness of ordinary people. Such a conception of justice has these features: all and only the guilty receive punishment, and the punishments are in some sense proportionate to the crime. Since disregarding this popular conception of justice results in resentment and political instability, Han Fei, without any moral commitment to it, accepts the popular conception of justice on prudential and consequentialist grounds.     

Does the autistic child have a metarepresentational deficit?

This study examines the claim that autistic children lack a “theory of mind” because of an inability to metarepresent. We argue that if autistic children have a “metarepresentational” deficit in Leslie's (1987, 1988) sense of the term, then they should have difficulty not only with mental representations such as false beliefs, but also with external representations such as photographs. Autistic children's understanding of photographic representations was tested using Zaitchik's (1990) task. This task is modelled on the false belief task (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985: Wimmer & Perner, 1983) but involves “false” photographs where a photographic representation does not conform with the current state of the real world. Like Zaitchik (1990) we found that normal 3 and 4-year-olds found this task as difficult as the false belief task. In sharp contrast, however, the autistic children in our study passed the photograph task but failed the false belief task. As both tasks require the ability to decouple, this evidence challenges the view that autistic children lack “metarepresentational” ability in Leslie's sense. However, the results leave open the question of whether autistic children have a metarepresentational ability in the different sense of the term intended by Pylyshyn (1978), that is, representing the relationship between a representation and what it represents.     

Does visual short-term memory have a high-capacity stage?

Visual short-term memory (VSTM) has long been considered a durable, limited-capacity system for the brief retention of visual information. However, a recent work by Sligte et al. (Plos One 3:e1699, 2008) reported that, relatively early after the removal of a memory array, a cue allowed participants to access a fragile, high-capacity stage of VSTM that is distinct from iconic memory. In the present study, we examined whether this stage division is warranted by attempting to corroborate the existence of an early, high-capacity form of VSTM. The results of four experiments did not support Sligte et al.’s claim, since we did not obtain evidence for VSTM retention that exceeded traditional estimates of capacity. However, performance approaching that observed in Sligte et al. can be achieved through extensive practice, providing a clear explanation for their findings. Our evidence favors the standard view of VSTM as a limited-capacity system that maintains a few object representations in a relatively durable form.     

Are shapes intrinsic?

It is widely believed that shapes are intrinsic properties. But this claim is hard to defend. I survey all known theories of shape properties, and argue that each theory is either incompatible with the claim that shapes are intrinsic, or can be shown to be false.