Conventional Fouls - A Note on Strategic Fouls

ABSTRACT

Strategic fouls (SF) are intentional violations of the rules ‘in which the violator expects to be detected and penalized but expects some benefit to his or her competitive effectiveness’ (Fraleigh 2003, 169). Sometimes SF are widely viewed within a playing practice as acceptable—possibly as legitimate prices) e.g. stopping the clock in Basketball). In other instances, they are considered illegitimate (e.g., handling the ball to prevent a goal in dying minutes of a football match). And of course sometimes the issue is contested (e.g., fouling to stop a counterattack in football). My aim is to defend Converionalsim: Conventionalism: SF of a certain type in a particular sport is justifiable if there is a legitimate agreement or a convention according to which it is legitimate. Simply put, Conventionalism means that stopping the clock in Basketball is justified because there is a convention that it is legitimate. After briefly setting out the initial case in favor of conventionalism, I will utilize some prominent discussions of SF to challenge Conventionalism, and will offer a response to these challenges.     

Video Game Violence and the Female Game Player: Self‐ and Opponent Gender Effects on Presence and Aggressive Thoughts

Adding depth and breadth to the general aggression model, this paper presents three experiments that test the relationships among user and opponent gender representation, opponent type, presence, and aggressive thoughts from violent video game play. Studies 1 and 2 suggest that females experience greater presence and more aggressive thoughts from game play when a gender match between self and game character exists. Studies 2 and 3 indicate that playing against a human opponent (rather than a computer) increases aggressive thoughts. Finally, although Studies 1, 2, and 3 indicate that playing as a female against a male opponent increases aggressive thoughts, Studies 1 and 2 suggest that playing as a male against a female opponent consistently and significantly decreases aggressive thoughts.     

Strategic Intentional Fouls,Spoiling The Game and Gamesmanship

The analysis of so-called ‘strategic intentional fouls’ (SIF) as well as the discussion of their validity in the normative systems of sports have a long track record. These fouls can be characterised as rule violations committed in order to be detected and which accept the corresponding sanction. However, there is an additional goal of obtaining an advantage or subsequent benefit in the competition. In fact, this practice is not infrequent and it is even occasionally accepted by the players themselves, referees, judges, sports authorities and spectators. In this work I have analysed the internal structure of SIFs (the features of an axiological gap and a ‘special intention’) with a view to providing a deeper understanding and stressing the differences with closely related concepts: cheating, and especially fraus legis or what in Anglo-Saxon culture is called ‘spoiling the game’. Finally, I try to show some difficulties in distinguishing SIF from gamesmanship.     

Criticism in Need of Clarification

It furthers the dialectic when the opponent is clear about what motivates and underlies her critical stance, even if she does not adopt an opposite standpoint, but merely doubts the proponent’s opinion. Thus, there is some kind of burden of criticism. In some situations, there should an obligation for the opponent to offer explanatory counterconsiderations, if requested, whereas in others, there is no real dialectical obligation, but a mere responsibility for the opponent to cooperate by providing her motivations for being critical. In this paper, it will be shown how a set of dialogue rules may encourage an opponent, in this latter type of situation, to provide her counterconsiderations, and to do so at an appropriate level of specificity. Special attention will be paid to the desired level of specificity. For example, the critic may challenge a thesis by saying “Why? Says who?,” without conveying whether she could be convinced by an argument from expert opinion, or from position to know, or from popular opinion. What are fair dialogue rules for dealing with less than fully specific criticism?     

Games,Rules, and Practices

We present and defend a view labeled “practiceism” which provides a solution to the incompatibility problems. The classic incompatibility problem is inconsistency of: 1. Someone who intentionally violates the rules of a game is not playing the game.

2. In many cases, players intentionally violate the rules as part of playing the game (e.g. fouling to stop the clock in basketball).

The problem has a normative counterpart: 1’. In normal cases, it is wrong for a player to intentionally violate the rules of the game.

2’. In many normal cases, it is not wrong for a player to intentionally violate the rules of the game (e.g. fouling to stop the clock in basketball).

According to both formalism and informalism, the rules of the game include the formal rules of the game. Both traditional positions avoid the incompatibility problems by rejecting 1 and 1'. Practiceism rejects 2 and 2’: it maintains that the rules are the rules manifested in playing the game, not the formal rules.

Practiceism presents two theses: (a) the real rules of the game are the rules players follow: the practice determines the rules, and not vice versa. (b) the (first order) rules of a game determine what is legitimate within the game.     

Consequences of Politicians’ Disrespectful Communication Depend on Social Judgment Dimensions and Voters’ Moral Identity

The present study investigates the consequences of respectful versus disrespectful communication in political debates on voters’ social judgments and voting decisions. Reconciling previously mixed results, we argue that the consequences of disrespect vary with the judgment dimension (communion vs. agency) and voters’ moral identity. An initial study (N = 197) finds that a political candidate's disrespect towards his or her opponent affects voting decision through voting intention. A second study (N = 327) shows that disrespect influences voting intention through communion but not through agency ratings. Qualifying the previous finding, a third study (N = 329) shows that both communion and agency judgments act as mediators, but in different ways depending on the level of moral identity. Overall, communion judgments played a more prominent part in explaining the consequences of disrespectful communication. Our findings thus present a nuanced picture of respect and disrespect in political communication and shed light on their ramifications.     

Normativity and context in young children's pretend play

In two studies 3-year-olds’ understanding of the context-specificity of normative rules was investigated through games of pretend play. In the first study, children protested against a character who joined a pretend game but treated the target object according to its real function. However, they did not protest when she performed the same action without having first joined the game. In the second study, children protested when the character mixed up an object's pretend identities between two different pretend games. However, they did not protest when she performed the same pretend action in its correct game context. Thus, the studies show that young children see the pretence–reality distinction, and the distinction between different pretence identities, as normative. More generally, the results of these studies demonstrate young children's ability to enforce normative rules in their pretence and to do so context-specifically.     

To Have–or Not to Have–Another Child: Family Planning Attitudes,Intentions, and Behavior1

Two hundred eighty-two respondents, representing 141 married couples with either one child (N= 71 couples) or two children (N= 70 couples), were interviewed about their considerations and intentions regarding whether or not to have another child. Reports of their actual subsequent family planning behavior were obtained 12 months later via a mailed questionnaire. The data was gathered and analyzed according to Fishbein's attitude-behavior model which stipulates that the individual's actual behavior is a function of one's behavioral intention. This intention, in turn, is determined by two multiple factors: (a) the individual's beliefs about the consequences of performing the behavior multiplied by his/her evaluation of those consequences, and (b) one's normative beliefs multiplied by one's motivation to comply with the perceived norms. The results provided substantial support for the model; both behavioral intention and actual behavior were successfully predicted from the attitudinal and normative components of the model. It was also shown that the behavioral intention mediates the relationship between the model's attitudinal and normative components and actual behavior.     

The relation between the sense of agency and the experience of flow

This article investigates the relation between people’s feelings of agency and their feelings of flow. In the dominant model describing how people are able to assess their own agency—the comparator model of agency—when the person’s intentions match perfectly to what happens, the discrepancy between intention and outcome is zero, and the person is thought to interpret this lack of discrepancy as being in control. The lack of perceived push back from the external world seems remarkably similar to the state that has been described as a state of flow. However, when we used a computer game paradigm to investigate the relation between people’s feelings of agency and their feelings of flow, we found a dissociation between these two states. Although these two states may, in some ways, seem to be similar, our data indicate that they are governed by different principles and phenomenology.     

Play as co‐created narrative in computer game consumption: The hero's journey in Warcraft III

Computer games are now a significant consumption activity in consumer culture. Informed by interdisciplinary studies and drawing on data from in‐depth interviews with players of the Warcraft III computer game, we explore the relationship between play and storytelling during digital play. Understanding that such play is determined by systems of game rules and that computer game characters and settings are capable of conveying cultural meanings to players, we found that the rules of play in computer games can be designed in ways that encourage consumers to co‐create meaningful story plots derived from their knowledge of myth and fiction. In the case of Warcraft, these plots resembled the archetypal plot of the hero's journey. We conclude that computer games immerse consumers in a form of playful consumption that engages them in memorialised, co‐authored storytelling. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

From reasonable preferences,via argumentation,to logic

This article demonstrates that typical restrictions which are imposed in dialogical logic in order to recover first-order logical consequence from a fragment of natural language argumentation are also forthcoming from preference profiles of boundedly rational players, provided that these players instantiate a specific player type and compute partial strategies. We present two structural rules, which are formulated similarly to closure rules for tableaux proofs that restrict players' strategies to a mapping between games in extensive forms (i.e., game trees) and proof trees. Both rules are motivated from players' preferences and limitations; they can therefore be viewed as being player-self-imposable. First-order logical consequence is thus shown to result from playing a specific type of argumentation game. The alignment of such games with the normative model of the Pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation is positively evaluated. But explicit rules to guarantee that the argumentation game instantiates first-order logical consequence have now become gratuitous, since their normative content arises directly from players' preferences and limitations. A similar naturalization for non-classical logics is discussed.     

Rule utilitarianism and decision theory

The purpose of this paper is to show how some of the controversial questions concerning utilitarianism can be clarified by the modelling techniques and the other analytical tools of decision theory (and, sometimes, of game theory). It is suggested that the moral rules of utilitarian ethics have a logical status similar to that of the normative rules (theorems) of such formal normative disciplines as decision theory and game theory.The paper argues that social utility should be defined, not in hedonistic or in ideal-utilitarian terms, but rather in terms of individual preferences, in accordance with the author's equiprobability model of moral value judgments.After describing the difficulties of act utilitarianism, rule utilitarianism is discussed as a possibly superior alternative. Brandt and Lyons have tried to show that these two forms of utilitarianism are actually equivalent. To test Brandt's and Lyons's equivalence thesis, a decision-theoretical model for utilitarian theory is proposed. The model shows that the thesis is definitely false. The basic difference between the two theories results from the expectation effect and the incentive effect, which, surprisingly enough, have been almost completely neglected in the philosophical literature. The paper illustrates these two effects in connection with the moral duty of promise keeping.Yet, even if we do neglect the expectation and the incentive effects, and concentrate on the coordination effect, as most of the philosophical literature does, it can be shown that rule utilitarianism and act utilitarianism have very different practical implications. This is demonstrated by analysis of three voting situations. Hence, the equivalence thesis fails even under the assumptions most favorable to it.     

The Burden of Criticism: Consequences of Taking a Critical Stance

Some critical reactions hardly give clues to the arguer as to how to respond to them convincingly. Other critical reactions convey some or even all of the considerations that make the critic critical of the arguer’s position and direct the arguer to defuse or to at least contend with them. First, an explication of the notion of a critical reaction will be provided, zooming in on the degree of “directiveness” that a critical reaction displays. Second, it will be examined whether there are normative requirements that enhance the directiveness of criticism. Does the opponent have in circumstances a dialectical obligation to provide clarifications, explanations, or even arguments? In this paper, it is hypothesized that the competitiveness inherent in critical discussion must be mitigated by making the opponent responsible for providing her counterconsiderations, if available, thus assisting the proponent in developing an argumentative strategy that defuses them.     

Real rules

Wright is correct in surmising that Wittgenstein’s refusal to be drawn into the metaphysical and epistemological questions that his own discussion of rules allegedly raises results from his rejection of the assumptions that pit the Platonist against the communitarian. This paper shows why the entire idea (which continues to dazzle philosophers)—that in speaking a language or in engaging in other normative practices we are operating a calculus according to strict rules—has to be rejected. It results, in part, from the conflation of different understandings of ‘knowing the rules’: one in which rules can be ‘read off’ from the practice by a theorist and those in which expressions of rules are consulted within the course of the practice.     

Acting rightly: Three dimensions of moral conduct

Philosophical literature in normative ethics has tended to concentrate on (1) what we should do—what acts we should perform—or (2) virtues of character, understood as leading to the right deeds or (3), as most notable in Kant, the importance of motivation appraising agents and actions. All these elements—actions, virtues, and motives—are ethically significant. But there is a dimension of moral responsibility that should be given a place beside obligations to act, virtues of character, and appraisability of actions in relation to their motivation. It is the manner in which actions are performed. This can be right or wrong, an object of intention, and behavior for a reason; and it is important for assessing moral virtue. This paper explores manners of action, shows why they apparently do not reduce to kinds of actions, and proposes an account of their importance. The result is a wider conception of acting rightly than the common understanding on which it simply doing the right thing, a partial account of how acting rightly figures in the content of intention, and a sketch of the moral dimensions of the manners in which we act.     

Accepting Forgiveness

Forgiving wrongdoers who neither apologized, nor sought to make amends in any way, is controversial. Even defenders of the practice agree with critics that such “unilateral” forgiveness involves giving up on the meaningful redress that victims otherwise justifiably demand from their wrongdoers: apology, reparations, repentance, and so on. Against that view, I argue here that when a victim of wrongdoing sets out to grant forgiveness to her offender, and he in turn accepts her forgiveness, he thereby serves some important ends of apology and reparation, no matter what else he did—or did not do—by way of repair. Although much overlooked, the simple act of accepting forgiveness joins victim and offender in affirming and acting upon some important shared background assumptions, including many of those expressed in standard apologies. Perhaps more surprisingly, I argue that accepting forgiveness also fulfills the duty to counteract any concrete harm wrongfully inflicted. The argument helps explain some otherwise puzzling features of forgiveness, including that a victim can change her offender’s normative status, making him a less fitting target of the resentment, indignation and shunning of others, and even his own guilt pangs, simply by forgiving him.

     

Socially Constructed Technology

The concepts of omniscience and omnipotence are defined in 2 × 2 ordinal games, and implications for the optimal play of these games, when one player is omniscient or omnipotent and the other player is aware of his omniscience or omnipotence, are derived. Intuitively, omniscience allows a player to predict the strategy choice of an opponent in advance of play, and omnipotence allows a player, after initial strategy choices are made, to continue to move after the other player is forced to stop. Omniscience and its awareness by an opponent may hurt both players, but this problem can always be rectified if the other player is omniscient. This pathology can also be rectified if at least one of the two players is omnipotent, which can override the effects of omniscience. In some games, one player's omnipotence ‐ versus the other's ‐ helps him, whereas in other games the outcome induced does not depend on which player is omnipotent. Deducing whether a player is superior (omniscient or omnipotent) from the nature of his game playing alone raises several problems, however, suggesting the difficulty of devising tests for detecting superior ability in games.     

The ‘Enforcer’ in Elite-Level Sport: A Conceptual Critique

The role of the ‘enforcer’ in elite-level sports contests is a familiar one. Simply, the role involves establishing or restoring a ‘moral balance’ to the sporting encounter when it is absent – usually when match officials are thought to be failing to apply the laws/rules of the game. How the enforcer secures this outcome is more morally contentious as it may involve deliberate violations of the laws/rules of the sport. In this paper we consider the role of the enforcer in rugby union. First we interrogate some of the extant sports ethics literature and explore the notion of ‘fairness’ in the well-played game, including the role of the enforcer. Second, we illustrate conceptually how the ethos of elite sport as a moral discourse creates a theoretical platform from which to assess the intervention of an enforcer. Third, we address the role of match officials as members of the practice community from an institutional sense (what the international governing body for rugby union makes explicit) and from an empirical sense (what actually occurs or might occur) in the circumstances that precipitate the intervention of ‘enforcers’. We conclude that the conceptual tension between the laws and the spirit (ethos) of the game is reflected in the choices facing players when playing the game.     

Cultural Property, Restitution and Value

abstract Demands for restitution of cultural artefacts and relics raise four main issues: 1) how claims to cultural property can be justified; 2) whether and under what conditions demands for restitution of cultural property are valid — especially when they are made long after the artefacts were taken away; 3) whether there are values, aesthetic, scholarly and educational, which can override restitution claims, even when these claims are legitimate; and 4) how these values bear on the question of whether artefacts should be returned to their place of origin. I argue that a proper conception of cultural property emphasises the role that artefacts play in the practices and traditions of a collectivity. On the basis of this conception, some restitution claims can be defended as legitimate. However, many demands for restitution are not justified (including the Greek claim to the Parthenon Marbles). Moreover, a case for restitution can be more or less strong, and other considerations sometimes prevail over rights of cultural property.