生殖细胞基因增强技术的伦理争议与对策

分析生殖细胞基因增强的概念,论述支持和反对生殖细胞基因增强的理由,初步探讨伦理学对策.在人类理性的指引下,生殖细胞基因增强能够成为造福人类的有力武器.     

A Draft Model Aggregated Code of Ethics for Bioethicists

Bioethicists function in an environment in which their peers—healthcare executives, lawyers, nurses, physicians—assert the integrity of their fields through codes of professional ethics. Is it time for bioethics to assert its integrity by developing a code of ethics? Answering in the affirmative, this paper lays out a case by reviewing the historical nature and function of professional codes of ethics. Arguing that professional codes are aggregative enterprises growing in response to a field's historical experiences, it asserts that bioethics now needs to assert its integrity and independence and has already developed a body of formal statements that could be aggregated to create a comprehensive code of ethics for bioethics. A Draft Model Aggregated Code of Ethics for Bioethicists is offered in the hope that analysis and criticism of this draft code will promote further discussion of the nature and content of a code of ethics for bioethicists.     

A League of Their Own? Evaluating Justifications for The Division of Sport into ‘Enhanced’ and ‘Unenhanced’ Leagues

Cheating through the use of illegal performance enhancements (such as doping) is a persistent problem in sport. It has been suggested that one response to this problem is to separate sport into two parallel leagues. One league would resemble sport as it is currently practised – i.e. with restrictions on use of particular enhancements – and the other would not possess these restrictions, allowing those that wish to use currently illegal enhancements to do so. In this paper I articulate the ‘two leagues’ proposal further and subject it to critical scrutiny. The proposal fails. It does so by failing to address conceptual confusion regarding enhancement use in sport; by replicating in the new league the current problems associated with enhancement-based cheating; and by creating new problems. In an attempt to revive it I describe other possible justifications for the proposal, based on its promotion of personal autonomy, and rights-based justifications. These fail, with the exception of a group right claiming provision of the enhanced league as a participatory good. I conclude that this latter use of the proposal is the only sensible one, but it nevertheless faces significant obstacles.     

Gene therapy: ethical issues

To discern the ethical issues involved incurrent gene therapy research, to explore theproblems inherent in possible future genetherapies, and to encourage debate within thescientific community about ethical questionsrelevant to both, we surveyed American Societyof Human Genetics scientists who engage inhuman genetics research. This study of theopinions of U.S. scientific experts about theethical issues discussed in the literature ongene therapy contributes systematic data on theattitudes of those working in the field as wellas elaborative comments. Our survey finds thatrespondents are highly supportive of thepotential use of somatic cell gene therapy tocure serious diseases in adults and children aswell as prospective offspring. A clearmajority, however, believe that using suchgenetic techniques for enhancement purposes isunacceptable. Delineating the line betweendisease/disorder and improvement/enhancementposes a problem not easily resolved and oneconducive to the growth of slippery-slopeapprehensions. The majority of respondents alsoadvocate germ-line therapy, in theory at least,and under similar restrictions, but theyrecognize the roadblock that the existence ofunanticipated negative consequences currentlypresents. Another complex matter involvestrying to determine appropriate reasons forchoosing target diseases for research, forwhich the dichotomy between rare single-geneand common multifactorial diseases reveals anongoing dilemma.     

系统视角下致癌基因与遗传背景的相互作用

肿瘤是当今人类生命健康的主要威胁之一。致癌基因与遗传背景和肿瘤的形成有密切关系。致癌基因与遗传背景,致癌基因与抗癌基因之间的时空结构和非线性作用都有可能使正常细胞恶变,导致肿瘤的形成。致癌基因与遗传背景实际上构成了细胞中的一个完整的遗传系统。本文试图用系统方法探讨两者的相互作用,以便更好地探讨肿瘤发生的机理和治疗手段。     

Responsibility and the shallow self

Contemporary philosophers of moral responsibility are in widespread agreement that we can only be blamed for actions that express, reflect, or disclose something about us or the quality of our wills. In this paper I reject that thesis and argue that self disclosure is not a necessary condition on moral responsibility and blameworthiness: reactive responses ranging from aretaic appraisals all the way to outbursts of anger and resentment can be morally justified even when the blamed agent’s action expresses or discloses nothing significant about his or her “deep self,” judgments and cares, or the quality of his or her will. I argue that the self-disclosure requirement on responsibility overestimates the extent to which our blaming practices and responsibility judgments are responsive to agents as opposed to actions, and that this mistake has the potential to distort both our reactive responses and our understanding of blamed agents’ characters.     

Responsibility and the Kinds of Freedom

In this paper I seek to identify different sorts of freedom putatively linked to moral responsibility; I then explore the relationship between such notions of freedom and the Consequence Argument, on the one hand, and the Frankfurt-examples, on the other. I focus (in part) on a dilemma: if a compatibilist adopts a broadly speaking “conditional” understanding of freedom in reply to the Consequence Argument, such a theorist becomes vulnerable in a salient way to the Frankfurt-examples.     

Sport,nature and worldmaking

Many philosophers of sport maintain that athletics can contribute to our understanding of ourselves and the environments in which we live. It may be relatively easy to offer accounts of how athletes might acquire self-knowledge through sport; however, it is far more difficult to see how sport could add to the general understanding of human individuals, cultural frameworks or the material world. The study of sport as a way of worldmaking is helpful in understanding how sport can contribute to the pursuit of knowledge in such areas.

The position I present is based on arguments made by Gunter Gebauer in his 1993 presidential address to the Philosophic Society for the Study of Sport, ‘Sport, theater, and ritual: Three ways of worldmaking’, and in my explanation and interpretation of Gebauer's position, I rely heavily on Nelson Goodman's Ways of worldmaking. Gebauer's work is focused on traditional sports, and he argues that such sports create worlds that represent fundamental attitudes and values of the cultures that produce them. I argue that alternative sports are well suited to create new and original worlds that instantiate value systems in opposition to mainstream culture. I argue further that nature sports such as climbing and surfing represent relationships between humans and natural features, and that such sports, as a subcategory of alternative sports, are in a position to create new and original frameworks that can help us to better comprehend our relationships with natural environments.     

Negotiating Responsibility: Case Studies of Reproductive Decision-Making and Prenatal Genetic Testing in Families Facing Huntington Disease

Three case studies are presented to further our understanding of how responsibility is negotiated in families when making decisions about genetic risk. These draw on a model of responsibility generated in a study of reproductive decision-making in families facing Huntington disease (HD) to illustrate the impact of prenatal testing on this process. This involves analyzing: how people present themselves as acting responsibly whether or not they utilize genetic testing; who they feel responsible to in their family and elsewhere; the impact that testing has on these relationships; and, how negotiating responsibility changes over time with repeated use of prenatal testing, changing risk status and maturational changes. Two key findings are: how decision-making is perceived can become as important as what is decided; and, how responsibility is negotiated depends on which of these relationships are prioritized. Implications of the findings for clinical practice are noted and suggestions made for further applications of the model.     

Martin in the Field

Martin Strel, a Slovenian hero, swam all 3004 km of Danube in 200, and Mississippi in 2002, to become one of nominees for the sportsperson of the year award. Surprisingly, an orchestrated attack on his status as a sportsperson and on status of his achievements as sport records followed successfully. Martin did not get the award. He continued with his activities, swimming Parana, Jang Tse, and Amazonas lately, but was never mentioned in sport context again. This case is examined to show how definition struggles serve to strengthen the border control between sport as such, and its internationally institutionalised realm. To make a comparison, the case of art and its definition is mentioned. Martin Strel did not endanger sport, being a false pretender on sport-status, but he endangered sport management and sport business. He was thrown out of the “sport city”, to swim “extra portes” and to inhabit a place where sport as “esportes” originally belonges.     

Egalitarianism and Responsibility

This essay examines several possible rationales for the egalitarian judgment that justice requires better-off individuals to help those who are worse off even in the absence of social interaction. These rationales include equality (everyone should enjoy the same level of benefits), moral meritocracy (each should get benefits according to her responsibility or deservingness), the threshold of sufficiency (each should be assured a minimally decent quality of life), prioritarianism (a function of benefits to individuals should be maximized that gives priority to the worse off), and mixed views. A case is made for adopting either prioritarianism or a mixed view that gives priority both to the worse off and to the more responsible and deserving.     

Responsibility and Manipulation

I address various critiques of the approach to moral responsibility sketched in previous work by Ravizza and Fischer. I especially focus on the key issues pertaining to manipulation. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Blame and Responsibility

This paper looks at judgments of guilt in the face of alleged wrong-doing, be it in public or in private discourse. Its concern is not the truth of such judgments, although the complexity and contestability of such claims will be stressed. The topic, instead, is what sort of activities we are engaged in, when we make our judgments on others' conduct. To examine judging as an activity it focuses on a series of problems that can occur when we blame others. On analysis, we see that these problems take the form of performative contradictions, so that the ostensible purposes of assigning guilt to others are undermined.There is clear evidence from social psychology that blame is especially frequently and inappropriately attributed to individuals in modern Western societies. On the other hand, it has often been observed how suspicious we are about the activity of judging – thus a widespread perception that a refusal to judge is somehow virtuous. My suggestion is that the sheer difficulty of attributions of responsibility, in the face of a complex and often arbitrary moral reality, frequently defeats us. This leads to a characteristic set of distortions when we blame, so that it is no surprise that we have become suspicious of all blaming activities.Yet, the paper argues, these problems need not arise when we hold others responsible. This paper therefore investigates what, exactly, can be questionable about attempts to assign guilt, and the structural logic that lies behind these problems – what will be called, adapting a term from social psychology, a belief in a just world. Such a belief takes for granted what needs to be worked for through human activity, and therefore tends to be counter-productive in dealing with misdeeds and adverse outcomes.     

Responsibility and Planning

We are planning agents and we are, or so we suppose, responsible agents. How are these two distinctive aspects of our agency related? In his "Freedom and Resentment" Peter Strawson understands responsible agency in terms of "reactive attitudes" like resentment and gratitude, attitudes which are normally embedded in "ordinary inter-personal relationships." I draw on Strawson's account to sketch an answer to my question about responsibility and planning. First, the fact that an action is plan-embedded can influence the agent's degree of culpability for that action; for such embeddings can constitute or indicate important facts about the quality of the agent's will. Second, general planning incapacities can to some extent exempt an agent from normal judgments of responsibility. My argument for this second claim appeals to the normal roles of planning in "ordinary inter-personal relationships."     

Responsibility and Self-Expression

I present two different models of moral responsibility -- two different accounts of what we value in behavior for which the agent can legitimately be held morally responsible. On the first model, what we value is making a certain sort of difference to the world. On the second model, which I favor, we value a certain kind of self-expression. I argue that if one adopts the self-expression view, then one will be inclined to accept that moral responsibility need not require alternative possibilities.