Realization and the metaphysics of mind1

According to a familiar view in philosophy of mind, mental states or properties are realized by physical states or properties but are not identical to them. This view is often called realization physicalism. But what is realization? I argue that recent approaches to realization, represented by Carl Gillett's ‘dimensioned’ view, fail to acknowledge some textbook cases of realization. I also argue Gillett's account in particular admits realization relations that should not count if realization physicalism is to be distinguished from its competitors in the usual ways. I offer my own account of realization, and argue that it is superior not only in passing the above tests but also in its utility for answering questions about multiple realizability.     

Extended cognition and the metaphysics of mind

This paper explores the relationship between several ideas about the mind and cognition. The hypothesis of extended cognition claims that cognitive processes can and do extend outside the head, that elements of the world around us can actually become parts of our cognitive systems. It has recently been suggested that the hypothesis of extended cognition is entailed by one of the foremost philosophical positions on the nature of the mind: functionalism, the thesis that mental states are defined by their functional relations rather than by their physical constituents. Furthermore, it has been claimed that functionalism entails a version of extended cognition which is sufficiently radical as to be obviously false. I survey the debate and propose several ways of avoiding this conclusion, emphasizing the importance of distinguishing the hypothesis of extended cognition from the related notion of the extended mind.     

The feeling of choosing: Self-involvement and the cognitive status of things past

Previous research has demonstrated that self-involvement enhances the memorability of information (i.e., self>other) encountered in the past. The emergence of this effect, however, is dependent on guided evaluative processing and the explicit association of items with self. It remains to be seen, therefore, whether self-memory effects would emerge in task contexts characterized by incidental-encoding and minimal self-involvement. Integrating insights from work on source monitoring and action recognition, we hypothesized that the effects of self-involvement on memory function may be moderated by the extent to which encoding experiences entail volitional (i.e., choice-based) processing. The results of three experiments supported this prediction. Despite the adoption of an incidental task context and stimulus materials that were inconsequential to participants, the act of selection enhanced the memorability and accessibility of information. The implications of these findings for contemporary treatments of self are considered.     

Sociologizing metaphysics and mind: A pragmatist point of view on the methodology of the social sciences

There are realist philosophers and social scientists who believe in the indispensability of social ontology. However, we argue that certain pragmatist outlines for inquiry open more fruitful roads to empirical research than such ontologizing perspectives. The pragmatist conceptual tools in a Darwinian vein—concepts like action, habit, coping and community—are in a particularly stark contrast with, for instance, the Searlean and Chomskian metaphysics of human being. In particular, we bring Searle’s realist philosophy of society and mind under critical survey in this paper and contrast it with a pragmatist, sociologizing approach. Drawing from Dewey, James, and recent antirepresentationalism, we propose for research work a methodological relationalism of its own kind, altogether detached from the ontologies of society and mind.

Individuals: an essay in revisionary metaphysics

We naturally think of the material world as being populated by a large number of individuals. These are things, such as my laptop and the particles that compose it, that we describe as being propertied and related in various ways when we describe the material world around us. In this paper I argue that, fundamentally speaking at least, there are no such things as material individuals. I then propose and defend an individual-less view of the material world I call “generalism”.

道、器、形之问中西哲学形而上学的通汇

器是物自身,形是人心对器的感知,而道又是对形的抽象提升。形在道、器之间,形的存在与意义常被人们所忽略。器、道、形三者之外还有一个“心”字,最为重要,是构成世界、组建社会存在的基础与前提。但它与器是永远有隔的。器是人心的界限。作为最凝练、最具有概括性的道学,哲学不关乎器,至少不直接与器相联系,而只是对关于器的所有道学的再度总结。科学直接关乎对象,而哲学则是最高程度的形而上,始终与对象保持一定距离。最严肃、最艰苦而又最具有征服力的哲学追求一定是指向本体之物(器)的。“物是什么”不可问,“哲学是什么”也不可答。问不可问之问,说不可说之说,把哲学推向其本身永远无法企及的境地,这是哲学家永远不可超越的游戏。     

道、器、形之间--中西哲学形而上学的通汇

器是物自身,形是人心对器的感知,而道又是对形的抽象提升.形在道、器之间,形的存在与意义常被人们所忽略.器、道、形三者之外还有一个"心"字,最为重要,是构成世界、组建社会存在的基础与前提.但它与器是永远有隔的.器是人心的界限.作为最凝练、最具有概括性的道学,哲学不关乎器,至少不直接与器相联系,而只是对关于器的所有道学的再度总结.科学直接关乎对象,而哲学则是最高程度的形而上,始终与对象保持一定距离.最严肃、最艰苦而又最具有征服力的哲学追求一定是指向本体之物(器)的."物是什么"不可问,"哲学是什么"也不可答.问不可问之问,说不可说之说,把哲学推向其本身永远无法企及的境地,这是哲学家永远不可超越的游戏.     

Beyond the group mind: a quantitative review of the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect

This quantitative review of 130 comparisons of interindividual and intergroup interactions in the context of mixed-motive situations reveals that intergroup interactions are generally more competitive than interindividual interactions. The authors identify 4 moderators of this interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect, each based on the theoretical perspective that the discontinuity effect flows from greater fear and greed in intergroup relative to interindividual interactions. Results reveal that each moderator shares a unique association with the magnitude of the discontinuity effect. The discontinuity effect is larger when (a) participants interact with an opponent whose behavior is unconstrained by the experimenter or constrained by the experimenter to be cooperative rather than constrained by the experimenter to be reciprocal, (b) group members make a group decision rather than individual decisions, (c) unconstrained communication between participants is present rather than absent, and (d) conflict of interest is severe rather than mild.     

Putting psychology before metaphysics in moral responsibility: Reactive attitudes and a “gut feeling” that can trigger and justify them

ABSTRACT

In “Freedom and Resentment,” P.F. Strawson argues that since the reactive attitudes are psychologically unavoidable, they do not stand in need of justification from philosophical theorizing about the metaphysical conditions necessary for free action. After reviewing and criticizing this line of argument, we develop an alternative account of how the reactive attitudes can be justified through a feature of our psychology. This new account focuses upon a collection of cognitive mechanisms identified by cognitive neuroscience, which recognize human beings (and other minded beings) and which also give rise to a gut feeling that certain entities are possible targets for the reactive attitudes. By focusing on the justificatory power of this gut feeling, we arrive at an account of moral responsibility that places psychology before metaphysics in a manner broadly similar to Strawson’s original account, but in a way that avoids some of the shortcomings of that account.     

Pluralistic folk psychology and varieties of self-knowledge: an exploration

Turning the techniques we use to understand other people onto ourselves can provide an insight into the types of self-knowledge that may be possible for us. Adopting Pluralistic Folk Psychology, according to which we understand others not primarily by thinking about invisible beliefs and desires that cause behavior, but instead by modeling others as people - with rich characters, relationships, past histories, cultural embeddedness, personality traits, and so forth. A preliminary investigation shows that we understand ourselves at least in terms of our phenomenal states, informational states, perceptual states, traits, desires, and beliefs. I then appeal to empirical research to examine the accuracy of our sense of self-understanding in these ways, and argue that these are often non-veridical. Moreover, in our folk practices, we do not take our statements of self-understanding as infallible, but we allow others to help us see ourselves. While there is room for some improvement in our acurarcy, I conclude that our sense of self is largely a joint construct of self and others, and that looping effects play a significant role in what one’s self turns out to be. The self is a fluid thing that we are constantly creating through our actions and self-constituting thoughts, but it is a creation we do not make alone. Others help to create us, as we help to create them.     

Toward an exploration of feeling of strangeness in schizophrenia: perspectives on acousmatic and everyday listening

The aim of this study was to investigate abnormal perceptual experiences in schizophrenia, in particular the feeling of strangeness, which is commonly found in patients' self-reports. The experimental design included auditory complex stimuli within 2 theoretical frameworks based on "sensory gating deficit" and "aberrant salience," inspired from conventional perceptual scales. A specific sound corpus was designed with environmental (meaningful) and abstract (meaningless) sounds. The authors compared sound evaluations on 3 perceptual dimensions (bizarre, familiar, and invasive) and 2 emotional dimensions (frightening and reassuring) between 20 patients with schizophrenia (SCZ) and 20 control participants (CTL). The perceptual judgment was rated on independent linear scales for each sound. In addition, the conditioning-testing P50 paradigm was conducted on 10 SCZ and 10 CTL. Both behavioral and electrophysiological data confirmed the authors' expectations according to the 2 previous theoretical frameworks and showed that abnormal perceptual experiences in SCZ consisted of perceiving meaningful sounds in a distorted manner and as flooding/inundating but also in perceiving meaningless sounds as things that become meaningful by assigning them some significance. In addition, the use of independent scales to each perceptual dimension highlighted an unexpected ambivalence on familiarity and bizarreness in SCZ compatible with the explanation of semantic process impairment. The authors further suggested that this ambivalence might be due to a conflicting coactivation of 2 types of listening, that is, every day and musical (or acousmatic) listening.     

Frankfurt and the folk: an experimental investigation of Frankfurt-style cases

An important disagreement in contemporary debates about free will hinges on whether an agent must have alternative possibilities to be morally responsible. Many assume that notions of alternative possibilities are ubiquitous and reflected in everyday intuitions about moral responsibility: if one lacks alternatives, then one cannot be morally responsible. We explore this issue empirically. In two studies, we find evidence that folk judgments about moral responsibility call into question two popular principles that require some form of alternative possibilities for moral responsibility. Survey participants given scenarios involving agents that fail to satisfy these principles nonetheless found these agents to be (1) morally responsible, (2) blameworthy, (3) deserving of blame, and (4) at fault for morally bad actions and consequences. We defend our interpretation of this evidence against objections and explore some implications of these findings for the free will debate.     

Thinking outside the box: a metacognitive / theory of mind perspective on concrete thinking

Concrete thinking, an extraordinarily difficult condition to treat, has been psychoanalytically theorized to result from failures of symbolization-problems forming, linking, or fathoming the meaning of symbols-and/or failures of differentiation, resulting in difficulties distinguishing symbols from the thing being symbolized, fantasy from reality, self from other. Though difficulties symbolizing and differentiating are clearly evident in patients whose thinking is concrete, these may be a manifestation of concrete thinking rather than a root cause. Childhood thinking is characteristically concrete, and a persistence of such thinking into adulthood can be adequately explained as a failure to develop a more sophisticated theory of mind. Given that patients who exhibit such thinking tend to respond poorly to classic psychoanalytic interpretations, alternative technical approaches have been proposed. One such approach, "metacognitive" in nature, draws on a mode of thought used by gifted individuals that helps them "think outside the box" by dispensing with a typical pattern-recognition search so that novel meanings might be discovered. Metacognition, thoughts about one's thoughts and thought processes, facilitates symbolic thinking by creating sufficient distance from one's thoughts to allow the consideration of alternative meanings.     

On feeling understood and feeling well: The role of interdependence

The present research examined whether people feel happier and healthier when they feel more understood in daily social interactions. A two-week diary study showed that people reported greater life satisfaction and fewer physical symptoms on days in which they felt more understood by others. Moreover, we found that individuals who tend to see themselves in relations to others (i.e., women or those scored high on interdependent self-construal measure) showed a stronger association between daily felt understanding and daily life satisfaction or physical symptoms. These findings demonstrate that daily social experiences, such as felt understanding, are associated with daily well-being, particularly for individuals with greater interdependent self-construal.