ON THE LOOKS OF THINGS

In recent publications, Michael Tye and Alva Noë have claimed that there is a sense in which a tilted plate looks round and another sense in which it looks elliptical. This paper argues that their proposal faces decisive objections. On Tye and Noë's account of ordinary, veridical perception, appearances are in constant conflict. As a characterization of ordinary visual experience, this cannot be correct. I examine various responses to this criticism, and conclude that they all fail. I then argue that Noë's account has the further, unintended and undesirable consequence of promoting a version of the sense‐datum theory.     

A Dual Coding Theoretical Model of Decoding in Reading: Subsuming the Laberge and Samuels Model

In this article we present a detailed Dual Coding Theory (DCT) model of decoding. The DCT model reinterprets and subsumes The LaBerge and Samuels (1974) model of the reading process which has served well to account for decoding behaviors and the processes that underlie them. However, the LaBerge and Samuels model has had little to say about comprehension processes. Its subsumption into DCT provides an account of decoding in DCT terms and connects it to the established DCT explanation of comprehension. Relevant research evidence is reviewed. We propose that this constitutes an incremental advancement toward unifying theories in reading.     

Effect of alcohol on visual constancy values and possible relation to driving performance

The effects of the constancy phenomena in vision seem to be to provide information about the environment which is not solely dependent upon the characteristics of shape or size of the retinal image but which is modified by the brain to appear closer to the idealized characteristics of the real object. There is a regression away from the retinal image towards the actual object's characteristics. A plate viewed from an angle tends to look more like a disc than would be predicted from the geometry of perspective. This ability of the brain to impose conditions on perception is a high-level process which may be adversely affected by the depressive action of alcohol on the nervous system. In this case, objects such as road signs, etc. would tend to look smaller and so more distant than when sober if regression is inhibited. Drivers' reactions may be delayed if hazards are seen smaller and further away, thereby increasing the possibility of accident. This research indicates a reduction in phenomenal regression after ingestion of alcohol. There are implications for accident-rates in driving or in industry.     

Strong representationalism and centered content

I argue that strong representationalism, the view that for a perceptual experience to have a certain phenomenal character just is for it to have a certain representational content (perhaps represented in the right sort of way), encounters two problems: the dual looks problem and the duplication problem. The dual looks problem is this: strong representationalism predicts that how things phenomenally look to the subject reflects the content of the experience. But some objects phenomenally look to both have and not have certain properties, for example, my bracelet may phenomenally look to be circular-shaped and oval-shaped (and hence non-circular-shaped). So, if strong representationalism is true, then the content of my experience ought to represent my bracelet as being both circular-shaped and non-circular-shaped. Yet, intuitively, the content of my experience does not represent my bracelet as being both circular-shaped and non-circular-shaped. The duplication problem is this. On a standard conception of content, spatio-temporally distinct experiences and experiences had by distinct subjects may differ in content despite the fact that they are phenomenally indistinguishable. But this undermines the thesis that phenomenal character determines content. I argue that the two problems can be solved by applying a version of an idea from David Chalmers, which is to recognize the existence of genuinely centered properties in the content of perceptual experience.     

Why We Shouldn't Swallow Worm Slices: A Case Study in Semantic Accommodation

A radical metaphysical theory typically comes packaged with a semantic theory that reconciles those radical claims with common sense. The metaphysical theory says what things exist and what their natures are, while the semantic theory specifies, in terms of these things, how we are to interpret everyday language. Thus may we “think with the learned, and speak with the vulgar.” This semantic accommodation of common sense, however, can end up undermining the very theory it is designed to protect. This paper is a case study, showing in detail how one popular version of temporal parts theory is self‐undermining. This raises the specter that the problem generalizes to other metaphysical theories. The traditional flavor of temporal parts theory, Worm Theory, claims that everyday objects are four‐dimensional space‐time worms. An alternative flavor, Slice Theory, claims that objects are not space‐time worms but are instead momentary slices of these worms. The differences, we find, are not nearly as great as advertised. In fact, the differences in the two metaphysical theories are entirely masked by compensating differences in the accompanying semantic theories. As a result, the two theories generate exactly the same truth conditions. Common sense says that I was born years ago. Slice Theory adopts a semantic theory that accommodates such claims, but in doing so, it also endorses the claim that I, like other everyday objects, persist and thus do not exist for a mere moment. That is, the metaphysical claims constitutive of Slice Theory are denied by the very semantic theory Slice Theory adopts to accommodate common sense. Slice Theory thus undermines itself.     

Self-awareness as conscious meta-representation

Citing the phenomenon of transparency, some philosophers argue that we cannot become aware of the intrinsic properties of our experiences. When we introspect, they argue, our experiences always seem as if they are exhausted by their intentional contents. They conclude that introspection does not reveal any properties that seem intrinsic to experience. In order to answer this argument, we must show how it could seem as if we are simultaneously aware of external objects and our experience of those objects. I explain how this is possible by introducing the notion of conscious meta-representation. Conscious meta-representation occurs when we consciously conceive of represented objects as being merely putative. This sort of conceiving sometimes involves a distinctive phenomenology, and it explains how certain features of an experience can simultaneously seem as if they belong to external objects and to our experiences of those objects. We can, I conclude, look ‘at’ our experiences even as we are looking ‘through’ them.     

Peripheral vision benefits spatial learning by guiding eye movements

The loss of peripheral vision impairs spatial learning and navigation. However, the mechanisms underlying these impairments remain poorly understood. One advantage of having peripheral vision is that objects in an environment are easily detected and readily foveated via eye movements. The present study examined this potential benefit of peripheral vision by investigating whether competent performance in spatial learning requires effective eye movements. In Experiment 1, participants learned room-sized spatial layouts with or without restriction on direct eye movements to objects. Eye movements were restricted by having participants view the objects through small apertures in front of their eyes. Results showed that impeding effective eye movements made subsequent retrieval of spatial memory slower and less accurate. The small apertures also occluded much of the environmental surroundings, but the importance of this kind of occlusion was ruled out in Experiment 2 by showing that participants exhibited intact learning of the same spatial layouts when luminescent objects were viewed in an otherwise dark room. Together, these findings suggest that one of the roles of peripheral vision in spatial learning is to guide eye movements, highlighting the importance of spatial information derived from eye movements for learning environmental layouts.     

Smelling objects

Objects are central to perception and our interactions with the world. We perceive the world as parsed into discrete entities that instantiate particular properties, and these items capture our attention and shape how we interact with the environment. Recently there has been some debate about whether the sense of smell allows us to perceive odours as discrete objects, with some suggesting that olfaction is aspatial and doesn’t allow for object-individuation. This paper offers two empirically tractable criteria for assessing whether particular objects are exhibited in perceptual experience—(1) susceptibility to figure-ground segregation and (2) perceptual constancies—and argues that these criteria are fulfilled by olfactory perception, and thus there are olfactory objects. I argue that there are, in fact, two different ways that olfaction allows for figure-ground segregation. First, I look at various Gestalt grouping principles, which are thought to govern when features are perceived as grouped into structured wholes, segregated from everything around them. I argue that these principles apply to olfactory experience, providing evidence of non-spatial figure-ground segregation. Second, I defend the contentious idea that a spatial variety of figure-ground segregation can also occur in olfaction. To see this, however, we need to look to empirical evidence showing that tactile stimulation and bodily movements play a crucial role in olfactory phenomenology. Finally, I draw on empirical evidence and olfactory phenomenology to argue that there are perceptual constancies in olfactory experience, allowing us to perceive odours as coherent objects that survive shifts in our perspectives on the world.

     

Facilitated pointing to remembered objects in front: Evidence for egocentric retrieval or for spatial priming?

Recent spatial memory theories propose that long-term spatial memories are retrieved egocentrically. One source of evidence comes from imagined perspective taking, in which participants learn an object layout, later imagine standing at one object and facing a second (orienting) object, and then point to a third (target) object from the imagined perspective. Pointing is faster for target objects in the anterior than in the posterior half of imaginal space. This “front facilitation” is consistent with asymmetric sensory and biomechanical body properties (favoring the anterior half of body space), supporting claims of egocentric retrieval. However, front facilitation might actually result from spatial priming: Proximity differences might cause orienting objects to prime target objects more in the anterior than in the posterior half of imagined space. Using a modified perspectivetaking task that unconfounded front facilitation and spatial priming, two experiments identified separate influences of front facilitation and spatial priming when participants imagined perspectives within the surrounding environment or a remote environment.     

Relational and Substantival Ontologies, and the Nature and the Role of Primitives in Ontological Theories

Several metaphysical debates have typically been modeled as oppositions between a relationist approach and a substantivalist approach. Such debates include the Bundle Theory and the Substratum Theory about ordinary material objects, the Bundle (Humean) Theory and the Substance (Cartesian) Theory of the Self, and Relationism and Substantivalism about time. In all three debates, the substantivalist side typically insists that in order to provide a good treatment of the subject-matter of the theory (time, Self, material objects), it is necessary to postulate the existence of a certain kind of substance, while the other side, the relationist one, characteristically feels that this is an unnecessary expense and that one can get the job done in an ontologically cheaper way just with inter-related properties or events. In this paper I shall defend the view that there is much less of a disagreement between relational ontologies and substantival ontologies than it is usually thought. I believe that, when carefully examined, the two sides of the debate are not that different from each other, in all three cases of pairs of views mentioned above. As we will see, both the relational side and the substantival side work in the same way, suffer from and answer the same objections, and are structurally extremely similar. It will be an important question—one that I shall discuss in detail, and that is indeed the main point of interest for me in this paper—whether this means that the two sides of the debate are somehow ‘equivalent’ or not, and what ‘equivalent’ could mean.     

Spatio-Temporal Coincidence and the Grounding Problem

A lot of people believe that distinct objectscan occupy precisely the same place for theentire time during which they exist. Suchpeople have to provide an answer to the`grounding problem' – they have to explain howsuch things, alike in so many ways, nonethelessmanage to fall under different sortals, or havedifferent modal properties. I argue in detailthat they cannot say that there is anything invirtue of which spatio-temporally coincidentthings have those properties. However, I alsoargue that this may not be as bad as it looks,and that there is a way to make sense of theclaim that such properties are primitive.     

Peacocke’s trees

In Sense and Content, Christopher Peacocke points out that two equally-sized trees at different distances from the perceiver are normally represented to be the same size, despite the fact that in a certain sense the nearer tree looks bigger; he concludes on the basis of this observation that visual experiences possess irreducibly phenomenal properties. This argument has received the most attention of all of Peacocke’s arguments for separatism—the view that the intentional and phenomenal properties of experiences are independent of one another. However, despite its notoriety, the argument is widely misunderstood and underappreciated. I argue that once the structure of the argument is clarified and the replies that have been offered are considered closely, one must conclude that the trees argument is successful.     

Actualism,ontological commitment,and possible world semantics

Actualism is the doctrine that the only things there are, that have being in any sense, are the things that actually exist. In particular, actualism eschews possibilism, the doctrine that there are merely possible objects. It is widely held that one cannot both be an actualist and at the same time take possible world semantics seriously — that is, take it as the basis for a genuine theory of truth for modal languages, or look to it for insight into the modal structure of reality. For possible world semantics, it is supposed, commits one to possibilism. In this paper I take issue with this view. To the contrary, I argue that one can take possible world semantics seriously and yet remain in full compliance with actualist scruples.     

Compression of environmental representations following interactions with objects

Previous work reveals that interacting with all objects in an environment can compress spatial memory for the entire group of objects. To assess the scope and magnitude of this effect, we tested whether interacting with a subset of objects compresses spatial memory for all objects in an environment. Participants inspected objects in one or two unmarked regions of space, then recalled the distances between pairs of objects from memory. One group of participants picked up objects in both regions, a second group picked up objects in one region and passively viewed objects in the other region, and a third group passively viewed objects in both regions. When participants manually interacted with objects, they recalled shorter object-pair distances throughout the environment. The magnitude of this effect was the same, regardless of whether participants interacted with all objects in the environment or just a subset of them. Together, these findings suggest that interacting with objects can compress environmental representations in memory, even when observers interact with a relatively small subset of objects.     

Frames of reference in spatial memories acquired from language

Four experiments examined reference systems in spatial memories acquired from language. Participants read narratives that located 4 objects in canonical (front, back, left, right) or noncanonical (left front, right front, left back, right back) positions around them. Participants' focus of attention was first set on each of the 4 objects, and then they were asked to report the name of the object at the location indicated by a direction word or an iconic arrow. The results indicated that spatial memories were represented in terms of intrinsic (object-to-object) reference systems, which were selected using egocentric cues (e.g., alignment with body axes). Results also indicated that linguistic direction cues were comprehended in terms of egocentric reference systems, whereas iconic arrows were not.     

The Inaugural Address: Perception and Metaphysical Scepticism

In this paper I introduce and critically examine a paradox about perceiving that is in some ways analogous to the paradox about meaning which Kripke puts forward in his exegesis of Wittgenstein's views on Rule-following.
When applied to vision, the paradox of perceiving raises a metaphysical scepticism about which object a person is seeing if he looks, for example, at an apple on a tree directly in front of him. Physical objects can be seen when their appearance is distorted in various ways by illusions. The question therefore arises as to how can we answer the sceptic who suggests the following: although the viewer appears to be seeing the green apple in front of him, he is actually suffering a bizarre illusion of a blue car situated somewhere behind him. The sceptic is not concerned with epistemic problems about how we know which object, if any, the subject is seeing; the sceptic is raising the more fundamental question: what fact of the matter underlies a person's perceptual relation to the physical world, in virtue of which that person may be justified in arriving at a perceptual belief about the environment?
Among the various different issues raised by the sceptic, I focus on the question: what determines the perceiving relation? I canvass a number of possible proposals in answer to it, concentrating mainly on two opposed accounts: the Disjunctive View and the Causal Theory of Perception. I argue in particular for the following two claims:
that the paradox highlights the fact that the Disjunctive View fails to provide a coherent positive account of what perceiving is.
that the problem of 'deviant causal chains', often thought to raise particular difficulties for the Causal theorist, can also be raised against other accounts of perception, including versions of the Disjunctive View.
I conclude that unless the Causal Theory of Perception can be upheld, there will be no way of answering the sceptic.     

Object-position binding in visual memory for natural scenes and object arrays

Nine experiments examined the means by which visual memory for individual objects is structured into a larger representation of a scene. Participants viewed images of natural scenes or object arrays in a change detection task requiring memory for the visual form of a single target object. In the test image, 2 properties of the stimulus were independently manipulated: the position of the target object and the spatial properties of the larger scene or array context. Memory performance was higher when the target object position remained the same from study to test. This same-position advantage was reduced or eliminated following contextual changes that disrupted the relative spatial relationships among contextual objects (context deletion, scrambling, and binding change) but was preserved following contextual change that did not disrupt relative spatial relationships (translation). Thus, episodic scene representations are formed through the binding of objects to scene locations, and object position is defined relative to a larger spatial representation coding the relative locations of contextual objects.     

The Sense of Touch: From Tactility to Tactual Probing

Because philosophical reflections on touch usually start from our ability to perceive properties of objects, they tend to overlook features of touch that are crucial to correct understanding of tactual perception. This paper brings out these features and uses them to develop a general reconception of the sense of touch. I start by taking a fresh look at our ability to feel, in order to reveal its vital role. This sheds a different light on the skin's perceptual potential. While it is commonly observed that tactile experiences have two intentional objects, an external object and one's own body, I will advance a more accurate alternative: in tactile experiences, one becomes aware of what one's body undergoes. This alternative not only fits better with tactility's vital role; it is also key to explaining how active touching provides for a unique contribution to our perceptual relation to material objects. By thus connecting tactility's vital role to the way we rely on touch while manipulating objects, this essay offers a cross-sectional survey of our tactile powers that reveals the interplay between sensing and touching.     

Dominance and context effects on activation of alternative homophone meanings

Two eyetracking-during-listening experiments showed frequency and context effects on fixation probability for pictures representing multiple meanings of homophones. Participants heard either an imperative sentence instructing them to look at a homophone referent (Experiment 1) or a declarative sentence that was either neutral or biased toward the homophone's subordinate meaning (Experiment 2). At homophone onset in both experiments, the participants viewed four pictures: (1) a referent of one homophone meaning, (2) a shape competitor for a nonpictured homophone meaning, and (3) two unrelated filler objects. In Experiment 1, meaning dominance affected looks to both the homophone referent and the shape competitor. In Experiment 2, as compared with neutral contexts, subordinate-biased contexts lowered the fixation probability for shape competitors of dominant meanings, but shape competitors still attracted more looks than would be expected by chance. We discuss the consistencies and discrepancies of these findings with the selective access and reordered access theories of lexical ambiguity resolution.