Argument by Analogy

In this essay I characterize arguments by analogy, which have an important role both in philosophical and everyday reasoning. Arguments by analogy are different from ordinary inductive or deductive arguments and have their own distinct features. I try to characterize the structure and function of these arguments. It is further discussed that some arguments, which are not explicit arguments by analogy, nevertheless should be interpreted as such and not as inductive or deductive arguments. The result is that a presumed outcome of a philosophical dispute will have to be reconsidered.     

Temporal Passage and Kant's Second Analogy

In this essay I address the question of the reality of temporal passage through a discussion of some of the implications of Kant's reasoning concerning the necessary conditions of objective judgement. Some theorists have claimed that the attribution of non-relational temporal properties to objects and events represents a conceptual confusion, or 'category mistake'. By means of an examination of Kant's Second Analogy, and a comparison between that argument and Cassam's recent exploration of an argument regarding the necessity of the conceptualisation of ourselves as spatially located, I draw out a consequence of Kant's argument: namely, that the representation of temporal becoming is a necessary condition of objective judgement and an a priori element in the representation of objects of experience. I finish by explaining why this would show that the attribution of temporal becoming to objects and events cannot be described as a category mistake.     

Plato's Analogy of Soul and State

In Part I of this paper, I argue that the arguments Plato offers for the tripartition of the soul are founded upon an equivocation, and that each of the valid options by which Plato might remove the equivocation will not produce a tripartite soul. In Part II, I argue that Plato is not wholly committed to an analogy of soul and state that would require either a tripartite state or a tripartite soul for the analogy to hold. It follows that the heart of the analogy is not to be found in the comparison of the Kallipolis and its three parts to the soul conceived as tripartite, but rather must be supposed to reside in some other connection between the ways in which justice characterizes states and souls, and I will suggest what this other connection consists in.     

Analogy Between Quantum and Cell Relations

Relations occur on all levels of systems. Following a major assumption of generalized quantum theory, namely that the principles of quantum mechanics will occur on higher system levels as well, it was investigated in an a posteriori analysis of pre-existing data whether relational patterns found for two-photon experiments are similarly performed by two cell-populations. In particular, the typical pattern in outcomes of two-photon entanglement experiments was extrapolated to discover similar patterns of relationships in the cellular biological system of the Ciliate Paramecium caudatum. In the former case we find one photon assuming a particular state when being measured and the other assuming a correlated state with regard to the first particle. From a perspective of degrees of freedom (df) the author interprets this outcome as follows: Each particle has only one df for assuming a particular state (e.g. its spin). When measured this is leading to a pattern: They use their two degrees of freedom for establishing a relation among them (particle-to-particle) and for a relation with the environment (particle-to-measurement). If this pattern is unique then we should find it also in cell-to-cell relationships. It was suggested to consider causations in cell-to-cell relations as the analogue to the relationship between the quantum particles (see above) and the dependence of repeating the experiments as the analogue to the measurement event in the quantum experiment. It was hypothesized that in a relational system of two cell populations only one should be sensitive to the repetition of the experiment. The other population, however, should establish a relation with the first one. Since the author had successfully performed experiments with pairs of cell populations that were separated with glass barriers from each other but having effects on each other (Fels in PLoS One 4:e5086, 2009), the system was perfectly well suited for testing the hypothesis. The assessed cell variable was cell division. An a posteriori analysis of three similar experiments confirmed that when populations were in a relation with each other, only one of them stood in relation with the repetition of the experiment.     

Analogy and exchangeability in predictive inferences

An important problem in inductive probability theory is the design of exchangeable analogical methods, i.e., of exchangeable inductive methods that take into account certain considerations of analogy by similarity for predictive inferences. Here a precise reformulation of the problem of predictive analogy is given and a new family of exchangeable analogical methods is introduced.Firstly, it is proved that the exchangeable analogical method introduced by Skyrms (1993) does not satisfy the best known general principles of predictive analogy. Secondly, Skyrms's approach — consisting of the usage of particular hyper-Carnapian methods, i.e., mixtures of Carnapian inductive methods — is adopted in the design of a new family of exchangeable analogical methods. Lastly, it is proved that such methods satisfy an interesting general principle of predictive analogy.     

类比的图式驱动效应

本研究采用了两个实验探讨了类比的图式驱动效应即类比的映射不仅是一种外显的推理过程而且也是一种内隐的推理过程,这一内隐过程具有图式驱动效应.实验1要求被试者首先阅读基础课文和目标课文然后回答问题,结果表明在课文阅读过程中存在着内隐推理.实验2采用更加复杂的实验方法检验了影响内隐推理的图式驱动效应,结果发现被试者的类比内隐推理主要受图式驱动或者结构排列的影响而很少受到语义激活或者启动效应的影响.最后,在结构排列理论与图式理论的框架中讨论了本研究的结果.     

Post-Established Harmony: Kant and Analogy Reconsidered

This essay is a response to John Milbank’s comparison of Kant and Aquinas’ theories of analogy in ‘A Critique of the Theology of Right’. A critique of Milbank’s essay forms the point of departure for my reconstruction of Kant’s actual theory of analogy. I show that the usual focus on the Prolegomena for this end is insufficient; in fact, the full extent of Kant’s theory of analogy only becomes clear in the Critique of Judgment. I also consider the significance of the Analogies of Experience in the Critique of Pure Reason. In conclusion, I draw on the work of Michel Guérin to designate Kantian analogy, ‘post-established harmony’.     

Reifying Analogy in Natural Theology

Karl Schmitz-Moormann argues that the doctrines of God and Creation, usually explicated in Roman Catholic theology by using the analogy of being, must rather be conceived in light of evolution and an analogy of becoming. God the Trinity, characterized by unity, information, and freedom, provides the image toward which the creation tends in its evolutionary processes. Informed by Teilhard and others, the author hereby provides more of a new research program for theology's engagement with natural science than a fully developed theology.     

Taking the Perceptual Analogy Seriously

This paper offers a qualified defense of a historically popular view that I call sentimental perceptualism. At a first pass, sentimental perceptualism says that emotions play a role in grounding evaluative knowledge analogous to the role perceptions play in grounding empirical knowledge. Recently, András Szigeti and Michael Brady have independently developed an important set of objections to this theory. The objections have a common structure: they begin by conceding that emotions have some important epistemic role to play, but then go on to argue that understanding how emotions play that role means that there must be some alternative, emotion-independent route to obtaining knowledge of value. If there has to be such an emotion-independent route, then the perceptual analogy breaks down in a significant way. In this paper, I argue that the right ways for sentimental perceptualists to respond to each of these objections are revealed by thinking through how analogous objections applied to perception and the empirical domain would be answered. Although Szigeti's and Brady's objections should not persuade sentimental perceptualists to give up their view, the objections do put important constraints on what a form of the view has to be like in order to do exciting metaethical work.