Measuring Inconsistency in Some Logics with Modal Operators

Studia Logica - The first mention of the concept of an inconsistency measure for sets of formulas in first-order logic was given in 1978, but that paper presented only classifications for them. The...     

What is the pronunciation for -ough and the spelling for /u/? A database for computing feedforward and feedback consistency in English

Recent studies suggest that performance attendant on visual word perception is affected not only by feedforward inconsistency (i.e., multiple ways to pronounce a spelling) but also by feedback inconsistency (i.e., multiple ways to spell a pronunciation). In the present study, we provide a statistical analysis of these types of inconsistency for all monosyllabic English words. This database can be used as a tool for controlling, selecting, and constructing stimulus materials for psycholinguistic and neuropsychological research. Such large-scale statistical analyses are necessary devices for developing metrics of inconsistency, for generating hypotheses for psycholinguistic experiments, and for building models of word perception, speech perception, and spelling.     

Personality variables and cognitive inconsistency

The present research studied the relationships between personality variables and cognitive inconsistency. Cognitive inconsistency was defined on the basis of the cognitive orientation theory of Kreitler and Kreitler (1972, 1976) as inconsistency and three personality variables: Extraversion, Cattell's factor “Independence” and Cattell's factor “Radicalism- Conservatism”. The implications of these results to Eysenck's and Cattell's theories were discussed.     

“Impossible figures” and interpretations of polyhedral figures

The concept “impossible figure” is analyzed by formalizing the interpretations of a polyhedral figure by an observer, and defining several types of inconsistency in such interpretations. Tests for these inconsistencies are developed using simple graph theory, and a sufficient condition is established for the feasibility of an interpretation. Finally, techniques are derived for the automatic construction of usual or unusual multibar figures.     

Vulnerability to depression,mild depression,and degree of self-schema consolidation

The present study investigated the degree of consolidation of self-schema content in mildly depressed individuals, individuals cognitively vulnerable to depression (but currently nondepressed), and nonvulnerable-nondepressed controls. All three groups of subjects were presented with pairs of adjectives involving one depressed and one nondepressed content adjective, and were asked to decide which of the two adjectives described them the best (or least). Following this, subjects rated each adjective on a 9-point degree of self-reference scale. On the basis of these two types of self-referent judgments, a measure of decision inconsistency was computed for each subject. In accord with predictions generated from a self-schema model of depression, similar decision inconsistency scores were found for mildly depressed and vulnerable-nondepressed individuals. In turn, both of these groups revealed greater decision inconsistencies than normal controls (the nonvulnerable-nondepressed group). Using the inconsistency measure as an index of the degree of consolidation of self-schema content, these findings suggest that relatively poor consolidation of depressed and nondepressed self-schema content may relate to both the etiology and maintenance of depression.     

Handling Inconsistencies in the Early Calculus

The early calculus is a popular example of an inconsistent but fruitful scientific theory. This paper is concerned with the formalisation of reasoning processes based on this inconsistent theory. First it is shown how a formal reconstruction in terms of a sub-classical negation leads to triviality. This is followed by the evaluation of the chunk and permeate mechanism (C&P) proposed by Brown and Priest in (Journal of Philosophical Logic, 33(4), 379–388, 2004) to obtain a non-trivial formalisation of the early infinitesimal calculus. Different shortcomings of this application of C&P as an explication of inconsistency tolerant reasoning are pointed out, both conceptual and technical. To remedy these shortcomings, an adaptive logic is proposed that allows for conditional permeations of formulas under the assumption of consistency preservation. First the adaptive logic is defined and explained and thereafter it is demonstrated how this adaptive logic remedies the defects C&P suffered from.     

Does inconsistency always lead to negative affect? The influence of need for closure on affective reactions to cognitive inconsistency

We present an experiment showing that need for closure (NFC)—defined as the epistemic desire for certainty—can moderate individuals' affective reactions to cognitive inconsistency. Informed by Kruglanski and colleagues' new theory, that cognitive inconsistency elicits negative affect particularly under certain circumstances, we find that NFC (i.e. the desire for certain, stable and unambiguous knowledge) influences the strength of consistency effects and resulting negative affect. More specifically, we find that individuals who are high on NFC experience more negative affect upon encountering an inconsistent (vs. consistent) cognition. However, when individuals are low on NFC, inconsistency is irrelevant, and their affect depends on whether the ultimate outcome of the cognition is positive or negative. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of this research.     

Tales of the unexpected: executive function and person perception

The present research investigated the role of executive functioning in person perception. Given the assumption that perceivers' recollective preference for unexpected material relies on the operation of an executive cognitive process (i.e., inconsistency resolution), it was anticipated that only under dual-task conditions in which executive functioning is impaired would one expect inconsistency resolution to be impaired and perceivers' memory bias for unexpected material to be eliminated. When concurrent mental activity impairs the operation of nonexecutive cognitive operations, inconsistency resolution and the related process of individuation were not expected to be impaired. The results of 2 experiments using different memory measures (e.g., free recall and source identification) supported these predictions. The findings are considered in the context of contemporary issues in person perception and executive functioning.     

Intellectual Ability and Achievement in Anxiety-Disordered Children: A Clarification and Extension of the Literature

Intellectual and achievement deficits associated with childhood anxiety disorders are of considerable controversy. Part of this controversy and inconsistency in findings appears related to methodological differences in studies: anxiety disorders are defined as occurring anywhere in the diagnostic profile (e.g., primary, secondary, or tertiary) in some studies whereas in other studies anxiety disorders are defined only when primary (excluding secondary or tertiary disorders). Results in the present study broadly parallel findings from the previous studies when the procedures inherent to each study are replicated. Through careful diagnostic assignment, it is shown that anxiety disorders are no more impairing than other psychiatric disorders in the present study. However, when compared to referred children without significant psychopathology, children with anxiety disorders show statistically and clinically significant impairment. Subsequent analyses do not suggest inattention mediates this effect. Discussion emphasizes the need to assess for and consider comorbidity in understanding these differences. A portion of these findings were presented at the 40th annual meetings of the Association for Cognitive and Behavioral Therapies (2006).     

Varieties of Inconsistency Across Test Occasions: Effects of Computerized Test Administration and Repeated Testing

This article investigates different types of instability in subjects' responses to the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI). Indices were constructed to measure the effects of the automated testing format and repeated testing on 150 undergraduate subjects who took a computer-administered and pencil-and-paper MMPI 1 week apart. One set of indices measures systematic shifting, attributable to format or time alone. Two families of six indices each are computed measuring unsystematic changes in responding, tendencies to shift in particular directions between true, false, and cannot say responses across all 566 items. Unsystematic changes were assessed both between formats and across times, although these factors are confounded. Subjects tend to change their responses to cannot say from the pencil-and-paper to the computer administration and to shift from false to true on the second administration. Systematic shifting due to the test format is related to the more general, unsystematic tendency to shift between true and false responses. The number of cannot say responses in the computerized testing situation, although greater in magnitude, is correlated with the use of cannot say in the pencil-and-paper condition. Systematic shifting attributable to time is distinct from the other types of inconsistency. Subjects are more inconsistent across occasions when the test format changes than would be expected from repeated testing alone, although the consequences of this inconsistency for clinical interpretation are not yet clear. Inconsistent responding is related to subjects' personality characteristics, but not to age or prior experience with computers.     

Mental chronometry and individual differences: Modeling reliabilities and correlations of reaction time means and effect sizes

We used a general stage-based model of reaction time (RT) to investigate the psychometric properties of mean RTs and experimental effect sizes (i.e., differences in mean RTs). Using the model, formulas were derived for the reliabilities of mean RTs and RT difference scores, and these formulas provide guidance about the number of trials per participant needed to obtain reliable estimates of these measures. In addition, formulas were derived for various different types of correlations computed in RT research (e.g., correlations between a mean RT and an external non-RT measure, between two mean RTs, between a mean RT and an RT effect size). The analysis revealed that observed RT-based correlations depend on many parameters of the underlying processes contributing to RT. We conclude that these correlations often fail to support the inferences drawn from them and that their proper interpretation is far more complex than is generally acknowledged.     

The measurement of reliability of social relations components from round‐robin designs

The social relations model (SRM) is a useful tool for measuring relationship effects, defined as the unique perceptions or behaviors of 2 people. The sources of variance in SRM studies are persons (actors and partners), groups, and items; the relationship effect is defined as the actor–partner interaction. By removing variance because of persons and groups, a measure of a “pure” relationship effect is obtained. In this article, generalizability theory (G Theory) is applied to estimate the reliability of SRM components from round‐robin data structures. Using G Theory, reliability formulas for actor, partner, group, and relationship are developed and interpretations for the reliability estimates are provided. The authors also discuss how these formulas can be used in both planning and interpreting results from relationship research.     

The Reliability And Consistency Of Complex Personality Judgements

Two separate tasks were used to investigate the ability of subjects to make reliable and consistent judgments of similarities among personalities. Ten social categories for which each subject specified persons known to him- self were used as concepts. Test-retest reliabilities were obtained for an 8 point similarity-dissimilarity scale and inconsistency was measured by the intransitive relations appearing in a triadic judgment test. Reliabilities and consistencies were judged sufficiently adequate for use of these types of judgments in a multidimensional scaling approach t o individual differences in social perception.     

Farewell to Objectivity: A Critique of Brandom

I argue that Brandom's account of inconsistency in terms of the pragmatic notion of incompatibility, as originally set out in his Making It Explicit (1994) and defended in Articulating Reasons (2000), has the absurd consequence that all true claims are warranted. This is in obvious conflict with our ordinary conception of truth as objective, which is what Brandom intends to capture. My proof proceeds from two principles, extracted from Making It Explicit , that govern the notions of commitment and entitlement in terms of which the notion of incompatibility is being defined. If either of these principles is rejected, it will no longer be clear what the content of Brandom's thesis is.     

Predictors of Genetic Testing Decisions: A Systematic Review and Critique of the Literature

Genetic testing is increasingly available in medical settings and direct-to-consumer. However, the large and growing literature on genetic testing decisions is rife with conflicting findings, inconsistent methodology, and uneven attention across test types and across predictors of genetic testing decisions. Existing reviews of the literature draw broad conclusions but sacrifice nuanced analysis that with a closer look reveals far more inconsistency than homogeny across studies. The goals of this paper are to provide a systematic review of the empirical work on predictors of genetic testing decisions, highlight areas of consistency and inconsistency, and suggest productive directions for future research. We included all studies that provided quantitative analysis of subjective (e.g., perceived risk, perceived benefits of testing) and/or objective (e.g., family history, sociodemographic variables) predictors of genetic testing interest, intentions, or uptake, which produced a sample of 115 studies. From this review, we conclude that self-reported and test-related (as opposed to disorder-related or objective) predictors are relatively consistent across studies but that theoretically-driven efforts to examine testing interest across test types are sorely needed.     

Selective humanitarian intervention: moral reason and collective agents

This paper examines four interpretations of the observation that humanitarian intervention might be used ‘selectively’ or ‘inconsistently’ in order to elucidate the normative commitments of the deliberative process in international relations. The paper argues that there are several types of concerns that are implicit in the accusation of inconsistency, and only some of them amount to objections to humanitarian intervention as a whole. The paradox of humanitarian intervention is that intervention is prohibited except where the intervention is humanitarian, yet humanitarian reasons never exist in isolation, and it is nearly impossible to determine the real reason for intervention (or any other collective action) in the international arena. The problems revealed by an examination of inconsistency in the example of humanitarian intervention turn out to be general problems with applying the norms of practical reasoning to moral questions dealing with collective agents.     

On the logic of informational independence and its applications

We shall introduce in this paper a language whose formulas will be interpreted by games of imperfect information. Such games will be defined in the same way as the games for first-order formulas except that the players do not have complete information of the earlier course of the game. Some simple logical properties of these games will be stated together with the relation of such games of imperfect information to higher-order logic. Finally, a set of applications will be outlined.     

Self-concept consistency and culture: the differential impact of two forms of consistency

Self-concept consistency is viewed as central to authenticity and adjustment in Western cultures. The authors propose that the implications of self-concept consistency depend on both the cultural background of the individual and the type of consistency involved. Specifically, although consistency of the self-concept across different contexts may be less important in East Asian than Western cultures, East Asians may still benefit from consistency within specific social contexts over time (i.e., maintaining stable, distinct relational selves). Supporting these ideas, across three studies, inconsistency of trait self-perceptions across different relationship contexts was linked to lower subjective authenticity and relationship quality for European Americans but not East Asian Americans. However, inconsistency within the same relationship context over time showed similar negative associations with these outcomes in both groups. Overall, the results suggest that inconsistency may be less consequential for East Asians relative to Westerners only if it reflects culturally prescribed adjustment to different social contexts.     

Incentive Inequalities and Talents: A Reply to Shiffrin

In a recent article, Seana Valentine Shiffrin offers a distinctive egalitarian critique of the types of incentive inequalities that are permitted by John Rawls's difference principle. She argues that citizens of a well-ordered society, who publicly accept Rawls's two principles of justice and their justifications, may not demand incentives to employ their talents in productive ways since such demands are inconsistent with a major justification for the difference principle: the moral arbitrariness of talent. I argue that there is no such inconsistency. Citizens can publicly accept the claim that talent is morally arbitrary and accept incentives to employ their talents productively without inconsistency. In the standard case that Rawls envisions, citizens who do so take their preferences to be a reason for a higher salary, not their talents.