The Virtues of Ingenuity: Reasoning and Arguing without Bias

This paper describes and defends the “virtues of ingenuity”: detachment, lucidity, thoroughness. Philosophers traditionally praise these virtues for their role in the practice of using reasoning to solve problems and gather information. Yet, reasoning has other, no less important uses. Conviction is one of them. A recent revival of rhetoric and argumentative approaches to reasoning (in psychology, philosophy and science studies) has highlighted the virtues of persuasiveness and cast a new light on some of its apparent vices—bad faith, deluded confidence, confirmation and myside biases. Those traits, it is often argued, will no longer look so detrimental once we grasp their proper function: arguing in order to persuade, rather than thinking in order to solve problems. Some of these biases may even have a positive impact on intellectual life. Seen in this light, the virtues of ingenuity may well seem redundant. Defending them, I argue that the vices of conviction are not innocuous. If generalized, they would destabilize argumentative practices. Argumentation is a common good that is threatened when every arguer pursues conviction at the expense of ingenuity. Bad faith, myside biases and delusions of all sorts are neither called for nor explained by argumentative practices. To avoid a collapse of argumentation, mere civil virtues (respect, humility or honesty) do not suffice: we need virtues that specifically attach to the practice of making conscious inferences.     

Reasoning Is for Arguing: Understanding the Successes and Failures of Deliberation

Theoreticians of deliberative democracy have sometimes found it hard to relate to the seemingly contradictory experimental results produced by psychologists and political scientists. We suggest that this problem may be alleviated by inserting a layer of psychological theory between the empirical results and the normative political theory. In particular, we expose the argumentative theory of reasoning that makes the observed pattern of findings more coherent. According to this theory, individual reasoning mechanisms work best when used to produce and evaluate arguments during a public deliberation. It predicts that when diverse opinions are discussed, group reasoning will outperform individual reasoning. It also predicts that individuals have a strong confirmation bias. When people reason either alone or with like‐minded peers, this confirmation bias leads them to reinforce their initial attitudes, explaining individual and group polarization. We suggest that the failures of reasoning are most likely to be remedied at the collective than at the individual level.     

Reasoning About Relations: Spatial and Nonspatial Problems

Two experiments investigated the mental representation of spatial and nonspatial two-dimensional problems. The experiments were designed to contrast opposite predictions of the model theory of reasoning and the formal rules of inference theories. Half of the problems required more inferential steps but only one model, whereas the other half required fewer inferential steps but two models. According to the inference rules, theory problems that require more inferential steps should be harder, whereas the model-based theory predicts that problems that require two models should be harder. In Experiments 1a and 1b we measured the problem solving time and the percentage of errors. In Experiments 2a and 2b the problems were presented segmented in two different displays. We measured the comprehension time for each display, the question answering times, and the percentage of errors. The results of all experiments supported the model theory predictions in both spatial and nonspatial domains.     

Strategic Numeracy: Self-Serving Reasoning About Health Statistics

This research shows that the same people who appear to have low numerical competence when analyzing personally irrelevant health-related numerical information are able to overcome their reasoning shortcomings and make better judgments when they are shown equivalent information that is personally relevant, and when only a sophisticated kind of reasoning enables them to interpret this information in a favorable way. The fact that people can engage in poorer or more sophisticated numerical reasoning depending on whether that reasoning produces favorable or unfavorable conclusions has implications both for the concept of numeracy as an individual-difference variable and for health communication.     

Moral Reasoning and Rhetoric: The Acceptability of Arguments About AIDS-Related Dilemmas1

The disease AIDS has given rise to a host of social dilemmas. Here we explore the rhetoric that affects people's reasoning about actions taken in the face of such dilemmas. We presented a group of 514 undergraduates with vignettes depicting dilemmas having to do with the distribution of sexually explicit educational material to high school students and with the forced HIV blood testing of factory workers. Subjects rated the acceptability of arguments for and against courses of action taken by persons in the vignettes. The arguments embodied concerns typical of moral reasoning at each of Kohlberg's six stages. We found that the acceptability of stage-typical moral arguments about AIDS-related dilemmas depends on both the dilemma at hand and the course of action being argued for. We argue that knowledge of how people respond to different kinds of moral arguments concerning AIDS-related dilemmas is valuable for informing efforts to advocate humane and lifesaving policies to particular audiences.     

Plausible Reasoning and the Resolution of Quantifier Scope Ambiguities

Despite overwhelming evidence suggesting that quantifier scope is a phenomenon that must be treated at the pragmatic level, most computational treatments of scope ambiguities have thus far been a collection of syntactically motivated preference rules. This might be in part due to the prevailing wisdom that a commonsense inferencing strategy would require the storage of and reasoning with a vast amount of background knowledge. In this paper we hope to demonstrate that the challenge in developing a commonsense inferencing strategy is in the discovery of the relevant commonsense data and in a proper formulation of the inferencing strategy itself, and that a massive amount of background knowledge is not always required. In particular, we present a very effective procedure for resolving quantifier scope ambiguities at the pragmatic level using simple quantitative data that is readily available in most database environments.     

实践推理:从信念和愿望应该形成什么目标

这篇文章探讨实践推理中目标推理的问题,试图发现一个理性主体从信念和愿望形成目标的基本逻辑标准。文中的分析以循序渐进的方式展开,从只包含信念和愿望的基础模型开始,到增加了数值和排序方式表示愿望偏好的混合拓展模型结束,都给出了相应的目标形成标准,并构造出了形式化的目标形成理论。最后,我们探讨了不同模型形成的目标之间的关系,并证明了混合拓展模型中目标的存在性等基本定理。     

Competing Conceptions of Justice: Faculty Moral Reasoning About Affirmative Action

College faculty (N = 115) were recruited to investigate the influence of moral reasoning on hiring decisions about affirmative action dilemmas. Participants completed the Defining Issues Test (DIT), a standard test of moral reasoning, a measure that presented two hypothetical moral dilemmas about affirmative action that manipulated candidates' race and moral issues, and a scale evaluating the use of external norms versus self-chosen principles. Results indicated that moral issue but not race of a minority candidate affected hiring decisions. Faculty used greater percentages of principled reasoning when solving the more salient affirmative action dilemmas than when solving the hypothetical dilemmas of the DIT. Higher scores on the DIT were related to the use of principles rather than norms when making hiring decisions. Findings suggest that faculty decisions about hiring a hypothetical affirmative action candidate are more influenced by moral reasoning level and competing conceptions of justice than racial bias or ambivalence.     

The Role of Domain-Specific Knowledge in Generative Reasoning About Complicated Multileveled Phenomena

Promoting the ability to reason generatively about novel phenomena and problems students may encounter in their everyday lives is a major goal of science education. This goal proves to be a formidable challenge in domains, such as molecular genetics, for which the accumulated scientific understandings are daunting in both amount and complexity. To develop effective instruction that fosters generative reasoning we need to have a sound understanding of the types of knowledge in the domain that are critical for such reasoning. In this study I examined the ensemble of knowledge, both general and domain-specific, undergraduate students employed in reasoning about problems in genetics. I found that students initially formulate a solution in terms that are not domain specific and that serve as a frame–solution frame–that outlines and constrains a more specific and domain-appropriate explanation. This solution frame is then filled in with two powerful forms of domain-specific knowledge I term: domain-specific heuristics and domain-specific explanatory schemas. These knowledge forms embody understandings of central mechanisms and entities in molecular genetics. By invoking these domain-specific knowledge forms, students were able to reason about a variety of both familiar and novel genetics problems. I present a cognitive model that highlights the role of these powerful conceptual understandings in promoting generative reasoning in genetics.     

The Influence of Decision Makers' Goals on Their Concerns About Procedural Justice1

Two studies examine how decision makers' goals of enhancing organizational effectiveness and promoting positive interpersonal relations shape their decision making when they are allocating scarce resources among group members. Past research has conceptualized this problem as one of balancing between the use of two distributive justice principles: equity and equality. The studies reported examine the degree to which authorities are also concerned about issues of procedural justice. The results suggest that experienced decision makers—both managerial and administrative—believe that when trying to maintain positive interpersonal relations it is as important to use decision-making procedures that will be regarded as fair (procedural justice) as it is to allocate outcomes in ways which will be regarded as fair (distributive justice). Decision makers' definitions of procedural justice are also examined.     

Arguing Towards Truth: The Case of the Periodic Table

Recently Erik Scerri has published an influential philosophical history of the development of the Periodic Table. Following Scerri’s account, I will explore the main thread of the arguments responsible for the remarkable advancement of scientific understanding that the Periodic Table represents. I will argue that the history of disputation at crucial junctures in the debate shows sensitivity to the aspects of truth that are captured by my model of truth in inquiry. The availability of a clear and explicit model of truth in inquiry is of crucial importance as a response to post-modernist and other relativistic accounts of inquiry. It shows that despite such apparent sociological constraints as acceptability a robust theory of truth is available as a foundation for evaluating argumentation.     

Constitutivism About Practical Principles: Its Claims,Goals, Task and Failure

The aim of this paper is twofold: In its first part, we work out the key features of constitutivism as presented by Christine Korsgaard. This reconstruction serves to clarify which goals Korsgaard wants to achieve with her account and which of its central claims she has to defend in particular. In the second part, we discuss whether Korsgaard can vindicate constitutivism's most central claim. To do this, we analyse two important arguments - the argument from unavoidability and the argument from the abstract constitutive principle - that have been made in support of constitutivism. We show how both these arguments go amiss and conclude that at least for now, constitutivism's most central claim has not been successfully argued for.     

The observing self: Diminishing egocentrism through brief mindfulness meditation

Reflecting the egocentrism that permeates contemporary society, people often believe they stand out in the eyes of others (i.e., the spotlight effect), a conviction that is entirely misplaced. Although considerable efforts have focused on elucidating the consequences of the spotlight effect, much less is known about factors that may attenuate this illusory perception. Accordingly, the current study explored the possibility that, via shifts in perspectives on the self (i.e., first person vs. third person), brief mindfulness‐based meditation may reduce a future‐oriented variant of this bias. The results revealed that, compared with responses in the control conditions (i.e., control meditation or no mediation), brief mindfulness‐based meditation fostered the adoption of a third‐person vantage point during mental imagery and diminished perceptions of personal salience.     

Reflective Argumentation: A Cognitive Function of Arguing

Why do we formulate arguments? Usually, things such as persuading opponents, finding consensus, and justifying knowledge are listed as functions of arguments. But arguments can also be used to stimulate reflection on one’s own reasoning. Since this cognitive function of arguments should be important to improve the quality of people’s arguments and reasoning, for learning processes, for coping with “wicked problems,” and for the resolution of conflicts, it deserves to be studied in its own right. This contribution develops first steps towards a theory of reflective argumentation. It provides a definition of reflective argumentation, justifies its importance, delineates it from other cognitive functions of argumentation in a new classification of argument functions, and it discusses how reflection on one’s own reasoning can be stimulated by arguments.     

The Roles We Make Others Take: Thoughts on the Ethics of Arguing

Feminist argumentation theorists have criticized the Dominant Adversarial Model in argumentation, according to which arguers should take proponent and opponent roles and argue against one another. The model is deficient because it creates disadvantages for feminine gendered persons in a way that causes significant epistemic and practical harms. In this paper, I argue that the problem that these critics have pointed out can be generalized: whenever an arguer is given a role in the argument the associated tasks and norms of which she cannot fulfill, she is liable to suffer morally significant harms. One way to react to this problem is by requiring arguers to set up argument structures and allocate roles so that the argument will be reasons-reflective in as balanced a way as possible. However, I argue that this would create to heavy a burden. Arguers would then habitually have to take on roles that require them to divert time and energy away from the goals that they started arguing for and instead serve the goal of ideal reasons-reflectiveness. At least prima facie arguers should be able to legitimately devote their time and energy towards their own goals. This creates a problem: On the one hand, structures that create morally significant harms for some arguers should be avoided—on the other hand, arguers should be able to take argument-roles that allow them to devote themselves to their own argumentative goals. Fulfilling the second requirement for some arguers will often create the morally significant harms for their interlocutors. There are two possible solutions for this problem: first, arguers might be required to reach free, consensual agreements on the structure they will adopt for their argument and the way they will distribute argumentative roles. I reject this option as both fundamentally unfeasible and practically unrealistic, based on arguments developed by theorists like Krabbe and Jacobs. I argue that instead, we should take a liberal view on argument ethics. Arguers should abide by moral side constraints to their role taking. They should feel free to take roles that will allow them to concentrate on their argumentative goals, but only if this does not create a situation in which their interlocutors are pushed into a role that that they cannot effectively play.

     

The Sustainable Development Goals: a comment

The agreement on Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is a tremendous achievement. The goals represent an advance on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), by aiming to eliminate poverty, by including an equality goal and by bringing sustainability into the agenda. Nonetheless, three outstanding issues remain. First, national ownership is likely to be a problem. The centrally agreed goals need to be interpreted nationally to allow for national priorities and circumstances and to secure national commitment to them. Secondly, the goals are silent on the underlying economic structures needed to realize some of the goals, particularly of reducing inequality. Existing economic structures and policies are likely to result in a move away from achievement of this goal. Thirdly, most important, there is not true integration of the sustainability and economic goals. The goal of promoting economic growth needs to be seriously qualified for middle and high income countries, if the sustainability objectives – particularly on carbon emissions – are to be realized. This requires either that economic growth should only be promoted if sustainability can be assured, or that growth is redefined as ‘green growth’ so that promoting economic growth and achieving sustainability become consistent.