Perception,nonconceptual content,and immunity to error through misidentification

The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we clarify the notion of immunity to error through misidentification with respect to the first-person pronoun (IEM). In particular, we set out to dispel the view that for a judgment to be IEM it must contain a token of a certain class of predicates. Rather, the importance of the IEM status of certain judgments is that it teaches us about privileged ways of coming to know about ourselves. We then turn to examine how perception, as a state with nonconceptual content, can give rise to judgments that are IEM. On one view, the ‘inheritance model’ of immunity, perception gives rise to such judgments because perception itself is IEM. We argue that this model is misguided, and, instead, suggest and elucidate an alternative view: perception gives rise to judgments that are IEM by virtue of containing implicitly self-related or self-concerning information.     

Perception and behavior as compositions of ideals

This essay is a discussion of whether or not there are units out of which human perception, cognition, and action are constructed. It proposes that while these human activities are indeed generated from component aspects, we cannot talk of these aspects as “units” or as being directly inserted into these activities. Instead, we must describe them as “ideals” which enter into composition with one another in particular situations to generate a situationally specific structure which serves both to describe and control the situation in its particular aspects. In the process of composition, the standard form of the ideal is transformed so that the ideal may appear in a different form in each different composition. Furthermore, superficially similar compositions can arise from different combinations of ideals. These notions are shown to have the potential of unifying our accounts of a wide variety of psychological phenomena. An argument is also made that operational definition of ideals is impossible and that interpretive methods of investigation are justified.     

Third-Person Perception as an Impression Management Tactic

The current research aims at broadening the motivational explanations for the third-person perception (TPP) by documenting the role of impression management motives in this perception. In two experiments that were devised to explore this possibility, participants were asked to report in public or in private on their perceptions of how various advertisements affected them and others. In addition, their level of self-monitoring was measured, and they were divided into two categories—high and low. In line with the hypotheses, participants showed a larger TPP in public than in private. Moreover, while the public nature of the situation did not affect low self-monitors, high self-monitors reported a large TPP in public but no TPP at all in private. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications of the current findings for research on the causes and consequences of the TPP.     

Perception and imagination: amodal perception as mental imagery

When we see an object, we also represent those parts of it that are not visible. The question is how we represent them: this is the problem of amodal perception. I will consider three possible accounts: (a) we see them, (b) we have non-perceptual beliefs about them and (c) we have immediate perceptual access to them, and point out that all of these views face both empirical and conceptual objections. I suggest and defend a fourth account, according to which we represent the occluded parts of perceived objects by means of mental imagery. This conclusion could be thought of as a (weak) version of the Strawsonian dictum, according to which “imagination is a necessary ingredient of perception itself”.     

Human Echolocation as a Basic Form of Perception and Action

In this article we discuss known and possible uses of echolocation by humans. We argue that echolocation may be a basic perception-action ability of humans. We review studies which suggest that both blind and sighted humans are capable of substantial precision in the perception of properties of distal objects, such as distance, size, shape, substance, and relative motion. We analyze relations between acoustic pulse and echo that may provide information to support these percepts and others. Our analysis predicts echolocation-based sensitivity in humans and other animals to a number of properties of the animal-environment interaction. We also discuss echolocation-based acoustic specification of time-to-contact. We develop a new variable that provides this information and discuss acoustic Τs recently developed by Shaw, McGowan, and Turvey (1991) and by Lee, van der Weel, Hitchcock, Matejowsky, and Pettigrew (1992).Our analysis suggests that there may be important insights to be gained from an ecological study of echolocation in humans and other species. We end with suggestions for research derived from our analysis.     

The error statistical philosopher as normative naturalist

We argue for a naturalistic account for appraising scientific methods that carries non-trivial normative force. We develop our approach by comparison with Laudan’s (American Philosophical Quarterly 24:19–31, 1987, Philosophy of Science 57:20–33, 1990) “normative naturalism” based on correlating means (various scientific methods) with ends (e.g., reliability). We argue that such a meta-methodology based on means–ends correlations is unreliable and cannot achieve its normative goals. We suggest another approach for meta-methodology based on a conglomeration of tools and strategies (from statistical modeling, experimental design, and related fields) that affords forward looking procedures for learning from error and for controlling error. The resulting “error statistical” appraisal is empirical—methods are appraised by examining their capacities to control error. At the same time, this account is normative, in that the strategies that pass muster are claims about how actually to proceed in given contexts to reach reliable inferences from limited data.     

The abused child as parent: Perception of self and other

Although not all abused children grow up to be abusive parents, it is well known that people who were severely mistreated by their parents as compared to those who were not are at higher risk for mistreating their children. It has also been shown that abusive parents often have unrealistic expectations for their children—expectations based on distorted perceptions of their children's needs, feelings, and abilities. In this paper, we examine the utility of new methods developed in social psychology to study: (1) the impact of abuse on the structure and content of interpersonal and self-perception and (2) the interrelationships among an abused mother's social and self-perception, the quality of her interactions with her child, and the child's development. Case studies will be presented to illustrate how these new methods reflect risk for abuse as predicted independently by clinicians treating the cases.