A Psychotherapist Retires

Abstract

This article reflects on a year of my personal experience as I prepared to retire from my psychotherapy practice of 40 years. While aware that this might be a poignant experience for bothmyself and my clients, my own surprising emotions and dreams demanded that I pay attention to myself. By acknowledging my feelings I was able to direct sensitive attention to the clients' feelings of loss and sadness. Finding the balance between the sadness that filled the therapy room and my own enthusiasm for what awaited me outside that room, was not a simple task     

Hume's atheism and the role of Cleanthes

This is a reply to Willem Lemmens' discussion of my interpretation of the Dialogues on Natural Religion in my 2000 collection Themes from Hume: Self, Will, Religion. I use Lemmens' careful textual analysis to clarify my considered position and to further the reading of Part 12 of the Dialogues.     

Perceived impact of online written feedback on students’ writing and learning: a reflection

In this reflective study, I perceive the impact of my own written feedback on students’ academic writing skills in particular and on learning in general. Anchored on Schon’s reflection-on-action (ROA) framework, my reflection arose from a content analysis of my written feedback on 80 student drafts and 44 feedback responses. I found that my written feedback is of two types: focus on form and focus on meaning. Coding the feedback led to an identification of six feedback functions: instructive/using imperatives (18.36%); suggestive (15.31%); asking questions/probing (23.98%); stating a personal opinion (6.12%); corrective (29.59%); and affirming/negating (6.63%). The categorisation of feedback according to these functions was influenced by Wolsey’s feedback functions (2008) which was adapted by Alvarez, Espasa and Guasch. Results revealed that I employ corrective feedback, probing questions and instructive feedback more frequently than suggestive feedback, personal statement or affirmation/negation. I also found that my feedback on form (59%) is higher than my feedback on meaning (41%). I explain the relationship of these findings by identifying some confounding factors that enabled me to interrogate my assumptions, along with a discussion of their implications.     

The Intrinsic Value of Sport: A Reply to Culbertson

Leon Culbertson's recent contribution, ‘Does Sport Have Intrinsic Value?’ objects to the account of the value of sport as intrinsic value I had developed in my Sport, Rules and Values; in particular, as this occurs in my argument that the value of some sports resided in the possibility of their functioning as a moral laboratory. He identifies two accounts of intrinsic value; and shows that neither would fit my purposes seamlessly. He urges that my account of the place of normative reasons cannot generate intrinsic value: rather, the person whose reasons they are somehow imports that value. Yet he has misunderstood my particularist conception of values; and the place occupied by my contextualism – these, rather than a residual commitment to essentialism, are what generates an apparent inconsistency he identifies. But they also explain it away. As a result, much of his concern to find some exact account of the term ‘intrinsic’ is misplaced: we need to look contextually. Further, the project of my discussion was limited to showing, first, how the moral laboratory idea might explain the value of some sport (on the assumption that sport had intrinsic value); and, second, how failures of realisation of that intrinsic value might be traced to the distinction between motivating reasons and normative ones.     

Normative realism and ontology: reply to Clarke-Doane,Rosen, and Enoch and McPherson

In response to comments on my book, Being Realistic about Reasons, by Justin Clarke-Doane, David Enoch and Tristram McPherson, and Gideon Rosen, I try to clarify my domain-based view of ontology, my understanding of the epistemology of normative judgments, and my interpretation of the phenomenon of supervenience.     

Peace,Self‐Determination and Reckoning with the Past: A Reply to Butt,Lippert‐Rasmussen,Pasternak, Wellman and Stemplowska

In this article, I offer responses to five commentaries on my recently published book, Cosmopolitan Peace. Those articles address my conception of individual and collective agency, my account of self‐determination (and its implication for the problem of annexation during and after the war), and my accounts of, respectively, reparations and remembrance after war. I revise or provide further defences of those accounts in the light of my commentators’ probing remarks.     

Memento Auschwitz: Growing Up in Post-War Germany

In this article, I provide some biographical data that is emblematic of the ways in which growing up in Germany shaped my sense of what it means for me to be a German. By explaining the notions of collectivity, Hour Zero, Betroffenheit, and Wiedergutmachung, I identify the leading, albeit in hindsight contradictory, notions that organized my experience under the overarching memento of my life: memento Auschwitz.     

Replies to Wallace,Queloz, and Kirwin

In this article, I reply to the comments offered by R. Jay Wallace, Matthieu Queloz, and Claire Kirwin on my book, The Will to Nothingness. An Essay on Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morality (OUP, 2021). These comments and my replies cover central features of the book, including my analysis of ressentiment as an expression of the will to power; the concept of self-undermining functionality I introduce to make sense of Nietzsche's critique of the ascetic ideal; and my reasons for omitting to examine the “unconditional will to truth,” which he presents as the latest embodiment of this ideal.     

More Thinking About Gender: Reply

Patricia Elliot distorts my work, in summarizing my position as one of advocating a revaluing of feminine qualities. After clarifying my position, I flesh out in greater detail my argument that complete gender neutrality is neither necessary nor sufficient for a non-sexist society. The argument focuses on gender as a cognitive category and on the crucial question of “how do we get there from here.”     

Kant on freedom: A reply to my critics

The first two sections of this paper are devoted respectively to the criticisms of my views raised by Stephen Engstrom and Andrews Reath at a symposium on Kant's Theory of Freedom held in Washington D.C. on 28 December 1992 under the auspices of the North American Kant Society. The third section contains my response to the remarks of Marcia Baron at a second symposium in Chicago on 24 April 1993 at the APA Western Division meetings. The fourth section deals with some general criticisms of my treatment of Kant's theory of freedom and its connection with transcendental idealism that have been raised by Karl Ameriks, who was also a participant in the second symposium, in an earlier piece published in Inquiry and by Paul Guyer in a review. The paper as a whole is thus an attempt to reformulate and clarify some of the central claims of my book in light of the initial critical reaction.     

CONFESSIONS OF A PRACTICING NATURALISTIC THEIST: A RESPONSE TO HARDWICK,PEDERSON, AND PETERSON

Abstract. In my response to the comments of Charley Hardwick, Ann Pederson, and Greg Peterson, I continue the narrative, confessional mode of my writing in Dancing with the Sacred. First, I sketch some methodological decisions underlying my naturalistic, evolutionary, practical theology. I then respond to the encouraging suggestions of my commentators by further developing my ideas about naturalism, mystery, creativity as God, the place of ecological responsibility in my thinking, sin, and eschatology. I offer suggestions as to how I might widen the practical applications of my theology beyond environmental and medical ethics to other areas of moral responsibility in relation to the creative process. I do all this with much appreciation for the care and careful critical reflection that my commentators have devoted to my thinking.     

Reply to Psarros: Popper and Chemistry

In this article I reply to criticism of my published work by N. Psarros (Journal for the General Philosophy of Science 28: 297–305,1997). I show that I had already answered the first criticism in my published work and not overlooked his supposed refutation. However I offer a plausible argument which he could have used to strengthen his claim. Psarros cites my work on Hopkins in his opening paragraph, but then makes no further reference to it in the text. I indicated to Psarros verbally at Ilkley 1994 (and reiterate the message here) that Hopkins' work on Vitamins is the exemplar of a Popperian historical episode and must require addressing by the opponents of critical rationalism. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

A Reply to My Critics

Abstract

In this paper, I respond to three commentators on my book Understanding Moral Obligation: Kant, Hegel Kierkegaard. Anne Margaret Baxley focuses on my treatment of Kant, Dean Moyar on my treatment of Hegel, and William Bristow on my treatment of Kierkegaard. In this reply, I try to show how the critical points that they raise can be addressed.     

Some Musings About the Limits of an Ethics That Can Be Applied – A Response to a Question About Courage and Convictions That Confronted the Author When She Woke Up on November 9, 2016

I experienced the 2016 Presidential election as a loss of innocence. For the first time in my life, the prospect of losing my most basic rights and freedoms did not feel so remote. Confronting this possibility prompted the musings in this article. I call them ‘musings' because the article is not a systematic defense of a clearly demarcated position. It is, rather, a somewhat circuitous exploration of the many questions that pressed themselves upon me as I struggled to understand what distinguishes (a) reasonable accommodations to injustice from (b) morally unacceptable accommodations. When is a commitment not really a commitment? When does reasonable fear become shameful cowardice? When does my knowledge that I can do something to resist injustice give me good enough reason to resist? Under what conditions is my reason an enemy of my ideals? What is the proper balance between valuing myself beyond price and appreciating that many, many things matter far more than my own life and security? In grappling with these questions, I have been reminded of the extent to which moral discernment does not involve applying a ‘philosophy' and the extent to which it cannot be secured by prior training.     

The Way of the Serpent

This article describes my journey in learning to negotiate the shamanic realm, also referred to as the psychoid, the imaginal, or as subtle energies. Although The Red Book records Jung's work in this realm where healing occurs, analytic training too often does not emphasize the development of these spiritual tools. As a result of a series of unusual experiences, I had to seek an unconventional spiritual teacher to complete my own initiation as an analyst and then find my own way. The substance of the shamanic realm is discussed as well as placement of psyche.     

Response to Abrusán,Shaw, and Elbourne

In my book Category Mistakes (OUP 2013), I discuss a range of potential accounts of category mistakes and defend a pragmatic, presuppositional account of the phenomenon. Three commentators discuss the book: Márta Abrusán focuses on a comparison between my book and Asher’s Lexical Meaning in Context, suggesting that Asher’s theory has the advantage of accounting not only for category mistakes, but also for additional phenomena such as so-called ‘coertion’ and ‘co-predication’. I argue that Asher’s account of all three phenomena is deficient, and, moreover, that it is far from clear that the latter two phenomena are related to that of category mistakes. James Shaw challenges two of my arguments against the MBT view. I respond to these challenges. Paul Elbourne provides a novel argument in support of my account of category mistakes, involving multi-sentence discourses and ERP experiments. I show that it is not entirely straightforward for my account to explain this data, but that his argument does ultimately provide support for my view.     

“That's Not Analytic”: Theory Pressure and “Chaotic Possibilities” in Analytic Training

Hoping to create my own analytic voice, I experienced complex pressure to conform to the venerated rules of American ego psychology. I could find myself looking over my shoulder, and my training could become saturated with received ideas. Using complex systems theory as a ground, I contrast the constricting pressure to conform that I experienced with three supervisors with the openness that I found with my fourth. I propose that analytic training is a nonlinear, complex developmental process that occurs in a space of “chaotic possibilities” (Glatzer-Levy, 2004)     

“Maleness” Revisited

My response to the preceding commentaries draws on recent events such as the Thomas/Hill hearings to illustrate some of my central arguments in “Feminist Skepticism and the ‘Maleness’ of Philosophy.” I also attempt to clarify frequently misunderstood aspects of my use of gender as an analytical category, and discuss why, in my opinion, we should continue to care about the “maleness” of philosophy.     

Further Notes on Feminist Ethics and Pluralism: A Reply to Lindgren

In a comment on my paper, “Moral Understandings: Alternative Epistemology for a Feminist Ethics” (1989) Ralph Lindgren questions the wisdom of confronta' tional rhetoric in my paper and much feminist moral philosophy, and the consistency of this stance with pluralism about ethics. I defend both the rebellious rhetoric and the inclusivity of my own approach, but suggest that pluralism in moral philosophy is harder to define than Lindgren's comments suggest.     

I. Mathematical modeling of election predictions: Final reply to professor Aubert

Professor Aubert's ‘three‐stage rocket’ (Inquiry, Vol. 26 [1983], No. 1) has reached periodic orbit. His comments on my earlier reply to his critique of my election predictions paper simply repeat arguments I have already refuted. In this note, I limit myself largely to pointing out Professor Aubert's misconceptions of what my position actually is. I find no reasons for revising the views stated in my original election predictions paper, nor any reasons for thinking that paper violated norms of scientific method that prevail in the natural sciences.