Psychoanalysis as science

This work explores two “Copernican shifts” in the history of psychoanalysis. The first is Freud's recognition of the motives behind the constructions of psychic reality; the intrusion of the wish in the subject's perceptions. The author explores the roots of this recognition in the scientific tradition of Kant and Helmholtz, and suggests that these two predecessors were topical for Freud in their deviation from a theory of “immaculate perception”. The other theme of this work is what the author suggests is a contemporaneous “Copernican shift” in psychoanalytic theory. This shift consists in a recognition of the topicalness of the experience of reciprocity. Connections between this experience and the experience of the self are described, and implications for the theory of the psychoanalytic process are suggested.     

Psychoanalysis as medicine,psychoanalysis as religion

The author explores unfavorable comparisons between psychoanalysts and medical psychiatry, tracing the crisis in the mental health fields created by managed care. This current crisis is traced to an historical identification with the medical profession and a more recent dependence on third-party payments. He suggests reorganizing the profession as a religion or spiritual exercise as a way out of the crisis and as a way of revitalizing its practice.Richard A. Friedman, Ph.D., is a psychoanalyst in private practice in New York City, supervisor at the Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy Study Center, and a faculty member and training analyst at the New York Center for Psychoanalytic Training     

Object Relations Psychoanalysis as Political Theory

This article examines the political contents of object relations psychoanalysis, a theory that perceives dependence as the natural state of all humans. Unlike the views advanced by the classical state-of-nature models of Locke, Hobbes, and Rousseau, object relations perceives humans in their original state as already grouped and driven by an urge to associate. Company (rather than privacy, property, or political participation) stands out as the basic right, and all the other rights follow on it as instruments for fulfilling it. The primacy of care lends itself to the justification of distributive measures meant to bolster family cohesion and individual confidence at the expense of the open market. The theory is therefore compatible with the premises of the social-democratic welfare state.     

Authenticity at Work: Development and Validation of an Individual Authenticity Measure at Work

Building on the work by Barrett-Lennard (Carl Rogers’ helping system: Journey & substance. Sage, London 1998) and Wood et al. (J Couns Psychol 55:385–399 2008), this study describes the development and validation of a theory-based measure of state authenticity at work, the Individual Authenticity Measure at Work (IAM Work). Even though this construct is obviously relevant to the work context (e.g., as regards issues of work relations, leadership and well-being), none of the instruments currently available focuses on authenticity in the area of work and organizational psychology. A total sample of 646 participants was divided in two equal sized subsamples. Exploratory factor analysis supported the underlying tripartite construct of authenticity at work, resulting in the subscales authentic living, self-alienation, and accepting external influences. Confirmatory factor analysis confirmed the tripartite construct and showed good psychometric properties of the state-focused measure of authenticity at work. Finally, correlation analysis showed that each subscale and the total score of authenticity was positively related to commonly used work outcomes such as job satisfaction, in-role performance, and work engagement. This study concludes that the IAM Work is a reliable and valid measure of state authenticity at work. Implications for future research and practice are discussed.     

Authenticity as a foundational principle of medical ethics

Increasingly, contemporary medical ethicists have become aware of the need to explicate a foundation for their various models of applied ethics. Many of these theories are inspired by the apparent incompatibility of patient autonomy and provider beneficence. The principle of patient autonomy derives its current primacy to a large extent from its legal origins. However, this principle seems at odds with the clinical reality. In the bioethical literature, the notion of authenticity has been proposed as an alternative foundational principle to autonomy. This article examines this proposal in reference to various existentialist philosophers (Heidegger, Sartre, Camus and Marcel). It is concluded that the principle of autonomy fails to do what it is commonly supposed to do: provide a criterion of distinction that can be invoked to settle moral controversies between patients and providers. The existentialist concept of authenticity is more promising in at least one crucial respect: It acknowledges that the essence of human life disappears from sight if life's temporal character is reduced to a series of present decisions and actions. This also implies that the very quest for a criterion that allows physicians to distinguish between sudden, unexpected decisions of their patients to be or not to be respected, without recourse to the patient's past or future, is erroneous.     

Beyond Anti-thinking: Psychoanalysis as Politics*

This paper discusses the political nature of psychoanalytic audacity in an era of fake news and disinformation as receptive populations accustom themselves to societal and political misrepresentations of anti-thinking. Against the aggressive rise of anti-thinking that cauterizes individual and societal registration of precarity, the ideological foundation of psychoanalytic inquiry is in the freeing of that which emotionally and ideationally, has felt to be impenetrable, making such contents and expressions available for clarification within the consensual understandings between two very different individuals. Psychoanalysis, in its dyadic pairing, its regularity of meetings, and its continuous action of recognizing what is obscure or hidden, is the heir to the Enlightenment motto, “aude sapere” the ongoing act of daring to question (Kant, 1784). Operating against defensive foreclosure, psychoanalysis conditions the toleration of painful states of mind toward contingent consideration of the causes and effects from which productive future action might be considered. The dyadic engagement of psychoanalytic participants operates as a unitary political organization in witness of the human condition, from within which what was unthinkable becomes nameable, and what is named becomes spoken in clarification of anti-thinking’s foreclosures.     

To be or Not to be Authentic. In Defence of Authenticity as an Ethical Ideal

It has recently been pointed out that the cloudiness of the concept of authenticity as well as inflated ideologies of the ‘true self’ provide good reasons to criticize theories and ideals of authenticity. Nevertheless, there are also good reasons to defend an ethical ideal of authenticity, not least because of its critical and oppositional force, which is directed against experiences of self-abandonment and self-alienation. I will argue for an elaborated ethical ideal of authenticity: the ambitious ideal of a continuous self-reflective process of ‘self-authentication’. For this purpose, the ideal of being authentic in expressing and unfolding one’s individual personality and characteristics will be combined with the ideal of being ‘an authentic person’ - whereby ‘a person’ is to be understood in a Kantian sense as an autonomous person who is (at least potentially) reasonable and morally responsible.     

Psychoanalysis as science: the inductivist's resistance revisited

The scientific status of psychoanalysis has been the focus of heated debates among philosophers of science and among psychoanalysts. The most recent challenge to psychoanalysis as a science comes from the quarters of the inductivist philosophy of science. Since inductivism is a self-defeating philosophy, it is not surprising that inductivists demand that psychoanalysts pay an unlimited price for their claim of scientific status for psychoanalysis. Most psychoanalysts, in their response to this impossible challenge, unwittingly claim to have paid the price. What is worse, the claim is made in a confused and emotionally charged manner. Hence, psychoanalysts are usually defensive and, thus, in error when repelling (in this way) the attack of the inductivist philosopher. It is not psychoanalysis inductivists attack, but their own commitment to their own logic which leads inexorably to the dissolution of their argument, of all science, and, indeed, of psychoanalysis as well. It seems much more reasonable to postpone any response to the challenges that confront psychoanalysis today and to invest effort in a reformulation of the problem of the scientific status of psychoanalysis. Different rational solutions to the problem may evolve if we take care to become well informed first about the limits of our theoretical frameworks and show readiness to change them, if and when needed. That is to say, we can start with a somewhat tentative, not to say skeptical, frame of mind concerning the very concept of scientific status. We may try to keep and to contain our skepticism to the degree required by the discourse at hand, carry on exploring in our practice, report our results, and discuss them respectfully. We should start by admitting that, quite possibly, our discourse will end inconclusively.